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More Advance Praise for Blown to Bits
“Most writing about the digital world comes from techies writing about tech-
nical matter for other techies or from pundits whose turn of phrase greatly
exceeds their technical knowledge. In Blown to Bits, experts in computer
science address authoritatively the practical issues in which we all have keen
interest.”
—Howard Gardner, Hobbs Professor of Cognition and Education,
Harvard Graduate School of Education,
author of Multiple Intelligences and Changing Minds
“Regardless of your experience with computers, Blown to Bits provides a
uniquely entertaining and informative perspective from the computing indus-
try’s greatest minds.
A fascinating, insightful and entertaining book that helps you understand
computers and their impact on the world in a whole new way.
This is a rare book that explains the impact of the digital explosion in a
way that everyone can understand and, at the same time, challenges experts
to think in new ways.”
—Anne Margulies, Assistant Secretary for Information Technology and
Chief Information Officer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
“Blown to Bits is fun and fundamental. What a pleasure to see real teachers
offering such excellent framework for students in a digital age to explore and
understand their digital environment, code and law, starting with the insight
of Claude Shannon. I look forward to you teaching in an open online school.”
—Professor Charles Nesson, Harvard Law School,
Founder, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
“To many of us, computers and the Internet are magic. We make stuff, send
stuff, receive stuff, and buy stuff. It’s all pointing, clicking, copying, and
pasting. But it’s all mysterious. This book explains in clear and comprehen-
sive terms how all this gear on my desk works and why we should pay close
attention to these revolutionary changes in our lives. It’s a brilliant and nec-
essary work for consumers, citizens, and students of all ages.”
—Siva Vaidhyanathan, cultural historian and media scholar
at the University of Virginia and author of Copyrights and Copywrongs:
The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity
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“The world has turned into the proverbial elephant and we the blind men. The
old and the young among us risk being controlled by, rather than in control
of, events and technologies. Blown to Bits is a remarkable and essential
Rosetta Stone for beginning to figure out how all of the pieces of the new
world we have just begun to enter—law, technology, culture, information—are
going to fit together. Will life explode with new possibilities, or contract
under pressure of new horrors? The precipice is both exhilarating and fright-
ening. Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis, together, have ably man-
aged to describe the elephant. Readers of this compact book describing the
beginning stages of a vast human adventure will be one jump ahead, for they
will have a framework on which to hang new pieces that will continue to
appear with remarkable speed. To say that this is a ‘must read’ sounds trite,
but, this time, it’s absolutely true.”
—Harvey Silverglate, criminal defense and civil liberties lawyer and writer
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Preface
For thousands of years, people have been saying that the world is changing
and will never again be the same. Yet the profound changes happening today
are different, because they result from a specific technological development. 
It is now possible, in principle, to remember everything that anyone says,
writes, sings, draws, or photographs. Everything. If digitized, the world has
enough disks and memory chips to save it all, for as long as civilization can
keep producing computers and disk drives. Global computer networks can
make it available to everywhere in the world, almost instantly. And comput-
ers are powerful enough to extract meaning from all that information, to find
patterns and make connections in the blink of an eye. 
In centuries gone by, others may have dreamed these things could happen,
in utopian fantasies or in nightmares. But now they are happening. We are
living in the middle of the changes, and we can see the changes happening. 
But we don’t know how things will turn out. 
Right now, governments and the other institutions of human societies are
deciding how to use the new possibilities. Each of us is participating as we
make decisions for ourselves, for our families, and for people we work with.
Everyone needs to know how their world and the world around them is
changing as a result of this explosion of digital information. Everyone should
know how the decisions will affect their lives, and the lives of their children
and grandchildren and everyone who comes after. 
That is why we wrote this book. 
Each of us has been in the computing field for more than 40 years. The
book is the product of a lifetime of observing and participating in the changes
it has brought. Each of us has been both a teacher and a learner in the field.
This book emerged from a general education course we have taught at
Harvard, but it is not a textbook. We wrote this book to share what wisdom
we have with as many people as we can reach. We try to paint a big picture,
with dozens of illuminating anecdotes as the brushstrokes. We aim to enter-
tain you at the same time as we provoke your thinking. 
You can read the chapters in any order. The Appendix is a self-contained
explanation of how the Internet works. You don’t need a computer to read
this book. But we would suggest that you use one, connected to the Internet,
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to explore any topic that strikes your curiosity or excites your interest. Don’t
be afraid to type some of the things we mention into your favorite search
engine and see what comes up. We mention many web sites, and give their
complete descriptors, such as bitsbook.com, which happens to be the site for
this book itself. But most of the time, you should be able to find things more
quickly by searching for them. There are many valuable public information
sources and public interest groups where you can learn more, and can par-
ticipate in the ongoing global conversation about the issues we discuss. 
We offer some strong opinions in this book. If you would like to react to
what we say, please visit the book’s web site for an ongoing discussion. 
Our picture of the changes brought by the digital explosion is drawn
largely with reference to the United States and its laws and culture, but the
issues we raise are critical for citizens of all free societies, and for all people
who hope their societies will become freer. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 2008 
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CHAPTER 1
Digital Explosion
Why Is It Happening, and
What Is at Stake? 
On September 19, 2007, while driving alone near Seattle on her way to work,
Tanya Rider went off the road and crashed into a ravine.* For eight days, she
was trapped upside down in the wreckage of her car. Severely dehydrated and
suffering from injuries to her leg and shoulder, she nearly died of kidney fail-
ure. Fortunately, rescuers ultimately found her. She spent months recuperat-
ing in a medical facility. Happily, she was able to go home for Christmas. 
Tanya’s story is not just about a woman, an accident, and a rescue. It is a
story about bits—the zeroes and ones that make up all our cell phone conver-
sations, bank records, and everything else that gets communicated or stored
using modern electronics.
Tanya was found because cell phone companies keep records of cell phone
locations. When you carry your cell phone, it regularly sends out a digital
“ping,” a few bits conveying a “Here I am!” message. Your phone keeps “ping-
ing” as long as it remains turned on. Nearby cell phone towers pick up the
pings and send them on to your cellular service provider. Your cell phone
company uses the pings to direct your incoming calls to the right cell phone
towers. Tanya’s cell phone company, Verizon, still had a record of the last
location of her cell phone, even after the phone had gone dead. That is how
the police found her. 
So why did it take more than a week? 
If a woman disappears, her husband can’t just make the police find her by
tracing her cell phone records. She has a privacy right, and maybe she has
good reason to leave town without telling her husband where she is going. In
1
* Citations of facts and sources appear at the end of the book. A page number and a phrase
identify the passage.
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Tanya’s case, her bank account showed some activity (more bits!) after her
disappearance, and the police could not classify her as a “missing person.” In
fact, that activity was by her husband. Through some misunderstanding, the
police thought he did not have access to the account. Only when the police
suspected Tanya’s husband of involvement in her disappearance did they
have legal access to the cell phone records. Had they continued to act on the
true presumption that he was blameless, Tanya might never have been found. 
New technologies interacted in an odd way with evolving standards of pri-
vacy, telecommunications, and criminal law. The explosive combination
almost cost Tanya Rider her life. Her story is dramatic, but every day we
encounter unexpected consequences of data flows that could not have hap-
pened a few years ago. 
When you have finished reading this book, you should see the world in a
different way. You should hear a story from a friend or on a newscast and say
to yourself, “that’s really a bits story,” even if no one mentions anything dig-
ital. The movements of physical objects and the actions of flesh and blood
human beings are only the surface. To understand what is really going on, you
have to see the virtual world, the eerie flow of bits steering the events of life. 
This book is your guide to this new world. 
The Explosion of Bits, and Everything Else 
The world changed very suddenly. Almost everything is stored in a computer
somewhere. Court records, grocery purchases, precious family photos, point-
less radio programs…. Computers contain a lot of stuff that isn’t useful today
but somebody thinks might someday come in handy. It is all being reduced
to zeroes and ones—“bits.” The bits are stashed on disks of home computers
and in the data centers of big corporations and government agencies. The
disks can hold so many bits that there is no need to pick and choose what
gets remembered. 
So much digital information, misinformation, data, and garbage is being
squirreled away that most of it will be seen only by computers, never by
human eyes. And computers are getting better and better at extracting mean-
ing from all those bits—finding patterns that sometimes solve crimes and
make useful suggestions, and sometimes reveal things about us we did not
expect others to know. 
The March 2008 resignation of Eliot Spitzer as Governor of New York is a
bits story as well as a prostitution story. Under anti-money laundering (AML)
rules, banks must report transactions of more than $10,000 to federal regula-
tors. None of Spitzer’s alleged payments reached that threshold, but his
2 BLOWN TO BITS
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bank’s computer found that transfers of smaller sums formed a suspicious
pattern. The AML rules exist to fight terrorism and organized crime. But while
the computer was monitoring small banking transactions in search of
big-time crimes, it exposed a simple payment for services rendered that
brought down the Governor.
Once something is on a computer, it can replicate and move around the
world in a heartbeat. Making a million perfect copies takes but an instant—
copies of things we want everyone in the world to see, and also copies of
things that weren’t meant to be copied at all. 
The digital explosion is changing the world as much as printing once did—
and some of the changes are catching us unaware, blowing to bits our
assumptions about the way the world works. 
When we observe the digital explosion at all, it can seem benign, amus-
ing, or even utopian. Instead of sending prints through the mail to Grandma,
we put pictures of our children on a photo album web site such as Flickr. Then
not only can Grandma see them—so can Grandma’s friends and anyone else.
So what? They are cute and harmless. But suppose a tourist takes a vacation
snapshot and you just happen to appear in the background, at a restaurant
where no one knew you were dining. If the tourist uploads his photo, the
whole world could know where you were, and when you were there. 
Data leaks. Credit card records are supposed to stay locked up in a data
warehouse, but escape into the hands of identity thieves. And we sometimes
give information away just because we get something back for doing so. A
company will give you free phone calls to anywhere in the world—if you
don’t mind watching ads for the products its computers hear you talking
about.
And those are merely things that are happening today. The explosion, and
the social disruption it will create, have barely begun. 
We already live in a world in which there is enough memory just in digi-
tal cameras to store every word of every book in the Library of Congress a
hundred times over. So much email is being sent that it could transmit the
full text of the Library of Congress in ten minutes. Digitized pictures and
sounds take more space than words, so emailing all the images, movies, and
sounds might take a year—but that is just today. The explosive growth is still
happening. Every year we can store more information, move it more quickly,
and do far more ingenious things with it than we could the year before. 
So much disk storage is being produced every year that it could be used to
record a page of information, every minute or two, about you and every other
human being on earth. A remark made long ago can come back to haunt a
political candidate, and a letter jotted quickly can be a key discovery for a
CHAPTER 1 DIGITAL EXPLOSION 3
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biographer. Imagine what it would mean to record every word every human
being speaks or writes in a lifetime. The technological barrier to that has
already been removed: There is enough storage to remember it all. Should
any social barrier stand in the way?
Sometimes things seem to work both better and worse than they used to.
A “public record” is now very public—before you get hired in Nashville,
Tennessee, your employer can figure out if you were caught ten years ago
taking an illegal left turn in Lubbock, Texas. The old notion of a “sealed court
record” is mostly a fantasy in a world where any tidbit of information is
duplicated, cataloged, and moved around endlessly. With hundreds of TV and
radio stations and millions of web sites, Americans love the variety of news
sources, but are still adjusting uncomfortably to the displacement of more
authoritative sources. In China, the situation is reversed: The technology cre-
ates greater government control of the information its citizens receive, and
better tools for monitoring their behavior. 
This book is about how the digital explosion is changing everything. It
explains the technology itself—why it creates so many surprises and why
things often don’t work the way we expect them to. It is also about things the
information explosion is destroying: old assumptions about our privacy,
about our identity, and about who is in control of our lives. It’s about how
we got this way, what we are losing, and what remains that society still has
a chance to put right. The digital explosion is creating both opportunities and
risks. Many of both will be gone in a decade, settled one way or another.
Governments, corporations, and other authorities are taking advantage of the
chaos, and most of us don’t even see it happening. Yet we all have a stake in
the outcome. Beyond the science, the history, the law, and the politics, this
book is a wake-up call. The forces shaping your future are digital, and you
need to understand them. 
The Koans of Bits 
Bits behave strangely. They travel almost instantaneously, and they take
almost no space to store. We have to use physical metaphors to make them
understandable. We liken them to dynamite exploding or water flowing. We
even use social metaphors for bits. We talk about two computers agreeing on
some bits, and about people using burglary tools to steal bits. Getting the right
metaphor is important, but so is knowing the limitations of our metaphors. An
imperfect metaphor can mislead as much as an apt metaphor can illuminate. 
4 BLOWN TO BITS
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We offer seven truths about bits. We call them “koans” because they are
paradoxes, like the Zen verbal puzzles that provoke meditation and enlight-
enment. These koans are oversimplifications and over-generalizations. They
describe a world that is developing but hasn’t yet fully emerged. But even
today they are truer than we often realize. These themes will echo through
our tales of the digital explosion.
Koan 1: It’s All Just Bits
Your computer successfully creates the illusion that it contains photographs,
letters, songs, and movies. All it really contains is bits, lots of them, patterned
in ways you can’t see. Your computer was designed to store just bits—all the
files and folders and different kinds of data are illusions created by computer
programmers. When you send an email containing a photograph, the com-
puters that handle your message as it flows through the Internet have no idea
that what they are handling is part text and part graphic. Telephone calls are
also just bits, and that has helped create competition—traditional phone com-
panies, cell phone companies, cable TV companies, and Voice over IP (VoIP)
service providers can just shuffle bits around to each other to complete calls.
The Internet was designed to handle just bits, not emails or attachments,
which are inventions of software engineers. We couldn’t live without those
more intuitive concepts, but they are artifices. Underneath, it’s all just bits. 
This koan is more consequential than you might think. Consider the story
of Naral Pro-Choice America and Verizon Wireless. Naral wanted to form a
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Telephone Laboratories after the Second
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mathematical theory of communication,”
which foreshadowed much of the subsequent
development of digital technologies.
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the natural unit of information, and to the
use of the term.
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text messaging group to send alerts to its members. Verizon decided not to
allow it, citing the “controversial or unsavory” things the messages might
contain. Text message alert groups for political candidates it would allow, but
not for political causes it deemed controversial. Had Naral simply wanted
telephone service or an 800 number, Verizon would have had no choice.
Telephone companies were long ago declared “common carriers.” Like rail-
roads, phone companies are legally prohibited from picking and choosing
customers from among those who want their services. In the bits world, there
is no difference between a text message and a wireless phone call. It’s all just
bits, traveling through the air by radio waves. But the law hasn’t caught up
to the technology. It doesn’t treat all bits the same, and the common carriage
rules for voice bits don’t apply to text message bits. 
Verizon backed down in the case
of Naral, but not on the principle. A
phone company can do whatever it
thinks will maximize its profits in
deciding whose messages to distrib-
ute. Yet no sensible engineering dis-
tinction can be drawn between text
messages, phone calls, and any other
bits traveling through the digital air-
waves. 
Koan 2: Perfection
Is Normal 
To err is human. When books were
laboriously transcribed by hand, in
ancient scriptoria and medieval
monasteries, errors crept in with
every copy. Computers and networks
work differently. Every copy is per-
fect. If you email a photograph to a
friend, the friend won’t receive a
fuzzier version than the original. The
copy will be identical, down to the
level of details too small for the eye
to see. 
Computers do fail, of course.
Networks break down too. If the
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unless controlled somehow, tend to
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power goes out, nothing works at all. So the statement that copies are nor-
mally perfect is only relatively true. Digital copies are perfect only to the
extent that they can be communicated at all. And yes, it is possible in theory
that a single bit of a big message will arrive incorrectly. But networks don’t
just pass bits from one place to another. They check to see if the bits seem to
have been damaged in transit, and correct them or retransmit them if they
seem incorrect. As a result of these error detection and correction mecha-
nisms, the odds of an actual error—a character being wrong in an email, for
example—are so low that we would be wiser to worry instead about a meteor
hitting our computer, improbable though precision meteor strikes may be. 
The phenomenon of perfect copies has drastically changed the law, a story
told in Chapter 6, “Balance Toppled.” In the days when music was distributed
on audio tape, teenagers were not prosecuted for making copies of songs,
because the copies weren’t as good as the originals, and copies of copies
would be even worse. The reason that thousands of people are today receiv-
ing threats from the music and movie industries is that their copies are per-
fect—not just as good as the original, but identical to the original, so that
even the notion of “original” is meaningless. The dislocations caused by file
sharing are not over yet. The buzzword of the day is “intellectual property.”
But bits are an odd kind of property. Once I release them, everybody has
them. And if I give you my bits, I don’t have any fewer. 
Koan 3: There Is Want in the Midst of Plenty
Vast as world-wide data storage is today, five years from now it will be ten
times as large. Yet the information explosion means, paradoxically, the loss
of information that is not online. One of us recently saw a new doctor at a
clinic he had been using for decades. She showed him dense charts of his
blood chemistry, data transferred from his home medical device to the clinic’s
computer—more data than any specialist could have had at her disposal five
years ago. The doctor then asked whether he had ever had a stress test and
what the test had shown. Those records should be all there, the patient
explained, in the medical file. But it was in the paper file, to which the doc-
tor did not have access. It wasn’t in the computer’s memory, and the patient’s
memory was being used as a poor substitute. The old data might as well not
have existed at all, since it wasn’t digital. 
Even information that exists in digital form is useless if there are no
devices to read it. The rapid progress of storage engineering has meant that
data stored on obsolete devices effectively ceases to exist. In Chapter 3,
“Ghosts in the Machine,” we shall see how a twentieth-century update of the
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eleventh-century British Domesday Book was useless by the time it was only
a sixtieth the age of the original.
Or consider search, the subject of Chapter 4, “Needles in the Haystack.” At
first, search engines such as Google and Yahoo! were interesting conven-
iences, which a few people used for special purposes. The growth of the World
Wide Web has put so much information online that search engines are for
many people the first place to look for something, before they look in books
or ask friends. In the process, appearing prominently in search results has
become a matter of life or death for businesses. We may move on to purchase
from a competitor if we can’t find the site we wanted in the first page or two
of results. We may assume something didn’t happen if we can’t find it quickly
in an online news source. If it can’t be found—and found quickly—it’s just as
though it doesn’t exist at all.
Koan 4: Processing Is Power 
The speed of a computer is usually
measured by the number of basic
operations, such as additions, that
can be performed in one second. The
fastest computers available in the
early 1940s could perform about
five operations per second. The
fastest today can perform about a
trillion. Buyers of personal comput-
ers know that a machine that seems
fast today will seem slow in a year
or two. 
For at least three decades, the
increase in processor speeds was
exponential. Computers became
twice as fast every couple of years.
These increases were one conse-
quence of “Moore’s Law” (see side-
bar). 
Since 2001, processor speed has
not followed Moore’s Law; in fact,
processors have hardly grown faster
at all. But that doesn’t mean that computers won’t continue to get faster. New
chip designs include multiple processors on the same chip so the work can be
split up and performed in parallel. Such design innovations promise to
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achieve the same effect as continued increases in raw processor speed. And
the same technology improvements that make computers faster also make
them cheaper. 
The rapid increase in processing power means that inventions move out of
labs and into consumer goods very quickly. Robot vacuum cleaners and self-
parking vehicles were possible in theory a decade ago, but now they have
become economically feasible. Tasks that today seem to require uniquely
human skills are the subject of research projects in corporate or academic lab-
oratories. Face recognition and voice recognition are poised to bring us new
inventions, such as telephones that know who is calling and surveillance
cameras that don’t need humans to watch them. The power comes not just
from the bits, but from being able to do things with the bits. 
Koan 5: More of the Same Can Be a Whole New Thing 
Explosive growth is exponential growth—doubling at a steady rate. Imagine
earning 100% annual interest on your savings account—in 10 years, your
money would have increased more than a thousandfold, and in 20 years,
more than a millionfold. A more reasonable interest rate of 5% will hit the
same growth points, just 14 times more slowly. Epidemics initially spread
exponentially, as each infected individual infects several others. 
When something grows exponentially, for a long time it may seem not to
be changing at all. If we don’t watch it steadily, it will seem as though some-
thing discontinuous and radical occurred while we weren’t looking. 
That is why epidemics at first go unnoticed, no matter how catastrophic
they may be when full-blown. Imagine one sick person infecting two healthy
people, and the next day each of those two infects two others, and the next
day after that each of those four infects two others, and so on. The number
of newly infected each day grows from two to four to eight. In a week, 128
people come down with the disease in a single day, and twice that number
are now sick, but in a population of ten million, no one notices. Even after
two weeks, barely three people in a thousand are sick. But after another week,
40% of the population is sick, and society collapses
Exponential growth is actually smooth and steady; it just takes very little
time to pass from unnoticeable change to highly visible. Exponential growth
of anything can suddenly make the world look utterly different than it had
been. When that threshold is passed, changes that are “just” quantitative can
look qualitative. 
Another way of looking at the apparent abruptness of exponential
growth—its explosive force—is to think about how little lead time we have to
respond to it. Our hypothetical epidemic took three weeks to overwhelm the
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population. At what point was it only a half as devastating? The answer is
not “a week and a half.” The answer is on the next to last day. Suppose it took
a week to develop and administer a vaccine. Then noticing the epidemic after
a week and a half would have left ample time to prevent the disaster. But that
would have required understanding that there was an epidemic when only
2,000 people out of ten million were infected. 
The information story is full of examples of unperceived changes followed
by dislocating explosions. Those with the foresight to notice the explosion
just a little earlier than everyone else can reap huge benefits. Those who move
a little too slowly may be overwhelmed by the time they try to respond. Take
the case of digital photography. 
In 1983, Christmas shoppers could buy digital cameras to hook up to their
IBM PC and Apple II home computers. The potential was there for anyone to
see; it was not hidden in secret corporate laboratories. But digital photogra-
phy did not take off. Economically and practically, it couldn’t. Cameras were
too bulky to put in your pocket, and digital memories were too small to hold
many images. Even 14 years later, film photography was still a robust indus-
try. In early 1997, Kodak stock hit a record price, with a 22% increase in
quarterly profit, “fueled by healthy film and paper sales…[and] its motion pic-
ture film business,” according to a news report. The company raised its divi-
dend for the first time in eight years. But by 2007, digital memories had
become huge, digital processors had become fast and compact, and both were
cheap. As a result, cameras had become little computers. The company that
was once synonymous with photography was a shadow of its former self.
Kodak announced that its employee force would be cut to 30,000, barely a
fifth the size it was during the good times of the late 1980s. The move would
cost the company more than $3 billion. Moore’s Law moved faster than
Kodak did. 
In the rapidly changing world of bits, it pays to notice even small changes,
and to do something about them. 
Koan 6: Nothing Goes Away 
2,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. 
That is the number of bits that were created and stored away in 2007,
according to one industry estimate. The capacity of disks has followed its own
version of Moore’s Law, doubling every two or three years. For the time being
at least, that makes it possible to save everything though recent projections
suggest that by 2011, we may be producing more bits than we can store. 
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In financial industries, federal laws now require massive data retention, to
assist in audits and investigations of corruption. In many other businesses,
economic competitiveness drives companies to save everything they collect
and to seek out new data to retain. Wal-Mart stores have tens of millions of
transactions every day, and every one of them is saved—date, time, item,
store, price, who made the purchase, and how—credit, debit, cash, or gift card.
Such data is so valuable to planning the supply chain that stores will pay
money to get more of it from their customers. That is really what supermarket
loyalty cards provide—shoppers are supposed to think that the store is grant-
ing them a discount in appreciation for their steady business, but actually the
store is paying them for information about their buying patterns. We might
better think of a privacy tax—we pay the regular price unless we want to keep
information about our food, alcohol, and pharmaceutical purchases from the
market; to keep our habits to ourselves, we pay extra. 
The massive databases challenge our expectations about what will happen
to the data about us. Take something as simple as a stay in a hotel. When you
check in, you are given a keycard, not a mechanical key. Because the key-
cards can be deactivated instantly, there is no longer any great risk associ-
ated with losing your key, as long as you report it missing quickly. On the
other hand, the hotel now has a record, accurate to the second, of every time
you entered your room, used the gym or the business center, or went in the
back door after-hours. The same database could identify every cocktail and
steak you charged to the room, which other rooms you phoned and when, and
the brands of tampons and laxatives you charged at the hotel’s gift shop. This
data might be merged with billions like it, analyzed, and transferred to the
parent company, which owns restaurants and fitness centers as well as hotels.
It might also be lost, or stolen, or subpoenaed in a court case.
The ease of storing information has meant asking for more of it. Birth cer-
tificates used to include just the information about the child’s and parents’
names, birthplaces, and birthdates, plus the parents’ occupations. Now the
electronic birth record includes how much the mother drank and smoked dur-
ing her pregnancy, whether she had genital herpes or a variety of other med-
ical conditions, and both parents’ social security numbers. Opportunities for
research are plentiful, and so are opportunities for mischief and catastrophic
accidental data loss.
And the data will all be kept forever,
unless there are policies to get rid of it. For
the time being at least, the data sticks
around. And because databases are inten-
tionally duplicated—backed up for security,
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or shared while pursuing useful analyses—it is far from certain that data can
ever be permanently expunged, even if we wish that to happen. The Internet
consists of millions of interconnected computers; once data gets out, there is
no getting it back. Victims of identity theft experience daily the distress of
having to remove misinformation from the record. It seems never to go away. 
Koan 7: Bits Move Faster Than Thought 
The Internet existed before there were personal computers. It predates the
fiber optic communication cables that now hold it together. When it started
around 1970, the ARPANET, as it was called, was designed to connect a hand-
ful of university and military computers. No one imagined a network con-
necting tens of millions of computers and shipping information around the
world in the blink of an eye. Along with processing power and storage capac-
ity, networking has experienced its own exponential growth, in number of
computers interconnected and the rate at which data can be shipped over
long distances, from space to earth and from service providers into private
homes.
The Internet has caused drastic shifts in business practice. Customer ser-
vice calls are outsourced to India today not just because labor costs are low
there. Labor costs have always been low in India, but international telephone
calls used to be expensive. Calls about airline reservations and lingerie
returns are answered in India today because it now takes almost no time and
costs almost no money to send to India the bits representing your voice. The
same principle holds for professional services. When you are X-rayed at your
local hospital in Iowa, the radiologist who reads the X-ray may be half a
world away. The digital X-ray moves back and forth across the world faster
than a physical X-ray could be moved between floors of the hospital. When
you place an order at a drive-through station at a fast food restaurant, the
person taking the order may be in another state. She keys the order so it
appears on a computer screen in the kitchen, a few feet from your car, and
you are none the wiser. Such developments are causing massive changes to
the global economy, as industries figure out how to keep their workers in one
place and ship their business as bits. 
In the bits world, in which messages flow instantaneously, it sometimes
seems that distance doesn’t matter at all. The consequences can be startling.
One of us, while dean of an American college, witnessed the shock of a father
receiving condolences on his daughter’s death. The story was sad but famil-
iar, except that this version had a startling twist. Father and daughter were
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both in Massachusetts, but the condolences arrived from half-way around the
world before the father had learned that his daughter had died. News, even
the most intimate news, travels fast in the bits world, once it gets out. In the
fall of 2007, when the government of Myanmar suppressed protests by
Buddhist monks, television stations around the world showed video clips
taken by cell phone, probably changing the posture of the U.S. government.
The Myanmar rebellion also shows the power of information control when
information is just bits. The story dropped off the front page of the news-
papers once the government took total control of the Internet and cell phone
towers.
The instantaneous communication of massive amounts of information has
created the misimpression that there is a place called “Cyberspace,” a land
without frontiers where all the world’s people can be interconnected as
though they were residents of the same small town. That concept has been
decisively refuted by the actions of the world’s courts. National and state bor-
ders still count, and count a lot. If a book is bought online in England, the
publisher and author are subject to British libel laws rather than those of the
homeland of the author or publisher. Under British law, defendants have to
prove their innocence; in the U.S., plaintiffs have to prove the guilt of the
defendants. An ugly downside to the explosion of digital information and its
movement around the world is that information may become less available
even where it would be legally protected (we return to this subject in Chapter
7, “You Can’t Say That on the Internet”). Publishers fear “libel tourism”—
lawsuits in countries with weak protection of free speech, designed to intim-
idate authors in more open societies. It may prove simpler to publish only a
single version of a work for sale everywhere, an edition omitting information
that might somewhere excite a lawsuit.
Good and Ill, Promise and Peril
The digital explosion has thrown a lot of things up for grabs and we all have
a stake in who does the grabbing. The way the technology is offered to us, the
way we use it, and the consequences of the vast dissemination of digital infor-
mation are matters not in the hands of technology experts alone. Governments
and corporations and universities and other social institutions have a say. And
ordinary citizens, to whom these institutions are accountable, can influence
their decisions. Important choices are made every year, in government offices
CHAPTER 1 DIGITAL EXPLOSION 13
01_0137135599_ch01.qxd  4/16/08  1:19 PM  Page 13
and legislatures, in town meetings and police stations, in the corporate offices
of banks and insurance companies, in the purchasing departments of chain
stores and pharmacies. We all can help raise the level of discourse and under-
standing. We can all help ensure that technical decisions are taken in a con-
text of ethical standards. 
We offer two basic morals. The first is that information technology is inher-
ently neither good nor bad—it can be used for good or ill, to free us or to
shackle us. Second, new technology brings social change, and change comes
with both risks and opportunities. All of us, and all of our public agencies and
private institutions, have a say in whether technology will be used for good or
ill and whether we will fall prey to its risks or prosper from the opportunities
it creates.
Technology Is Neither Good nor Bad 
Any technology can be used for good or ill. Nuclear reactions create electric
power and weapons of mass destruction. The same encryption technology that
makes it possible for you to email your friends with confidence that no eaves-
dropper will be able to decipher your message also makes it possible for ter-
rorists to plan their attacks undiscovered. The same Internet technology that
facilitates the widespread distribution of educational works to impoverished
students in remote locations also enables massive copyright infringement. The
photomanipulation tools that enhance your snapshots are used by child
pornographers to escape prosecution. 
The key to managing the ethical and moral consequences of technology
while nourishing economic growth is to regulate the use of technology with-
out banning or restricting its creation. 
It is a marvel that anyone with a smart cell phone can use a search engine
to get answers to obscure questions almost anywhere. Society is rapidly
being freed from the old limitations of geography and status in accessing
information. 
The same technologies can be used to monitor individuals, to track their
behaviors, and to control what information they receive. Search engines need
not return unbiased results. Many users of web browsers do not realize that
the sites they visit may archive their actions. Technologically, there could be
a record of exactly what you have been accessing and when, as you browse a
library or bookstore catalog, a site selling pharmaceuticals, or a service offer-
ing advice on contraception or drug overdose. There are vast opportunities to
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use this information for invasive but
relatively benign purposes, such as
marketing, and also for more ques-
tionable purposes, such as blacklist-
ing and blackmail. Few regulations
mandate disclosure that the informa-
tion is being collected, or restrict the
use to which the data can be put.
Recent federal laws, such as the USA
PATRIOT Act, give government
agencies sweeping authority to sift
through mostly innocent data look-
ing for signs of “suspicious activity”
by potential terrorists—and to notice
lesser transgressions, such as
Governor Spitzer’s, in the process.
Although the World Wide Web now
reaches into millions of households,
the rules and regulations governing
it are not much better than those of
a lawless frontier town of the old
West. 
New Technologies Bring Both Risks and Opportunities 
The same large disk drives that enable anyone with a home computer to ana-
lyze millions of baseball statistics also allow anyone with access to confiden-
tial information to jeopardize its security. Access to aerial maps via the
Internet makes it possible for criminals to plan burglaries of upscale houses,
but technologically sophisticated police know that records of such queries can
also be used to solve crimes. 
Even the most un-electronic livelihoods are changing because of instant
worldwide information flows. There are no more pool hustlers today—jour-
neymen wizards of the cue, who could turn up in pool halls posing as out-
of-town bumpkins just looking to bet on a friendly game, and walk away
with big winnings. Now when any newcomer comes to town and cleans up,
his name and face are on AZBilliards.com instantly for pool players every-
where to see. 
BLACKLISTS AND WHITELISTS
In the bits world, providers of ser-
vices can create blacklists or
whitelists. No one on a blacklist
can use the service, but everyone
else can. For example, an auction-
eer might put people on a blacklist
if they did not pay for their pur-
chases. But service providers who
have access to other information
about visitors to their web sites
might use undisclosed and far more
sweeping criteria for blacklisting.
A whitelist is a list of parties to
whom services are available, with
everyone else excluded. For exam-
ple, a newspaper may whitelist its
home delivery subscribers for
access to its online content, allow-
ing others onto the whitelist only
after they have paid.
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Social networking sites such as facebook.com, myspace.com, and
match.com have made their founders quite wealthy. They have also given
birth to many thousands of new friendships, marriages, and other ventures.
But those pretending to be your online friends may not be as they seem.
Social networking has made it easier for predators to take advantage of the
naïve, the lonely, the elderly, and the young.
In 2006, a 13-year-old girl, Megan Meier of Dardenne Prairie, Missouri,
made friends online with a 16-year-old boy named “Josh.” When “Josh”
turned against her, writing “You are a bad person and everybody hates you….
The world would be a better place without you,” Megan committed suicide. Yet
Josh did not exist. Josh was a MySpace creation—but of whom? An early
police report stated that the mother of another girl in the neighborhood
acknowledged “instigating” and monitoring the account. That woman’s lawyer
later blamed someone who worked for his client. Whoever may have sent the
final message to Megan, prosecutors are having a hard time identifying any
law that might have been broken. “I can start MySpace on every single one of
you and spread rumors about every single one of you,” said Megan’s mother,
“and what’s going to happen to me? Nothing.” 
Along with its dazzling riches and vast horizons, the Internet has created
new manifestations of human evil—some of which, including the cyber-
harassment Megan Meier suffered, may not be criminal under existing law. In
a nation deeply committed to free expression as a legal right, which Internet
evils should be crimes, and which are just wrong? 
Vast data networks have made it possible to move work to where the
people are, not people to the work. The results are enormous business oppor-
tunities for entrepreneurs who take advantage of these technologies and new
enterprises around the globe, and also the other side of the coin: jobs lost to
outsourcing. 
The difference every one of us can make, to our workplace or to another
institution, can be to ask a question at the right time about the risks of
some new technological innovation—or to point out the possibility of doing
something in the near future that a few years ago would have been utterly
impossible. 
✷
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We begin our tour of the digital landscape with a look at our privacy, a social
structure the explosion has left in shambles. While we enjoy the benefits of
ubiquitous information, we also sense the loss of the shelter that privacy once
gave us. And we don’t know what we want to build in its place. The good and
ill of technology, and its promise and peril, are all thrown together when
information about us is spread everywhere. In the post-privacy world, we
stand exposed to the glare of noonday sunlight—and sometimes it feels
strangely pleasant. 
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CHAPTER 2
Naked in the Sunlight
Privacy Lost, Privacy Abandoned
1984 Is Here, and We Like It
On July 7, 2005, London was shaken as suicide bombers detonated four
explosions, three on subways and one on a double-decker bus. The attack on
the transit system was carefully timed to occur at rush hour, maximizing its
destructive impact. 52 people died and 700 more were injured.
Security in London had already been tight. The city was hosting the G8
Summit, and the trial of fundamentalist cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri had just
begun. Hundreds of thousands of surveillance cameras hadn’t deterred the
terrorist act, but the perpetrators were caught on camera. Their pictures were
sent around the world instantly. Working from 80,000 seized tapes, police
were able to reconstruct a reconnaissance trip the bombers had made two
weeks earlier.
George Orwell’s 1984 was published in 1948. Over the subsequent years,
the book became synonymous with a world of permanent surveillance, a soci-
ety devoid of both privacy and freedom:
…there seemed to be no color in anything except the posters that were
plastered everywhere. The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from
every commanding corner. There was one on the house front immedi-
ately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU …
The real 1984 came and went nearly a quarter century ago. Today, Big
Brother’s two-way telescreens would be amateurish toys. Orwell’s imagined
19
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London had cameras everywhere. His actual city now has at least half a mil-
lion. Across the UK, there is one surveillance camera for every dozen people.
The average Londoner is photographed hundreds of times a day by electronic
eyes on the sides of buildings and on utility poles. 
Yet there is much about the digital world that Orwell did not imagine. He
did not anticipate that cameras are far from the most pervasive of today’s
tracking technologies. There are dozens of other kinds of data sources, and
the data they produce is retained and analyzed. Cell phone companies know
not only what numbers you call, but where you have carried your phone.
Credit card companies know not only where you spent your money, but what
you spent it on. Your friendly bank keeps electronic records of your transac-
tions not only to keep your balance right, but because it has to tell the gov-
ernment if you make huge withdrawals. The digital explosion has scattered
the bits of our lives everywhere: records of the clothes we wear, the soaps we
wash with, the streets we walk, and the cars we drive and where we drive
them. And although Orwell’s Big Brother had his cameras, he didn’t have
search engines to piece the bits together, to find the needles in the haystacks.
Wherever we go, we leave digital footprints, while computers of staggering
capacity reconstruct our movements from the tracks. Computers re-assemble
the clues to form a comprehensive image of who we are, what we do, where
we are doing it, and whom we are discussing it with.
Perhaps none of this would have surprised Orwell. Had he known about
electronic miniaturization, he might have guessed that we would develop an
astonishing array of tracking technologies. Yet there is something more fun-
damental that distinguishes the world of 1984 from the actual world of today.
We have fallen in love with this always-on world. We accept our loss of pri-
vacy in exchange for efficiency, convenience, and small price discounts.
According to a 2007 Pew/Internet Project report, “60% of Internet users say
they are not worried about how much information is available about them
online.” Many of us publish and broadcast the most intimate moments of our
lives for all the world to see, even when no one requires or even asks us to
do so. 55% of teenagers and 20% of adults have created profiles on social
networking web sites. A third of the teens with profiles, and half the adults,
place no restrictions on who can see them.
In Orwell’s imagined London, only O’Brien and other members of the Inner
Party could escape the gaze of the telescreen. For the rest, the constant gaze
was a source of angst and anxiety. Today, we willingly accept the gaze. We
either don’t think about it, don’t know about it, or feel helpless to avoid it
except by becoming hermits. We may even judge its benefits to outweigh its
risks. In Orwell’s imagined London, like Stalin’s actual Moscow, citizens spied
on their fellow citizens. Today, we can all be Little Brothers, using our search
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engines to check up on our children,
our spouses, our neighbors, our col-
leagues, our enemies, and our
friends. More than half of all adult
Internet users have done exactly
that.
The explosive growth in digital
technologies has radically altered
our expectations about what will be
private and shifted our thinking
about what should be private.
Ironically, the notion of privacy has
become fuzzier at the same time as
the secrecy-enhancing technology of
encryption has become widespread.
Indeed, it is remarkable that we no
longer blink at intrusions that a decade ago would have seemed shocking.
Unlike the story of secrecy, there was no single technological event that
caused the change, no privacy-shattering breakthrough—only a steady
advance on several technological fronts that ultimately passed a tipping point.
Many devices got cheaper, better, and smaller. Once they became useful
consumer goods, we stopped worrying about their uses as surveillance
devices. For example, if the police were the only ones who had cameras in
their cell phones, we would be alarmed. But as long as we have them too, so
we can send our friends funny pictures from parties, we don’t mind so much
that others are taking pictures of us. The social evolution that was supported
by consumer technologies in turn made us more accepting of new enabling
technologies; the social and technological evolutions have proceeded hand in
hand. Meanwhile, international terrorism has made the public in most democ-
racies more sympathetic to intrusive measures intended to protect our secu-
rity. With corporations trying to make money from us and the government
trying to protect us, civil libertarians are a weak third voice when they warn
that we may not want others to know so much about us.
So we tell the story of privacy in stages. First, we detail the enabling tech-
nologies, the devices and computational processes that have made it easy and
convenient for us to lose our privacy—some of them familiar technologies,
and some a bit more mysterious. We then turn to an analysis of how we have
lost our privacy, or simply abandoned it. Many privacy-shattering things
have happened to us, some with our cooperation and some not. As a result,
the sense of personal privacy is very different today than it was two decades
ago. Next, we discuss the social changes that have occurred—cultural shifts
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PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
IN DEFENDING PRIVACY
Existing organizations have focused
on privacy issues in recent years,
and new ones have sprung up.
In the U.S., important forces are
the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU, www.aclu.org), the
Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC, epic.org), the
Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT, www.cdt.org),
and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (www.eff.org).
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that were facilitated by the technological diffusion, which in turn made new
technologies easier to deploy. And finally we turn to the big question: What
does privacy even mean in the digitally exploded world? Is there any hope of
keeping anything private when everything is bits, and the bits are stored,
copied, and moved around the world in an instant? And if we can’t—or
won’t—keep our personal information to ourselves anymore, how can we
make ourselves less vulnerable to the downsides of living in such an exposed
world? Standing naked in the sunlight, is it still possible to protect ourselves
against ills and evils from which our privacy used to protect us?
Footprints and Fingerprints
As we do our daily business and lead our private lives, we leave footprints
and fingerprints. We can see our footprints in mud on the floor and in the
sand and snow outdoors. We would not be surprised that anyone who went
to the trouble to match our shoes to our footprints could determine, or guess,
where we had been. Fingerprints are
different. It doesn’t even occur to us
that we are leaving them as we open
doors and drink out of tumblers.
Those who have guilty consciences
may think about fingerprints and
worry about where they are leaving
them, but the rest of us don’t.
In the digital world, we all leave both electronic footprints and electronic
fingerprints—data trails we leave intentionally, and data trails of which we
are unaware or unconscious. The identifying data may be useful for forensic
purposes. Because most of us don’t consider ourselves criminals, however, we
tend not to worry about that. What we don’t think about is that the various
small smudges we leave on the digital landscape may be useful to someone
else—someone who wants to use the data we left behind to make money or to
get something from us. It is therefore important to understand how and where
we leave these digital footprints and fingerprints.
Smile While We Snap!
Big Brother had his legions of cameras, and the City of London has theirs
today. But for sheer photographic pervasiveness, nothing beats the cameras
in the cell phones in the hands of the world’s teenagers. Consider the alleged
misjudgment of Jeffrey Berman. In early December 2007, a man about
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THE UNWANTED GAZE
The Unwanted Gaze by Jeffrey
Rosen (Vintage, 2001) details many
ways in which the legal system has
contributed to our loss of privacy.
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60 years old committed a series of assaults on the Boston public transit sys-
tem, groping girls and exposing himself. After one of the assaults, a victim
took out her cell phone. Click! Within hours, a good head shot was up on the
Web and was shown on all the Boston area television stations. Within a day,
Berman was under arrest and charged with several crimes. “Obviously we,
from time to time, have plainclothes officers on the trolley, but that’s a very
difficult job to do,” said the chief of the Transit Police. “The fact that this girl
had the wherewithal to snap a picture to identify him was invaluable.”
That is, it would seem, a story with a happy ending, for the victim at least.
But the massive dissemination of cheap cameras coupled with universal
access to the Web also enables a kind of vigilante justice—a ubiquitous Little-
Brotherism, in which we can all be detectives, judges, and corrections offi-
cers. Mr. Berman claims he is innocent; perhaps the speed at which the
teenager’s snapshot was disseminated unfairly created a presumption of his
guilt. Bloggers can bring global disgrace to ordinary citizens.
In June 2005, a woman allowed her dog to relieve himself on a Korean
subway, and subsequently refused to clean up his mess, despite offers from
others to help. The incident was cap-
tured by a fellow passenger and
posted online. She soon became
known as “gae-ttong-nyue” (Korean
for “puppy poo girl”). She was iden-
tified along with her family, was
shamed, and quit school. There is
now a Wikipedia entry about the
incident. Before the digital explo-
sion—before bits made it possible to
convey information instantaneously,
everywhere—her actions would have been embarrassing and would have been
known to those who were there at the time. It is unlikely that the story would
have made it around the world, and that it would have achieved such noto-
riety and permanence.
Still, in these cases, at least someone thought someone did something
wrong. The camera just happened to be in the right hands at just the right
moment. But looking at images on the Web is now a leisure activity that any-
one can do at any time, anywhere in the world. Using Google Street View, you
can sit in a café in Tajikistan and identify a car that was parked in my drive-
way when Google’s camera came by (perhaps months ago). From Seoul, you
can see what’s happening right now, updated every few seconds, in Picadilly
Circus or on the strip in Las Vegas. These views were always available to the
public, but cameras plus the Web changed the meaning of “public.”
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There are many free webcam sites,
at which you can watch what’s hap-
pening right now at places all over
the world. Here are a few:
www.camvista.com
www.earthcam.com
www.webcamworld.com
www.webworldcam.com
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And an electronic camera is not just a camera. Harry Potter and the
Deathly Hallows is, as far as anyone knows, the last book in the Harry Potter
series. Its arrival was eagerly awaited, with lines of anxious Harry fans
stretching around the block at bookstores everywhere. One fan got a pre-
release copy, painstakingly photographed every page, and posted the entire
book online before the official release. A labor of love, no doubt, but a bla-
tant copyright violation as well. He doubtless figured he was just posting the
pixels, which could not be traced back to him. If that was his presumption,
he was wrong. His digital fingerprints were all over the images. 
Digital cameras encode metadata along with the image. This data, known
as the Exchangeable Image File Format (EXIF), includes camera settings
(shutter speed, aperture, compression, make, model, orientation), date and
time, and, in the case of our Harry Potter fan, the make, model, and serial
number of his camera (a Canon Rebel 350D, serial number 560151117). If he
registered his camera, bought it with a credit card, or sent it in for service,
his identity could be known as well.
Knowing Where You Are
Global Position Systems (GPSs) have improved the marital lives of count-
less males too stubborn to ask directions. Put a Garmin or a Tom Tom in a
car, and it will listen to precisely timed signals from satellites reporting their
positions in space. The GPS calculates its own location from the satellites’
locations and the times their signals are received. The 24 satellites spinning
12,500 miles above the earth enable your car to locate itself within 25 feet,
at a price that makes these systems popular birthday presents.
If you carry a GPS-enabled cell phone, your friends can find you, if that
its what you want. If your GPS-enabled rental car has a radio transmitter, you
can be found whether you want it or not. In 2004, Ron Lee rented a car from
Payless in San Francisco. He headed east to Las Vegas, then back to Los
Angeles, and finally home. He was expecting to pay $150 for his little vaca-
tion, but Payless made him pay more—$1,400, to be precise. Mr. Lee forgot to
read the fine print in his rental contract. He had not gone too far; his con-
tract was for unlimited mileage. He had missed the fine print that said, “Don’t
leave California.” When he went out of state, the unlimited mileage clause
was invalidated. The fine print said that Payless would charge him $1 per
Nevada mile, and that is exactly what the company did. They knew where he
was, every minute he was on the road.
A GPS will locate you anywhere on earth; that is why mountain climbers
carry them. They will locate you not just on the map but in three dimensions,
telling you how high up the mountain you are. But even an ordinary cell
phone will serve as a rudimentary positioning system. If you are traveling in
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settled territory—any place where you can get cell phone coverage—the sig-
nals from the cell phone towers can be used to locate you. That is how Tanya
Rider was found (see Chapter 1 for details). The location is not as precise as
that supplied by a GPS—only within ten city blocks or so—but the fact that it
is possible at all means that photos can be stamped with identifying informa-
tion about where they were shot, as well as when and with what camera.
Knowing Even Where Your Shoes Are
A Radio Frequency Identification tag—RFID, for short—can be read from a
distance of a few feet. Radio Frequency Identification is like a more elaborate
version of the familiar bar codes that identify products. Bar codes typically
identify what kind of thing an item is—the make and model, as it were.
Because RFID tags have the capacity for much larger numbers, they can pro-
vide a unique serial number for each item: not just “Coke, 12 oz. can” but
“Coke can #12345123514002.” And because RFID data is transferred by radio
waves rather than visible light, the tags need not be visible to be read, and
the sensor need not be visible to do the reading.
RFIDs are silicon chips, typically embedded in plastic. They can be used to
tag almost anything (see Figure 2.1). “Prox cards,” which you wave near a
sensor to open a door, are RFID tags; a few bits of information identifying
you are transmitted from the card to the sensor. Mobil’s “Speedpass” is a lit-
tle RFID on a keychain; wave it near a gas pump and the pump knows whom
to charge for the gasoline. For a decade, cattle have had RFIDs implanted in
their flesh, so individual animals can be tracked. Modern dairy farms log the
milk production of individual cows, automatically relating the cow’s identity
to its daily milk output. Pets are commonly RFID-tagged so they can be
reunited with their owners if the animals go missing for some reason. The
possibility of tagging humans is obvious, and has been proposed for certain
high-security applications, such as controlling access to nuclear plants.
But the interesting part of the RFID story is more mundane—putting tags
in shoes, for example. RFID can be the basis for powerful inventory tracking
systems. 
RFID tags are simple devices.
They store a few dozen bits of infor-
mation, usually unique to a particu-
lar tag. Most are passive devices,
with no batteries, and are quite
small. The RFID includes a tiny elec-
tronic chip and a small coil, which
acts as a two-way antenna. A weak
CHAPTER 2 NAKED IN THE SUNLIGHT 25
SPYCHIPS
This aptly named book by Katherine
Albrecht and Liz McIntyre (Plume,
2006) includes many stories of
actual and proposed RFID uses by
consumer goods manufacturers and
retailers.
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current flows through the coil when the RFID passes through an electromag-
netic field—for example, from a scanner in the frame of a store, under the car-
pet, or in someone’s hand. This feeble current is just strong enough to power
the chip and induce it to transmit the identifying information. Because RFIDs
are tiny and require no connected power source, they are easily hidden. We
see them often as labels affixed to products; the one in Figure 2.1 was
between the pages of a book bought from a bookstore. They can be almost
undetectable.
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FIGURE 2.1 An RFID found between the pages of a book. A bookstore receiving a
box of RFID-tagged books can check the incoming shipment against the order
without opening the carton. If the books and shelves are scanned during stocking,
the cash register can identify the section of the store from which each purchased
copy was sold.
RFIDs are generally used to improve record-keeping, not for snooping.
Manufacturers and merchants want to get more information, more reliably,
so they naturally think of tagging merchandise. But only a little imagination
is required to come up with some disturbing scenarios. Suppose, for example,
that you buy a pair of red shoes at a chain store in New York City, and the
shoes have an embedded RFID. If you pay with a credit card, the store knows
your name, and a good deal more about you from your purchasing history. If
you wear those shoes when you walk into a branch store in Los Angeles a
month later, and that branch has an RFID reader under the rug at the
entrance, the clerk could greet you by name. She might offer you a scarf to
match the shoes—or to match anything else you bought recently from any
other branch of the store. On the other hand, the store might know that you
have a habit of returning almost everything you buy—in that case, you might
find yourself having trouble finding anyone to wait on you!
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The technology is there to do it. We know of no store that has gone quite
this far, but in September 2007, the Galeria Kaufhof in Essen, Germany
equipped the dressing rooms in the men’s clothing department with RFID
readers. When a customer tries on garments, a screen informs him of avail-
able sizes and colors. The system may be improved to offer suggestions about
accessories. The store keeps track of what items are tried on together and
what combinations turn into purchases. The store will remove the RFID tags
from the clothes after they are purchased—if the customer asks; otherwise,
they remain unobtrusively and could be scanned if the garment is returned
to the store. Creative retailers everywhere dream of such ways to use devices
to make money, to save money, and to give them small advantages over their
competitors. Though Galeria Kaufhof is open about its high-tech men’s
department, the fear that customers won’t like their clever ideas sometimes
holds back retailers—and sometimes simply causes them to keep quiet about
what they are doing.
Black Boxes Are Not Just for Airplanes Anymore
On April 12, 2007, John Corzine, Governor of New Jersey, was heading back
to the governor’s mansion in Princeton to mediate a discussion between Don
Imus, the controversial radio personality, and the Rutgers University women’s
basketball team. 
His driver, 34-year-old state trooper Robert Rasinski, headed north on the
Garden State Parkway. He swerved to avoid another car and flipped the
Governor’s Chevy Suburban. Governor Corzine had not fastened his seatbelt,
and broke 12 ribs, a femur, his collarbone, and his sternum. The details of
exactly what happened were unclear. When questioned, Trooper Rasinski said
he was not sure how fast they were going—but we do know. He was going 91
in a 65 mile per hour zone. There were no police with radar guns around; no
human being tracked his speed. We know his exact speed at the moment of
impact because his car, like 30 million cars in America, had a black box—an
“event data recorder” (EDR) that captured every detail about what was going
on just before the crash. An EDR is an automotive “black box” like the ones
recovered from airplane crashes.
EDRs started appearing in cars around 1995. By federal law, they will be
mandatory in the United States beginning in 2011. If you are driving a new
GM, Ford, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, or Subaru, your car has one—whether
anyone told you that or not. So do about half of new Toyotas. Your insur-
ance company is probably entitled to its data if you have an accident. Yet
most people do not realize that they exist. 
CHAPTER 2 NAKED IN THE SUNLIGHT 27
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  4/16/08  1:21 PM  Page 27
EDRs capture information about speed, braking time, turn signal status,
seat belts: things needed for accident reconstruction, to establish responsibil-
ity, or to prove innocence. CSX Railroad was exonerated of all liability in the
death of the occupants of a car when its EDR showed that the car was stopped
on the train tracks when it was hit. Police generally obtain search warrants
before downloading EDR data, but not always; in some cases, they do not
have to. When Robert Christmann struck and killed a pedestrian on October
18, 2003, Trooper Robert Frost of the New York State Police downloaded data
from the car at the accident scene. The EDR revealed that Christmann had
been going 38 MPH in an area where the speed limit was 30. When the data
was introduced at trial, Christmann claimed that the state had violated his
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures,
because it had not asked his permission or obtained a search warrant before
retrieving the data. That was not necessary, ruled a New York court. Taking
bits from the car was not like taking something out of a house, and no search
warrant was necessary.
Bits mediate our daily lives. It is almost as hard to avoid leaving digital
footprints as it is to avoid touching the ground when we walk. Yet even if we
live our lives without walking, we would unsuspectingly be leaving finger-
prints anyway.
Some of the intrusions into our pri-
vacy come because of the unexpected,
unseen side effects of things we do quite
voluntarily. We painted the hypothetical
picture of the shopper with the RFID-
tagged shoes, who is either welcomed or
shunned on her subsequent visits to the store, depending on her shopping his-
tory. Similar surprises can lurk almost anywhere that bits are exchanged. That
is, for practical purposes, pretty much everywhere in daily life.
Tracing Paper
If I send an email or download a web page, it should come as no surprise that
I’ve left some digital footprints. After all, the bits have to get to me, so some
part of the system knows where I am. In the old days, if I wanted to be anony-
mous, I could write a note, but my handwriting might be recognizable, and I
might leave fingerprints (the oily kind) on the paper. I might have typed, but
Perry Mason regularly solved crimes by matching a typewritten note with the
unique signature of the suspect’s typewriter. More fingerprints.
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So, today I would laserprint the letter and wear gloves. But even that may
not suffice to disguise me. Researchers at Purdue have developed techniques
for matching laser-printed output to a particular printer. They analyze printed
sheets and detect unique characteristics of each manufacturer and each indi-
vidual printer—fingerprints that can be used, like the smudges of old type-
writer hammers, to match output with source. It may be unnecessary to put
the microscope on individual letters to identify what printer produced a page. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has demonstrated that many color
printers secretly encode the printer serial number, date, and time on every
page that they print (see Figure 2.2). Therefore, when you print a report, you
should not assume that no one can tell who printed it. 
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Source: Laser fingerprint. Electronic Frontier Foundation. http://w.2.eff.org/Privacy/printers/
docucolor/.
FIGURE 2.2 Fingerprint left by a Xerox DocuColor 12 color laser printer. The dots
are very hard to see with the naked eye; the photograph was taken under blue light.
The dot pattern encodes the date (2005-05-21), time (12:50), and the serial number of
the printer (21052857).
There was a sensible rationale behind this technology. The government
wanted to make sure that office printers could not be used to turn out sets of
hundred dollar bills. The technology that was intended to frustrate counter-
feiters makes it possible to trace every page printed on color laser printers
back to the source. Useful technologies often have unintended consequences.
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Many people, for perfectly legal and valid reasons, would like to protect
their anonymity. They may be whistleblowers or dissidents. Perhaps they are
merely railing against injustice in their workplace. Will technologies that
undermine anonymity in political discourse also stifle free expression? A
measure of anonymity is essential in a healthy democracy—and in the U.S.,
has been a weapon used to advance free speech since the time of the
Revolution. We may regret a complete abandonment of anonymity in favor
of communication technologies that
leave fingerprints.
The problem is not just the existence
of fingerprints, but that no one told us
that we are creating them.
The Parking Garage Knows More Than You Think
One day in the spring of 2006, Anthony and his wife drove to Logan Airport
to pick up some friends. They took two cars, which they parked in the garage.
Later in the evening, they paid at the kiosk inside the terminal, and left—or
tried to. One car got out of the garage without a problem, but Anthony’s was
held up for more than an hour, in the middle of the night, and was not
allowed to leave. Why? Because his ticket did not match his license plate. 
It turns out that every car entering the airport garage has its license plate
photographed at the same time as the ticket is being taken. Anthony had held
both tickets while he and his wife were waiting for their friends, and then he
gave her back one—the “wrong” one, as it turned out. It was the one he had
taken when he drove in. When he tried to leave, he had the ticket that
matched his wife’s license plate number. A no-no.
Who knew that if two cars arrive and try to leave at the same time, they
may not be able to exit if the tickets are swapped? In fact, who knew that
every license plate is photographed as it enters the garage? 
There is a perfectly sensible explanation. People with big parking bills
sometimes try to duck them by picking up a second ticket at the end of their
trip. When they drive out, they try to turn in the one for which they would
have to pay only a small fee. Auto thieves sometimes try the same trick. So
the system makes sense, but it raises many questions. Who else gets access to
the license plate numbers? If the police are looking for a particular car, can
they search the scanned license plate numbers of the cars in the garage? How
long is the data retained? Does it say anywhere, even in the fine print, that
your visit to the garage is not at all anonymous?
30 BLOWN TO BITS
The problem is not just the
existence of fingerprints,
but that no one told us that
we are creating them.
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  4/16/08  1:21 PM  Page 30
All in Your Pocket
The number of new data sources—and the proliferation and interconnection
of old data sources—is part of the story of how the digital explosion shattered
privacy. But the other part of the technology story is about how all that data
is put together.
On October 18, 2007, a junior staff member at the British national tax
agency sent a small package to the government’s auditing agency via TNT, a
private delivery service. Three weeks later, it had not arrived at its destina-
tion and was reported missing. Because the sender had not used TNT’s “reg-
istered mail” option, it couldn’t be traced, and as of this writing has not been
found. Perhaps it was discarded by mistake and never made it out of the mail-
room; perhaps it is in the hands of criminals.
The mishap rocked the nation. As a result of the data loss, every bank and
millions of individuals checked account activity for signs of fraud or identity
theft. On November 20, the head of the tax agency resigned. Prime Minister
Gordon Brown apologized to the nation, and the opposition party accused the
Brown administration of having “failed in its first duty—to protect the
public.” 
The package contained two computer disks. The data on the disks included
names, addresses, birth dates, national insurance numbers (the British equiv-
alent of U.S. Social Security Numbers), and bank account numbers of 25 mil-
lion people—nearly 40% of the British population, and almost every child in
the land. The tax office had all this data because every British child receives
weekly government payments, and most families have the money deposited
directly into bank accounts. Ten years ago, that much data would have
required a truck to transport, not two small disks. Fifty years ago, it would
have filled a building.
This was a preventable catastrophe. Many mistakes were made; quite ordi-
nary mistakes. The package should have been registered. The disks should
have been encrypted. It should not have taken three weeks for someone to
speak up. But those are all age-old mistakes. Offices have been sending pack-
ages for centuries, and even Julius Caesar knew enough to encrypt informa-
tion if he had to use intermediaries to deliver it. What happened in 2007 that
could not have happened in 1984 was the assembly of such a massive data-
base in a form that allowed it to be easily searched, processed, analyzed, con-
nected to other databases, transported—and “lost.”
Exponential growth—in storage size, processing speed, and communication
speed—have changed the same old thing into something new. Blundering, stu-
pidity, curiosity, malice, and thievery are not new. The fact that sensitive data
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about everyone in a nation could fit on a laptop is new. The ability to search
for a needle in the haystack of the Internet is new. Easily connecting “pub-
lic” data sources that used to be stored in file drawers in Albuquerque and
Atlanta, but are now both electronically accessible from Algeria—that is new
too. 
Training, laws, and software all can help. But the truth of the matter is that
as a society, we don’t really know how to deal with these consequences of the
digital explosion. The technology revolution is outstripping society’s capac-
ity to adjust to the changes in what can be taken for granted. The Prime
Minister had to apologize to the British nation because among the things that
have been blown to bits is the presumption that no junior staffer could do
that much damage by mailing a small parcel.
Connecting the Dots
The way we leave fingerprints and footprints is only part of what is new. We
have always left a trail of information behind us, in our tax records, hotel
reservations, and long distance telephone bills. True, the footprints are far
clearer and more complete today than ever before. But something else has
changed—the harnessing of computing power to correlate data, to connect the
dots, to put pieces together, and to create cohesive, detailed pictures from
what would otherwise have been meaningless fragments. The digital explo-
sion does not just blow things apart. Like the explosion at the core of an
atomic bomb, it blows things together as well. Gather up the details, connect
the dots, assemble the parts of the puzzle, and a clear picture will emerge.
Computers can sort through databases too massive and too boring to be
examined with human eyes. They can assemble colorful pointillist paintings
out of millions of tiny dots, when any few dots would reveal nothing. When
a federal court released half a million Enron emails obtained during the cor-
ruption trial, computer scientists quickly identified the subcommunities, and
perhaps conspiracies, among Enron employees, using no data other than the
pattern of who was emailing whom (see Figure 2.3). The same kinds of clus-
tering algorithms work on patterns of telephone calls. You can learn a lot by
knowing who is calling or emailing whom, even if you don’t know what they
are saying to each other—especially if you know the time of the communica-
tions and can correlate them with the time of other events.
Sometimes even public information is revealing. In Massachusetts, the
Group Insurance Commission (GIC) is responsible for purchasing health
insurance for state employees. When the premiums it was paying jumped one
year, the GIC asked for detailed information on every patient encounter. And
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for good reason: All kinds of health care costs had been growing at prodi-
gious rates. In the public interest, the state had a responsibility to understand
how it was spending taxpayer money. The GIC did not want to know patients’
names; it did not want to track individuals, and it did not want people to
think they were being tracked. Indeed, tracking the medical visits of individ-
uals would have been illegal. 
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Source: Enron, Jeffrey Heer. Figure 3 from http://jheer.org/enron/v1/.
FIGURE 2.3 Diagram showing clusters of Enron emailers, indicating which
employees carried on heavy correspondence with which others. The evident “blobs”
may be the outlines of conspiratorial cliques.
So, the GIC data had no names, no addresses, no Social Security Numbers,
no telephone numbers—nothing that would be a “unique identifier” enabling
a mischievous junior staffer in the GIC office to see who exactly had a
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  4/16/08  1:21 PM  Page 33
particular ailment or complaint. To use the official lingo, the data was
“de-identified”; that is, stripped of identifying information. The data did
include the gender, birth date, zip code, and similar facts about individuals
making medical claims, along with some information about why they had
sought medical attention. That information was gathered not to challenge
any particular person, but to learn about patterns—if the truckers in Worcester
are having lots of back injuries, for example, maybe workers in that region
need better training on how to lift heavy items. Most states do pretty much
the same kind of analysis of de-identified data about state workers.
Now this was a valuable data set not just for the Insurance Commission, but
for others studying public health and the medical industry in Massachusetts.
Academic researchers, for example, could use such a large inventory of med-
ical data for epidemiological studies. Because it was all de-identified, there was
no harm in letting others see it, the GIC figured. In fact, it was such good data
that private industry—for example, businesses in the health management sec-
tor—might pay money for it. And so the GIC sold the data to businesses. The
taxpayers might even benefit doubly from this decision: The data sale would
provide a new revenue source to the state, and in the long run, a more
informed health care industry might run more efficiently. 
But how de-identified really was the material?
Latanya Sweeney was at the time a researcher at MIT (she went on to
become a computer science professor at Carnegie Mellon University). She
wondered how hard it would be for those who had received the de-identified
data to “re-identify” the records and learn the medical problems of a partic-
ular state employee—for example, the governor of the Commonwealth.
Governor Weld lived, at that time, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Cambridge, like many municipalities, makes its voter lists publicly available,
for a charge of $15, and free for candidates and political organizations. If you
know the precinct, they are available for only $.75. Sweeney spent a few dol-
lars and got the voter lists for Cambridge. Anyone could have done the same.
According to the Cambridge voter registration list, there were only six peo-
ple in Cambridge with Governor Weld’s birth date, only three of those were
men, and only one of those lived in Governor Weld’s five-digit zip code.
Sweeney could use that combination of factors, birth date, gender, and zip
code to recover the Governor’s medical records—and also those for members
of his family, since the data was organized by employee. This type of re-iden-
tification is straightforward. In Cambridge, in fact, birth date alone was suf-
ficient to identify more than 10% of the population. Nationally, gender, zip
code, and date of birth are all it takes to identify 87% of the U.S. population
uniquely. 
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The data set contained far more than gender, zip code, and birth date. In
fact, any of the 58 individuals who received the data in 1997 could have
identified any of the 135,000 people in the database. “There is no patient con-
fidentiality,” said Dr. Joseph Heyman, president of the Massachusetts Medical
Society. “It’s gone.”
It is easy to read a story like this and scream, “Heads should roll!.” But it
is actually quite hard to figure out who, if anyone, made a mistake. Certainly
collecting the information was the right thing to do, given that health costs
are a major expense for all businesses and institutions. The GIC made an hon-
est effort to de-identify the data before releasing it. Arguably the GIC might
not have released the data to other state agencies, but that would be like say-
ing that every department of govern-
ment should acquire its heating oil
independently. Data is a valuable
resource, and once someone has col-
lected it, the government is entirely
correct in wanting it used for the pub-
lic good. Some might object to selling
the data to an outside business, but only in retrospect; had the data really
been better de-identified, whoever made the decision to sell the data might
well have been rewarded for helping to hold down the cost of government. 
Perhaps the mistake was the ease with which voter lists can be obtained.
However, it is a tradition deeply engrained in our system of open elections
that the public may know who is eligible to vote, and indeed who has voted.
And voter lists are only one source of public data about the U.S. population.
How many 21-year-old male Native Hawaiians live in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts? In the year 2000, there were four. Anyone can browse the U.S.
Census data, and sometimes it can help fill in pieces of a personal picture:
Just go to factfinder.census.gov.
The mistake was thinking that the GIC data was truly de-identified, when
it was not. But with so many data sources available, and so much computing
power that could be put to work connecting the dots, it is very hard to know
just how much information has to be discarded from a database to make it
truly anonymous. Aggregating data into larger units certainly helps—releas-
ing data by five-digit zip codes reveals less than releasing it by nine-digit zip
codes. But the coarser the data, the less it reveals also of the valuable infor-
mation for which it was made available. 
How can we solve a problem that results from many developments, no one
of which is really a problem in itself? 
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Why We Lost Our Privacy, or Gave It Away
Information technology did not cause the end of privacy, any more than
automotive technology caused teen sex. Technology creates opportunities and
risks, and people, as individuals and as societies, decide how to live in the
changed landscape of new possibilities. To understand why we have less pri-
vacy today than in the past, we must look not just at the gadgets. To be sure,
we should be wary of spies and thieves, but we should also look at those who
protect us and help us—and we should also take a good look in the mirror.
We are most conscious of our personal information winding up in the
hands of strangers when we think about data loss or theft. Reports like the
one about the British tax office have become fairly common. The theft of
information about 45 million customers of TJX stores, described in Chapter 5,
“Secret Bits,” was even larger than the British catastrophe. In 2003, Scott
Levine, owner of a mass email business named Snipermail, stole more than a
billion personal information records from Acxiom. Millions of Americans are
victimized by identity theft every year, at a total cost in the tens of billions of
dollars annually. Many more of us harbor daily fears that just “a little bit” of
our financial information has leaked out, and could be a personal time bomb
if it falls into the wrong hands.
Why can’t we just keep our personal information to ourselves? Why do so
many other people have it in the first place, so that there is an opportunity
for it to go astray, and an incentive for creative crooks to try to steal it?
We lose control of our personal information because of things we do to
ourselves, and things others do to us. Of things we do to be ahead of the
curve, and things we do because everyone else is doing them. Of things we
do to save money, and things we do to save time. Of things we do to be safe
from our enemies, and things we do because we feel invulnerable. Our loss of
privacy is a problem, but there is no one answer to it, because there is no one
reason why it is happening. It is a messy problem, and we first have to think
about it one piece at a time.
We give away information about ourselves—voluntarily leave visible foot-
prints of our daily lives—because we judge, perhaps without thinking about it
very much, that the benefits outweigh the costs. To be sure, the benefits are
many.
Saving Time
For commuters who use toll roads or bridges, the risk-reward calculation is not
even close. Time is money, and time spent waiting in a car is also anxiety and
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frustration. If there is an option to get a toll booth transponder, many com-
muters will get one, even if the device costs a few dollars up front. Cruising
past the cars waiting to pay with dollar bills is not just a relief; it actually
brings the driver a certain satisfied glow.
The transponder, which the driver attaches to the windshield from inside
the car, is an RFID, powered with a battery so identifying information can be
sent to the sensor several feet away as the driver whizzes past. The sensor can
be mounted in a constricted travel lane, where a toll booth for a human toll-
taker might have been. Or it can be mounted on a boom above traffic, so the
driver doesn’t even need to change lanes or slow down
And what is the possible harm? Of course, the state is recording the fact
that the car has passed the sensor; that is how the proper account balance can
be debited to pay the toll. When the balance gets too low, the driver’s credit
card may get billed automatically to replenish the balance. All that only
makes the system better—no fumbling for change or doing anything else to
pay for your travels.
The monthly bill—for the Massachusetts Fast Lane, for example—shows
where and when you got on the highway—when, accurate to the second. It
also shows where you got off and how far you went. Informing you of the
mileage is another useful service, because Massachusetts drivers can get a
refund on certain fuel taxes, if the fuel was used on the state toll road. Of
course, you do not need a PhD to figure out that the state also knows when
you got off the road, to the second, and that with one subtraction and one
division, its computers could figure out if you were speeding. Technically, in
fact, it would be trivial for the state to print the appropriate speeding fine at
the bottom of the statement, and to bill your credit card for that amount at
the same time as it was charging for tolls. That would be taking convenience
a bit too far, and no state does it, yet. 
What does happen right now, however, is that toll transponder records are
introduced into divorce and child custody cases. You’ve never been within
five miles of that lady’s house? Really? Why have you gotten off the high-
way at the exit near it so many times? You say you can be the better custo-
dial parent for your children, but the facts suggest otherwise. As one lawyer
put it, “When a guy says, ‘Oh, I’m home every day at five and I have dinner
with my kids every single night,’ you subpoena his E-ZPass and you find out
he’s crossing that bridge every night at 8:30. Oops!” These records can be
subpoenaed, and have been, hundreds of times, in family law cases. They
have also been used in employment cases, to prove that the car of a worker
who said he was working was actually far from the workplace.
But most of us aren’t planning to cheat on our spouses or our bosses, so
the loss of privacy seems like no loss at all, at least compared to the time
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saved. Of course, if we actually were cheating, we would be in a big hurry,
and might take some risks to save a few minutes!
Saving Money
Sometimes it’s money, not time, which motivates us to leave footprints. Such
is the case with supermarket loyalty cards. If you do not want Safeway to
keep track of the fact that you bought the 12-pack of Yodels despite your
recent cholesterol results, you can make sure it doesn’t know. You simply pay
the “privacy tax”—the surcharge for customers not presenting a loyalty card.
The purpose of loyalty cards is to enable merchants to track individual item
purchases. (Item-level transactions are typically not tracked by credit card
companies, which do not care if you bought Yodels instead of granola, so
long as you pay the bill.) With loyalty cards, stores can capture details of
cash transactions as well. They can process all the transaction data, and draw
inferences about shoppers’ habits. Then, if a lot of people who buy Yodels
also buy Bison Brew Beer, the store’s automated cash register can automati-
cally spit out a discount coupon for Bison Brew as your Yodels are being
bagged. A “discount” for you, and more sales for Safeway. Everybody wins.
Don’t they?
As grocery stores expand their web-based business, it is even easier for
them to collect personal information about you. Reading the fine print when
you sign up is a nuisance, but it is worth doing, so you understand what you
are giving and what you are getting in return. Here are a few sentences of
Safeway’s privacy policy for customers who use its web site: 
Safeway may use personal information to provide you with news-
letters, articles, product or service alerts, new product or service
announcements, saving awards, event invitations, personally tailored
coupons, program and promotional information and offers, and other
information, which may be provided to Safeway by other companies.
… We may provide personal information to our partners and suppliers
for customer support services and processing of personal information
on behalf of Safeway. We may also share personal information with
our affiliate companies, or in the course of an actual or potential sale,
re-organization, consolidation, merger, or amalgamation of our busi-
ness or businesses.
Dreary reading, but the language gives Safeway lots of leeway. Maybe you
don’t care about getting the junk mail. Not everyone thinks it is junk, and the
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company does let you “opt out” of receiving it (although in general, few
people bother to exercise opt-out rights). But Safeway has lots of “affiliates,”
and who knows how many companies with which it might be involved in a
merger or sale of part of its business. Despite privacy concerns voiced by
groups like C.A.S.P.I.A.N. (Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion
and Numbering, www.nocards.org), most shoppers readily agree to have the
data collected. The financial incentives are too hard to resist, and most con-
sumers just don’t worry about marketers knowing their purchases. But when-
ever purchases can be linked to your name, there is a record, somewhere in a
huge database, of whether you use regular or super tampons, lubricated or
unlubricated condoms, and whether you like regular beer or lite. You have
authorized the company to share it, and even if you hadn’t, the company
could lose it accidentally, have it stolen, or have it subpoenaed.
Convenience of the Customer
The most obvious reason not to worry about giving information to a com-
pany is that you do business with them, and it is in your interest to see that
they do their business with you better. You have no interest in whether they
make more money from you, but you do have a strong interest in making it
easier and faster for you to shop with them, and in cutting down the amount
of stuff they may try to sell you that you would have no interest in buying.
So your interests and theirs are, to a degree, aligned, not in opposition.
Safeway’s privacy policy states this explicitly: “Safeway Club Card informa-
tion and other information may be used to help make Safeway’s products,
services, and programs more useful to its customers.” Fair enough.
No company has been more progressive in trying to sell customers what
they might want than the online store Amazon. Amazon suggests products to
repeat customers, based on what they have bought before—or what they have
simply looked at during previous visits to Amazon’s web site. The algorithms
are not perfect; Amazon’s computers are drawing inferences from data, not
being clairvoyant. But Amazon’s guesses are pretty good, and recommending
the wrong book every now and then is a very low-cost mistake. If Amazon
does it too often, I might switch to Barnes and Noble, but there is no injury
to me. So again: Why should anyone care that Amazon knows so much about
me? On the surface, it seems benign. Of course, we don’t want the credit card
information to go astray, but who cares about knowing what books I have
looked at online?
Our indifference is another marker of the fact that we are living in an
exposed world, and that it feels very different to live here. In 1988, when a
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videotape rental store clerk turned over Robert Bork’s movie rental records to
a Washington, DC newspaper during Bork’s Supreme Court confirmation
hearings, Congress was so outraged that it quickly passed a tough privacy
protection bill, The Video Privacy Protection Act. Videotape stores, if any still
exist, can be fined simply for keeping rental records too long. Twenty years
later, few seem to care much what Amazon does with its millions upon mil-
lions of detailed, fine-grained views into the brains of all its customers.
It’s Just Fun to Be Exposed
Sometimes, there can be no explanation for our willing surrender of our pri-
vacy except that we take joy in the very act of exposing ourselves to public
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HOW SITES KNOW WHO YOU ARE
1. You tell them. Log in to Gmail, Amazon, or eBay, and you are letting
them know exactly who you are. 
2. They’ve left cookies on one of your previous visits. A cookie is a small
text file stored on your local hard drive that contains information that
a particular web site wants to have available during your current session
(like your shopping cart), or from one session to the next. Cookies give
sites persistent information for tracking and personalization. Your
browser has a command for showing cookies—you may be surprised how
many web sites have left them!
3. They have your IP address. The web server has to know where you are
so that it can ship its web pages to you. Your IP address is a number like
66.82.9.88 that locates your computer in the Internet (see the Appendix
for details). That address may change from one day to the next. But in
a residential setting, your Internet Service Provider (your ISP—typically
your phone or cable company) knows who was assigned each IP address
at any time. Those records are often subpoenaed in court cases.
If you are curious about who is using a particular IP address, you can check
the American Registry of Internet Numbers (www.arin.net). Services such as
whatismyip.com, whatismyip.org, and ipchicken.com also allow you to
check your own IP address. And www.whois.net allows you to check who
owns a domain name such as harvard.com—which turns out to be the
Harvard Bookstore, a privately owned bookstore right across the street from
the university. Unfortunately, that information won’t reveal who is sending
you spam, since spammers routinely forge the source of email they send you.
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view. Exhibitionism is not a new phenomenon. Its practice today, as in the
past, tends to be in the province of the young and the drunk, and those wish-
ing to pretend they are one or the other. That correlation is by no means per-
fect, however. A university president had to apologize when an image of her
threatening a Hispanic male with a stick leaked out from her MySpace page,
with a caption indicating that she had to “beat off the Mexicans because they
were constantly flirting with my daughter.” 
And there is a continuum of outrageousness. The less wild of the party
photo postings blend seamlessly with the more personal of the blogs, where
the bloggers are chatting mostly about their personal feelings. Here there is
not exuberance, but some simpler urge
for human connectedness. That pas-
sion, too, is not new. What is new is
that a photo or video or diary entry,
once posted, is visible to the entire
world, and that there is no taking it
back. Bits don’t fade and they don’t yellow. Bits are forever. And we don’t
know how to live with that.
For example, a blog selected with no great design begins:
This is the personal web site of Sarah McAuley. … I think sharing my
life with strangers is odd and narcissistic, which of course is why I’m
addicted to it and have been doing it for several years now. Need
more? You can read the “About Me” section, drop me an email, or you
know, just read the drivel that I pour out on an almost-daily basis.
No thank you, but be our guest. Or consider that there is a Facebook group
just for women who want to upload pictures of themselves uncontrollably
drunk. Or the Jennicam, through which Jennifer Kay Ringley opened her life
to the world for seven years, setting a standard for exposure that many since
have surpassed in explicitness, but few have approached in its endless ordi-
nariness. We are still experimenting, both the voyeurs and viewed.
Because You Can’t Live Any Other Way
Finally, we give up data about ourselves because we don’t have the time,
patience, or single-mindedness about privacy that would be required to live
our daily lives in another way. In the U.S., the number of credit, debit, and
bank cards is in the billions. Every time one is used, an electronic handshake
records a few bits of information about who is using it, when, where, and for
what. It is now virtually unheard of for people to make large purchases of
CHAPTER 2 NAKED IN THE SUNLIGHT 41
Bits don’t fade and they
don’t yellow. Bits are forever.
And we don’t know how to
live with that.
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  4/16/08  1:21 PM  Page 41
ordinary consumer goods with cash. Personal checks are going the way of
cassette tape drives, rendered irrelevant by newer technologies. Even if you
could pay cash for everything you buy, the tax authorities would have you
in their databases anyway. There even have been proposals to put RFIDs in
currency notes, so that the movement of cash could be tracked.
Only sects such as the Amish still live without electricity. It will soon be
almost that unusual to live without Internet connectivity, with all the finger-
prints it leaves of your daily searches and logins and downloads. Even the old
dumb TV is rapidly disappearing in favor of digital communications. Digital
TV will bring the advantages of video on demand—no more trips to rent
movies or waits for them to arrive in the mail—at a price: Your television ser-
vice provider will record what movies you have ordered. It will be so attrac-
tive to be able to watch what we want when we want to watch it, that we
won’t miss either the inconvenience or the anonymity of the days when all
the TV stations washed your house with their airwaves. You couldn’t pick the
broadcast times, but at least no one knew which waves you were grabbing
out of the air. 
Little Brother Is Watching
So far, we have discussed losses of privacy due to things for which we could,
in principle anyway, blame ourselves. None of us really needs a loyalty card,
we should always read the fine print when we rent a car, and so on. We would
all be better off saying “no” a little more often to these privacy-busters, but
few of us would choose to live the life of constant vigilance that such res-
olute denial would entail. And even if we were willing to make those sacri-
fices, there are plenty of other privacy problems caused by things others do
to us.
The snoopy neighbor is a classic American stock figure—the busybody who
watches how many liquor bottles are in your trash, or tries to figure out
whose Mercedes is regularly parked in your driveway, or always seems to
know whose children were disorderly last Saturday night. But in Cyberspace,
we are all neighbors. We can all check up on each other, without even open-
ing the curtains a crack.
Public Documents Become VERY Public
Some of the snooping is simply what anyone could have done in the past by
paying a visit to the Town Hall. Details that were always public—but inacces-
sible—are quite accessible now.
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In 1975, Congress created the Federal Election Commission to administer
the Federal Election Campaign Act. Since then, all political contributions
have been public information. There is a difference, though, between “public”
and “readily accessible.” Making public data available on the Web shattered
the veil of privacy that came from inaccessibility.
Want to know who gave money to Al Franken for Senate? Lorne Michaels
from Saturday Night Live, Leonard Nimoy, Paul Newman, Craig Newmark (the
“craig” of craigslist.com), and Ginnie W., who works with us and may not
have wanted us to know her political leanings. Paul B., and Henry G., friends
of ours, covered their bases by giving to both Obama and Clinton.
The point of the law was to make it easy to look up big donors. But since
data is data, what about checking on your next-door neighbors? Ours defi-
nitely leaned toward Obama over Clinton, with no one in the Huckabee camp.
Or your clients? One of ours gave heartily to Dennis Kucinich. Or your daugh-
ter’s boyfriend? You can find out for yourself, at www.fec.gov or
fundrace.huffingtonpost.com. We’re not telling about our own.
Hosts of other facts are now available for armchair browsing—facts that in
the past were nominally public but required a trip to the Registrar of Deeds.
If you want to know what you neighbor paid for their house, or what it’s
worth today, many communities put all of their real estate tax rolls online. It
was always public; now it’s accessible. It was never wrong that people could
get this information, but it feels very different now that people can browse
through it from the privacy of their home.
If you are curious about someone, you can try to find him or her on
Facebook, MySpace, or just using an ordinary search engine. A college would
not peek at the stupid Facebook page of an applicant, would it? Absolutely
not, says the Brown Dean of Admissions, “unless someone says there’s some-
thing we should look at.”
New participatory websites create even bigger opportunities for informa-
tion-sharing. If you are about to go on a blind date, there are special sites just
for that. Take a look at www.dontdatehimgirl.com, a social networking site
with a self-explanatory focus. When we checked, this warning about one man
had just been posted, along with his name and photograph: “Compulsive
womanizer, liar, internet cheater; pathological liar who can’t be trusted as a
friend much less a boyfriend. Total creep! Twisted and sick—needs mental
help. Keep your daughter away from this guy!” Of course, such information
may be worth exactly what we paid for it. There is a similar site,
www.platewire.com, for reports about bad drivers. If you are not dating or
driving, perhaps you’d like to check out a neighborhood before you move in,
or just register a public warning about the obnoxious revelers who live next
door to you. If so, www.rottenneighbor.com is the site for you. When we
CHAPTER 2 NAKED IN THE SUNLIGHT 43
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  7/31/08  1:37 PM  Page 43
typed in the zip code in which one of us lives, a nice Google map appeared
with a house near ours marked in red. When we clicked on it, we got this
report on our neighbor:
you’re a pretty blonde, slim and gorgeous. hey, i’d come on to you if i
weren’t gay. you probably have the world handed to you like most
pretty women. is that why you think that you are too good to pick up
after your dog? you know that you are breaking the law as well as
being disrespectful of your neighbors. well, i hope that you step in
your own dogs poop on your way to work, or on your way to dinner.
i hope that the smell of your self importance follows you all day.
For a little money, you can get a lot more information. In January 2006, John
Aravosis, creator of Americablog.com, purchased the detailed cell phone
records of General Wesley Clark. For $89.95, he received a listing of all of
Clark’s calls for a three-day period. There are dozens of online sources for this
kind of information. You might think you’d have to be in the police or the
FBI to find out who people are calling on their cell phones, but there are
handy services that promise to provide anyone with that kind of information
for a modest fee. The Chicago Sun Times decided to put those claims to a test,
so it paid $110 to locatecell.com and asked for a month’s worth of cell
phone records of one Frank Main, who happened to be one of its own
reporters. The Sun Times did it all with a few keystrokes—provided the tele-
phone number, the dates, and a credit card number. The request went in on
Friday of a long weekend, and on Tuesday morning, a list came back in an
email. The list included 78 telephone numbers the reporter had called—
sources in law enforcement, people he was writing stories about, and editors
in the newspaper. It was a great service for law enforcement—except that
criminals can use it too, to find out whom the detectives are calling. These
incidents stimulated passage of the Telephone Records and Privacy Act of
2006, but in early 2008, links on locatecell.com were still offering to help
“find cell phone records in seconds,” and more. 
If cell phone records are not enough information, consider doing a proper
background check. For $175, you can sign up as an “employer” with
ChoicePoint and gain access to reporting services including criminal records,
credit history, motor vehicle records, educational verification, employment
verification, Interpol, sexual offender registries, and warrants searchers—they
are all there to be ordered, with a la carte pricing. Before we moved from
paper to bits, this information was publicly available, but largely inaccessi-
ble. Now, all it takes is an Internet connection and a credit card. This is one
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of the most important privacy transformations. Information that was previ-
ously available only to professionals with specialized access or a legion of
local workers is now available to everyone.
Then there is real spying. Beverly O’Brien suspected her husband was hav-
ing an affair. If not a physical one, at a minimum she thought he was engag-
ing in inappropriate behavior online. So, she installed some monitoring
software. Not hard to do on the family computer, these packages are pro-
moted as “parental control software”—a tool to monitor your child’s activi-
ties, along with such other uses as employee monitoring, law enforcement,
and to “catch a cheating spouse.” Beverly installed the software, and discov-
ered that her hapless hubby, Kevin, was chatting away while playing Yahoo!
Dominoes. She was an instant spy, a domestic wire-tapper. The marketing
materials for her software neglected to tell her that installing spyware that
intercepts communications traffic was a direct violation of Florida’s Security
of Communications Act, and the trial court refused to admit any of the evi-
dence in their divorce proceeding. The legal system worked, but that didn’t
change the fact that spying has become a relatively commonplace activity,
the domain of spouses and employers, jilted lovers, and business competitors.
Idle Curiosity
There is another form of Little Brother-ism, where amateurs can sit at a com-
puter connected to the Internet and just look for something interesting—not
about their neighbors or husbands, but about anyone at all. With so much
data out there, anyone can discover interesting personal facts, with the
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PERSONAL COMPUTER MONITORING SOFTWARE
PC Pandora (www.pcpandora.com) enables you to “know everything they do
on your PC,” such as “using secret email accounts, chatting with unknown
friends, accessing secret dating profiles or even your private records.” Using it,
you can “find out about secret email accounts, chat partners, dating site
memberships, and more.”
Actual Spy (www.actualspy.com) is a “keylogger which allows you to find
out what other users do on your computer in your absence. It is designed
for the hidden computer monitoring and the monitoring of the computer
activity. Keylogger Actual Spy is capable of catching all keystrokes, captur-
ing the screen, logging the programs being run and closed, monitoring the
clipboard contents.”
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investment of a little time and a little imagination. To take a different kind of
example, imagine having your family’s medical history re-identified from a
paper in an online medical journal.
Figure 2.4 shows a map of the incidence of a disease, let’s say syphilis, in
a part of Boston. The “syphilis epidemic” in this illustration is actually a sim-
ulation. The data was just made up, but maps exactly like this have been
common in journals for decades. Because the area depicted is more than 10
square kilometers, there is no way to figure out which house corresponds to
a dot, only which neighborhood.
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Source: John S. Brownstein, Christopher A. Cassa, Kenneth D. Mandl, No place to hide—reverse
identification of patients from published maps, New England Journal of Medicine, 355:16,
October 19, 2007, 1741-1742.
FIGURE 2.4 Map of part of Boston as from a publication in a medical journal,
showing where a disease has occurred. (Simulated data.)
At least that was true in the days when journals were only print docu-
ments. Now journals are available online, and authors have to submit their
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figures as high-resolution JPEGs. Figure 2.5 shows what happens if you
download the published journal article from the journal’s web site, blow up a
small part of the image, and superimpose it on an easily available map of the
corresponding city blocks. For each of the seven disease locations, there is
only a single house to which it could correspond. Anyone could figure out
where the people with syphilis live.
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Source: John S. Brownstein, Christopher A. Cassa, Kenneth D. Mandl, No place to hide—reverse
identification of patients from published maps, New England Journal of Medicine, 355:16, October 19,
2007, 1741-1742.
FIGURE 2.5 Enlargement of Figure 2.4 superimposed on a housing map of a few
blocks of the city, showing that individual households can be identified to online
readers, who have access to the high-resolution version of the epidemiology map.
This is a re-identification problem, like the one Latanya Sweeney noted
when she showed how to get Governor Weld’s medical records. There are
things that can be done to solve this one. Perhaps the journal should not use
such high-resolution images (although that could cause a loss of crispness, or
even visibility—one of the nice things about online journals is that the visually
impaired can magnify them, to produce crisp images at a very large scale).
Perhaps the data should be “jittered” or “blurred” so what appears on the screen
for illustrative purposes is intentionally incorrect in its fine details. There are
always specific policy responses to specific re-identification scenarios.
Every scenario is a little different, however, and it is often hard to articu-
late sensible principles to describe what should be fixed.
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In 2001, four MIT students attempted to re-identify Chicago homicide vic-
tims for a course project. They had extremely limited resources: no propri-
etary databases such as the companies that check credit ratings possess, no
access to government data, and very limited computing power. Yet they were
able to identify nearly 8,000 individuals from a target set of 11,000.
The source of the data was a free download from the Illinois Criminal
Justice Authority. The primary reference data source was also free. The Social
Security Administration provides a comprehensive death index including
name, birth date, Social Security Number, zip code of last residence, date of
death, and more. Rather than paying the nominal fee for the data (after all,
they were students), these researchers used one of the popular genealogy web
sites, RootsWeb.com, as a free source for the Social Security Death Index
(SSDI) data. They might also have used municipal birth and death records,
which are also publicly available.
The SSDI did not include gender, which was important to completing an
accurate match. But more public records came to the rescue. They found a
database published by the census bureau that enabled them to infer gender
from first names—most people named “Robert” are male, and most named
“Susan” are female. That, and some clever data manipulation, was all it took.
It is far from clear that it was wrong for any particular part of these data sets
to be publicly available, but the combination revealed more than was
intended.
The more re-identification problems we see, and the more ad hoc solutions
we develop, the more we develop a deep-set fear that our problems may never
end. These problems arise because there is a great deal of public data, no one
piece of which is problematic, but which creates privacy violations in combi-
nation. It is the opposite of what we know about salt—that the component ele-
ments, sodium and chlorine, are both toxic, but the compound itself is safe.
Here we have toxic compounds arising from the clever combination of harm-
less components. What can possibly be done about that?
Big Brother, Abroad and in the U.S.
Big Brother really is watching today, and his job has gotten much easier
because of the digital explosion. In China, which has a long history of track-
ing individuals as a mechanism of social control, the millions of residents of
Shenzhen are being issued identity cards, which record far more than the
bearer’s name and address. According to a report in the New York Times, the
cards will document the individual’s work history, educational background,
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religion, ethnicity, police record, medical insurance status, landlord’s phone
number, and reproductive history. Touted as a crime-fighting measure, the new
technology—developed by an American company—will come in handy in case
of street protests or any individual activity deemed suspicious by the author-
ities. The sort of record-keeping that used to be the responsibility of local
authorities is becoming automated and nationalized as the country prospers
and its citizens become increasingly mobile. The technology makes it easier to
know where everyone is, and the government is taking advantage of that
opportunity. Chinese tracking is far more detailed and pervasive than Britain’s
ubiquitous surveillance cameras.
You Pay for the Mike, We’ll Just Listen In
Planting tiny microphones where they might pick up conversations of under-
world figures used to be risky work for federal authorities. There are much
safer alternatives now that many people carry their own radio-equipped
microphones with them all the time.
Many cell phones can be reprogrammed remotely so that the microphone
is always on and the phone is transmitting, even if you think you have pow-
ered it off. The FBI used this technique in 2004 to listen to John Tomero’s con-
versations with other members of his organized crime family. A federal court
ruled that this “roving bug,” installed after due authorization, constituted a
legal from of wiretapping. Tomero could have prevented it by removing the
battery, and now some nervous business executives routinely do exactly that. 
The microphone in a General Motors car equipped with the OnStar system
can also be activated remotely, a feature that can save lives when OnStar
operators contact the driver after receiving a crash signal. OnStar warns,
“OnStar will cooperate with official court orders regarding criminal investi-
gations from law enforcement and other agencies,” and indeed, the FBI has
used this method to eavesdrop on conversations held inside cars. In one case,
a federal court ruled against this way of collecting evidence—but not on pri-
vacy grounds. The roving bug disabled the normal operation of OnStar, and
the court simply thought that the FBI had interfered with the vehicle owner’s
contractual right to chat with the OnStar operators!
Identifying Citizens—Without ID Cards
In the age of global terrorism, democratic nations are resorting to digital sur-
veillance to protect themselves, creating hotly contested conflicts with tradi-
tions of individual liberty. In the United States, the idea of a national
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identification card causes a furious libertarian reaction from parties not usu-
ally outspoken in defense of individual freedom. Under the REAL ID act of
2005, uniform federal standards are being implemented for state-issued
drivers’ licenses. Although it passed through Congress without debate, the law
is opposed by at least 18 states. Resistance pushed back the implementation
timetable first to 2009, and then, in early 2008, to 2011. Yet even fully imple-
mented, REAL ID would fall far short of the true national ID preferred by
those charged with fighting crime and preventing terrorism. 
As the national ID card debate continues in the U.S., the FBI is making it
irrelevant by exploiting emerging technologies. There would be no need for
anyone to carry an ID card if the govern-
ment had enough biometric data on
Americans—that is, detailed records of
their fingerprints, irises, voices, walking
gaits, facial features, scars, and the shape
of their earlobes. Gather a combination of
measurements on individuals walking in
public places, consult the databases, connect the dots, and—bingo!—their
names pop up on the computer screen. No need for them to carry ID cards;
the combination of biometric data would pin them down perfectly.
Well, only imperfectly at this point, but the technology is improving. And
the data is already being gathered and deposited in the data vault of the FBI’s
Criminal Justice Information Services database in Clarksburg, West Virginia.
The database already holds some 55 million sets of fingerprints, and the FBI
processes 100,000 requests for matches every day. Any of 900,000 federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers can send a set of prints and ask the
FBI to identify it. If a match comes up, the individual’s criminal history is
there in the database too.
But fingerprint data is hard to gather; mostly it is obtained when people
are arrested. The goal of the project is to get identifying information on
nearly everyone, and to get it without bothering people too much. For exam-
ple, a simple notice at airport security could advise travelers that, as they pass
through airport security, a detailed “snapshot” will be taken as they enter the
secure area. The traveler would then know what is happening, and could have
refused (and stayed home). As an electronic identification researcher puts it,
“That’s the key. You’ve chosen it. You have chosen to say, ‘Yeah, I want this
place to recognize me.’” No REAL ID controversies, goes the theory; all the
data being gathered would, in some sense at least, be offered voluntarily.
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Friendly Cooperation Between Big Siblings
In fact, there are two Big Brothers, who often work together. And we are, by
and large, glad they are watching, if we are aware of it at all. Only occasion-
ally are we alarmed about their partnership.
The first Big Brother is Orwell’s—the government. And the other Big
Brother is the industry about which most of us know very little: the business
of aggregating, consolidating, analyzing, and reporting on the billions of
individual transactions, financial and otherwise, that take place electronically
every day. Of course, the commercial data aggregation companies are not in
the spying business; none of their data reaches them illicitly. But they do
know a lot about us, and what they know can be extremely valuable, both to
businesses and to the government.
The new threat to privacy is that computers can extract significant infor-
mation from billions of apparently uninteresting pieces of data, in the way
that mining technology has made it economically feasible to extract precious
metals from low-grade ore. Computers can correlate databases on a massive
level, linking governmental data sources together with private and commer-
cial ones, creating comprehensive digital dossiers on millions of people. With
their massive data storage and processing power, they can make connections
in the data, like the clever connections the MIT students made with the
Chicago homicide data, but using brute force rather than ingenuity. And the
computers can discern even very faint traces in the data—traces that may help
track payments to terrorists, set our insurance rates, or simply help us be sure
that our new babysitter is not a sex offender.
And so we turn to the story of the government and the aggregators. 
Acxiom is the country’s biggest customer data company. Its business is to
aggregate transaction data from all those swipes of cards in card readers all
over the world—in 2004, this amounted to more than a billion transactions a
day. The company uses its massive data about financial activity to support
the credit card industry, banks, insurers, and other consumers of information
about how people spend money. Unsurprisingly, after the War on Terror
began, the Pentagon also got interested in Acxiom’s data and the ways they
gather and analyze it. Tracking how money gets to terrorists might help find
the terrorists and prevent some of their attacks. 
ChoicePoint is the other major U.S. data aggregator. ChoicePoint has more
than 100,000 clients, which call on it for help in screening employment can-
didates, for example, or determining whether individuals are good insurance
risks.
Acxiom and ChoicePoint are different from older data analysis operations,
simply because of the scale of their operations. Quantitative differences have
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qualitative effects, as we said in Chapter 1; what has changed is not the tech-
nology, but rather the existence of rich data sources. Thirty years ago, credit
cards had no magnetic stripes. Charging a purchase was a mechanical oper-
ation; the raised numerals on the card made an impression through carbon
paper so you could have a receipt, while the top copy went to the company
that issued the card. Today, if you charge something using your CapitalOne
card, the bits go instantly not only to CapitalOne, but to Acxiom or other
aggregators. The ability to search through huge commercial data sources—
including not just credit card transaction data, but phone call records, travel
tickets, and banking transactions, for example—is another illustration that
more of the same can create something new.
Privacy laws do exist, of course. For a bank, or a data aggregator, to post
your financial data on its web site would be illegal. Yet privacy is still devel-
oping as an area of the law, and it is connected to commercial and govern-
ment interests in uncertain and surprising ways.
A critical development in privacy law was precipitated by the presidency
of Richard Nixon. In what is generally agreed to be an egregious abuse of
presidential power, Nixon used his authority as president to gather informa-
tion on those who opposed him—in the words of his White House Counsel at
the time, to “use the available federal machinery to screw our political ene-
mies.” Among the tactics Nixon used was to have the Internal Revenue
Service audit the tax returns of individuals on an “enemies list,” which
included congressmen, journalists, and major contributors to Democratic
causes. Outrageous as it was to use the IRS for this purpose, it was not ille-
gal, so Congress moved to ban it in the future. 
The Privacy Act of 1974 established broad guidelines for when and how
the Federal Government can assemble dossiers on citizens it is not investigat-
ing for crimes. The government has to give public notice about what infor-
mation it wants to collect and why, and it has to use it only for those reasons.
The Privacy Act limits what the government can do to gather information
about individuals and what it can do with records it holds. Specifically, it
states, “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system
of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written con-
sent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless ….” If the govern-
ment releases information inappropriately, even to another government
agency, the affected citizen can sue for damages in civil court. The protec-
tions provided by the Privacy Act are sweeping, although not as sweeping as
they may seem. Not every government office is in an “agency”; the courts are
not, for example. The Act requires agencies to give public notice of the uses
to which they will put the information, but the notice can be buried in the
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Federal Register where the public probably won’t see it unless news media
happen to report it. Then there is the “unless” clause, which includes signifi-
cant exclusions. For example, the law does not apply to disclosures for
statistical, archival, or historical purposes, civil or criminal law enforcement
activities, Congressional investigations, or valid Freedom of Information Act
requests.
In spite of its exclusions, government practices changed significantly
because of this law. Then, a quarter century later, came 9/11. Law enforcement
should have seen it all coming, was the constant refrain as investigations
revealed how many unconnected dots were in the hands of different govern-
ment agencies. It all could have been prevented if the investigative fiefdoms
had been talking to each other. They should have been able to connect the dots.
But they could not—in part because the Privacy Act restricted inter-agency
data transfers. A response was badly needed. The Department of Homeland
Security was created to ease some of the interagency communication prob-
lems, but that government reorganization was only a start.
In January 2002, just a few months after the World Trade Center attack,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the
Information Awareness Office (IAO) with a mission to:
imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate, and transition infor-
mation technologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, infor-
mation systems that will counter asymmetric threats by achieving
total information awareness useful for preemption; national security
warning; and national security decision making. The most serious
asymmetric threat facing the United States is terrorism, a threat char-
acterized by collections of people loosely organized in shadowy net-
works that are difficult to identify and define. IAO plans to develop
technology that will allow understanding of the intent of these net-
works, their plans, and potentially define opportunities for disrupting
or eliminating the threats. To effectively and efficiently carry this out,
we must promote sharing, collaborating, and reasoning to convert
nebulous data to knowledge and actionable options. 
Vice Admiral John Poindexter directed the effort that came to be known as
“Total Information Awareness” (TIA). The growth of enormous private data
repositories provided a convenient way to avoid many of the prohibitions of
the Privacy Act. The Department of Defense can’t get data from the Internal
Revenue Service, because of the 1974 Privacy Act. But they can both buy it
from private data aggregators! In a May 2002 email to Adm. Poindexter, Lt.
Col Doug Dyer discussed negotiations with Acxiom.
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Acxiom’s Jennifer Barrett is a lawyer and chief privacy officer. She’s
testified before Congress and offered to provide help. One of the key
suggestions she made is that people will object to Big Brother, wide-
coverage databases, but they don’t object to use of relevant data for
specific purposes that we can all agree on. Rather than getting all the
data for any purpose, we should start with the goal, tracking terrorists
to avoid attacks, and then identify the data needed (although we can’t
define all of this, we can say that our templates and models of terror-
ists are good places to start). Already, this guidance has shaped my
thinking.
Ultimately, the U.S. may need huge databases of commercial transac-
tions that cover the world or certain areas outside the U.S. This infor-
mation provides economic utility, and thus provides two reasons why
foreign countries would be interested. Acxiom could build this mega-
scale database.
The New York Times broke the story in October 2002. As Poindexter had
explained in speeches, the government had to “break down the stovepipes”
separating agencies, and get more sophisticated about how to create a big
picture out of a million details, no one of which might be meaningful in itself.
The Times story set off a sequence of reactions from the Electronic Privacy
Information Center and civil libertarians. Congress defunded the office in
2003. Yet that was not the end of the idea.
The key to TIA was data mining, looking for connections across disparate
data repositories, finding patterns, or “signatures,” that might identify terror-
ists or other undesirables. The General Accountability Office report on Data
Mining (GAO-04-548) reported on their survey of 128 federal departments.
They described 199 separate data mining efforts, of which 122 used personal
information.
Although IAO and TIA went away, Project ADVISE at the Department of
Homeland Security continued with large-scale profiling system development.
Eventually, Congress demanded that the privacy issues concerning this pro-
gram be reviewed as well. In his June 2007 report (OIG-07-56), Richard
Skinner, the DHS Inspector General, stated that “program managers did not
address privacy impacts before implementing three pilot initiatives,” and a
few weeks later, the project was shut down. But ADVISE was only one of
twelve data-mining projects going on in DHS at the time.
Similar privacy concerns led to the cancellation of the Pentagon’s TALON
database project. That project sought to compile a database of reports of
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suspected threats to defense facilities as part of a larger program of domestic
counterintelligence.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for airline
passenger screening. One proposed system, CAPPS II, which was ultimately
terminated over privacy concerns, sought to bring together disparate data
sources to determine whether a particular individual might pose a transporta-
tion threat. Color-coded assessment tags would determine whether you could
board quickly, be subject to further screening, or denied access to air travel.
The government creates projects, the media and civil liberties groups raise
serious privacy concerns, the projects are cancelled, and new ones arise to
take their place. The cycle seems to be endless. In spite of Americans’ tradi-
tional suspicions about government surveillance of their private lives, the
cycle seems to be almost an inevitable consequence of Americans’ concerns
about their security, and the responsibility that government officials feel to
use the best available technologies to protect the nation. Corporate databases
often contain the best information on the people about whom the govern-
ment is curious.
Technology Change and Lifestyle Change
New technologies enable new kinds of social interactions. There were no sub-
urban shopping malls before private automobiles became cheap and widely
used. Thirty years ago, many people getting off an airplane reached for cig-
arettes; today, they reach for cell phones. As Heraclitus is reported to have
said 2,500 years ago, “all is flux”—everything keeps changing. The reach-for-
your-cell phone gesture may not last much longer, since airlines are starting
to provide onboard cell phone coverage.
The more people use a new technology, the more useful it becomes. (This
is called a “network effect”; see Chapter 4, “Needles in the Haystack.”) When
one of us got the email address lewis@harvard as a second-year graduate
student, it was a vainglorious joke; all the people he knew who had email
addresses were students in the same office with him. Email culture could not
develop until a lot of people had email, but there wasn’t much point in hav-
ing email if no one else did.
Technology changes and social changes reinforce each other. Another way
of looking at the technological reasons for our privacy loss is to recognize that
the social institutions enabled by the technology are now more important than
the practical uses for which the technology was originally conceived. Once a
lifestyle change catches on, we don’t even think about what it depends on.
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Credit Card Culture
The usefulness of the data aggregated by Acxiom and its kindred data aggre-
gation services rises as the number of people in their databases goes up, and
as larger parts of their lives leave traces in those databases. When credit cards
were mostly short-term loans taken out for large purchases, the credit card
data was mostly useful for determining your creditworthiness. It is still use-
ful for that, but now that many people buy virtually everything with credit
cards, from new cars to fast-food hamburgers, the credit card transaction
database can be mined for a detailed image of our lifestyles. The information
is there, for example, to determine if you usually eat dinner out, how much
traveling you do, and how much liquor you tend to consume. Credit card
companies do in fact analyze this sort of information, and we are glad they
do. If you don’t seem to have been outside Montana in your entire life and
you turn up buying a diamond bracelet in Rio de Janeiro, the credit card com-
pany’s computer notices the deviation from the norm, and someone may call
to be sure it is really you.
The credit card culture is an economic problem for many Americans, who
accept more credit card offers than they need, and accumulate more debt than
they should. But it is hard to imagine the end of the little plastic cards, unless
even smaller RFID tags replace them. Many people carry almost no cash
today, and with every easy swipe, a few more bits go into the databases.
Email Culture
Email is culturally in between telephoning and writing a letter. It is quick, like
telephoning (and instant messaging is even quicker). It is permanent, like a
letter. And like a letter, it waits for the recipient to read it. Email has, to a
great extent, replaced both of the other media for person-to-person commu-
nication, because it has advantages of both. But it has the problems that other
communication methods have, and some new ones of its own.
Phone calls are not intended to last forever, or to be copied and redistrib-
uted to dozens of other people, or to turn up in court cases. When we use
email as though it were a telephone, we tend to forget about what else might
happen to it, other than the telephone-style use, that the recipient will read it
and throw it away. Even Bill Gates probably wishes that he had written his
corporate emails in a less telephonic voice. After testifying in an antitrust
lawsuit that he had not contemplated cutting a deal to divide the web browser
market with a competitor, the government produced a candid email he had
sent, seeming to contradict his denial: “We could even pay them money as
part of the deal, buying a piece of them or something.”
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Email is bits, traveling within an ISP and
through the Internet, using email software that
may keep copies, filter it for spam, or submit it
to any other form of inspection the ISP may
choose. If your email service provider is Google,
the point of the inspection is to attach some
appropriate advertising. If you are working within a financial services corpo-
ration, your emails are probably logged—even the ones to your grandmother—
because the company has to be able to go back and do a thorough audit if
something inappropriate happens.
Email is as public as postcards, unless it is encrypted, which it usually is
not. Employers typically reserve the right to read what is sent through com-
pany email. Check the policy of your own employer; it may be hard to find,
and it may not say what you expect. Here is Harvard’s policy, for example:
Employees must have no expectation or right of privacy in anything
they create, store, send, or receive on Harvard’s computers, networks,
or telecommunications systems. …. Electronic files, e-mail, data files,
images, software, and voice mail may be accessed at any time by
management or by other authorized personnel for any business pur-
pose. Access may be requested and arranged through the system(s)
user, however, this is not required.
Employers have good reason to retain such sweeping rights; they have to be
able to investigate wrongdoing for which the employer would be liable. As a
result, such policies are often less important than the good judgment and
ethics of those who administer them. Happily, Harvard’s are generally good.
But as a general principle, the more people who have the authority to snoop,
the more likely it is that someone will succumb to the temptation.
Commercial email sites can retain copies of messages even after they have
been deleted. And yet, there is very broad acceptance of public, free, email ser-
vices such as Google’s Gmail, Yahoo! Mail, or Microsoft’s Hotmail. The tech-
nology is readily available to make email private: whether you use encryption
tools, or secure email services such as Hushmail, a free, web-based email ser-
vice that incorporates PGP-based encryption (see Chapter 5). The usage of
these services, though, is an insignificant fraction of their unencrypted coun-
terparts. Google gives us free, reliable email service and we, in return, give up
some space on our computer screen for ads. Convenience and cost trump pri-
vacy. By and large, users don’t worry that Google, or its competitors, have all
their mail. It’s a bit like letting the post office keep a copy of every letter you
send, but we are so used to it, we don’t even think about it.
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Web Culture
When we send an email, we think at least a little bit about the impression we
are making, because we are sending it to a human being. We may well say
things we would not say face-to-face, and live to regret that. Because we
can’t see anyone’s eyes or hear anyone’s voice, we are more likely to over-
react and be hurtful, angry, or just too smart for our own good. But because
email is directed, we don’t send email thinking that no one else will ever read
what we say. 
The Web is different. Its social sites inherit their communication culture
not from the letter or telephone call, but from the wall in the public square,
littered with broadsides and scribbled notes, some of them signed and some
not. Type a comment on a blog, or post a photo on a photo album, and your
action can be as anonymous as you wish it to be—you do not know to whom
your message is going. YouTube has millions of personal videos. Photo-
archiving sites are the shoeboxes and photo albums of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Online backup now provides easy access to permanent storage for the
contents of our personal computers. We entrust commercial entities with
much of our most private information, without apparent concern. The gener-
ation that has grown up with the Web has embraced social networking in all
its varied forms: MySpace, YouTube, LiveJournal, Facebook, Xanga,
Classmates.com, Flickr, dozens more, and blogs of every shape and size. More
than being taken, personal privacy has been given away quite freely, because
everyone else is doing it—the surrender of privacy is more than a way to
social connectedness, it is a social institution in its own right. There are 70
million bloggers sharing everything from mindless blather to intimate per-
sonal details. Sites like www.loopt.com let you find your friends, while
twitter.com lets you tell the entire world where you are and what you are
doing. The Web is a confused, disorganized, chaotic realm, rich in both gold
and garbage.
The “old” web, “Web 1.0,” as we now refer to it, was just an information
resource. You asked to see something, and you got to see it. Part of the dis-
inhibition that happens on the new “Web 2.0” social networking sites is due
to the fact that they still allow the movie-screen illusion—that we are “just
looking,” or if we are contributing, we are not leaving footprints or finger-
prints if we use pseudonyms. (See Chapter 4 for more on Web 1.0 and
Web 2.0.)
But of course, that is not really the way the Web ever worked. It is impor-
tant to remember that even Web 1.0 was never anonymous, and even “just
looking” leaves fingerprints. 
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In July 2006, a New York Times reporter called Thelma Arnold of Lilburn,
Georgia. Thelma wasn’t expecting the call. She wasn’t famous, nor was she
involved in anything particularly noteworthy. She enjoyed her hobbies,
helped her friends, and from time to time looked up things on the Web—stuff
about her dogs, and her friends’ ailments.
Then AOL, the search engine she used, decided to release some “anony-
mous” query data. Thelma, like most Internet users, may not have known that
AOL had kept every single topic that she, and every other one of their users,
had asked about. But it did. In a moment of unenlightened generosity, AOL
released for research use a small sample: about 20 million queries from
658,000 different users. That is actually not a lot of data by today’s standards.
For example, in July 2007, there were about 5.6 billion search engine queries,
of which roughly 340 million were AOL queries. So, 20 million queries com-
prise only a couple of days’ worth of search queries. In an effort to protect
their clients’ privacy, AOL “de-identified” the queries. AOL never mentioned
anyone by name; they used random numbers instead. Thelma was 4417149.
AOL mistakenly presumed that removing a single piece of personal identifi-
cation would make it hard to figure out who the users were. It turned out that
for some of the users, it wasn’t hard at all.
It didn’t take much effort to match Thelma with her queries. She had
searched for “landscapers in Lilburn, GA” and several people with the last
name “Arnold,” leading to the obvious question of whether there were any
Arnolds in Lilburn. Many of Thelma’s queries were not particularly useful for
identifying her, but were revealing nonetheless: “dry mouth,” “thyroid,” “dogs
that urinate on everything,” and “swing sets.”
Thelma was not the only person to be identified. User 22690686 (Terri)
likes astrology, and the Edison National Bank, Primerica, and Budweiser.
5779844 (Lawanna) was interested in credit reports, and schools. From what
he searched for, user 356693 seems to have been an aide to Chris Shays,
Congressman from Connecticut.
One of the privacy challenges that we confront as we rummage through
the rubble of the digital explosion is that information exists without context.
Was Thelma Arnold suffering from a wide range of ailments? One might read-
ily conclude that from her searches. The fact is that she often tried to help her
friends by understanding their medical problems.
Or consider AOL user 17556639, whose search history was released along
with Thelma Arnold’s. He searched for the following:
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how to kill your wife 23 Mar, 22:09
wife killer 23 Mar, 22:11
poop 23 Mar, 22:12
dead people 23 Mar, 22:13
pictures of dead people 23 Mar, 22:15
killed people 23 Mar, 22:16
dead pictures 23 Mar, 22:17
murder photo 23 Mar, 22:20
steak and cheese 23 Mar, 22:22
photo of death 23 Mar, 22:30
death 23 Mar, 22:33
dead people photos 23 Mar, 22:33
photo of dead people 23 Mar, 22:35
www.murderdpeople.com 23 Mar, 22:37
decapitated photos 23 Mar, 22:39
car crashes3 23 Mar, 22:40
car crash photo 23 Mar, 22:41
Is this AOL user a potential criminal? Should AOL have called the police? Is
17556639 about to kill his wife? Is he (or she) a researcher with a spelling
problem and an interest in Philly cheese steak? Is reporting him to the police
doing a public service, or is it an invasion of privacy?
There is no way to tell just from these queries if this user was contemplat-
ing some heinous act or doing research for a novel that involves some grisly
scenes. When information is incomplete and decontextualized, it is hard to
judge meaning and intent.
In this particular case, we happen to know the answer. The user, Jason
from New Jersey, was just fooling around, trying to see if Big Brother was
watching. He wasn’t planning to kill his wife at all. Inference from incom-
plete data has the problem of false positives—thinking you have something
that you don’t, because there are other patterns that fit the same data. 
Information without context often leads to erroneous conclusions. Because
our digital trails are so often retrieved outside the context within which they
were created, they sometimes suggest incorrect interpretations. Data interpre-
tation comes with balanced social responsibilities, to protect society when
there is evidence of criminal behavior or intent, and also to protect the indi-
vidual when such evidence is too limited to be reliable. Of course, for every
example of misleading and ambiguous data, someone will want to solve the
problems it creates by collecting more data, rather than less.
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Beyond Privacy
There is nothing new under the sun, and the struggles to define and enforce
privacy are no exception. Yet history shows that our concept of privacy has
evolved, and the law has evolved with it. With the digital explosion, we have
arrived at a moment where further evolution will have to take place rather
quickly.
Leave Me Alone
More than a century ago, two lawyers raised the alarm about the impact tech-
nology and the media were having on personal privacy:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that “what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”
This statement is from the seminal law review article on privacy, published in
1890 by Boston attorney Samuel Warren and his law partner, Louis Brandeis,
later to be a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Warren and Brandeis went on,
“Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To sat-
isfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle.” New technologies made this garbage easy to produce, and
then “the supply creates the demand.”
And those candid photographs and gossip columns were not merely taste-
less; they were bad. Sounding like modern critics of mindless reality TV,
Warren and Brandeis raged that society was going to hell in a handbasket
because of all that stuff that was being spread about.
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circu-
lated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by
inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the
thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains
the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of
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real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and
thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension,
appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never wholly
cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one
can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable
of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and
delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse
can survive under its blighting influence.
The problem they perceived was that it was hard to say just why such inva-
sions of privacy should be unlawful. In individual cases, you could say some-
thing sensible, but the individual legal decisions were not part of a general
regime. The courts had certainly applied legal sanctions for defamation—
publishing malicious gossip that was false—but then what about malicious
gossip that was true? Other courts had imposed penalties for publishing an
individual’s private letters—but on the basis of property law, just as though
the individual’s horse had been stolen rather than the words in his letters.
That did not seem to be the right analogy either. No, they concluded, such
rationales didn’t get to the nub. When something private is published about
you, something has been taken from you, you are a victim of theft—but the
thing stolen from you is part of your identity as a person. In fact, privacy was
a right, they said, a “general right of the individual to be let alone.” That right
had long been in the background of court decisions, but the new technolo-
gies had brought this matter to a head. In articulating this new right, Warren
and Brandeis were, they asserted, grounding it in the principle of “inviolate
personhood,” the sanctity of individual identity.
Privacy and Freedom
The Warren-Brandeis articulation of privacy as a right to be left alone was
influential, but it was never really satisfactory. Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, there were simply too many good reasons for not leaving people alone,
and too many ways in which people preferred not to be left alone. And in the
U.S., First Amendment rights stood in the way of privacy rights. As a general
rule, the government simply cannot stop me from saying anything. In partic-
ular, it usually cannot stop me from saying what I want about your private
affairs. Yet the Warren-Brandeis definition worked well enough for a long
time, because, as Robert Fano put it, “The pace of technological progress was
for a long time sufficiently slow as to enable society to learn pragmatically
how to exploit new technology and prevent its abuse, with society maintain-
ing its equilibrium most of the time.” By the late 1950s, the emerging
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electronic technologies, both computers and communication, had destroyed
that balance. Society could no longer adjust pragmatically, because surveil-
lance technologies were developing too quickly.
The result was a landmark study of privacy by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, which culminated in the publication, in 1967, of a
book by Alan Westin, entitled Privacy and Freedom. (Fano was reviewing
Westin’s book when he painted the picture of social disequilibrium caused by
rapid technological change.) Westin proposed a crucial shift of focus. 
Brandeis and Warren had seen a loss of privacy as a form of personal
injury, which might be so severe as to cause “mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.” Individuals had to take
responsibility for protecting themselves. “Each man is responsible for his own
acts and omissions only.” But the law had to provide the weapons with which
to resist invasions of privacy.
Westin recognized that the Brandeis-Warren formulation was too absolute,
in the face of the speech rights of other individuals and society’s legitimate
data-gathering practices. Protection might come not from protective shields,
but from control over the uses to which personal information could be put.
“Privacy,” wrote Westin, “is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others.” 
… what is needed is a structured and rational weighing process, with
definite criteria that public and private authorities can apply in com-
paring the claim for disclosure or surveillance through new devices
with the claim to privacy. The following are suggested as the basic
steps of such a process: measuring the seriousness of the need to con-
duct surveillance; deciding whether there are alternative methods to
meet the need; deciding what degree of reliability will be required of
the surveillance instrument; determining whether true consent to sur-
veillance has been given; and measuring the capacity for limitation
and control of the surveillance if it is allowed.
So even if there were a legitimate reason why the government, or some other
party, might know something about you, your right to privacy might limit
what the knowing party could do with that information. 
This more nuanced understanding of privacy emerged from the important
social roles that privacy plays. Privacy is not, as Warren and Brandeis had it,
the right to be isolated from society—privacy is a right that makes society
work. Fano mentioned three social roles of privacy. First, “the right to main-
tain the privacy of one’s personality can be regarded as part of the right of
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self-preservation”—the right to keep your adolescent misjudgments and per-
sonal conflicts to yourself, as long as they are of no lasting significance to
your ultimate position in society. Second, privacy is the way society allows
deviations from prevailing social norms,
given that no one set of social norms is
universally and permanently satisfactory—
and indeed, given that social progress
requires social experimentation. And third,
privacy is essential to the development of
independent thought—it enables some
decoupling of the individual from society,
so that thoughts can be shared in limited
circles and rehearsed before public exposure.
Privacy and Freedom, and the rooms full of disk drives that sprouted in
government and corporate buildings in the 1960s, set off a round of soul-
searching about the operational significance of privacy rights. What, in prac-
tice, should those holding a big data bank think about when collecting the
data, handling it, and giving it to others? 
Fair Information Practice Principles
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued “Fair
Information Practice Principles” (FIPP), as follows:
• Openness. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
• Disclosure. There must be a way for a person to find out what infor-
mation about the person is in a record and how it is used.
• Secondary use. There must be a way for a person to prevent informa-
tion about the person that was obtained for one purpose from being
used or made available for other purposes without the person’s
consent.
• Correction. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about the person.
• Security. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dissemi-
nating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability
of the data for its intended use and must take precautions to prevent
misuses of the data.
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These principles were proposed for U.S. medical data, but were never adopted.
Nevertheless, they have been the foundation for many corporate privacy poli-
cies. Variations on these principles have been codified in international trade
agreements by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in 1980, and within the European Union (EU) in 1995. In the United
States, echoes of these principles can be found in some state laws, but federal
laws generally treat privacy on a case by case or “sectorial” basis. The 1974
Privacy Act applies to interagency data transfers within the federal govern-
ment, but places no limitations on data handling in the private sector. The
Fair Credit Reporting Act applies only to consumer credit data, but does not
apply to medical data. The Video Privacy Act applies only to videotape
rentals, but not to “On Demand” movie downloads, which did not exist when
the Act was passed! Finally, few federal or state laws apply to the huge data
banks in the file cabinets and computer systems of cities and towns.
American government is decentralized, and authority over government data
is decentralized as well. 
The U.S. is not lacking in privacy laws. But privacy has been legislated
inconsistently and confusingly, and in terms dependent on technological
contingencies. There is no national consensus on what should be protected,
and how protections should be enforced. Without a more deeply informed
collective judgment on the benefits and costs of privacy, the current legisla-
tive hodgepodge may well get worse
in the United States.
The discrepancy between Ameri-
can and European data privacy stan-
dards threatened U.S. involvement in
international trade, because an EU
directive would prohibit data trans-
fers to nations, such as the U.S., that
do not meet the European “adequacy”
standard for privacy protection.
Although the U.S. sectorial approach
continues to fall short of European
requirements, in 2000 the European
Commission created a “safe harbor”
for American businesses with multi-
national operations. This allowed individual corporations to establish their
practices are adequate with respect to seven principles, covering notice, choice,
onward transfer, access, security, data integrity, and enforcement. 
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U.S. PRIVACY LAWS
The Council of Better Business
Bureaus has compiled a “Review of
Federal and State Privacy Laws”:
www.bbbonline.org/
UnderstandingPrivacy/library/
fed_statePrivLaws.pdf
The state of Texas has also com-
piled a succinct summary of major
privacy laws:
www.oag.state.tx.us/notice/
privacy_table.htm.
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It is, unfortunately, too easy to debate whether the European omnibus
approach is more principled than the U.S. piecemeal approach, when the real
question is whether either approach accomplishes what we want it to achieve.
The Privacy Act of 1974 assured us that obscure statements would be buried
deep in the Federal Register, providing the required official notice about mas-
sive governmental data collection plans—better than nothing, but providing
“openness” only in a narrow and technical sense. Most large corporations
doing business with the public have privacy notices, and virtually no one
reads them. Only 0.3% of Yahoo! users read its privacy notice in 2002, for
example. In the midst of massive negative publicity that year when Yahoo!
changed its privacy policy to allow advertising messages, the number of users
who accessed the privacy policy rose only to 1%. None of the many U.S. pri-
vacy laws prevented the warrantless wiretapping program instituted by the
Bush administration, nor the cooperation with it by major U.S. telecommuni-
cations companies. 
Indeed, cooperation between the federal government and private industry
seems more essential than ever for gathering information about drug traffick-
ing and international terrorism, because of yet another technological devel-
opment. Twenty years ago, most long-distance telephone calls spent at least
part of their time in the air, traveling by radio waves between microwave
antenna towers or between the ground and a communication satellite.
Government eavesdroppers could simply listen in (see the discussion of
Echelon in Chapter 5). Now many phone calls travel through fiber optic
cables instead, and the government is seeking the capacity to tap this pri-
vately owned infrastructure. 
High privacy standards have a cost. They can limit the public usefulness
of data. Public alarm about the release of personal medical information has
led to major legislative remedies. The Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) was intended both to encourage the use of elec-
tronic data interchange for health information, and to impose severe penal-
ties for the disclosure of “Protected Health Information,” a very broad
category including not just medical histories but, for example, medical pay-
ments. The bill mandates the removal of anything that could be used to
re-connect medical records to their source. HIPAA is fraught with problems
in an environment of ubiquitous data and powerful computing. Connecting
the dots by assembling disparate data sources makes it extremely difficult to
achieve the level of anonymity that HIPAA sought to guarantee. But help is
available, for a price, from a whole new industry of HIPAA-compliance advi-
sors. If you search for HIPAA online, you will likely see advertisements for
services that will help you protect your data, and also keep you out of jail.
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At the same time as HIPAA and other privacy laws have safeguarded our
personal information, they are making medical research costly and sometimes
impossible to conduct. It is likely that classic studies such as the Framingham
Heart Study, on which much public policy about heart disease was founded,
could not be repeated in today’s environment of strengthened privacy rules.
Dr. Roberta Ness, president of the American College of Epidemiology, reported
that “there is a perception that HIPAA may even be having a negative effect
on public health surveillance practices.”
The European reliance on the Fair Information Practice Principles is often
no more useful, in practice, than the American approach. Travel through
London, and you will see many signs saying “Warning: CCTV in use” to meet
the “Openness” requirement about the surveillance cameras. That kind of
notice throughout the city hardly empowers the individual. After all, even Big
Brother satisfied the FIPP Openness standard, with the ubiquitous notices that
he was watching! And the “Secondary Use” requirement, that European citi-
zens should be asked permission before data collected for one purpose is used
for another, is regularly ignored in some countries, although compliance
practices are a major administrative burden on European businesses and may
cause European businesses at least to pause and think before “repurposing”
data they have gathered. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni repeatedly asks European
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EVER READ THOSE “I AGREE” DOCUMENTS?
Companies can do almost anything they want with your information, as long
as you agree. It seems hard to argue with that principle, but the deck can be
stacked against the consumer who is “agreeing” to the company’s terms. Sears
Holding Corporation (SHC), the parent of Sears, Roebuck and Kmart, gave
consumers an opportunity to join “My Sears Holding Community,” which the
company describes as “something new, something different … a dynamic and
highly interactive online community … where your voice is heard and your
opinion matters.” When you went online to sign up, the terms appeared in a
window on the screen. 
The scroll box held only 10 lines of text, and the agreement was 54 boxfuls
long. Deep in the terms was a detail: You were allowing Sears to install soft-
ware on your PC that “monitors all of the Internet behavior that occurs on
the computer …, including … filling a shopping basket, completing an appli-
cation form, or checking your … personal financial or health information.”
So your computer might send your credit history and AIDS test results to
SHC, and you said it was fine!
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audiences if they have ever been asked for permission to re-use data collected
about them, and has gotten only a single positive response—and that was
from a gentleman who had been asked by a U.S. company.
The five FIPP principles, and the spirit of transparency and personal con-
trol that lay behind them, have doubtless led to better privacy practices. But
they have been overwhelmed by the digital explosion, along with the insecu-
rity of the world and all the social and cultural changes that have occurred
in daily life. Fred H. Cate, a privacy scholar at the Indiana University, char-
acterizes the FIPP principles as almost a complete bust:
Modern privacy law is often expensive, bureaucratic, burdensome,
and offers surprisingly little protection for privacy. It has substituted
individual control of information, which it in fact rarely achieves, for
privacy protection. In a world rapidly becoming more global through
information technologies, multinational commerce, and rapid travel,
data protection laws have grown more fractured and protectionist.
Those laws have become unmoored from their principled basis, and
the principles on which they are based have become so varied and
procedural, that our continued intonation of the FIPPS mantra no
longer obscures the fact that this emperor indeed has few if any
clothes left. 
Privacy as a Right to Control Information
It is time to admit that we don’t even really know what we want. The bits are
everywhere; there is simply no locking them down, and no one really wants
to do that anymore. The meaning of pri-
vacy has changed, and we do not have a
good way of describing it. It is not the right
to be left alone, because not even the most
extreme measures will disconnect our digi-
tal selves from the rest of the world. It is
not the right to keep our private informa-
tion to ourselves, because the billions of
atomic factoids don’t any more lend themselves into binary classification,
private or public.
Reade Seligmann would probably value his privacy more than most
Americans alive today. On Monday, April 17, 2006, Seligmann was indicted
in connection with allegations that a 27-year-old performer had been raped
at a party at a Duke fraternity house. He and several of his lacrosse team-
mates instantly became poster children for everything that is wrong with
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American society—an example of national over-exposure that would leave
even Warren and Brandeis breathless if they were around to observe it.
Seligmann denied the charges, and at first it looked like a typical he-said,
she-said scenario, which could be judged only on credibility and presump-
tions about social stereotypes.
But during the evening of that fraternity party, Seligmann had left a trail
of digital detritus. His data trail indicated that he could not have been at the
party long enough, or at the right time, to have committed the alleged rape.
Time-stamped photos from the party showed that the alleged victim of his
rape was dancing at 12:02 AM. At 12:24 AM, he used his ATM card at a bank,
and the bank’s computers kept records of the event. Seligmann used his cell
phone at 12:25 AM, and the phone company tracked every call he made, just
as your phone company keeps a record of every call you make and receive.
Seligmann used his prox card to get into his dormitory room at 12:46 AM,
and the university’s computer kept track of his comings and goings, just as
other computers keep track of every card swipe or RFID wave you and I make
in our daily lives. Even during the ordinary movements of a college student
going to a fraternity party, every step along the way was captured in digital
detail. If Seligmann had gone to the extraordinary lengths necessary to avoid
leaving digital fingerprints—not using a modern camera, a cell phone, or a
bank, and living off campus to avoid electronic locks—his defense would have
lacked important exculpatory evidence.
Which would we prefer—the new world with digital fingerprints every-
where and the constant awareness that we are being tracked, or the old world
with few digital footprints and a stronger sense of security from prying eyes?
And what is the point of even asking the question, when the world cannot be
restored to its old information lock-down?
In a world that has moved beyond the old notion of privacy as a wall
around the individual, we could instead regulate those who would inappro-
priately use information about us. If I post a YouTube video of myself danc-
ing in the nude, I should expect to suffer some personal consequences.
Ultimately, as Warren and Brandeis said, individuals have to take responsibil-
ity for their actions. But society has drawn lines in the past around which
facts are relevant to certain decisions, and which are not. Perhaps, the border
of privacy having become so porous, the border of relevancy could be
stronger. As Daniel Weitzner explains:
New privacy laws should emphasize usage restrictions to guard
against unfair discrimination based on personal information, even if
it’s publicly available. For instance, a prospective employer might be
able to find a video of a job applicant entering an AIDS clinic or a
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mosque. Although the individual might have already made such facts
public, new privacy protections would preclude the employer from
making a hiring decision based on that information and attach real
penalties for such abuse.
In the same vein, it is not intrinsically wrong that voting lists and political
contributions are a matter of public record. Arguably, they are essential to the
good functioning of the American democracy. Denying someone a promotion
because of his or her political inclinations would be wrong, at least for most
jobs. Perhaps a nuanced classification of the ways in which others are
allowed to use information about us would relieve some of our legitimate
fears about the effects of the digital explosion. 
In The Transparent Society, David Brin wrote:
Transparency is not about eliminating privacy. It’s about giving us the
power to hold accountable those who would violate it. Privacy implies
serenity at home and the right to be let alone. It may be irksome how
much other people know about me, but I have no right to police their
minds. On the other hand I care very deeply about what others do to
me and to those I love. We all have a right to some place where we
can feel safe.
Despite the very best efforts, and the most sophisticated technologies, we can-
not control the spread of our private information. And we often want infor-
mation to be made public to serve our own, or society’s purposes. 
Yet there can still be principles of accountability for the misuse of infor-
mation. Some ongoing research is outlining a possible new web technology,
which would help ensure that information is used appropriately even if it is
known. Perhaps automated classification and reasoning tools, developed to
help connect the dots in networked information systems, can be retargeted to
limit inappropriate use of networked information. A continuing border war is
likely to be waged, however, along an existing free speech front: the line sep-
arating my right to tell the truth about you from your right not to have that
information used against you. In the realm of privacy, the digital explosion
has left matters deeply unsettled.
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Always On
In 1984, the pervasive, intrusive technology could be turned off:
As O’Brien passed the telescreen a thought seemed to strike him. He
stopped, turned aside and pressed a switch on the wall. There was a
sharp snap. The voice had stopped.
Julia uttered a tiny sound, a sort of squeak of surprise. Even in the
midst of his panic, Winston was too much taken aback to be able to
hold his tongue.
“You can turn it off!” he said.
“Yes,” said O’Brien, “we can turn it off. We have that privilege. …Yes,
everything is turned off. We are alone.”
Sometimes we can still turn it off today, and should. But mostly we don’t
want to. We don’t want to be alone; we want to be connected. We find it con-
venient to leave it on, to leave our footprints and fingerprints everywhere, so
we will be recognized when we come back. We don’t want to have to keep
retyping our name and address when we return to a web site. We like it when
the restaurant remembers our name, perhaps because our phone number
showed up on caller ID and was linked to our record in their database. We
appreciate buying grapes for $1.95/lb instead of $3.49, just by letting the
store know that we bought them. We may want to leave it on for ourselves
because we know it is on for criminals. Being watched reminds us that they
are watched as well. Being watched also means we are being watched over.
And perhaps we don’t care that so much is known about us because that
is the way human society used to be—kinship groups and small settlements,
where knowing everything about everyone else was a matter of survival.
Having it on all the time may resonate with inborn preferences we acquired
millennia ago, before urban life made anonymity possible. Still today, privacy
means something very different in a small rural town than it does on the
Upper East Side of Manhattan.
We cannot know what the cost will be of having it on all the time. Just as
troubling as the threat of authoritarian measures to restrict personal liberty is
the threat of voluntary conformity. As Fano astutely observed, privacy allows
limited social experimentation—the deviations from social norms that are
much riskier to the individual in the glare of public exposure, but which can
be, and often have been in the past, the leading edges of progressive social
changes. With it always on, we may prefer not to try anything unconven-
tional, and stagnate socially by collective inaction.
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For the most part, it is too late, realistically, ever to turn it off. We may
once have had the privilege of turning it off, but we have that privilege no
more. We have to solve our privacy problems another way.
✷
The digital explosion is shattering old assumptions about who knows what.
Bits move quickly, cheaply, and in multiple perfect copies. Information that
used to be public in principle—for example, records in a courthouse, the price
you paid for your house, or stories in a small-town newspaper—is now
available to everyone in the world. Information that used to be private and
available to almost no one—medical records and personal snapshots, for
example—can become equally widespread through carelessness or malice. The
norms and business practices and laws of society have not caught up to the
change. 
The oldest durable communication medium is the written document. Paper
documents have largely given way to electronic analogs, from which paper
copies are produced. But are electronic documents really like paper docu-
ments? Yes and no, and misunderstanding the document metaphor can be
costly. That is the story to which we now turn. 
72 BLOWN TO BITS
02_0137135599_ch02.qxd  4/16/08  1:21 PM  Page 72
CHAPTER 3
Ghosts in the Machine
Secrets and Surprises of Electronic
Documents 
What You See Is Not What the Computer
Knows 
On March 4, 2005, Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena was released from cap-
tivity in Baghdad, where she had been held hostage for a month. As the car
conveying her to safety approached a checkpoint, it was struck with gunfire
from American soldiers. The shots wounded Sgrena and her driver and killed
an Italian intelligence agent, Nicola Calipari, who had helped engineer her
release. 
A fierce dispute ensued about why U.S soldiers had rained gunfire on a car
carrying citizens of one of its Iraq war allies. The Americans claimed that the
car was speeding and did not slow when warned. The Italians denied both
claims. The issue caused diplomatic tension between the U.S. and Italy and
was a significant political problem for the Italian prime minister. 
The U.S. produced a 42-page report on the incident, exonerating the U.S.
soldiers. The report enraged Italian officials. The Italians quickly released
their own report, which differed from the U.S. report in crucial details. 
Because the U.S. report included sensitive military information, it was
heavily redacted before being shared outside military circles (see Figure 3.1).
In another time, passages would have been blacked out with a felt marker,
and the document would have been photocopied and given to reporters. But
in the information age, the document was redacted and distributed electron-
ically, not physically. The redacted report was posted on a web site the allies
used to provide war information to the media. In an instant, it was visible to
any of the world’s hundreds of millions of Internet users.
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Source: http://www.corriere.it/Media/Documenti/Classified.pdf, extract from page 10.
FIGURE 3.1 Section from page 10 of redacted U.S. report on the death of Italian
journalist Nicola Calipari. Information that might have been useful to the enemy was
blacked out.
One of those Internet users was an Italian blogger, who scrutinized the U.S.
report and quickly recovered the redacted text using ordinary office software.
The blogger posted the full text of the report (see Figure 3.2) on his own web
site. The unredacted text disclosed positions of troops and equipment, rules
of engagement, procedures followed by allied troops, and other information
of interest to the enemy. The revelations were both dangerous to U.S. soldiers
and acutely embarrassing to the U.S. government, at a moment when tempers
were high among Italian and U.S. officials. In the middle of the most high-
tech war in history, how could this fiasco have happened? 
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Source: http://www.corriere.it/Media/Documenti/Unclassified.doc.
FIGURE 3.2 The text of Figure 3.1 with the redaction bars electronically removed.
Paper documents and electronic documents are useful in many of the same
ways. Both can be inspected, copied, and stored. But they are not equally use-
ful for all purposes. Electronic documents are easier to change, but paper doc-
uments are easier to read in the bathtub. In fact, the metaphor of a series of
bits as a “document” can be taken only so far. When stretched beyond its
breaking point, the “document” metaphor can produce surprising and dam-
aging results—as happened with the Calipari report. 
Office workers love “WYSIWYG” interfaces—“What You See Is What You
Get.” They edit the electronic document on the screen, and when they print
it, it looks just the same. They are deceived into thinking that what is in the
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computer is a sort of miniaturized duplicate of the image on the screen,
instead of computer codes that produce the picture on the screen. In fact, the
WYSIWYG metaphor is imperfect, and therefore risky. The report on the death
of Nicola Calipari illustrates what can go wrong when users accept such a
metaphor too literally. What the authors of the document saw was dramati-
cally different from what they got. 
The report had been prepared using software that creates PDF files. Such
software often includes a “Highlighter Tool,” meant to mimic the felt markers
that leave a pale mark on ordinary paper, through which the underlying text
is visible (see Figure 3.3). The software interface shows the tool’s icon as a
marker writing a yellow stripe, but the user can change the color of the stripe.
Probably someone tried to turn the Highlighter Tool into a redaction tool by
changing its color to black, unaware that what was visible on the screen was
not the same as the contents of the electronic document. 
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Reprinted with permission from Adobe Systems Incorporated.
FIGURE 3.3 Adobe Acrobat Highlighter Tool, just above the middle. On the screen,
the “highlighter” is writing yellow ink, but with a menu command, it can be changed
to any other color. 
The Italian blogger guessed that the black bars were nothing more than
overlays created using the Highlighter Tool, and that the ghostly traces of the
invisible words were still part of the electronic document that was posted on
the web. With that realization, he easily undid the black “highlighting” to
reveal the text beneath. 
Just as disturbing as this mistake is the fact that two major newspapers had
quite publicly made the same mistake only a few years before. On April 16,
2000, the New York Times had detailed a secret CIA history of attempts by
the U.S. to overthrow Iran’s government in 1953. The newspaper reproduced
sections of the CIA report, with black redaction bars to obscure the names of
CIA operatives within Iran. The article was posted on the Web in mid-June,
2000, accompanied by PDFs of several pages of the CIA report. John Young,
who administers a web site devoted to publishing government-restricted doc-
uments, removed the redaction bars and revealed the names of CIA agents. A
controversy ensued about the ethics and legality of the disclosure, but the
names are still available on the Web as of this writing.
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The Washington Post made exactly the same mistake in 2002, when it pub-
lished an article about a demand letter left by the Washington snipers, John
Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo. As posted on the Post’s web site,
certain information was redacted in a way that was easily reversed by an
inquisitive reader of the online edition of the paper (see Figure 3.4). The paper
fixed the problem quickly after its discovery, but not quickly enough to pre-
vent copies from being saved.
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Source: Washington Post web site, transferred to web.bham.ac.uk/forensic/news/02/sniper2.html.
Actual images taken from slide 29 of http://www.ccc.de/congress/2004/fahrplan/files/
316-hidden-data-slides.pdf.
FIGURE 3.4 Letter from the Washington snipers. On the left, the redacted letter as
posted on the Washington Post web site. On the right, the letter with the redaction
bars electronically removed.
What might have been done in these cases, instead of posting the PDF with
the redacted text hidden but discoverable? The Adobe Acrobat software has a
security feature, which uses encryption (discussed in Chapter 5, “Secret Bits”)
to make it impossible for documents to be altered by unauthorized persons,
while still enabling anyone to view them. Probably those who created these
documents did not know about this feature, or about commercially available
software called Redax, which government agencies use to redact text from
documents created by Adobe Acrobat. 
A clumsier, but effective, option would be to scan the printed page, com-
plete with its redaction bars. The resulting file would record only a series of
black and white dots, losing all the underlying typographical structure—font
names and margins, for example. Whatever letters had once been “hidden”
under the redaction bars could certainly not be recovered, yet this solution
has an important disadvantage. 
One of the merits of formatted text documents such as PDFs is that they
can be “read” by a computer. They can be searched, and the text they con-
tain can be copied. With the document reduced to a mass of black and white
dots, it could no longer be manipulated as text. 
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A more important capability would be lost as well. The report would be
unusable by programs that vocalize documents for visually impaired readers.
A blind reader could “read” the U.S. report on the Calipari incident, because
software is available that “speaks” the contents of PDF documents. A blind
reader would find a scanned version of the same document useless. 
Tracking Changes—and Forgetting That They Are
Remembered 
In October, 2005, UN prosecutor Detlev Mehlis released to the media a report
on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Syria
had been suspected of engineering the killing, but Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad denied any involvement. The report was not final, Mehlis said, but
there was “evidence of both Lebanese and Syrian involvement.” Deleted, and
yet uncovered by the reporters who were given the document, was an incen-
diary claim: that Assad’s brother Maher, commander of the Republican Guard,
was personally involved in the assassination. 
Microsoft Word offers a “Track Changes” option. If enabled, every change
made to the document is logged as part of the document itself—but ordinar-
ily not shown. The document bears its entire creation history: who made each
change, when, and what it was. Those editing the document can also add
comments—which would not appear in the final document, but may help edi-
tors explain their thinking to their colleagues as the document moves around
electronically within an office. 
Of course, information about strategic planning is not meant for outsiders
to see, and in the case of legal documents, can have catastrophic conse-
quences if revealed. It is a simple matter to remove these notes about the doc-
ument’s history—but someone has to remember to do it! The UN prosecutor
neglected to remove the change history from his Microsoft Word document,
and a reporter discovered the deleted text (see Figure 3.5). (Of course, in
Middle Eastern affairs, one cannot be too suspicious. Some thought that
Mehlis had intentionally left the text in the document, as a warning to the
Syrians that he knew more than he was yet prepared to acknowledge.) 
A particularly negligent example of document editing involved SCO
Corporation, which claimed that several corporations violated its intellectual
property rights. In early 2004, SCO filed suit in a Michigan court against
Daimler Chrysler, claiming Daimler had violated terms of its Unix software
agreement with SCO. But the electronic version of its complaint carried its
modification history with it, revealing a great deal of information about SCO’s
litigation planning. In particular, when the change history was revealed, it
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Source: Section of UN report, posted on Washington Post web site, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
world/syria/mehlis.report.doc.
FIGURE 3.5 Section from the UN report on the assassination of Rafik Hariri. An
earlier draft stated that Maher Assad and others were suspected of involvement in
the killing, but in the document as it was released, their names were replaced with
the phrase “senior Lebanese and Syrian officials.”
Saved Information About a Document 
An electronic document (for exam-
ple, one produced by text-processing
software) often includes information
that is about the document—so-called
metadata. The most obvious example
is the name of the file itself. File
names carry few risks. For example,
when we send someone a file as an
email attachment, we realize that the
recipient is going to see the name of
the file as well as its contents. 
But the file is often tagged with
much more information than just its
name. The metadata generally
includes the name associated with
the owner of the computer, and the
dates the file was created and last
modified—often useful information,
since the recipient can tell whether
she is receiving an older or newer
version than the version she already
turned out that until exactly 11:10 a.m. on February 18, 2004, SCO had instead
planned to sue a different company, Bank of America, in federal rather than
state court, for copyright infringement rather than breach of contract!
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FORGING METADATA
Metadata can help prove or refute
claims. Suppose Sam emails his
teacher a homework paper after
the due date, with a plea that the
work had been completed by the
deadline, but was undeliverable due
to a network failure. If Sam is a
cheater, he could be exposed if he
doesn’t realize that the “last modi-
fied” date is part of the document.
However, if Sam is aware of this,
he could “stamp” the document
with the right time by re-setting
the computer’s clock before saving
the file. The name in which the
computer is registered and other
metadata are also forgeable, and
therefore are of limited use as
evidence in court cases. 
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has. Some word processors include version information as well, a record of
who changed what, when, and why. But the unaware can be trapped even by
such innocent information, since it tends not to be visible unless the recipi-
ent asks to see it. In Figure 3.6, the metadata reveals the name of the military
officer who created the redacted report on the death of Nicola Calipari. 
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Reprinted with permission from Adobe Systems Incorporated.
FIGURE 3.6 Part of the metadata of the Calipari report, as revealed by the
“Properties” command of Adobe Acrobat Reader. The data shows that Richard Thelin
was the author, and that he altered the file less than two minutes after creating it.
Thelin was a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps at the time of the incident. 
Authorship information leaked in this way can have real consequences. In
2003, the British government of Tony Blair released documentation of its case
for joining the U.S. war effort in Iraq. The document had many problems—large
parts of it turned out to have been plagiarized from a 13-year-old PhD thesis.
Equally embarrassing was that the electronic fingerprints of four civil servants
who created it were left on the document when it was released electronically
on the No. 10 Downing Street web site. According to the Evening Standard of
London, “All worked in propaganda units controlled by Alastair Campbell, Tony
Blair’s director of strategy and communications,” although the report had sup-
posedly been the work of the Foreign Office. The case of the “dodgy dossier”
caused an uproar in Parliament. 
You don’t have to be a businessperson or government official to be
victimized by documents bearing fingerprints. When you send someone a
document as an attachment to an email, very likely the document’s metadata
shows who actually created it, and when. If you received it from someone else
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and then altered it, that may show as well. If you put the text of the docu-
ment into the body of your email instead, the metadata won’t be included;
the message will be just the text you see on the screen. Be sure of what you
are sending before you send it! 
Can the Leaks Be Stopped? 
Even in the most professional organizations, and certainly in ordinary house-
holds, knowledge about technological dangers and risks does not spread
instantaneously to everyone who should know it. The Calipari report was pub-
lished five years after the New York Times had been embarrassed. How can
users of modern information technology—today, almost all literate people—
stay abreast of knowledge about when and how to protect their information? 
It is not easy to prevent the leakage of sensitive information that is hid-
den in documents but forgotten by their creators, or that is captured as meta-
data. In principle, offices should have a check-out protocol so that documents
are cleansed before release. But in a networked world, where email is a criti-
cal utility, how can offices enforce document release protocols without ren-
dering simple tasks cumbersome? A rather harsh measure is to prohibit use
of software that retains such information; that was the solution adopted by
the British government in the aftermath of the “dodgy dossier” scandal. But
the useful features of the software are then lost at the same time. A protocol
can be established for converting “rich” document formats such as that of
Microsoft Word to formats that retain less information, such as Adobe PDF.
But it turns out that measures used to eradicate personally identifiable infor-
mation from documents don’t achieve as thorough a cleansing as is com-
monly assumed.
At a minimum, office workers need education. Their software has great
capabilities they may find useful, but many of those useful features have risks
as well. And we all just need to think about what we are doing with our doc-
uments. We all too mindlessly re-type keystrokes we have typed a hundred
times in the past, not pausing to think that the hundred and first situation
may be different in some critical way! 
Representation, Reality, and Illusion 
René Magritte, in his famous painting of a pipe, said “This isn’t a pipe” (see
Figure 3.7). Of course it isn’t; it’s a painting of a pipe. The image is made out
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of paint, and Magritte was making a metaphysical joke. The painting is enti-
tled “The treachery of images,” and the statement that the image isn’t the
reality is part of the image itself. 
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Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Purchased with funds provided by the Mr. and Mrs. William
Preston Harrison Collection. Photograph © 2007 Museum Associates/LACMA.
FIGURE 3.7 Painting by Magritte. The legend says “This isn’t a pipe.” Indeed, it’s
only smudges of paint that make you think of a pipe, just as an electronic document
is only bits representing a document. 
When you take a photograph, you capture inside the camera something
from which an image can be produced. In a digital camera, the bits in an elec-
tronic memory are altered according to some pattern. The image, we say, is
“represented” in the camera’s memory. But if you took out the memory and
looked at it, you couldn’t see the image. Even if you printed the pattern of 0s
and 1s stored in the memory, the image wouldn’t appear. You’d have to know
how the bits represent the image in order to get at the image itself. In the
world of digital photography, the format of the bits has been standardized, so
that photographs taken on a variety of cameras can be displayed on a vari-
ety of computers and printed on a variety of printers. 
The general process of digital photography is shown in Figure 3.8. Some
external reality—a scene viewed through a camera lens, for example—is
turned into a string of bits. The bits somehow capture useful information
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about reality, but there is nothing “natural” about the way reality is captured.
The representation is a sort of ghost of the original, not identical to the orig-
inal and actually quite unlike it, but containing enough of the soul of the
original to be useful later on. The representation follows rules. The rules are
arbitrary conventions and the product of human invention, but they have
been widely accepted so photographs can be exchanged. 
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FIGURE 3.8 Reproducing an image electronically is a two-stage process. First, the
scene is translated into bits, creating a digital model. Then the model is rendered as a
visible image. The model can be stored indefinitely, communicated from one place to
another, or computationally analyzed and enhanced to produce a different model
before it is rendered. The same basic structure applies to the reproduction of video
and audio.
The representation of the photograph in bits is called a model and the
process of capturing it is called modeling. The model is turned into an image
by rendering the model; this is what happens when you transfer the bits rep-
resenting a digital photograph to a computer screen or printer. Rendering
brings the ghost back to life. The image resembles, to the human eye, the
original reality—provided that the model is good enough. Typically, a model
that is not good enough—has too few bits, for example—cannot produce an
image that convincingly resembles the reality it was meant to capture. 
Modeling always omits information. Magritte’s painting doesn’t smell like
a pipe; it has a different patina than a pipe; and you can’t turn it around to
see what the other side of the pipe looks like. Whether the omitted informa-
tion is irrelevant or essential can’t be judged without knowing how the model
is going to be used. Whoever creates the model and renders it has the power
to shape the experience of the viewer.
The process of modeling followed by rendering applies to many situations
other than digital photography. For example, the same transformations hap-
pen when music is captured on a CD or as an MP3. The rendering process pro-
duces audible music from a digital representation, via stereo speakers or a
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headset. CDs and MP3s use quite distinct modeling methods, with CDs gen-
erally capturing music more accurately, using a larger number of bits. 
Knowing that digital representations don’t resemble the things they repre-
sent explains the difference between the terms “analog” and “digital.” An
analog telephone uses a continuously varying electric signal to represent a
continuously varying sound—the voltage of the telephone signal is an “ana-
log” of the sound it resembles—in the same way that Magritte applied paint
smoothly to canvas to mimic the shape of the pipe. The shift from analog to
digital technologies, in telephones, televisions, cameras, X-ray machines, and
many other devices, at first seems to lose the immediacy and simplicity of the
old devices. But the enormous processing power of modern computers makes
the digital representation far more flexible and useful. 
Indeed, the same general pro-
cesses are at work in situations
where there is no “reality” because
the images are of things that have
never existed. Examples are video
games, animated films, and virtual
walk-throughs of unbuilt architec-
ture. In these cases, the first step of
Figure 3.8 is truncated. The “model”
is created not by capturing reality in
an approximate way, but by pure
synthesis: as the strokes of an artist’s
electronic pen, or the output of com-
puter-aided design software. 
The severing of the immediate
connection between representation
and reality in the digital world has
created opportunities, dangers, and
puzzles. One of the earliest triumphs
of “digital signal processing,” the
science of doing computations on
the digital representations of reality,
was to remove the scratches and
noise from old recordings of the
great singer Enrico Caruso. No amount of analog electronics could have
cleaned up the old records and restored the clarity to Caruso’s voice. 
And yet the growth of digital “editing” has its dark side as well. Photo-
editing software such as Photoshop can be used to alter photographic evi-
dence presented to courts of law. 
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CAN WE BE SURE A PHOTO
IS UNRETOUCHED? 
Cryptographic methods (discussed
in Chapter 5) can establish that a
digital photograph has not been
altered. A special camera gets a
digital key from the “image verifi-
cation system,” attaches a “digital
signature” (see Chapter 5) to the
image and uploads the image and
the signature to the verification
system. The system processes the
received image with the same key
and verifies that the same signa-
ture results. The system is secure
because it is impossible, with any
reasonable amount of computation,
to produce another image that
would yield the same signature
with this key.
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The movie Toy Story and its descendants are unlikely to put human actors
out of work in the near future, but how should society think about synthetic
child pornography? “Kiddie porn” is absolutely illegal, unlike other forms of
pornography, because of the harm done to the children who are abused to
produce it. But what about pornographic images of children who do not exist
and never have—who are simply the creation of a skilled graphic synthesizer?
Congress outlawed such virtual kiddie porn in 1996, in a law that prohibited
any image that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.” The Supreme Court overturned the law on First Amendment
grounds. Prohibiting images that “appear to” depict children is going too far,
the court ruled—such synthetic pictures, no matter how abhorrent, are consti-
tutionally protected free speech. 
In this instance at least, real-
ity matters, not what images
appear to show. Chapter 7, “You
Can’t Say That on the Internet,”
discusses other cases in which
society is struggling to control
social evils that are facilitated
by information technology. In
the world of exploded assumptions about reality and artifice, laws that com-
bat society’s problems may also compromise rights of free expression. 
What Is the Right Representation? 
Figure 3.9 is a page from the Book of
Kells, one of the masterpieces of
medieval manuscript illumination,
produced around A.D. 800 in an Irish
monastery. The page contains a few
words of Latin, portrayed in an
astoundingly complex interwoven
lacework of human and animal fig-
ures, whorls, and crosshatching. The
book is hundreds of pages long, and
in the entire work no two of the let-
ters or decorative ornaments are
drawn the same way. The elaborately
ornate graphic shows just 21 letters
(see Figure 3.10). 
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In the world of exploded
assumptions about reality and
artifice, laws that combat society’s
problems may also compromise
rights of free expression.
DIGITAL CAMERAS AND MEGAPIXELS
Megapixels—millions of pixels—are
a standard figure of merit for digi-
tal cameras. If a camera captures
too few pixels, it can’t take good
photographs. But no one should
think that more pixels invariably
yield a better image. If a digital
camera has a low-quality lens,
more pixels will simply produce a
more precise representation of a
blurry picture!
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FIGURE 3.9 Opening page of the Gospel of St. John from the Book of Kells. 
IN PRINCIPIO ERAT VERBUM
FIGURE 3.10 The words of the beginning of the gospel of St. John. In the book of
Kells, the easiest word to spot is ERAT, just to the left of center about a quarter of
the way up the page. 
Do these two illustrations contain the same information? The answer
depends on what information is meant to be recorded. If the only important
thing were the Latin prose, then either representation might be equally good,
though Figure 3.10 is easier to read. But the words themselves are far from
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the only important thing in the Book of Kells. It is one of the great works of
Western art and craftsmanship. 
A graphic image such as Figure 3.9 is represented as a rectangular grid of
many rows and columns, by recording the color at each position in the grid
(see Figure 3.11). To produce such a representation, the page itself is scanned,
one narrow row after the next, and each row is divided horizontally into tiny
square “picture elements” or pixels. An image representation based on a divi-
sion into pixels is called a raster or bitmap representation. The representation
corresponds to the structure of a computer screen (or a digital TV screen),
which is also divided into a grid of individual pixels—how many pixels, and
how small they are, affect the quality and price of the display. 
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FIGURE 3.11 A detail enlarged from the upper-right corner of the opening page of
John from the Book of Kells. 
What would be the computer representation of the mere Latin text, Figure
3.10? The standard code for the Roman alphabet, called ASCII for the
American Standard Code for Information Interchange, assigns a different 8-
bit code to each letter or symbol. ASCII uses one byte (8 bits) per character.
For example, A = 01000001, a = 01100001, $ = 00100100, and 7 = 00110111. 
The equation 7 = 00110111 means that the bit pattern used to represent
the symbol “7” in a string of text is 00110111. The space character has its own
code, 00100000. Figure 3.12 shows the ASCII representation of the characters
“IN PRINCIPIO ERAT VERBUM,” a string of 24 bytes or 192 bits. We’ve
separated the long string of bits into bytes to improve readability ever so
slightly! But inside the computer, it would just be one bit after the next. 
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FIGURE 3.12 ASCII bit string for the characters of “IN PRINCIPIO ERAT VERBUM.” 
So 01001001 represents the letter I. But not always! Bit strings are used to
represent many things other than characters. For example, the same bit string
01001001, if interpreted as the representation of a whole number in binary
notation, represents 73. A computer cannot simply look at a bit string
01001001 and know whether it is supposed to represent the letter I or the
number 73 or data of some other type, a color perhaps. A computer can inter-
pret a bit string only if it knows the conventions that were used to create the
document—the intended interpretation of the bits that make up the file. 
The meaning of a bit string is a matter of convention. Such conventions
are arbitrary at first. The code for the letter I could have been 11000101 or
pretty much anything else. Once conventions have become accepted through
a social process of agreement and economic incentive, they became nearly as
inflexible as if they were physical laws. Today, millions of computers assume
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FILENAME EXTENSIONS
The three letters after the dot at the end of a filename indicate how the
contents are to be interpreted. Some examples are as follows: 
Extension File Type
.doc Microsoft Word document
.odt OpenDocument text document
.ppt Microsoft PowerPoint document
.ods OpenDocument Spreadsheet
.pdf Adobe Portable Document Format
.exe Executable program
.gif Graphics Interchange Format (uses 256-color palette)
.jpg JPEG graphic file (Joint Photographic Experts Group)
.mpg MPEG movie file (Moving Picture Experts Group)
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that 01001001, if interpreted as a character, represents the letter I, and the
universal acceptance of such conventions is what makes worldwide informa-
tion flows possible.
The document format is the key to turning the representation into a view-
able document. If a program misinterprets a document as being in a different
format from the one in which it was created, only nonsense will be rendered.
Computers not equipped with software matching the program that created a
document generally refuse to open it. 
Which representation is “better,” a raster image or ASCII? The answer
depends on the use to which the document is to be put. For representation of
freeform shapes in a great variety of shades and hues, a raster representation
is unbeatable, provided the pixels are small enough and there are enough of
them. But it is hard even for a trained human to find the individual letters
within Figure 3.9, and it would be virtually impossible for a computer pro-
gram. On the other hand, a document format based on ASCII codes for char-
acters, such as the PDF format, can easily be searched for text strings. 
The PDF format includes more than simply the ASCII codes for the text.
PDF files include information about typefaces, the colors of the text and of
the background, and the size and exact positions of the letters. Software that
produces PDFs is used to typeset elegant documents such as this one. In other
words, PDF is actually a page description language and describes visible fea-
tures that are typographically meaningful. But for complicated pictures, a
graphical format such as JPG must be used. A mixed document, such as these
pages, includes graphics within PDF files. 
Reducing Data, Sometimes Without Losing Information 
Let’s take another look at the page from the Book of Kells, Figure 3.9, and
the enlargement of a small detail of that image, Figure 3.11. The computer file
from which Figure 3.9 was printed is 463 pixels wide and 651 pixels tall, for
a total of about 300,000 individual pixels. The pages of the Book of Kells
measure about 10 by 13 inches, so the raster image has only about 50 pixels
per inch of the original work. That is too few to capture the rich detail of the
original—Figure 3.11 actually shows one of the animal heads in the top-right
corner of the page. A great deal of detail was lost when the original page was
scanned and turned into pixels. The technical term for the problem is under-
sampling. The scanning device “samples” the color value of the original doc-
ument at discrete points to create the representation of the document, and in
this case, the samples are too far apart to preserve detail that is visible to the
naked eye in the original. 
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Credit as in Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Resolution_illustration.png.
FIGURE 3.13 A shape shown at various resolutions, from 1 × 1 to 100 × 100 pixels.
A square block consisting of many pixels of a single shade can be represented much
more compactly than by repeating the code for that shade as many times as there
are pixels. 
But, of course, a price is paid for increased resolution. The more pixels in
the representation of an image, the more memory is needed to hold the rep-
resentation. Double the resolution, and the memory needed goes up by a fac-
tor of four, since the resolution doubles both vertically and horizontally. 
Standard software uses a variety of representational techniques to repre-
sent raster graphics more concisely. Compression techniques are of two kinds:
“lossless” and “lossy.” A lossless representation is one that allows exactly the
same image to be rendered. A lossy
representation allows an approxima-
tion to the same image to be ren-
dered—an image that is different
from the original in ways the human
eye may or may not be able to
discern. 
One method used for lossless
image compression takes advantage
of the fact that in most images, the
color doesn’t change from pixel to
pixel—the image has spatial coher-
ence, to use the official term.
Looking at the middle and rightmost
images in Figure 3.13, for example,
makes clear that in the 100 × 100
resolution image, the 100 pixels in a
The answer to undersampling is to increase the resolution of the scan—the
number of samples per inch. Figure 3.13 shows how the quality of an image
improves with the resolution. In each image, each pixel is colored with the
“average” color of part of the original. 
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AUDIO COMPRESSION
MP3 is a lossy compression method
for audio. It uses a variety of tricks
to create small data files. For exam-
ple, human ears are not far enough
apart to hear low-frequency sounds
stereophonically, so MP3s may
record low frequencies in mono
and play the same sound to both
speakers, while recording and
playing the higher frequencies in
stereo! MP3s are “good enough” for
many purposes, but a trained and
sensitive ear can detect the loss of
sound quality. 
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10 × 10 square in the top-left corner are all the same color; there is no need
to repeat a 24-bit color value 100 times in the representation of the image. 
Accordingly, graphic representations have ways of saying “all pixels in this
block have the same color value.” Doing so can reduce the number of bits sig-
nificantly. 
Depending on how an image will be used, a lossy compression method
might be acceptable. What flashes on your TV is gone before you have time
to scrutinize the individual pixels. But in some cases, only lossless compres-
sion is satisfactory. If you have the famous Zapruder film of the Kennedy
assassination and want to preserve it in a digital archive, you want to use a
lossless compression method once you have digitized it at a suitably fine res-
olution. But if you are just shipping off the image to a low-quality printer
such as those used to print newspapers, lossy compression might be fine. 
Technological Birth and Death 
The digital revolution was possible because the capacity of memory chips
increased, relentlessly following Moore’s Law. Eventually, it became possible to
store digitized images and sounds at such high resolution that their quality was
higher than analog representations. Moreover, the price became low enough
that the storage chips could be included in consumer goods. But more than
electrical engineering is involved. At more than a megabyte per image, digital
cameras and HD televisions would still be exotic rarities. A megabyte is about
a million bytes, and that is just too much data per image. The revolution also
required better algorithms—better computational methods, not just better hard-
ware—and fast, cheap processing chips to carry out those algorithms. 
For example, digital video compression utilizes temporal coherence as well
as spatial coherence. Any portion of the image is unlikely to change much in
color from frame to frame, so large parts of a picture typically do not have
to be retransmitted to the home when the frame changes after a thirtieth of a
second. At least, that is true in principle. If a woman in a TV image walks
across a fixed landscape, only her image, and a bit of landscape that newly
appears from behind her once she passes it, needs be transmitted—if it is com-
putationally feasible to compare the second frame to the first before it is
transmitted and determine exactly where it differs from its predecessor. To
keep up with the video speed, there is only a thirtieth of a second to do that
computation. And a complementary computation has to be carried out at the
other end—the previously transmitted frame must be modified to reflect the
newly transmitted information about what part of it should change one frame
time later. 
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Digital movies could not have happened without an extraordinary increase
in speed and drop in price in computing power. Decompression algorithms are
built into desktop photo printers and cable TV boxes, cast in silicon in chips
more powerful than the fastest computers of only a few years ago. Such com-
pact representations can be sent quickly through cables and as satellite sig-
nals. The computing power in the cable boxes and television sets is today
powerful enough to reconstruct the image from the representation of what
has changed. Processing is power. 
By contrast, part of the reason the compact disk is dying as a medium for
distributing music is that it doesn’t hold enough data. At the time the CD for-
mat was adopted as a standard, decompression circuitry for CD players would
have been too costly for use in homes and automobiles, so music could not
be recorded in compressed form. The magic of Apple’s iPod is not just the
huge capacity and tiny physical size of its disk—it is the power of the pro-
cessing chip that renders the stored model as music. 
The birth of new technologies presage the death of old technologies.
Digital cameras killed the silver halide film industry; analog television sets
will soon be gone; phonograph records gave way to cassette tapes, which in
turn gave way to compact disks, which are themselves now dying in favor of
digital music players with their highly compressed data formats. 
The periods of transition between technologies, when one emerges and
threatens another that is already in wide use, are often marked by the exer-
cise of power, not always progressively. Businesses that dominate old tech-
nologies are sometimes innovators, but often their past successes make them
slow to change. At their worst, they may throw up roadblocks to progress in
an attempt to hold their ground in the marketplace. Those roadblocks may
include efforts to scare the public about potential disruptions to familiar prac-
tices, or about the dollar costs of progress. 
Data formats, the mere conventions used to intercommunicate informa-
tion, can be remarkably contentious, when a change threatens the business of
an incumbent party, as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts learned when it
tried to change its document formats. The tale of Massachusetts and
OpenDocument illustrates how hard change can be in the digital world,
although it sometimes seems to change on an almost daily basis. 
Data Formats as Public Property 
No one owns the Internet, and everyone owns the Internet. No government
controls the whole system, and in the U.S., the federal government controls
only the computers of government agencies. If you download a web page to
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your home computer, it will reach you through the cooperation of several,
perhaps dozens, of private companies between the web server and you. 
This flexible and constantly
changing configuration of computers
and communication links developed
because the Internet is in its essence
not hardware, but protocols—the
conventions that computers use for
sending bits to each other (see the
Appendix). The most basic Internet
Protocol is known as IP. The Internet
was a success because IP and the
designs for the other protocols
became public standards, available
for anyone to use. Anyone could
build on top of IP. Any proposed
higher-level protocol could be
adopted as a public standard if it met
the approval of the networking com-
munity. The most important protocol
exploiting IP is known as TCP. TCP is
used by email and web software to
ship messages reliably between com-
puters, and the pair of protocols is known as TCP/IP. The Internet might not
have developed that way had proprietary networking protocols taken hold in
the early days of networking. 
It was not always thus. Twenty to thirty years ago, all the major computer
companies—IBM, DEC, Novell, and Apple—had their own networking proto-
cols. The machines of different companies did not intercommunicate easily,
and each company hoped that the rest of the world would adopt its protocols
as standards. TCP/IP emerged as a standard because agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment insisted on its use in research that it sponsored—the Defense
Department for the ARPANET, and the National Science Foundation for
NSFnet. TCP/IP was embedded in the Berkeley Unix operating system, which
was developed under federal grants and came to be widely used in universi-
ties. Small companies quickly moved to use TCP/IP for their new products.
The big companies moved to adopt it more slowly. The Internet, with all of
its profusion of services and manufacturers, could not have come into exis-
tence had one of the incumbent manufacturers won the argument—and they
failed even though their networking products were technologically superior
to the early TCP/IP implementations. 
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UPLOADING AND DOWNLOADING
Historically, we thought of the
Internet as consisting of powerful
corporate “server” machines
located “above” our little home
computers. So when we retrieved
material from a server, we were
said to be “downloading,” and
when we transferred material from
our machine to a server, we were
“uploading.” Many personal
machines are now so powerful that
the “up” and “down” metaphors
are no longer descriptive, but the
language is still with us. See the
Appendix, and also the explanation
of “peer-to-peer” in Chapter 6,
“Balance Toppled.”
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File formats stand at a similar fork in the road today. There is increasing
concern about the risks of commercial products evolving into standards.
Society will be better served, goes the argument, if documents are stored in
formats hammered out by standards organizations, rather than disseminated
as part of commercial software packages. But consensus around one de facto
commercial standard, the .doc format of Microsoft Word, is already well
advanced. 
Word’s .doc format is proprietary, developed by Microsoft and owned by
Microsoft. Its details are now public, but Microsoft can change them at any
time, without consultation. Indeed, it does so regularly, in order to enhance
the capabilities of its software—and new releases create incompatibilities with
legacy documents. Some documents created with Word 2007 can’t be opened
in Word 2003 without a software add-on, so even all-Microsoft offices risk
document incompatibilities if they don’t adjust to Microsoft’s format changes.
Microsoft does not exclude competitors from adopting its format as their own
document standard—but competitors would run great risks in building on a
format they do not control. 
In a large organization, the cost of licensing Microsoft Office products for
thousands of machines can run into the millions of dollars. In an effort to
create competition and to save money, in 2004 the European Union advanced
the use of an “OpenDocument Format” for exchange of documents among EU
businesses and governments. Using ODF, multiple companies could enter the
market, all able to read documents produced using each other’s software. 
In September, 2005, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts decided to fol-
low the EU initiative. Massachusetts announced that effective 15 months
later, all the state’s documents would have to be stored in OpenDocument
Format. About 50,000 state-owned computers would be affected. State offi-
cials estimated the cost savings at about $45 million. But Eric Kriss, the state’s
secretary of administration and finance, said that more than software cost
was at stake. Public documents were public property; access should never
require the cooperation of a single private corporation. 
Microsoft did not accept the state’s decision without an argument. The
company rallied advocates for the disabled to its side, claiming that no avail-
able OpenDocument software had the accessibility features Microsoft offered.
Microsoft, which already had state contracts that extended beyond the
switchover date, also argued that adopting the ODF standard would be unfair
to Microsoft and costly to Massachusetts. “Were this proposal to be adopted,
the significant costs incurred by the Commonwealth, its citizens, and the pri-
vate sector would be matched only by the levels of confusion and incompat-
ibility that would result….” Kriss replied, “The question is whether a sovereign
state has the obligation to ensure that its public documents remain forever free
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and unencumbered by patent, license,
or other technical impediments. We
say, yes, this is an imperative. Micro-
soft says they disagree and want the
world to use their proprietary for-
mats.” The rhetoric quieted down, but
the pressure increased. The stakes
were high for Microsoft, since where
Massachusetts went, other states
might follow. 
Three months later, neither Kriss
nor Quinn was working for the state.
Kriss returned to private industry as
he had planned to do before joining
the state government. The Boston
Globe published an investigation of
Quinn’s travel expenses, but the state
found him blameless. Tired of the
mudslinging, under attack for his
decision about open standards, and
lacking Kriss’s support, on December
24, Quinn announced his resigna-
tion. Quinn suspected “Microsoft
money and its lobbyist machine” of
being behind the Globe investigation
and the legislature’s resistance to his
open standard initiative.
The deadline for Massachusetts to
move to OpenDocuments has passed, and as of the fall of 2007, the state’s
web site still says the switchover will occur in the future. In the intervening
months, the state explains, it became possible for Microsoft software to read
and write OpenDocument formats, so the shift to OpenDocument would not
eliminate Microsoft from the office software competition. Nonetheless, other
software companies would not be allowed to compete for the state’s office
software business until “accessibility characteristics of the applications meet
or exceed those of the currently deployed office suite”—i.e., Microsoft’s. For
the time being, Microsoft has the upper hand, despite the state’s effort to
wrest from private hands the formats of its public documents. 
Which bits mean what in a document format is a multi-billion dollar busi-
ness. As in any big business decisions, money and politics count, reason
becomes entangled with rhetoric, and the public is only one of the stake-
holders with an interest in the outcome. 
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OPENDOCUMENT,
OPEN SOURCE, FREE
These three distinct concepts all
aim, at least in part, to slow the
development of software monopo-
lies. OpenDocument (opendocu-
ment.xml.org) is an open standard
for file formats. Several major
computer corporations have backed
the effort, and have promised not
to raise intellectual property issues
that would inhibit the development
of software meeting the standards.
Open source (opensource.org) is a
software development methodol-
ogy emphasizing shared effort and
peer review to improve quality. The
site openoffice.org provides a full
suite of open source office produc-
tivity tools, available without
charge. Free software—”Free as
in freedom, not free beer”
(www.fsf.org, www.gnu.org)—”is a
matter of the users’ freedom to
run, copy, distribute, study, change,
and improve the software.” 
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Hiding Information in Images 
The surprises in text documents are mostly things of which the authors were
ignorant or unaware. Image documents provide unlimited opportunities for
hiding things intentionally—hiding secrets from casual human observers, and
obscuring open messages destined for human recipients so anti-spam soft-
ware won’t filter them out. 
The Spam Wars 
Many of us are used to receiving email pleas such as this one: I am Miss
Faatin Rahman the only child/daughter of late mrs helen rahman Address:
Rue 142 Marcory Abidjan Cote d’ivoire west africa, I am 20 years old girl. I
lost my parent, and I have an inheritance from my late mother, My parents
were very wealthy farmers and cocoa merchant when they were alive, After
the death of my father, long ago, my mother was controling his business untill
she was poisoned by her business associates which she suffered and died, …
I am crying and seeking for your kind assistance in the following ways: To
provide a safe bank account into where the money will be transferred for
investment…. 
If you get such a request, don’t respond to it! Money will flow out of, not
into, your bank account. Most people know not to comply. But mass emails
are so cheap that getting one person out of a million to respond is enough to
make the spammer financially successful. 
“Spam filters” are programs that intercept email on its way into the in-box
and delete messages like these before we read them. This kind of spam fol-
lows such a standard style that it is easy to spot automatically, with minimal
risk that any real correspondence with banks or African friends will be fil-
tered out by mistake. 
But the spam artists have fought back. Many of us have received emails
like the one in Figure 3.14. Why can’t the spam filter catch things like this? 
Word-processing software includes the name and size of the font in con-
junction with the coded characters themselves, as well as other information,
such as the color of the letters and the color of the background. Because the
underlying text is represented as ASCII codes, however, it remains relatively
easy to locate individual letters or substrings, to add or delete text, and to per-
form other such common text-processing operations. When a user positions a
cursor over the letter on the screen, the program can figure out the location
within the file of the character over which the cursor is positioned. Computer
software can, in turn, render the character codes as images of characters. 
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FIGURE 3.14 Graphic spam received by one of the authors. Although it looks like
text, the computer “sees” it as just an image, like a photograph. Because it doesn’t
realize that the pixels are forming letters, its spam filters cannot identify it as spam. 
But just because a computer screen shows a recognizable letter of the
alphabet, this does not mean that the underlying representation is by means
of standard character codes. A digitized photograph of text may well look
identical to an image rendered from a word-processing document—that is, the
two utterly different representations may give rise to exactly the same image. 
And that is one reason why, in the battle between spam producers and
makers of spam filters, the spam producers currently have the upper hand.
The spam of Figure 3.14 was produced in graphical form, even though what
is represented is just text. As the underlying representation is pixels and not
ASCII, spam like this makes it through all the filters we know about! 
The problem of converting raster graphics to ASCII text is called character
recognition. The term optical character recognition, or OCR, is used when the
original document is a printed piece of paper. The raster graphic representa-
tion is the result of scanning the document, and then some character recog-
nition algorithm is used to convert the image into a sequence of character
codes. If the original document is printed in a standard typeface and is rela-
tively free of smudges and smears, contemporary OCR software is quite accu-
rate, and is now incorporated into commercially available scanners
commonly packaged as multipurpose devices that also print, photocopy, and
fax. Because OCR algorithms are now reasonably effective and widely avail-
able, the next generation of spam filters will likely classify emails such as
Figure 3.14 as spam. 
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OCR and spam are merely an illustration of a larger point. Representation
determines what can be done with data. In principle, many representations
may be equivalent. But in practice, the secrecy of formatting information and
the computation required to convert one format to another may limit the use-
fulness of the data itself.
Hiding Information in Plain Sight 
During World War I, the German Embassy in Washington, DC sent a message
to Berlin that began thus: “PRESIDENT’S EMBARGO RULING SHOULD HAVE
IMMEDIATE NOTICE.” U.S. intelligence was reading all the German
telegrams, and this one might have seemed innocuous enough. But the first
letters of the words spelled out “PERSHING,” the name of a U.S. Navy vessel.
The entire telegram had nothing to do with embargoes. It was about U.S. ship
movements, and the initial letters read in full, “PERSHING SAILS FROM N.Y.
JUNE 1.” 
Steganography is the art of sending secret messages in imperceptible ways.
Steganography is different from cryptography, which is the art of sending
messages that are indecipherable. In a cryptographic communication, it is
assumed that if Alice sends a message to Bob, an adversary may well inter-
cept the message and recognize that it holds a secret. The objective is to make
the message unreadable, except to Bob, if it falls into the hands of such an
eavesdropper or enemy. In the world of electronic communication, sending
an encrypted message is likely to arouse suspicion of electronic monitoring
software. By contrast, in a steganographic message from Alice to Bob, the
communication itself arouses no suspicion. It may even be posted on a web
site and seem entirely innocent. Yet hidden in plain sight, in a way known
only to Alice and Bob, is a coded message. 
Steganography has been in use for a long time. The Steganographia of
Johannes Trithemius (1462–1516) is an occult text that includes long conju-
rations of spirits. The first letters of the words of these mystic incantations
encode other hidden messages, and the book was influential for a century
after it was written. Computers have created enormous opportunities for
steganographic communications. As a very simple example, consider an ordi-
nary word-processing document—a simple love letter, for example. Print it
out or view it on the screen, and it seems to be about Alice’s sweet nothings
to Bob, and nothing more. But perhaps Alice included a paragraph at the end
in which she changed the font color to white. The software renders the white
text on the white background, which looks exactly like the white background.
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But Bob, if he knows what to look for, can make it visible—for example, by
printing on black paper (just as the text could be recovered from the electron-
ically redacted Calipari report). 
If an adversary has any reason to think a trick like this might be in use,
the adversary can inspect Alice’s electronic letter using software that looks
for messages hidden using just this technique. But there are many places to
look for steganographic messages, and many ways to hide the information. 
Since each Roman letter has an eight-bit ASCII code, a text can be hidden
within another as long as there is an agreed-upon method for encoding 0s
and 1s. For example, what letter is hidden in this sentence?
Steganographic algorithms hide messages inside photos, text, and
other data. 
The answer is “I,” the letter whose ASCII character code is 01001001. In the
first eight words of the sentence, words beginning with consonants encode 0
bits and words beginning with vowels encode 1s (see Figure 3.15). 
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Steganographic algorithms hide messages inside photos, text, and other data.
0              1          0    0        1      0     0     1
FIGURE 3.15 A steganographic encoding of text within text. Initial consonants
encode 0, vowels encode 1, and the first eight words encode the 8-bit ASCII code for
the letter “I.” 
A steganographic method that would seem to be all but undetectable
involves varying ever so slightly the color values of individual pixels within
a photograph. Red, green, and blue components of a color determine the color
itself. A color is represented internally as one byte each for red, green, and
blue. Each 8-bit string represents a numerical value between 0 and 255.
Changing the rightmost bit from a 1 to a 0 (for example, changing 00110011
to 00110010), changes the numerical value by subtracting one—in this case,
changing the color value from 51 to 50. That results in a change in color so
insignificant that it would not be noticed, certainly not as a change in a sin-
gle pixel. But the rightmost bits of the color values of pixels in the graphics
files representing photographs can then carry quite large amounts of infor-
mation, without raising any suspicions. The recipient decodes the message
not by rendering the bits as visible images, but by inspecting the bits them-
selves, and picking out the significant 0s and 1s. 
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Who uses steganography today, if anyone? It is very hard to know. USA
Today reported that terrorists were communicating using steganography in
early 2001. A number of software tools are freely available that make
steganography easy. Steganographic detectors—what are properly known as
steganalysis tools—have also been developed, but their usefulness as yet
seems to be limited. Both steganography and steganalysis software is freely
available on the World Wide Web (see, for example, www.cotse.com/tools/
stega.htm and www.outguess.org/detection.php). 
The use of steganography to transmit secret messages is today easy, cheap,
and all but undetectable. A foreign agent who wanted to communicate with
parties abroad might well encode a bit string in the tonal values of an MP3
or the color values of pixels in a pornographic image on a web page. So much
music and pornography flows between the U.S. and foreign countries that the
uploads and downloads would arouse no suspicion! 
The Scary Secrets of Old Disks 
By now, you may be tempted to delete all the files on your disk drive and
throw it away, rather than run the risk that the files contain unknown secrets.
That isn’t the solution: Even deleted files hold secrets! 
A few years ago, two MIT researchers bought 158 used disk drives, mostly
from eBay, and recovered what data they could. Most of those who put the
disks up for sale had made some effort to scrub the data. They had dragged
files into the desktop trash can. Some had gone so far as to use the Microsoft
Windows FORMAT command, which warns that it will destroy all data on
the disk. 
Yet only 12 of the 158 disk drives had truly been sanitized. Using several
methods well within the technical capabilities of today’s teenagers, the
researchers were able to recover user data from most of the others. From 42
of the disks, they retrieved what appeared to be credit card numbers. One of
the drives seemed to have come from an Illinois automatic teller machine and
contained 2,868 bank account numbers and account balances. Such data
from single business computers would be a treasure trove for criminals. But
most of the drives from home computers also contained information that the
owners would consider extremely sensitive: love letters, pornography, com-
plaints about a child’s cancer therapy, and grievances about pay disputes, for
example. Many of the disks contained enough data to identify the primary
user of the computer, so that the sensitive information could be tied back to
an individual whom the researchers could contact. 
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The users of the computers had
for the most part done what they
thought they were supposed to do—
they deleted their files or formatted
their disks. They probably knew not
to release toxic chemicals by dump-
ing their old machines in a landfilll,
but they did not realize that by
dumping them on eBay, they might
be releasing personal information
into the digital environment. Any-
one in the world could have bought
the old disks for a few dollars, and
all the data they contained. What is
going on here, and is there anything
to do about it? 
Disks are divided into blocks,
which are like the pages of a book—
each has an identifying address, like
a page number, and is able to hold a
few hundred bytes of data, about the
same amount as a page of text in a
book. If a document is larger than
one disk block, however, the docu-
ment is typically not stored in con-
secutive disk blocks. Instead, each
block includes a piece of the docu-
ment, and the address of the block
where the document is continued. So
the entire document may be physically scattered about the disk, although log-
ically it is held together as a chain of references of one block to another.
Logically, the structure is that of a magazine, where articles do not necessar-
ily occupy contiguous pages. Part of an article may end with “Continued on
page 152,” and the part of the article on page 152 may indicate the page on
which it is continued from there, and so on. 
Because the files on a disk begin at random places on disk, an index
records which files begin where on the disk. The index is itself another disk
file, but one whose location on the disk can be found quickly. A disk index
is very much like the index of a book—which always appears at the end, so
readers know where to look for it. Having found the index, they can quickly
find the page number of any item listed in the index and flip to that page. 
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CLOUD COMPUTING
One way to avoid having problems
with deleted disk files and expen-
sive document-processing software
is not to keep your files on your
disks in the first place! In “cloud
computing,” the documents stay on
the disks of a central service
provider and are accessed through
a web browser. “Google Docs” is
one such service, which boasts very
low software costs, but other major
software companies are rumored to
be exploring the market for cloud
computing. If Google holds your
documents, they are accessible
from anywhere the Internet
reaches, and you never have to
worry about losing them—Google’s
backup procedures are better than
yours could ever be. But there are
potential disadvantages. Google’s
lawyers would decide whether to
resist subpoenas. Federal investiga-
tors could inspect bits passing
through the U.S., even on a trip
between other countries.
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Why aren’t disks themselves organized like books, with documents laid out
on consecutive blocks? Because disks are different from books in two impor-
tant respects. First, they are dynamic. The information on disks is constantly
being altered, augmented, and removed. A disk is less like a book than like a
three-ring binder, to which pages are regularly added and removed as infor-
mation is gathered and discarded. Second, disks are perfectly re-writable. A
disk block may contain one string of 0s and 1s at one moment, and as a result
of a single writing operation, a different string of 0s and 1s a moment later.
Once a 0 or a 1 has been written in a particular position on the disk, there is
no way to tell whether the bit previously in that position was a 0 or a 1. There
is nothing analogous to the faint traces of pencil marks on paper that are left
after an erasure. In fact, there is no notion of “erasure” at all on a disk—all
that ever happens is replacement of some bits by others. 
Because disks are dynamic, there are many advantages to breaking the file
into chained, noncontiguous blocks indexed in this way. For example, if the
file contains a long text document and a user adds a few words to the mid-
dle of the text, only one or two blocks in the middle of the chain are affected.
If enough text is added that those blocks must be replaced by five new ones,
the new blocks can be logically threaded into the chain without altering any
of the other blocks comprising the document. Similarly, if a section of text is
deleted, the chain can be altered to “jump over” the blocks containing the
deleted text. 
Blocks that are no longer part of any file are added to a “pool” of avail-
able disk blocks. The computer’s software keeps track of all the blocks in the
pool. A block can wind up in the pool either because it has never been used
or because it has been used but abandoned. A block may be abandoned
because the entire file of which it was part has been deleted or because the
file has been altered to exclude the block. When a fresh disk block is needed
for any purpose—for example, to start a new file or to add to an existing file—
a block is drawn from the pool of available blocks. 
What Happens to the Data in Deleted Files? 
Disk blocks are not re-written when they are abandoned and added to the
pool. When the block is withdrawn from the pool and put back to work as
part of another file, it is overwritten and the old data is obliterated. But until
then, the block retains its old pattern of zeroes and ones. The entire disk file
may be intact—except that there is no easy way to find it. A look in the index
will reveal nothing. But “deleting” a file in this way merely removes the index
entry. The information is still there on the disk somewhere. It has no more
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been eradicated than the information in a book would be expunged by tear-
ing out the index from the back of the volume. To find something in a book
without an index, you just have to go through the book one page at a time
looking for it—tedious and time-consuming, but not impossible. 
And that is essentially what the MIT researchers did with the disks they
bought off eBay—they went through the blocks, one at a time, looking for rec-
ognizable bit patterns. A sequence of sixteen ASCII character codes represent-
ing decimal digits, for example, looks suspiciously like a credit card number.
Even if they were unable to recover an entire file, because some of the blocks
comprising it had already been recycled, they could recognize significant
short character strings such as account numbers. 
Of course, there would be a simple way to prevent sensitive information
from being preserved in fragments of “deleted” files. The computer could be
programmed so that, instead of simply putting abandoned blocks into the
pool, it actually over-wrote the
blocks, perhaps by “zeroing” them—
that is, writing a pattern of all 0s.
Historically, computer and software
manufacturers have thought the ben-
efits of zeroing blocks far less than
the costs. Society has not found
“data leakage” to be a critical prob-
lem until recently—although that
may be changing. And the costs of
constantly zeroing disk blocks would
be significant. Filling blocks with
zeroes might take so much time that
the users would complain about how
slowly their machines were running
if every block were zeroed immediately. With some clever programming the
process could be made unnoticeable, but so far neither Microsoft nor Apple
has made the necessary software investment. 
And who has not deleted a file and then immediately wished to recover it?
Happily for all of us who have mistakenly dragged the wrong file into the
trash can, as computers work today, deleted files are not immediately added
to the pool—they can be dragged back out. Files can be removed only until
you execute an “Empty trash” command, which puts the deleted blocks into
the pool, although it does not zero them. 
But what about the Windows “FORMAT” command, shown in Figure 3.16?
It takes about 20 minutes to complete. Apparently it is destroying all the bits
on the disk, as the warning message implies. But that is not what is happen-
THE LAW ADJUSTS
Awareness is increasing that
deleted data can be recovered from
disks. The Federal Trade Commission
now requires “the destruction or
erasure of electronic media con-
taining consumer information so
that the information cannot practi-
cably be read or reconstructed,”
and a similar provision is in a 2007
Massachusetts Law about security
breaches.
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FIGURE 3.16 Warning screen of Microsoft Windows FORMAT command. The
statement that all the data will be lost is misleading—in fact, a great deal of it can be
recovered. 
As if the problems with disks were not troubling enough, exactly the same
problems afflict the memory of cell phones. When people get rid of their old
phones, they forget the call logs and email messages they contain. And if they
do remember to delete them, using the awkward combinations of button-
pushes described deep in the phone’s
documentation, they may not really
have accomplished what they hoped.
A researcher bought ten cell phones
on eBay and recovered bank account
numbers and passwords, corporate
strategy plans, and an email
exchange between a woman and her
married boyfriend, whose wife was
getting suspicious. Some of this
information was recovered from
phones whose previous owners had
scrupulously followed the manufac-
turer’s instructions for clearing the
memory. 
ing. It is simply looking for faulty spots on the disk. Physical flaws in the
magnetic surface can make individual disk blocks unusable, even though
mechanically the disk is fine and most of the surface is flawless as well. The
FORMAT command attempts to read every disk block in order to identify
blocks that need to be avoided in the future. Reading every block takes a long
time, but rewriting them all would take twice as long. The FORMAT command
identifies the bad blocks and re-initializes the index, but leaves most of the
data unaltered, ready to be recovered by an academic researcher—or an
inventive snooper. 
CHAPTER 3 GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE 103
SOFTWARE TO SCRUB YOUR DISK
If you really want to get rid of all
the data on your disk, a special
“Secure empty trash” command is
available on Macintosh computers.
On Windows machines, DBAN is
free software that really will zero
your disk, available through
dban.sourceforge.net, which has
lots of other useful free software.
Don’t use DBAN on your disk until
you are sure you don’t want any-
thing on it anymore! 
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In a global sense, bits turn out to be very hard to eradicate. And most of
the time, that is exactly the way we want it. If our computer dies, we are glad
that Google has copies of our data. When our cell phone dies, we are happy
if our contact lists reappear, magically downloaded from our cellular service
provider to our replacement phone. There are upsides and downsides to the
persistence of bits. 
Physical destruction always works as a method of data deletion. One of us
uses a hammer; another of us prefers his axe. Alas, these methods, while
effective, do not meet contemporary standards for recovery and recycling of
potentially toxic materials.
Can Data Be Deleted Permanently? 
Rumors arise every now and then
that engineers equipped with very
sensitive devices can tell the differ-
ence between a 0 that was written
over a 0 on a disk and a 0 that was
written over a 1. The theory goes that
successive writing operations are not
perfectly aligned in physical space—a
“bit” has width. When a bit is rewrit-
ten, its physical edges may slightly
overlap or fall short of its previous
position, potentially revealing the
previous value. If such microscopic
misalignments could be detected, it
would be possible to see, even on a
disk that has been zeroed, what the
bits were before it was zeroed. 
No credible authentication of such
an achievement has ever been pub-
lished, however, and as the density of
hard disks continues to rise, the like-
lihood wanes that such data recovery can be accomplished. On the other hand,
the places most likely to be able to achieve this feat are government intelli-
gence agencies, which do not boast of their successes! So all that can be said
for certain is that recovering overwritten data is within the capabilities of at
most a handful of organizations—and if possible at all, is so difficult and costly
that the data would have to be extraordinarily valuable to make the recovery
attempt worthwhile. 
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COPIES MAKE DATA HARD
TO DELETE
If your computer has ever been
connected to a network, destroying
its data will not get rid of copies of
the same information that may
exist on other machines. Your
emails went to and from other
people—who may have copies on
their machines, and may have
shared them with others. If you use
Google’s Gmail, Google may have
copies of your emails even after
you have deleted them. If you
ordered some merchandise online,
destroying the copy of the invoice
on your personal computer cer-
tainly won’t affect the store’s
records. 
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How Long Will Data Really Last? 
As persistent as digital information seems to be, and as likely to disclose
secrets unexpectedly, it also suffers from exactly the opposite problem.
Sometimes electronic records become unavailable quite quickly, in spite of
best efforts to save them permanently. 
Figure 3.17 shows an early geopolitical and demographic database—the
Domesday Book, an inventory of English lands compiled in 1086 by Norman
monks at the behest of William the Conqueror. The Domesday Book is one of
Britain’s national treasures and rests in its archives, as readable today as it
was in the eleventh century. 
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British National Archives.
FIGURE 3.17 The Domesday Book of 1086.
In honor of the 900th anniversary of the Domesday Book, the BBC issued a
modern version, including photographs, text, and maps documenting how
Britain looked in 1986. Instead of using vellum, or even paper, the material was
assembled in digital formats and issued on 12-inch diameter video disks, which
could be read only by specially equipped computers (see Figure 3.18). The
project was meant to preserve forever a detailed snapshot of late twentieth-
century Britain, and to make it available immediately to schools and libraries
everywhere. 
By 2001, the modern Domesday Book was unreadable. The computers and
disk readers it required were obsolete and no longer manufactured. In 15
years, the memory even of how the information was formatted on the disks
had been forgotten. Mocking the project’s grand ambitions, a British news-
paper exclaimed, “Digital Domesday Book lasts 15 years not 1000.”
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“Domesday Redux,” from Ariadne, Issue 56.
FIGURE 3.18 A personal computer of the mid-1980s configured to read the 12-inch
videodisks on which the modern “Domesday Book” was published. 
Paper and papyrus thousands of years older even than the original
Domesday Book are readable today. Electronic records become obsolete in a
matter of years. Will the vast amounts of information now available because
of the advances in storage and communication technology actually be usable
a hundred or a thousand years in the future, or will the shift from paper to
digital media mean the loss of history? 
The particular story of the modern Domesday Book has a happy ending.
The data was recovered, though just barely, thanks to a concerted effort by
many technicians. Reconstructing the data formats required detective work
on masses of computer codes (see Figure 3.19) and recourse to data structure
books of the period—so that programmers in 2001 could imagine how others
would have attacked the same data representation problems only 15 years
earlier! In the world of computer science, “state of the art” expertise dies very
quickly. 
The recovered modern Domesday Book is accessible to anyone via the
Internet. Even the data files of the original Domesday Book have been trans-
ferred to a web site that is accessible via the Internet.
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FIGURE 3.19 Efforts to reconstruct, shortly after the year 2000, the forgotten data
formats for the modern “Domesday Book,” designed less than 20 years earlier. 
But there is a large moral for any
office or library worker. We cannot
assume that the back-ups and saved
disks we create today will be useful
even ten years from now for retriev-
ing the vast quantities of information
they contain. It is an open question
whether digital archives—much less
the box of disk drives under your bed
in place of your grandmother’s box
of photographs—will be as permanent
as the original Domesday Book.  An
extraordinary effort is underway to
archive the entire World Wide Web,
taking snapshots of every publicly
accessible web page at period inter-
vals. Can the effort succeed, and can
the disks on which the archive is held
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PRESERVING THE WEB
The Internet Archive
(www.archive.org) periodically
records “snapshots” of publicly
accessible web pages and stores
them away. Anyone can retrieve a
page from the past, even if it no
longer exists or has been altered.
By installing a “Wayback” button
(available from the Internet
Archive) on your web browser, you
can instantly see how any web
page looked in the past—just go to
the web page and click the
Wayback button; you get a list of
the archived copies of the page,
and you can click on any of them
to view it. 
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themselves be updated periodically so that the information will be with us
forever? 
Or would we be wisest to do the apparently Luddite thing: to print every-
thing worth preserving for the long run—electronic journals, for example—so
that documents will be preserved in the only form we are certain will remain
readable for thousands of years? 
✷
The digital revolution put the power to document ideas into the hands of
ordinary people. The technology shift eliminated many of the intermediaries
once needed to produce office memoranda and books. Power over the
thoughts in those documents shifted as well. The authority that once accom-
panied the physical control of written and printed works has passed into the
hands of the individuals who write them. The production of information has
been democratized—although not always with happy results, as the mishaps
discussed in this chapter tellingly illustrate. 
We now turn to the other half of the story: how we get the information
that others have produced. When power over documents was more central-
ized, the authorities were those who could print books, those who had the
keys to the file cabinets, and those with the most complete collections of doc-
uments and publications. Document collections were used both as informa-
tion choke points and as instruments of public enlightenment. Libraries, for
example, have been monuments to imperial power. University libraries have
long been the central institutions of advanced learning, and local public
libraries have been key democratizing forces in literate nations. 
If everything is just bits and everyone can have as many bits as they want,
the problem may not be having the information, but finding it. Having a fact
on the disk in your computer, sitting a few inches from your eyes and brain,
is irrelevant, if what you want to know is irretrievably mixed with billions of
billions of other bits. Having the haystack does you no good if you can’t find
your precious needle within it. In the next chapter, we ask: Where does the
power now go, in the new world where access to information means finding
it, as well as having it?
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CHAPTER 4
Needles in the Haystack
Google and Other Brokers in the
Bits Bazaar
Found After Seventy Years
Rosalie Polotsky was 10 years old when she waved goodbye to her cousins,
Sophia and Ossie, at the Moscow train station in 1937. The two sisters were
fleeing the oppression of Soviet Russia to start a new life. Rosalie’s family
stayed behind. She grew up in Moscow, taught French, married Nariman
Berkovich, and raised a family. In 1990, she emigrated to the U.S. and settled
near her son, Sasha, in Massachusetts.
Rosalie, Nariman, and Sasha always wondered about the fate of Sophia
and Ossie. The Iron Curtain had utterly severed communication among Jewish
relatives. By the time Rosalie left for the U.S., her ties to Sophia and Ossie had
been broken for so long that she had little hope of reconnecting with them—
and, as the years wore on, less reason for optimism that her cousins were still
alive. Although his grandfather dreamed of finding them, Sasha’s search of
immigrant records at Ellis Island and the International Red Cross provided no
clues. Perhaps, traveling across wartime Europe, the little girls had never even
made it to the U.S.
Then one day, Sasha’s cousin typed “Polotsky” into Google’s search win-
dow and found a clue. An entry on a genealogical web site mentioned
“Minacker,” the name of Sophia’s and Ossie’s father. In short order, Rosalie,
Sophia, and Ossie were reunited in Florida, after 70 years apart. “All the time
when he was alive, he asked me to do something to find them,” said Sasha,
recalling his grandfather’s wish. “It’s something magic.”
The digital explosion has produced vast quantities of informative data, the
Internet has scattered that data across the globe, and the World Wide Web has
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put it within reach of millions of ordinary people. But you can’t reach for
something if you don’t know where it is. Most of that vast store of digital
information might as well not exist without a way to find it. For most of us,
the way to find things on the Web is with web search engines. Search is a
wondrous, transformative technology, which both fulfills dreams and shapes
human knowledge. The search tools that help us find needles in the digital
haystack have become the lenses through which we view the digital land-
scape. Businesses and governments use them to distort our picture of reality.
The Library and the Bazaar
In the beginning, the Web was a library. Information providers—mostly
businesses and universities, which could afford to create web pages—posted
information for others to see. Information consumers—mostly others in busi-
ness and academia—found out where to get the information and downloaded
it. They might know where to look because someone sent them the URL (the
“Uniform Resource Locator”), such as mit.edu (the URL for MIT). Ordinary peo-
ple didn’t use the Web. Instead, they
used services such as CompuServe for
organized access to databases of var-
ious kinds of information.
As the Web went commercial,
directories began to appear, includ-
ing printed “Yellow Pages.” These
directories listed places to go on the
Web for various products and ser-
vices. If you wanted to buy a car, you
looked in one place, and you looked
in another place to find a job. These
lists resembled the categories AOL
and CompuServe provided in the
days before consumers could connect
directly to the Internet. Human
beings constructed these lists—
editors decided what went in each
category, and what got left out
entirely.
The Web has changed drastically
since the mid-1990s. First, it is no
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WEB 1.0 VS. WEB 2.0
In contemporary jargon, the newer,
more participatory web sites to
which users can contribute are
dubbed “Web 2.0.” The older, more
passive web sites are now called
“Web 1.0.” These look like software
release numbers, but “Web 2.0”
describes something subtler and
more complex. Web 2.0 sites—
Facebook and Wikipedia, for
example—exploit what economists
call “network effects.” Because
users are contributing information
as well as utilizing information
others supply, these sites become
more valuable the more people are
using them. See http://www.
oreillynet.com/lpt/a/6228 for a
fuller explanation of Web 2.0.
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longer a passive information resource. Blogs, Wikipedia, and Facebook are
contributory structures, where peer involvement makes the information use-
ful. Web sites are cheap and easy to create; ordinary individuals and even the
smallest of organizations can now have them. As a result, the content and
connectedness of the Web are changing all the time. 
Second, the Web has gotten so big and so unstructured that it is not
humanly possible to split it up into neat categories. Web pages simply don’t
lend themselves to organization in a nice structure, like an outline. There is
no master plan for the Web—vast numbers of new pages are added daily in
an utterly unstructured way. You certainly can’t tell what a web page con-
tains by looking at its URL. 
Moreover, hierarchical organization is useless in helping you find informa-
tion if you can’t tell where in the hierarchy it might belong. You don’t usu-
ally go to the Web to look for a web page. You go to look for information,
and are glad to get it wherever you can find it. Often, you can’t even guess
where to look for what you want to know, and a nice, structured organiza-
tion of knowledge would do you no good. For example, any sensible organ-
ization of human knowledge, such as an encyclopedia, would have a section
on cows and a section on the moon. But if you didn’t know that there was a
nursery rhyme about the cow jumping over the moon, neither the “cow” nor
the “moon” entry would help you figure out what the cow supposedly did to
the moon. If you typed both words into a search engine, however, you would
find out in the blink of an eye.
Search is the new paradigm for finding information—and not just on the
Web as a whole. If you go to Wal-Mart’s web site, you can trace through its
hierarchical organization. At the top level, you get to choose between “acces-
sories,” “baby,” “boys,” “girls,” and so on. If you click “baby,” your next click
takes you to “infant boys,” “toddler girls,” and so on. There is also a search
window at the top. Type whatever you want, and you may be taken directly
to what you are looking for—but only on Wal-Mart’s site. Such limited search
engines help us share photos, read newspapers, buy books online from
Amazon or Barnes and Noble, and even find old email on our own laptops. 
Search makes it possible to find things in
vast digital repositories. But search is more
than a quick form of look-up in a digital
library. Search is a new form of control over
information. 
Information retrieval tools such as Google are extraordinarily democratiz-
ing—Rosalie and Sasha Berkovich did not need to hire a professional people-
finder. But the power that has been vested in individuals is not the only kind
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Search is a new form of
control over information.
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that search has created. We have given search engines control over where we
get reliable information—the same control we used to assign to authoritative
sources, such as encyclopedias and “newspapers of record.” If we place
absolute trust in a search engine to find things for us, we are giving the
search engine the power to make it hard or impossible for us to know things.
Use Google in China, and your searches will “find” very different information
about democracy than they will “find” if you use Google in the United States.
Search for “401(K)” on John Hancock’s web site, and Fidelity’s 401(K) plans
will seem not to exist. 
For the user, search is the power to find things, and for whoever controls
the engine, search is the power to shape what you see. Search is also power
of a third kind. Because the search
company records all our search
queries, we are giving the search
company the power that comes with
knowing what we want to know. In
its annual “Zeitgeist” report, Google
takes the pulse of the population by
revealing the questions its search
engine is most often asked. It was amusing to know that of the most popular
“Who is …?” searches of 2007, “God” was #1 and “Satan” was #10, with
“Buckethead” beating “Satan” at #6. Search engines also gather similar infor-
mation about each one of us individually. For example, as discussed in
Chapter 2, Amazon uses the information to suggest books you might like to
read once you have used its web site for a bit.
The Web is no longer a library. It is a chaotic marketplace of the billions
of ideas and facts cast up by the bits explosion. Information consumers and
information producers constantly seek out each other and morph into each
other’s roles. In this shadowy bits bazaar, with all its whispers and its couri-
ers running to and fro, search engines are brokers. Their job is not to supply
the undisputed truth, nor even to judge the accuracy of material that others
provide. Search engines connect willing producers of information to willing
consumers. They succeed or fail not on the quality of the information they
provide, because they do not produce content at all. They only make connec-
tions. Search engines succeed or fail depending on whether we are happy
with the connections they make, and nothing more. In the bazaar, it is not
always the knowledgeable broker who makes the most deals. To stay in busi-
ness, a broker just has to give most people what they want, consistently over
time.
Search does more than find things for us. Search helps us discover things
we did not know existed. By searching, we can all be armchair bits detectives,
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Here are some interesting Google
Zeitgeist results from 2007: among
“What is” questions, “love” was #1
and “gout” was #10; among “How
to” queries, “kiss” was #1 and
“skateboard” was #10.
04_0137135599_ch04.qxd  5/2/08  8:03 AM  Page 112
finding surprises in the book next to
the one we were pulling off the dig-
ital bookshelf, and sniffing out curi-
ous information fragments cast far
and wide by the digital explosion.
Forbidden Knowledge Is
Only a Click Away
Schizophrenia is a terrible brain dis-
ease, afflicting millions of people. If
you wanted to know about the latest
treatment options, you might try to
find some web sites and read the
information they contain.
Some people already know where
they think they can good find med-
ical information—they have book-
marked a site they trust, such as
WebMD.com or DrKoop.com. If you
were like us, however, you’d use a
search engine—Google.com, Yahoo.
com, or Ask.com, for example. You’d
type in a description of what you
were looking for and start to click
links and read. Of course, you should
not believe uncritically anything you
read from a source you don’t know
anything about—or act on the med-
ical information you got through
your browsing, without checking
with a physician.
When we tried searching for “schizophrenia drugs” using Google, we got
the results shown in Figure 4.1. The top line tells us that if we don’t like these
results, there are a quarter-million more that Google would be glad to show
us. It also says that it took six-hundredths of a second to get these results for
us—we didn’t sense that it took even that long. Three “Sponsored Links”
appear to the right. A link is “sponsored” if someone has paid Google to have
it put there—in other words, it’s an advertisement. To the left is a variety of
ordinary links that Google’s information retrieval algorithms decided were
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BRITNEY IN THE BITS BAZAAR
Providing what most people want
creates a tyranny of the majority
and a bias against minority inter-
ests. When we searched for
“spears,” for example, we got back
three pages of results about Britney
Spears and her sister, with only
three exceptions: a link to Spears
Manufacturing, which produces
PVC piping; one to comedian Aries
Spears; and one to Prof. William M.
Spears of the University of
Wyoming. Ironically, Prof. Spears’s
web page ranked far below
“Britney Spears’ Guide to Semicon-
ductor Physics,” a site maintained
by some light-hearted physicists at
the University of Essex in the UK.
That site has a distinctive URL,
britneyspears.ac—where “.ac”
stands not for “academic” but for
“Ascension Island” (which gets a
few pennies for use of the .ac URL,
wherever in the world the site may
be hosted). Whatever the precise
reason for this site’s high ranking,
the association with Britney prob-
ably didn’t hurt!
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Google ™ is a registered trademark of Google, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
FIGURE 4.1 Google’s results from a search for “schizophrenia drugs.”
Just looking at this window raises
a series of important questions:
• The Web is enormous. How can a
search engine find those results
so fast? Is it finding every appro-
priate link?
• How did Google decide what is
search result number 1 and what
is number 283,000? 
• If you try another search engine instead of Google, you’ll get 
different results. Which is right? Which is better? Which is more
authoritative? 
most likely to be useful to someone wanting information about “schizophre-
nia drugs.” Those ordinary links are called the search engine’s organic results,
as opposed to the sponsored results.
114 BLOWN TO BITS
THOSE FUNNY NAMES
Yahoo! is an acronym—it stands for
“Yet Another Hierarchical Officious
Oracle” (docs.yahoo.com/info/
misc/history.html). “Google”
comes from “googol,” which is the
number represented by a 1 followed
by 100 zeroes. The Google founders
were evidently thinking big!
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• Are the sponsored links supposed to be better links than the organic
links, or worse? Is the advertising really necessary?
• How much of this does the government oversee? If a TV station kept
reporting lies as the truth, the government would get after them. Does
it do anything with search engines?
We shall take up each of these questions in due course, but for the time being,
let’s just pursue our medical adventure.
When we clicked on the first organic link, it took us to a page from the
web site of a distinguished Swedish university. That page contained some
information about the different kinds of schizophrenia drugs. One of the
drugs it mentioned was “olanzapin (Zyprexa).” The trade name rang a bell for
some reason, so we started over and searched for “Zyprexa.”
The first of the organic links we got back was to www.zyprexa.com, which
described itself as “The Official ZYPREXA Olanzapine Site.” The page was
clearly marked as maintained by Eli Lilly and Company, the drug’s manufac-
turer. It provided a great deal of information about the drug, as well as pho-
tographs of smiling people—satisfied patients, presumably—and slogans such
as “There is Hope” and “Opening the Door to Possibility.” The next few links
on our page of search results were to the medical information sites drugs.com,
rxlist.com, webmd.com, and askapatient.com. 
Just below these was a link that took us in a different direction:
“ZyprexaKills wiki.” The drug was associated with some serious side effects,
it seems, and Lilly allegedly kept these side effects secret for a long time. At
the very top of that page of search results, as the only sponsored link, was
the following: “Prescription Drug Lawsuit. Zyprexa-olanzapine-lawyer.com.
Pancreatitis & diabetes caused by this drug? Get legal help today.” That link
took us to a web form where a Houston attorney offered to represent us
against Lilly.
It took only a few more mouse clicks before a document appeared that was
entitled “Olanzapine—Blood glucose changes” (see Figure 4.2). It was an inter-
nal Lilly memorandum, never meant to be seen outside the company, and
marked as a confidential exhibit in a court case. Some patients who had devel-
oped diabetes while using Zyprexa had sued Lilly, claiming that the drug had
caused the disease. In the course of that lawsuit, this memo and other confi-
dential materials were shared with the plaintiffs’ lawyers under a standard dis-
covery protocol. Through a series of improper actions by several lawyers, a
New York Times reporter procured these documents. The reporter then pub-
lished an exposé of Lilly’s slowness to acknowledge the drug’s side effects. The
documents themselves appeared on a variety of web sites.
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Source: www.furiousseasons.com/zyprexa%20documents/ZY1%20%20%2000008758.pdf.
FIGURE 4.2 Top and bottom lines of a document filed in a court case. It was
supposed to be kept secret, but once on the Web, anyone searching for “Zyprexa
documents” finds it easily.
Lilly demanded that the documents be returned, that all copies be
destroyed, and that the web sites that had posted them be required to take
them down. A legal battle ensued. On February 13, 2007, Judge Jack B.
Weinstein of the U.S. District Court in New York issued his judgment, order,
and injunction. Yes, what had been done with the documents was grievously
wrong and contrary to earlier court orders. The lawyers and the journalist had
cooked up a scam on the legal system, involving collusion with an Alaska
lawyer who had nothing to do with the case, in order to spring the docu-
ments. The lawyers who conspired to get the documents had to give them
back and not keep any copies. They were enjoined against giving any copies
to anyone else.
But, concluded Judge Weinstein, the web sites were another matter. The
judge would not order the web sites to take down their copies. Lilly was enti-
tled to the paper documents, but the bits had escaped and could not be recap-
tured. As of this writing, the documents are still viewable. We quickly found
them directly by searching for “zyprexa documents.” 
The world is a different place from a time when the judge could have
ordered the return of all copies of offending materials. Even if there were
hundreds of copies in file cabinets and desk drawers, he might have been able
to insist on their return, under threat of harsh penalties. But the Web is not a
file cabinet or a desk drawer. “Web sites,” wrote Judge Weinstein, “are prima-
rily fora for speech.” Lilly had asked for an injunction against five web sites
that had posted the documents, but millions of others could post them in the
future. “Limiting the fora available to would-be disseminators by such an
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infinitesimal percentage would be a fruitless exercise,” the judge concluded.
It probably would not be effective to issue a broader injunction, and even if
it were, “the risk of unlimited inhibitions of free speech should be avoided
when practicable.”
The judge understood the gravity of the issue he was deciding.
Fundamentally, he was reluctant to use the authority of the government in a
futile attempt to prevent people from saying what they wanted to say and
finding out what they wanted to know. Even if the documents had been vis-
ible only for a short time period, unknown numbers of copies might be
circulating privately among interested parties. Grasping for an analogy, the
judge suggested that God Himself had failed in His attempt to enjoin Adam
and Eve from their pursuit of the truth!
Two sponsored links appeared when we did the search for “zyprexa docu-
ments.” One was for another lawyer offering his services for Zyprexa-related
lawsuits against Lilly. The other, triggered by the word “documents” in our
search term, was for Google itself: “Online Documents. Easily share & edit
documents online for free. Learn more today. docs.google.com.” This was an
ironic reminder that the bits are out there, and the tools to spread them are
there too, for anyone to use. Thanks to search engines, anyone can find the
information they want. Information has exploded out of the shells that used
to contain it.
In fact, the architecture of human knowledge has changed as a result of
search. In a single decade, we have been liberated from information straight-
jackets that have been with us since the dawn of recorded history. And many
who should understand what has happened, do not. In February 2008, a San
Francisco judge tried to shut down the Wikileaks web site, which posts leaked
confidential documents anonymously as an aid to whistleblowers. The judge
ordered the name “Wikileaks” removed from DNS servers, so the URL
“Wikileaks.org” would no longer correspond to the correct IP address. (In
the guts of the Internet, DNS servers provide the service of translating URLs
into IP addresses. See the Appendix.) The publicity that resulted from this
censorship attempt made it easy to find various “mirrors”—identical twins,
located elsewhere on the Web—by searching for “Wikileaks.”
The Fall of Hierarchy
For a very long time, people have been organizing things by putting them
into categories and dividing those categories into subcategories. Aristotle
tried to classify everything. Living things, for example, were either plants or
animals. Animals either had red blood or did not; red-blooded animals were
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either live-bearers or egg-bearers; live-bearers were either humans or other
mammals; egg-bearers either swam or flew; and so on. Sponges, bats, and
whales all presented classification enigmas, on which Aristotle did not think
he had the last word. At the dawn of the Enlightenment, Linnaeus provided
a more useful way of classifying living things, using an approach that gained
intrinsic scientific validity once it reflected evolutionary lines of descent. 
Our traditions of hierarchical classification are evident everywhere. We
just love outline structures. The law against cracking copyright protection
(discussed in Chapter 6, “Balance Toppled”) is Title 17, Section 1201, para-
graph (a), part (1), subpart (A). In the Library of Congress system, every book
is in one of 26 major categories, designated by a Roman letter, and these
major categories are internally divided in a similar way—B is philosophy, for
example, and BQ is Buddhism.
If the categories are clear, it may be possible to use the organizing hierar-
chy to locate what you are looking for. That requires that the person doing
the searching not only know the classification system, but be skilled at mak-
ing all the necessary decisions. For example, if knowledge about living things
was organized as Aristotle had it, anyone wanting to know about whales
would have to know already whether a whale was a fish or a mammal in
order to go down the proper branch of the classification tree. As more and
more knowledge has to be stuffed into the tree, the tree grows and sprouts
twigs, which over time become branches sprouting more twigs. The classifi-
cation problem becomes unwieldy, and the retrieval problem becomes practi-
cally impossible.
The system of Web URLs started out as such a classification tree. The site
www.physics.harvard.edu is a web server, of the physics department, within
Harvard University, which is an educational institution. But with the profu-
sion of the Web, this system of domain names is now useless as a way of find-
ing anything whose URL you do not already know.
In 1991, when the Internet was barely known outside academic and gov-
ernment circles, some academic researchers offered a program called “Gopher.”
This program provided a hierarchical directory of many web sites, by organ-
izing the directories provided by the individual sites into one big outline.
Finding things using Gopher was
tedious by today’s standards, and was
dependent on the organizational skills
of the contributors. Yahoo! was
founded in 1994 as an online Internet
directory, with human editors placing
products and services in categories,
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“Gopher” was a pun—it was soft-
ware you could use to “go for”
information on the Web. It was
also the mascot of the University
of Minnesota, where the software
was first developed.
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making recommendations, and generally trying to make the Internet accessi-
ble to non-techies. Although Yahoo! has long since added a search window, it
retains its basic directory function to the present day.
The practical limitations of hierarchical organization trees were foreseen
sixty years ago. During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed
Vannevar Bush of MIT to serve as Director of the Office of Strategic Research
and Development (OSRD). The OSRD coordinated scientific research in sup-
port of the war effort. It was a large effort—30,000 people and hundreds of
projects covered the spectrum of science and engineering. The Manhattan
Project, which produced the atomic bomb, was just a small piece of it.
From this vantage point, Bush saw a major obstacle to continued scientific
progress. We were producing information faster than it could be consumed,
or even classified. Decades before computers became commonplace, he wrote
about this problem in a visionary article, “As We May Think.” It appeared in
the Atlantic Monthly—a popular magazine, not a technical journal. As Bush
saw it,
The difficulty seems to be, not so much that we publish unduly … but
rather that publication has been extended far beyond our present abil-
ity to make real use of the record. The summation of human experi-
ence is being expanded at a prodigious rate, and the means we use for
threading through the consequent maze to the momentarily important
item is the same as was used in the days of square-rigged ships. …
Our ineptitude in getting at the record is largely caused by the artifi-
ciality of systems of indexing.
The dawn of the digital era was at this time barely a glimmer on the horizon.
But Bush imagined a machine, which he called a “memex,” that would aug-
ment human memory by storing and retrieving all the information needed. It
would be an “enlarged intimate supplement” to human memory, which can
be “consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility.” 
Bush clearly perceived the problem, but the technologies available at the
time, microfilm and vacuum tubes, could not solve it. He understood that the
problem of finding information would eventually overwhelm the progress of
science in creating and recording knowledge. Bush was intensely aware that
civilization itself had been imperiled in the war, but thought we must proceed
with optimism about what the record of our vast knowledge might bring us.
Man “may perish in conflict before he learns to wield that record for his true
good. Yet, in the application of science to the needs and desires of man, it
would seem to be a singularly unfortunate stage at which to terminate the
process, or to lose hope as to the outcome.”
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Capabilities that were inconceivable then are commonplace now. Digital
computers, vast storage, and high-speed networks make information search
and retrieval necessary. They also make it possible. The Web is a realization
of Bush’s memex, and search is key to making it useful.
It Matters How It Works
How can Google or Yahoo! possibly take a question it may never have been
asked before and, in a split second, deliver results from machines around the
world? The search engine doesn’t “search” the entire World Wide Web in
response to your question. That couldn’t possibly work quickly enough—it
would take more than a tenth of a second just for bits to move around the
earth at the speed of light. Instead, the search engine has already built up an
index of web sites. The search engine does the best it can to find an answer
to your query using its index, and then sends its answer right back to you.
To avoid suggesting that there is anything unique about Google or Yahoo!,
let’s name our generic search engine Jen. Jen integrates several different
processes to create the illusion that you simply ask her a question and she
gives back good answers. The first three steps have nothing to do with your
particular query. They are going on repeatedly and all the time, whether any-
one is posing any queries or not. In computer speak, these steps are happen-
ing in the background:
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A FUTURIST PRECEDENT
In 1937, H. G. Wells anticipated Vannevar Bush’s 1945 vision of a “memex.”
Wells wrote even more clearly about the possibility of indexing everything,
and what that would mean for civilization:
There is no practical obstacle whatever now to the creation of an
efficient index to all human knowledge, ideas and achievements,
to the creation, that is, of a complete planetary memory for all
mankind. And not simply an index; the direct reproduction of the
thing itself can be summoned to any properly prepared spot. …
This in itself is a fact of tremendous significance. It foreshadows a
real intellectual unification of our race. The whole human memory
can be, and probably in a short time will be, made accessible to
every individual. … This is no remote dream, no fantasy.
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1. Gather information. Jen explores the Web, visiting many sites on a
regular basis to learn what they contain. Jen revisits old pages
because their contents may have changed, and they may contain links
to new pages that have never been visited.
2. Keep copies. Jen retains copies of many of the web pages she visits.
Jen actually has a duplicate copy of a large part of the Web stored on
her computers.
3. Build an index. Jen constructs a huge index that shows, at a mini-
mum, which words appear on which web pages. 
When you make a query, Jen goes through four more steps, in the foreground:
4. Understand the query. English has lots of ambiguities. A query like
“red sox pitchers” is fairly challenging if you haven’t grown up with
baseball!
5. Determine the relevance of each possible result to the query. Does
the web page contain information the query asks about?
6. Determine the ranking of the relevant results. Of all the relevant
answers, which are the “best”?
7. Present the results. The results need not only to be “good”; they have
to be shown to you in a form you find useful, and perhaps also in a
form that serves some of Jen’s other purposes—selling more advertis-
ing, for example.
Each of these seven steps involves technical challenges that computer scien-
tists love to solve. Jen’s financial backers hope that her engineers solve them
better than the engineers of competing search engines. 
We’ll go through each step in more detail, as it is important to understand
what is going on—at every step, more than technology is involved. Each step
also presents opportunities for Jen to use her information-gathering and edi-
torial powers in ways you may not have expected—ways that shape your view
of the world through the lens of Jen’s search results.
The background processing is like the set-building and rehearsals for a
theatrical production. You couldn’t have a show without it, but none of it
happens while the audience is watching, and it doesn’t even need to happen
on any particular schedule.
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Step 1: Gather Information 
Search engines don’t index everything. The ones we think of as general util-
ities, such as Google, Yahoo!, and Ask, find information rather indiscrimi-
nately throughout the Web. Other search engines are domain-specific. For
example, Medline searches only through medical literature. ArtCylopedia
indexes 2,600 art sites. The FindLaw LawCrawler searches only legal web
sites. Right from the start, with any search engine, some things are in the
index and some are out, because some sites are visited during the gathering
step and others are not. Someone decides what is worth remembering and
what isn’t. If something is left out in Step 1, there is no possibility that you
will see it in Step 7. 
Speaking to the Association of National Advertisers in October 2005, Eric
Schmidt, Google’s CEO, observed that of the 5,000 terabytes of information
in the world, only 170 terabytes had been indexed. (A terabyte is about a tril-
lion bytes.) That’s just a bit more than 3%, so 97% was not included. Another
estimate puts the amount of indexed information at only .02% of the size of
the databases and documents reachable via the Web. Even in the limited con-
text of the World Wide Web, Jen needs to decide what to look at, and how
frequently. These decisions implicitly define what is important and what is
not, and will limit what Jen’s users can find.
How often Jen visits web pages to index them is one of her precious trade
secrets. She probably pays daily visits to news sites such as CNN.com, so that
if you ask tonight about something that happened this morning, Jen may
point you to CNN’s story. In fact, there is most likely a master list of sites to
be visited frequently, such as whitehouse.gov—sites that change regularly
and are the object of much public interest. On the other hand, Jen probably
has learned from her repeated visits that some sites don’t change at all. For
example, the Web version of a paper published ten years ago doesn’t change.
After a few visits, Jen may decide to revisit it once a year, just in case. Other
pages may not be posted long enough to get indexed at all. If you post a
futon for sale on Craigslist.com, the ad will become accessible to potential
buyers in just a few minutes. If it sells quickly, however, Jen may never see
it. Even if the ad stays up for a while, you probably won’t be able to find it
with most search engines for several days. 
Jen is clever about how often she revisits pages—but her cleverness also
codifies some judgments, some priorities—some control. The more important
Jen judges your page to be, the less time it will take for your new content to
show up as responses to queries to Jen’s search engine.
Jen roams the Web to gather information by following links from the
pages she visits. Software that crawls around the Web is (in typical geek
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irony) called a “spider.” Because the spidering process takes days or even
weeks, Jen will not know immediately if a web page is taken down—she will
find out only when her spider next visits the place where it used to be. At
that point, she will remove it from her index, but in the meantime, she may
respond to queries with links to pages that no longer exist. Click on such a
link, and you will get a message such as “Page not found” or “Can’t find the
server.”
Because the Web is unstructured, there is no inherently “correct” order in
which to visit the pages, and no obvious way to know when to stop. Page A
may contain references to page B, and also page B to page A, so the spider
has to be careful not to go around in circles. Jen must organize her crawl of
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HOW A SPIDER EXPLORES THE WEB
Search engines gather information by wandering through the World Wide
Web. For example, when a spider visits the main URL of the publisher of this
book, www.pearson.com, it retrieves a page of text, of which this is a fragment:
<div id=”subsidiary”>
<h2 class=”hide”>Subsidiary sites links</h2>
<label for=”subsidiarySites” class=”hide”>Available
sites</label>
<select name=”subsidiarySites” id=”subsidiarySites” size=”1”>
<option value=””>Browse sites</option>
<optgroup label=”FT Group”>
<option value=”http://www.ftchinese.com/sc/index.jsp”>
Chinese.FT.com</option>
<option value=”http://ftd.de/”>FT Deutschland</option>
This text is actually a computer program written in a special programming
language called HTML (“HyperText Markup Language”). Your web browser ren-
ders the web page by executing this little program. But the spider is retriev-
ing this text not to render it, but to index the information it contains. “FT
Deutschland” is text that appears on the screen when the page is rendered;
such terms should go into the index. The spider recognizes other links, such as
www.ftchinese.com or ftd.de, as URLs of pages it needs to visit in turn. In
the process of visiting those pages, it indexes them and identifies yet more
links to visit, and so on!
A spider, or web crawler, is a particular kind of bot. A bot (as in “robot”) is a
program that endlessly performs some intrinsically repetitive task, often an
information-gathering task.
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the Web to visit as much as she chooses without wasting time revisiting sec-
tions she has already seen.
A web site may stipulate that it does not want spiders to visit it too
frequently or to index certain kinds of information. The site’s designer sim-
ply puts that information in a file named robots.txt, and virtually all web-
crawling software will respect what it says. Of course, pages that are
inaccessible without a login cannot be crawled at all. So, the results from Step
7 may be influenced by what the sites want Jen to know about them, as well
as by what Jen thinks is worth knowing. For example, Sasha Berkovich was
fortunate that the Polotsky family tree had been posted to part of the geneal-
ogy.com web site that was open to the public—otherwise, Google’s spider
could not have indexed it. 
Finally, spidering is not cost free. Jen’s “visits” are really requests to web
sites that they send their pages back to her. Spidering creates Internet traffic
and also imposes a load on the web server. This part of search engines’ back-
ground processing, in other words, has unintended effects on the experience
of the entire Internet. Spiders consume network bandwidth, and they may tie
up servers, which are busy responding to spider requests while their ordinary
users are trying to view their pages. Commercial search engines attempt to
schedule their web crawling in ways that won’t overload the servers they visit.
Step 2: Keep Copies
Jen downloads a copy of every web page her spider visits—this is what it
means to “visit” a page. Instead of rendering the page on the screen as a web
browser would, Jen indexes it. If she wishes, she can retain the copy after she
has finished indexing it, storing it on her own disks. Such a copy is said to
be “cached,” after the French word for “hidden.” Ordinarily Jen would not do
anything with her cached copy; it may quickly become out of date. But
caching web pages makes it possible for Jen to have a page that no longer
exists at its original source, or a version of a page older than the current one.
This is the flip side of Jen never knowing about certain pages because their
owners took them down before she had a chance to index them. With a
cached page, Jen knows what used to be on the page even after the owner
intended it to disappear.
Caching is another blow to the Web-as-library metaphor, because remov-
ing information from the bookshelf doesn’t necessarily get rid of it. Efforts to
scrub even dangerous information are beyond the capability of those who
posted it. For example, after 9/11, a lot of information that was once avail-
able on the Web was pulled. Among the pages that disappeared overnight
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were reports on government vulnerabilities, sensitive security information,
and even a Center for Disease Control chemical terrorism report that revealed
industry shortcomings. Because the pages had been cached, however, the bits
lived on at Google and other search engine companies.
Not only did those pages of dangerous information survive, but anyone
could find them. Anytime you do a search with one of the major search
engines, you are offered access to the cached copy, as well as the link to
where the page came from, whether or not it still exists. Click on the link for
the “Cached” page, and you see something that looks very much like what
you might see if you clicked on the main link instead. The cached copy is
identified as such (see Figure 4.3).
CHAPTER 4 NEEDLES IN THE HAYSTACK 125
My remarks have been misconstrued as suggesting that women lack the ability to
FIGURE 4.3 Part of a cached web page, Google’s copy of an official statement made
by Harvard’s president and replaced two days later after negative public reaction. This
copy was retrieved from Google after the statement disappeared from the university’s
web site. Harvard, which holds the copyright on this once-public statement, refused to
allow it to be printed in this book (see Conclusion).
This is an actual example; it was the statement Lawrence Summers
released on January 17, 2005, after word of his remarks about women in sci-
ence became public. As reported in Harvard Magazine in March–April 2005,
the statement began, “My remarks have been misconstrued as suggesting that
women lack the ability to succeed at the highest levels of math and science.
I did not say that, nor do I believe it.” This unapologetic denial stayed on the
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Harvard web site for only a few
days. In the face of a national
firestorm of protest, Summers
issued a new statement on
January 19, 2005, reading, in
part, “I deeply regret the impact of
my comments and apologize for
not having weighed them more
carefully.” Those searching for the President’s statement were then led to the
contrite new statement—but for a time, the original, defiant version remained
visible to those who clicked on the link to Google’s cached copy. 
The digital explosion grants the
power of both instant communica-
tion and instant retraction—but
almost every digital action leaves
digital fingerprints. Bits do not die
easily, and digital words, once said,
are hard to retract.
If Jen caches web pages, it may be
possible for you to get information
that was retracted after it was dis-
covered to be in error or embarrass-
ing. Something about this doesn’t
feel quite right, though—is the infor-
mation on those pages really Jen’s to
do with as she wishes? If the material
is copyrighted—a published paper
from ten years ago, for example—
what right does Jen have to show you her cached copy? For that matter, what
right did she have to keep a copy in the first place? If you have copyrighted
something, don’t you have some authority over who can make copies of it?
This enigma is an early introduction to the confused state of copyright law
in the digital era, to which we return in Chapter 6. Jen cannot index my web
page without receiving a copy of it. In the most literal sense, any time you
“view” or “visit” a web page, you are actually copying it, and then your web
browser renders the copy on the screen. A metaphorical failure once again:
The Web is not a library. Viewing is an exchange of bits, not a passive activ-
ity, as far as the web site is concerned. If “copying” copyrighted materials was
totally prohibited, neither search engines nor the Web itself could work, so
some sort of copying must be permissible. On the other hand, when Jen
caches the material she indexes—perhaps an entire book, in the case of the
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FINDING DELETED PAGES
An easy experiment on finding
deleted pages is to search using
Google for an item that was sold on
craigslist. You can use the “site”
modifier in the Google search box to
limit your search to the craigslist
web site, by including a “modifier”:
futon site:craigslist.com
The results will likely return pages
for items that are no longer avail-
able, but for which the cached
pages will still exist.
The digital explosion grants the
power of both instant
communication and instant
retraction—but almost every
digital action leaves digital
fingerprints.
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Google Books project—the legal controversies become more highly contested.
Indeed, as we discuss in Chapter 6, the Association of American Publishers
and Google are locked in a lawsuit over what Google is and is not allowed to
do with the digital images of books that Google has scanned.
Step 3: Build an Index
When we searched the Web for
“Zyprexa,” Jen consulted her index,
which has the same basic structure as
the index of a book: a list of terms
followed by the places they occur.
Just as a book’s index lists page num-
bers, Jen’s index lists URLs of web
pages. To help the search engine give
the most useful responses to queries,
the index may record other informa-
tion as well: the size of the font in
which the term appears, for example,
and where on the page it appears.
Indexes are critical because hav-
ing the index in order—like the index
of a book, which is in alphabetical order—makes it possible to find things
much faster than with sequential searching. This is where Jen’s computer sci-
entists really earn their salaries, by devising clever ways of storing indexed
information so it can be retrieved quickly. Moore’s Law also played a big role
in the creation of web indexes—until computer memories got fast enough,
cheap enough, and big enough, even the cleverest computer scientists could
not program machines to respond instantly to arbitrary English queries.
When Jen wants to find a term in her index, she does not start at the
beginning and go through it one entry at a time until she finds what she is
looking for. That is not the way you would look up something in the index
of a book; you would use the fact that the index is in order alphabetically. A
very simple strategy to look up something in a big ordered index, such as a
phone book, is just to open the book in the middle and see if the item you
are looking for belongs in the first half or the second. Then you can ignore
half the phone book and use the same strategy to subdivide the remaining
half. The number of steps it takes to get down to a single page in a phone
book with n pages using this method is the number of times you have to
divide n by 2 to get down to 1. So if n is 1000, it takes only 10 of these prob-
ing steps to find any item using binary search, as this method is known. 
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INDEXES AND CONCORDANCES
The information structure used by
search engines is technically known
as an inverted index—that is, an
index of the words in a document
or a set of documents, and the
places where those words appear.
Inverted indexes are not a new
idea; the biblical concordances
laboriously constructed by medieval
monks were inverted indexes.
Constructing concordances was one
of the earliest applications of com-
puter technology to a nonmathe-
matical problem.
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In general, the number of steps needed to search an index of n things using
binary search is proportional, not to n, but to the number of digits in n. That
means that binary search is exponentially faster than linear search—search-
ing through a million items would take only 20 steps, and through a billion
items would take 30 steps. And binary search is fairly dumb by comparison
with what people actually do—if you were looking for “Ledeen” in the phone
book, you might open it in the middle, but if you were looking for “Abelson,”
you’d open it near the front. That strategy can be reduced to an even better
computer algorithm, exponentially faster than binary search.
How big is Jen’s index, in fact? To begin with, how many terms does Jen
index? That is another of her trade secrets. Jen’s index could be useful with
a few tens of millions of entries. There are fewer than half a million words in
the English language, but Jen probably wants to index some numbers too (try
searching for a number such as 327 using your search engine). Proper names
and at least some words in foreign languages are also important. The list of
web pages associated with a term is probably on disk in most cases, with only
the information about where on the disk kept with the term itself in main
memory. Even if storing the term and the location on disk of the list of asso-
ciated URLs takes 100 bytes per entry, with 25 million entries, the table of
index entries would occupy 2.5 gigabytes (about 2.5 billion bytes) of main
memory. A few years ago, that amount of memory was unimaginable; today,
you get that on a laptop from Wal-Mart. The index can be searched quickly—
using binary search, for example—although retrieving the list of URLs might
require going to disk. If Jen has Google’s resources, she can speed up her
query response by keeping URLs in main memory too, and she can split the
search process across multiple computers to make it even faster.
Now that the preparations have been made, we can watch the performance
itself—what happens when you give Jen a query.
Step 4: Understand the Query
When we asked Google the query Yankees beat Red Sox, only one of the top
five results was about the Yankees beating the Red Sox (see Figure 4.4). The
others reported instead on the Red Sox beating the Yankees. Because English
is hard for computers to understand and is often ambiguous, the simplest
form of query analysis ignores syntax, and treats the query as simply a list
of keywords. Just looking up a series of words in an index is computation-
ally easy, even if it often misses the intended meaning of the query. 
To help users reduce the ambiguity of their keyword queries, search
engines support “advanced queries” with more powerful features. Even the
simplest, putting a phrase in quotes, is used by fewer than 10% of search
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engine users. Typing the quotation marks in the query “Red Sox beat
Yankees” produces more appropriate results. You can use “~” to tell Google
to find synonyms, “-” to exclude certain terms, or cryptic commands such as
“allinurl:” or “inanchor:” to limit the part of the Web to search. Arguably we
didn’t ask our question the right way, but most of us don’t bother; in general,
people just type in the words they want and take the answers they get. 
Often they get back quite a lot. Ask Yahoo! for the words “allergy” and
“treatment,” and you find more than 20,000,000 references. If you ask for
“allergy treatment”—that is, if you just put quotes around the two words—you
get 628,000 entries, and quite different top choices. If you ask for “treating
allergies,” the list shrinks to 95,000. The difference between these queries may
have been unintentional, but the search engine thought they were drastically
different. It’s remarkable that human-computer communication through the
lens of the search engine is so useful, given its obvious imperfections!
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Google ™ is a registered trademark of Google, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
FIGURE 4.4 Keyword search misses the meaning of English-language query. Most of
the results for the query “Yankees beat Red Sox” are about the Red Sox beating the
Yankees.
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Today, users tend to be tolerant when search engines misunderstand their
meaning. They blame themselves and revise their queries to produce better
results. This may be because we are still amazed that search engines work at
all. In part, we may be tolerant of error because in web search, the cost to the
user of an inappropriate answer is very low. As the technology improves,
users will expect more, and will become less tolerant of wasting their time
sorting through useless answers. 
Step 5: Determine Relevance 
A search engine’s job is to provide results that match the intent of the query.
In technical jargon, this criterion is called “relevance.” Relevance has an
objective component—a story about the Red Sox beating the Yankees is only
marginally responsive to a query about the Yankees beating the Red Sox. But
relevance is also inherently subjective. Only the person who posed the query
can be the final judge of the relevance of the answers returned. In typing my
query, I probably meant the New York Yankees beating the Boston Red Sox
of Major League Baseball, but I didn’t say that—maybe I meant the Flagstaff
Yankees and the Continental Red Sox of Arizona Little League Baseball.
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NATURAL LANGUAGE QUERIES
Query-understanding technology is improving. The experimental site
www.digger.com, for example, tells you when your query is ambiguous and
helps you clarify what you are asking. If you ask Digger for information
about “java,” it realizes that you might mean the beverage, the island, or the
programming language, and helps get the right interpretation if it guessed
wrong the first time.
Powerset (www.powerset.com) uses natural language software to disam-
biguate queries based on their English syntax, and answers based on what
web pages actually say. That would resolve the misunderstanding of “Yankees
beat Red Sox.”
Ongoing research promises to transfer the burden of disambiguating
queries to the software, where it belongs, rather than forcing users to twist
their brains around computerese. Natural language understanding seems to
be on its way, but not in the immediate future. We may need a hundred-
fold increase in computing power to make semantic analysis of web pages
accurate enough so that search engines no longer give boneheaded
answers to simple English queries.
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Finding all the relevant documents is referred to as “recall.” Because the
World Wide Web is so vast, there is no reasonable way to determine if the
search engine is finding everything that is relevant. Total recall is unachiev-
able—but it is also unimportant. Jen could give us thousands or even millions
more responses that she judges to be
relevant, but we are unlikely to look
beyond the first page or two. Degree
of relevance always trumps level of
recall. Users want to find a few good
results, not all possible results. 
The science of measuring rele-
vance is much older than the Web; it
goes back to work by Gerald Salton
in the 1960s, first at Harvard and
later at Cornell. The trick is to auto-
mate a task when what counts as
success has such a large subjective
component. We want the computer
to scan the document, look at the
query, do a few calculations, and
come up with a number suggesting
how relevant the document is to the
query. 
As a very simple example of how
we might calculate the relevance of a
document to a query, suppose there
are 500,000 words in the English
language. Construct two lists of
500,000 numbers: one for the docu-
ment and one for the query. Each
position in the lists corresponds to
one of the 500,000 words—for example, position #3682 might be for the word
“drugs.” For the document, each position contains a count of the number of
times the corresponding word occurs in the document. Do the same thing for
the query—unless it contains repeated words, each position will be 1 or 0.
Multiply the lists for the document and the query, position by position, and
add up the 500,000 results. If no word in the query appears in the document,
you’ll get a result of 0; otherwise, you will get a result greater than 0. The
more frequently words from the query appear in the document, the larger the
results will be. 
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SEARCH ENGINES AND
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
Three articles offer interesting
insights into how search engines
and information retrieval work:
“The Anatomy of a Large-Scale
Hypertextual Web Search Engine”
by Sergey Brin and Larry Page was
written in 2000 and gives a clear
description of how the original
Google worked, what the goal was,
and how it was differentiated from
earlier search engines.
“Modern Information Retrieval: A
Brief Overview” by Amit Singhal was
written in 2001 and surveys the IR
scene. Singhal was a student of
Gerry Salton and is now a Google
Fellow.
“The Most Influential Paper Gerald
Salton Never Wrote” by David
Dubin presents an interesting look
at some of the origins of the
science.
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Figure 4.5 shows how the relevance calculation might proceed for the
query “Yankees beat Red Sox” and the visible part of the third document of
Figure 4.4, which begins, “Red Sox rout Yankees ….” (The others probably
contain more of the keywords later in the full document.) The positions in the
two lists correspond to words in a dictionary in alphabetical order, from “ant”
to “zebra.” The words “red” and “sox” appear two times each in the snippet
of the story, and the word “Yankees” appears three times. 
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FIGURE 4.5 Document and query lists for relevance calculation.
That is a very crude relevance calculation—problems with it are easy to
spot. Long documents tend to be measured as more relevant than short doc-
uments, because they have more word repetitions. Uninteresting words such
as “from” add as much to the relevance score as more significant terms such
as “Yankees.” Web search engines such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, and Ask.com
consider many other factors in addition to which words occur and how often.
In the list for the document, perhaps the entries are not word counts, but
another number, adjusted so words in the title of the page get greater weight.
Words in a larger font might also count more heavily. In a query, users tend
to type more important terms first, so maybe the weights should depend on
where words appear in the query. 
Step 6: Determine Ranking
Once Jen has selected the relevant documents—perhaps she’s chosen all the
documents whose relevance score is above a certain threshold—she “ranks”
the search results (that is, puts them in order). Ranking is critical in making
the search useful. A search may return thousands of relevant results, and
users want to see only a few of them. The simplest ranking is by relevance—
putting the page with the highest relevance score first. That doesn’t work
well, however. For one thing, with short queries, many of the results will have
approximately the same relevance. 
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More fundamentally, the documents Jen returns should be considered
“good results” not just because they have high relevance to the query, but also
because the documents themselves have high quality. Alas, it is hard to say
what “quality” means in the search context, when the ultimate test of success
is providing what people want. In the example of the earlier sidebar, who is
to judge whether the many links to material about Britney Spears are really
“better” answers to the “spears” query than the link to Professor Spears? And
whatever “quality” may be, the ranking process for the major web search
engines takes place automatically, without human intervention. There is no
way to include protocols for checking professional licenses and past convic-
tions for criminal fraud—not in the current state of the Web, at least. 
Even though quality can’t be measured automatically, something like
“importance” or “reputation” can be extracted from the structure of linkages
that holds the Web together. To take a crude analogy, if you think of web
pages as scientific publications, the reputations of scientists tend to rise if
their work is widely cited in the work of other scientists. That’s far from a
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WHAT MAKES A PAGE SEARCHABLE
No search provider discloses the full details of its relevance and ranking algo-
rithm. The formulas remain secret because they offer competitive advantages,
and because knowing what gives a page high rank makes abuse easier. But
here are some of the factors that might be taken into account: 
• Whether a keyword is used in the title of the web page, a major head-
ing, or a second-level heading
• Whether it appears only in the body text, and if so, how “prominently”
• Whether the web site is considered “trustworthy”
• Whether the pages linked to from within the page are themselves
relevant
• Whether the pages that link to this page are relevant
• Whether the page is old or young
• Whether the pages it links to are old or young
• Whether it passes some objective quality metric—for example, not
containing any misspellings
Once you go to the trouble of crawling the Web, there is plenty to analyze,
if you have the computing power to do it!
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perfect system for judging the importance of scientific work—junk science
journals do exist, and sometimes small groups of marginal scientists form
mutual admiration societies. But for the Web, looking at the linkage structure
is a place to start to measure the significance of pages.
One of Google’s innovations was to enhance the relevance metric with
another numerical value called “PageRank.” PageRank is a measure of the
“importance” of each a page that takes into account the external references
to it—a World Wide Web popularity contest. If more web pages link to a par-
ticular page, goes the logic, it must be more important. In fact, a page should
be judged more important if a lot of important pages link to it than if the
same number of unimportant pages link to it. That seems to create a circular
definition of importance, but the circularity can be resolved—with a bit of
mathematics and a lot of computing power.
This way of ranking the search results seems to reward reputation and to
be devoid of judgment—it is a mechanized way of aggregating mutual opin-
ions. For example, when we searched using Google for “schizophrenia drugs,”
the top result was part of the site of a Swedish university. Relevance was cer-
tainly part of the reason that page came up first; the page was specifically
about drugs used to treat schizophrenia, and the words “schizophrenia” and
“drugs” both appeared in the title of the page. Our choice of words affected
the relevance of the page—had we gone to the trouble to type “medicines”
instead of “drugs,” this link wouldn’t even have made it to the first page of
search results. Word order matters, too—Google returns different results for
“drugs schizophrenia” than for “schizophrenia drugs.”
This page may also have been
ranked high because many other web
pages contained references to it, par-
ticularly if many of those pages were
themselves judged to be important.
Other pages about schizophrenia drugs
may have used better English prose
style, may have been written by more
respected scientific authorities, and
may have contained more up-to-date
information and fewer factual errors. The ranking algorithm has no way to
judge any of that, and no one at Google reads every page to make such
judgments. 
Google, and other search engines that rank pages automatically, use a
secret recipe for ranking—a pinch of this and a dash of that. Like the formula
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Sergey Brin and Larry Page,
Google’s founders, were graduate
students at Stanford when they
developed the company’s early
technologies. The “Page” in
“PageRank” refers not to web
pages, but to Larry Page.
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for Coca-Cola, only a few people know the details of commercial ranking
algorithms. Google’s algorithm is patented, so anyone can read a description.
Figure 4.6 is an illustration from that patent, showing several pages with links
to each other. This illustration suggests that both the documents themselves
and the links between them might be assigned varying numbers as measures
of their importance. But the description omits many details and, as actually
implemented, has been adjusted countless times to improve its performance.
A company’s only real claim for the validity of its ranking formula is that
people like the results it delivers—if they did not, they would shift to one of
the competing search engines. 
CHAPTER 4 NEEDLES IN THE HAYSTACK 135
FIGURE 4.6 A figure from the PageRank patent (U.S. Patent #6285999), showing
how links between documents might receive different weights.
It may be that one of the things people like about their favored search
engine is consistently getting what they believe to be unbiased, useful, and
even truthful information. But “telling the truth” in search results is ulti-
mately only a means to an end—the end being greater profits for the search
company.
Ranking is a matter of opinion. But a lot hangs on those opinions. For a
user, it usually does not matter very much which answer comes up first or
whether any result presented is even appropriate to the query. But for a
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company offering a product, where it appears in the search engine results can
be a matter of life and death. 
KinderStart (www.kinderstart.com) runs a web site that includes a direc-
tory and search engine focused on products and services for young children.
On March 19, 2005, visits to its site declined by 70% when Google lowered
its PageRank to zero (on a scale of 0 to 10). Google may have deemed
KinderStart’s page to be low quality because its ranking algorithm found the
page to consist mostly of links to other sites. Google’s public description of
its criteria warns about pages with “little or no original content.” KinderStart
saw matters differently and mounted a class action lawsuit against Google,
claiming, among other things, that Google had violated its rights to free
speech under the First Amendment by making its web site effectively invisi-
ble. Google countered that KinderStart’s low PageRank was just Google’s
opinion, and opinions were not matters to be settled in court:
Google, like every other search engine operator, has made that deter-
mination for its users, exercising its judgment and expressing its
opinion about the relative significance of web sites in a manner that
has made it the search engine of choice for millions. Plaintiff
KinderStart contends that the judiciary should have the final say
over that editorial process.
No fair, countered KinderStart to
Google’s claim to be just expressing
an opinion. “PageRank,” claimed
KinderStart, “is not a mere statement
of opinion of the innate value or
human appeal of a given web site and
its web pages,” but instead is “a
mathematically-generated product of
measuring and assessing the quantity
and depth of all the hyperlinks on the
Web that tie into PageRanked web
site, under programmatic determina-
tion by Defendant Google.” 
The judge rejected every one of KinderStart’s contentions—and not just the
claim that KinderStart had a free speech right to be more visible in Google
searches. The judge also rejected claims that Google was a monopoly guilty
of antitrust violations, and that KinderStart’s PageRank of zero amounted to
a defamatory statement about the company. 
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SEEING A PAGE’S PAGERANK
Google has a toolbar you can add
to certain browsers, so you can see
PageRanks of web pages. It is
downloadable from toolbar.
google.com. You can also use
the site www.iwebtool.com/
pagerank_checker to enter a
URL in a window and check its
PageRank.
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Whether it’s a matter of opinion or manipulation, KinderStart is certainly
much easier to find using Yahoo! than Google. Using Yahoo!, kinderstart.
com is the top item returned when searching for “kinderstart.” When we used
Google, however, it did not appear until the twelfth page of results. 
A similar fate befell bmw.de, the German web page of automaker BMW. The
page Google indexed was straight text, containing the words “gebrauchtwagen”
and “neuwagen” (“used car” and “new car”) dozens of times. But a coding
trick caused viewers instead to see a more conventional page with few words
and many pictures. The effect was to raise BMW’s position in searches for
“new car” and “used car,” but the means violated Google’s clear instructions
to web site designers: “Make pages for users, not for search engines. Don’t
deceive your users or present different content to search engines than you
display to users, which is commonly referred to as ‘cloaking.’” Google
responded with a “death penalty”—removing bmw.de from its index. For a
time, the page simply ceased to exist in Google’s universe. The punitive meas-
ure showed that Google was prepared to act harshly against sites attempting
to gain rank in ways it deemed consumers would not find helpful—and at the
same time, it also made clear that Google was prepared to take ad hoc actions
against individual sites.
Step 7: Presenting Results
After all the marvelous hard work of Steps 1–6, search engines typically pro-
vide the results in a format that is older than Aristotle—the simple, top-to-
bottom list. There are less primitive ways of displaying the information.
If you search for something ambiguous like “washer” with a major web
search engine, you will be presented with a million results, ranging from
clothes washers to software packages that remove viruses. If you search Home
Depot’s web site for “washer,” you will get a set of automatically generated
choices to assist you in narrowing the search: a set of categories, price ranges,
brand names, and more, complete with pictures (see Figure 4.7).
Alternatives to the simple rank-ordered list for presenting results better
utilize the visual system. Introducing these new forms of navigation may shift
the balance of power in the search equation. Being at the top of the list may
no longer have the same economic value, but something else may replace the
currently all-important rank of results—quality of the graphics, for example.
No matter how the results are presented, something else appears alongside
them, and probably always will. It is time to talk about those words from the
sponsors.
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Source: Home Depot.
FIGURE 4.7 Results page from a search for “washers” on the Home Depot web site.
Who Pays, and for What?
Web search is one of the most widely used functions of computers. More than
90% of online adults use search engines, and more than 40% use them on a
typical day. The popularity of search engines is not hard to explain. Search
engines are generally free for anyone to use. There are no logins, no fine print
to agree to, no connection speed parameters to set up, and no personal infor-
mation to be supplied that you’d rather not give away. If you have an Internet
connection, then you almost certainly have a web browser, and it probably
comes with a web search engine on its startup screen. There are no directions
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to read, at least to get started. Just type some words and answers come back.
You can’t do anyone any harm by typing random queries and seeing what
happens. It’s even fun. 
Perhaps because search is so useful and easy, we are likely to think of our
search engine as something like a public utility—a combination of an ency-
clopedia and a streetlamp, a single source supplying endless amounts of
information to anyone. In economic terms, that is a poor analogy. Utilities
charge for whatever they provide—water, gas, or electricity—and search firms
don’t. Utilities typically don’t have much competition, and search firms do.
Yet we trust search engines as though they were public utilities because their
results just flow to us, and because the results seem consistent with our
expectations. If we ask for American Airlines, we find its web site, and if we
ask for “the price of tea in China,” we find both the actual price ($1.84 for 25
tea bags) and an explanation of the phrase. And perhaps we trust them
because we assume that machines are neutral and not making value judg-
ments. The fact that our expectations are rarely disappointed does not, how-
ever, mean that our intuitions are correct.
Who pays for all this? There are four possibilities:
• The users could pay, perhaps as subscribers to a service. 
• Web sites could pay for the privilege of being discovered. 
• The government or some nonprofit entity could pay. 
• Advertisers could pay. 
All four business models have all been tried.
Commercial-Free Search
In the very beginning, universities and the government paid, as a great deal
of information retrieval research was conducted in universities under federal
grants and contracts. WebCrawler, one of the first efforts to crawl the Web in
order to produce an index of terms found on web pages, was Brian Pinkerton’s
research project at the University of Washington. He published a paper about
it in 1994, at an early conference on the World Wide Web. The 1997 academic
research paper by Google’s founders, explaining PageRank, acknowledges
support by the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as
well as several industrial supporters of Stanford’s computer science research
programs. To this day, Stanford University owns the patent on the PageRank
algorithm—Google is merely the exclusive licensee.
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Academia and government were the wellsprings of search technology, but
that was before the Web became big business. Search needed money to grow.
Some subscription service web sites, such as AOL, offered search engines.
Banner ads appeared on web sites even before search engines became the way
to find things, so it was natural to offer advertising to pay for search engine
sites. Banner ads are the equivalent of billboards or displayed ads in news-
papers. The advertiser buys some space on a page thought promising to bring
in some business for the advertiser, and displays an eye-catching come-on. 
With the advent of search, it was possible to sell advertising space depend-
ing on what was searched for—“targeted advertising” that would be seen only
by viewers who might have an interest in the product. To advertise cell
phones, for example, ads might be posted only on the result pages of searches
involving the term “phone.” Like billboards, banner ads bring in revenue. And
also like billboards, posting too many of them, with too much distracting
imagery, can annoy the viewer!
Whichever business model was in use,
there was a presumed, generally acknowl-
edged ethical line. If you were providing a
search engine, you were not supposed to
accept payments to alter the presentation of
your results. If you asked for information,
you expected the results to be impartial, even if they were subjective. Payola
was a no-no. But there was a very fine line between partiality and subjectiv-
ity, and the line was drawn in largely unexplored territory. That territory was
expanding rapidly, as the Web moved out of the academic and research set-
ting and entered the world of retail stores, real estate brokers, and impotence
cures.
Holding a line against commercialism posed a dilemma—what Brin and
Page, in their original paper, termed the “mixed motives” of advertising-based
search engines. How would advertisers respond if the engine provided highly
ranked pages that were unfriendly to their product? Brin and Page noted that
a search for “cell phones” on their prototype search engine returned an arti-
cle about the dangers of talking on cell phones while driving. Would cell
phone companies really pay to appear on the same page with information
that might discourage people from buying cell phones? Because of such con-
flicts, Google’s founders predicted “that advertising funded search engines
will be inherently biased toward the advertisers and away from the needs of
the consumers.” They noted that one search engine, Open Text, had already
gotten out of the search engine business after it was reported to be selling
rank for money.
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There was a presumed,
generally acknowledged
ethical line. Payola was
a no-no.
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Placements, Clicks, and Auctions
Only a year later, the world had changed. Starting in 1998, Overture (origi-
nally named GoTo.com) made a healthy living by leaping with gusto over the
presumed ethical line. That line turned out to have been a chasm mainly in
the minds of academics. Overture simply charged advertisers to be searchable,
and charged them more for higher rankings in the search results. The argu-
ment in favor of this simple commercialism was that if you could afford to
pay to be seen, then your capacity to spend money on advertising probably
reflected the usefulness of your web page. It mattered not whether this was
logical, nor whether it offended purists. It seemed to make people happy.
Overture’s CEO explained the company’s rationale in simple terms. Sounding
every bit like a broker in the bazaar arguing with the authorities, Jeffrey
Brewer explained, “Quite frankly, there’s no understanding of how any ser-
vice provides results. If consumers are satisfied, they really are not interested
in the mechanism.” 
Customers were indeed satisfied. In the heady Internet bubble of the late
1990s, commercial sites were eager to make themselves visible, and users
were eager to find products and services. Overture introduced a second inno-
vation, one that expanded its market beyond the sites able to pay the sub-
stantial up-front fees that AOL and Yahoo! charged for banner ads. Overture
charged advertisers nothing to have their links posted—it assessed fees only
if users clicked on those links from Overture’s search results page. A click was
only a penny to start, making it easy for small-budget Web companies to buy
advertising. Advertisers were eager to sign up for this “pay-per-click” (PPC)
service. They might not get a sale on every click, but at least they were pay-
ing only for viewers who took the trouble to learn a little bit more than what
was in the advertisement.
As a search term became popular, the price for links under that term went
up. The method of setting prices was Overture’s third innovation. If several
advertisers competed for the limited real estate on a search results page,
Overture held an auction among them and charged as much as a dollar a
click. The cost per click adjusted up and down, depending on how many other
customers were competing for use of the same keyword. If a lot of advertis-
ers wanted links to their sites to appear when you searched for “camera,” the
price per click would rise. Real estate on the screen was a finite resource, and
the market would determine the going rates. Auctioning keywords was sim-
ple, sensible, and hugely profitable.
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Ironically, the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2000 only made
Overture’s pay-for-ranking, pay-per-click, keyword auction model more
attractive. As profits and capital dried up, Internet businesses could no longer
afford up-front capital to buy banner ads, some of which seemed to yield
meager results. As a result, many companies shifted their advertising budg-
ets to Overture and other services that adopted some of Overture’s innova-
tions. The bursting bubble affected the hundreds of early search companies as
well. As competition took its toll, Yahoo! and AOL both started accepting
payment for search listings. 
Uncle Sam Takes Note
Different search engines offered different levels of disclosure about the pay-
for-placement practice. Yahoo! labeled the paid results with the word
“Sponsored,” the term today generally accepted as the correct euphemism for
“paid advertisement.” Others used vaguer terms such as “partner results” or
“featured listings.” Microsoft’s MSN offered a creative justification for its use
of the term “featured” with no other explanation: MSN’s surveys showed that
consumers already assumed that search results were for sale—so there was no
need to tell them! With the information superhighway becoming littered with
roadkill, business was less fun, and business tactics became less grounded in
the utopian spirit that had given birth to the Internet. “We can’t afford to
have ideological debates anymore,” said Evan Thornley, CEO of one startup.
“We’re a public company.”
At first, the government stayed out of all this, but in 2001, Ralph Nader’s
watchdog organization, Consumer Alert, got involved. Consumer Alert filed
a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission alleging that eight search
engine vendors were deceiving consumers by intermingling “paid inclusion”
and “paid placement” results along with those that were found by the search
engine algorithm. Consumer Alert’s Executive Director, Gary Ruskin, was
direct in his accusation: “These search engines have chosen crass commer-
cialism over editorial integrity. We are asking the FTC to make sure that no
one is tricked by the search engines’ descent into commercial deception. If
they are going to stuff ads into search results, they should be required to say
that the ads are ads.”
The FTC agreed, and requested search engines to clarify the distinction
between organic results and sponsored results. At the same time, the FTC issued
a consumer alert to advise and inform consumers of the practice (see Figure
4.8). Google shows its “sponsored links” to the right, as in Figure 4.1, or
slightly indented. Yahoo! shows its “sponsor results” on a colored background. 
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Source: Federal Trade Commission.
FIGURE 4.8 FTC Consumer Alert about paid ranking of search results.
Google Finds Balance Without Compromise
As the search engine industry was struggling with its ethical and fiscal prob-
lems in 2000, Google hit a vein of gold. 
Google already had the PageRank algorithm, which produced results
widely considered superior to those of other search engines. Google was fast,
in part because its engineers had figured out how to split both background
and foreground processing across many machines operating in parallel.
Google’s vast data storage was so redundant that you could pull out a disk
drive anywhere and the engine didn’t miss a beat. Google was not suspected
of taking payments for rankings. And Google’s interface was not annoying—
no flashy banner ads (no banner ads at all, in fact) on either the home page
or the search results page. Google’s home page was a model of understate-
ment. There was almost nothing on it except for the word “Google,” the
search window, and the option of getting a page of search results or of “feel-
ing lucky” and going directly to the top hit (an option that was more valu-
able when many users had slow dialup Internet connections). 
There were two other important facts about Google in early 2000: Google
was expanding, and Google was not making much money. Its technology was
successful, and lots of people were using its search engine. It just didn’t have
a viable business model—until AdWords.
Google’s AdWords allows advertisers to participate in an auction of key-
words, like Overture’s auction for search result placement. But when you win
an AdWords auction, you simply get the privilege of posting a small text
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advertisement on Google’s search results pages under certain circumstances—
not the right to have your web site come up as an organic search result. The
beauty of the system was that it didn’t interfere with the search results, was
relatively unobtrusive, was keyed to the specific search, and did not mess up
the screen with irritating banner ads. 
At first, Google charged by the “impression”—that is, the price of your
AdWords advertisement simply paid for having it shown, whether or not any-
one clicked on it. AdWords switched to Overture’s pay-per-click business
model in 2002. Initially, the advertisements were sold one at a time, through
a human agent at Google. AdWords took off when the process of placing an
advertisement was automated. To place an ad today, you simply fill out a web
form with information about what search terms you want to target, what few
words you want as the text of your ad—and what credit card number Google
can use to charge its fee.
Google’s technology was brilliant, but none of the elements of its business
model was original. With the combination, Google took off and became a
giant. The advertising had no effect on the search results, so confidence in
the quality of Google’s search results was undiminished. AdWords enabled
Google to achieve the balance Brin and Page had predicted would be impos-
sible: commercial sponsorship without distorted results. Google emerged—
from this dilemma, at least—with its pocketbooks overflowing and its
principles intact. 
Banned Ads
Targeted ads, such as Google’s AdWords, are changing the advertising indus-
try. Online ads are more cost-effective because the advertiser can control who
sees them. The Internet makes it possible to target advertisements not just by
search term, but geographically—to show different ads in California than in
Massachusetts, for example. The success of
web advertising has blown to bits a major
revenue source for newspapers and televi-
sion. The media and communications indus-
tries have not yet caught up with the sudden
reallocation of money and power. 
As search companies accumulate vast
advertising portfolios, they control what products, legal or illegal, may be
promoted. Their lists result from a combination of legal requirements, market
demands, and corporate philosophy. The combined effect of these decisions
represents a kind of soft censorship—with which newspapers have long been
familiar, but which acquires new significance as search sites become a
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dominant advertising engine. Among the items and services for which Google
will not accept advertisements are fake designer goods, child pornography
(some adult material is permitted in the U.S., but not if the models might be
underage), term paper writing services, illegal drugs and some legal herbal
substances, drug paraphernalia, fireworks, online gambling, miracle cures,
political attack ads (although political advertising is allowed in general),
prostitution, traffic radar jammers, guns, and brass knuckles. The list paints
a striking portrait of what Joe and Mary Ordinary want to see, should see, or
will tolerate seeing—and perhaps also how Google prudentially restrains the
use of its powerfully liberating product for illegal activities. 
Search Is Power
At every step of the search process, individuals and institutions are working
hard to control what we see and what we find—not to do us ill, but to help
us. Helpful as search engines are, they don’t have panels of neutral experts
deciding what is true or false, or what is important or irrelevant. Instead,
there are powerful economic and social motivations to present information
that is to our liking. And because the inner workings of the search engines
are not visible, those controlling what we see are themselves subject to few
controls.
Algorithmic Does Not Mean Unbiased
Because search engines compute relevance and ranking, because they are
“algorithmic” in their choices, we often assume that they, unlike human
researchers, are immune to bias. But bias can be coded into a computer pro-
gram, introduced by small changes in the weights of the various factors that
go into the ranking recipe or the spidering selection algorithm. And even
what counts as bias is a matter of human judgment.
Having a lot of money will not buy you a high rank by paying that money
to Google. Google’s PageRank algorithm nonetheless incorporates something
of a bias in favor of the already rich and powerful. If your business has
become successful, a lot of other web pages are likely to point to yours, and
that increases your PageRank. This makes sense and tends to produce the
results that most people feel are correct. But the degree to which power should
beget more power is a matter over which powerful and marginal businesses
might have different views. Whether the results “seem right,” or the search
algorithm’s parameters need adjusting, is a matter only humans can judge.
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For a time, Amazon customers searching for books about abortion would
get back results including the question, “Did you mean adoption?” When a
pro-choice group complained, Amazon responded that the suggestion was
automatically generated, a consequence of the similarity of the words. The
search engine had noticed, over time, that many people who searched for
“abortion” also searched for “adoption.” But Amazon agreed to make the ad
hoc change to its search algorithm to treat the term “abortion” as a special
case. In so doing, the company unintentionally confirmed that its algorithms
sometimes incorporate elements of human bias.
Market forces are likely to drive commercially viable search engines
toward the bias of the majority, and also to respond to minority interests only
in proportion to their political power. Search engines are likely to favor fresh
items over older and perhaps more comprehensive sources, because their
users go to the Internet to get the latest information. If you rely on a search
engine to discover information, you need to remember that others are mak-
ing judgment calls for you about what you are being shown.
Not All Search Engines Are Equal 
When we use a search engine, we may think that what we are getting is a
representative sample of what’s available. If so, what we get from one search
engine should be pretty close to what we get from another. This is very far
from reality. 
A study comparing queries to Google, Yahoo!, ASK, and MSN showed that
the results returned on the first page were unique 88% percent of the time.
Only 12% of the first-page results were in common to even two of these four
search engines. If you stick with one search engine, you could be missing
what you’re looking for. The tool ranking.thumbshots.com provides vivid
graphic representations of the level of overlap between the results of differ-
ent search engines, or different searches using the same search engine. For
example, Figure 4.9 shows how little overlap exists between Google and
Yahoo! search results for “boston florist.” 
Each of the hundred dots in the top row represents a result of the Google
search, with the highest-ranked result at the left. The bottom row represents
Yahoo!’s results. A line connects each pair of identical search results—in this
case, only 11% of the results were in common. Boston Rose Florist, which is
Yahoo’s number-one response, doesn’t turn up in Google’s search at all—not
in the top 100, or even in the first 30 pages Google returns.
Ranking determines visibility. An industry research study found that 62%
of search users click on a result from the first page, and 90% click on a result
within the first three pages. If they don’t find what they are looking for, more
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than 80% start the search over with the same search engine, changing the
keywords—as though confident that the search engine “knows” the right
answer, but they haven’t asked the right question. A study of queries to the
Excite search engine found that more than 90% of queries were resolved in
the first three pages. Google’s experience is even more concentrated on the
first page. 
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FIGURE 4.9 Thumbshots comparison of Google and Yahoo! search results for
“boston florists.”
Search engine users have great confidence that they are being given
results that are not only useful but authoritative. 36% of users thought see-
ing a company listed among the top search results indicated that it was a top
company in its field; only 25% said that seeing a company ranked high in
search results would not lead them to think that it was a leader in its field.
There is, in general, no reason for such confidence that search ranking cor-
responds to corporate quality.
04_0137135599_ch04.qxd  5/2/08  8:03 AM  Page 147
Search Results Can Be Manipulated
Search is a remarkable business. Internet users put a lot of confidence in the
results they get back from commercial search engines. Buyers tend to click on
the first link, or at least a link on the first page, even though those links may
depend heavily on the search engine they happen to be using, based on com-
plex technical details that hardly anyone understands. For many students, for
example, the library is an information source of last resort, if that. They do
research as though whatever their search engine turns up must be a link to
the truth. If people don’t get helpful answers, they tend to blame themselves
and change the question, rather than try a different search engine—even
though the answers they get can be inexplicable and capricious, as anyone
googling “kinderstart” to find kinderstart.com will discover. 
Under these circumstances, anyone putting up a web site to get a message
out to the world would draw an obvious conclusion. Coming out near the top
of the search list is too important to leave to chance. Because ranking is algo-
rithmic, a set of rules followed with diligence and precision, it must be pos-
sible to manipulate the results. The Search Engine Optimization industry
(SEO) is based on that demand. 
Search Engine Optimization is an activity that seeks to improve how par-
ticular web pages rank within major search engines, with the intent of
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CAT AND MOUSE WITH BLOG SPAMMERS
You may see comments on a blog consisting of nothing but random words
and a URL. A malicious bot is posting these messages in the hope that
Google’s spider will index the blog page, including the spam URL. With more
pages linking to the URL, perhaps its PageRank will increase and it will turn
up in searches. Blogs counter by forcing you to type some distorted letters—
a so-called captcha (“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart”), a test to determine if the party posting the
comment is really a person and not a bot. Spammers counter by having their
bot take a copy of the captcha and show it to human volunteers. The spam
bot then takes what the volunteers type and uses it to gain entry to the blog
site. The volunteers are recruited by being given access to free pornography if
they type the captcha’s text correctly! Here is a sample captcha:
This image has been released into the public domain by its author, Kruglov at the wikipedia project.
This applies worldwide.
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increasing the traffic that will come to those web sites. Legitimate businesses
try to optimize their sites so they will rank higher than their competitors.
Pranksters and pornographers try to optimize their sites, too, by fooling the
search engine algorithms into including them as legitimate results, even
though their trappings of legitimacy are mere disguises. The search engine
companies tweak their algorithms in order to see through the disguises, but
their tweaks sometimes have unintended effects on legitimate businesses.
And the tweaking is largely done in secret, to avoid giving the manipulators
any ideas about countermeasures. The result is a chaotic battle, with innocent
bystanders, who have become reliant on high search engine rankings, some-
times injured as the rules of engagement keep changing. 
Google proclaims of its PageRank algorithm that “Democracy on the web
works,” comparing the ranking-by-inbound-links to a public election. But the
analogy is limited—there are many ways to manipulate the “election,” and the
voting rules are not fully disclosed.
The key to search engine optimization is to understand how particular
engines do their ranking—what factors are considered, and what weights they
are given—and then to change your web site to improve your score. For
example, if a search engine gives greater weight to key words that appear in
the title, and you want your web page to rank more highly when someone
searches for “cameras,” you should put the word “cameras” in the title. The
weighting factors may be complex and depend on factors external to your
own web page—for example, external links that point to your page, the age
of the link, or the prestige of the site from which it is linked. So significant
time, effort, and cost must be expended in order to have a meaningful impact
on results.
Then there are techniques that are sneaky at best—and “dirty tricks” at
worst. Suppose, for example, that you are the web site designer for Abelson’s,
a new store that wants to compete with Bloomingdale’s. How would you
entice people to visit Abelson’s site when they would ordinarily go to
Bloomingdale’s? If you put “We’re better than Bloomingdale’s!” on your web
page, Abelson’s page might appear in the search results for “Bloomingdale’s.”
But you might not be willing to pay the price of mentioning the competition
on Abelson’s page. On the other hand, if you just put the word “Blooming-
dale’s” in white text on a white background on Abelson’s page, a human
viewer wouldn’t see it—but the indexing software might index it anyway. The
indexer is working with the HTML code that generates the page, not the
visible page itself. The software might not be clever enough to realize that the
word “Bloomingdale’s” in the HTML code for Abelson’s web page would not
actually appear on the screen.
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A huge industry has developed around SEO, rather like the business that
has arisen around getting high school students packaged for application to
college. A Google search for “search engine optimization” returned 11 spon-
sored links, including some with ads reading “Page 1 Rankings Guarantee”
and “Get Top Rankings Today.” 
Is the search world more ethical because the commercial rank-improving
transactions are indirect, hidden from the public, and going to the optimiza-
tion firms rather than to the search firms? After all, it is only logical that if
you have an important message to get out, you would optimize your site to
do so. And you probably wouldn’t have a web site at all if you thought you
had nothing important to say. Search engine companies tend to advise their
web site designers just to create better, more substantive web pages, in much
the same way that college admissions officials urge high school students just
to learn more in school. Neither of the dependent third-party “optimization”
industries is likely to disappear anytime soon because of such principled
advice.
And what’s “best”—for society in general, not just for the profits of the
search companies or the companies that rely on them—can be very hard to
say. In his book, Ambient Findability, Peter Morville describes the impact of
search engine optimization on the National Cancer Institute’s site, www.
cancer.gov. The goal of the National Cancer Institute is to provide the most
reliable and the highest-quality information to people who need it the most,
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GOOGLE BOMBING
A “Google bomb” is a prank that causes a particular search to return mischie-
vous results, often with political content. For example, if you searched for
“miserable failure” after the 2000 U.S. presidential election, you got taken to
the White House biography of George Bush. The libertarian Liberty Round
Table mounted an effort against the Center for Science in the Public Interest,
among others. In early 2008, www.libertyroundtable.org read, “Have you
joined the Google-bombing fun yet? Lob your volleys at the food nazis and
organized crime. Your participation can really make the difference with this
one—read on and join the fun! Current Target: Verizon Communications, for
civil rights violations.” The site explains what HTML code to include in your
web page, supposedly to trick Google’s algorithms.
Marek W., a 23-year-old programmer from Cieszyn, Poland, “Google
bombed” the country’s president, Lech Kaczyn´ski. Searches for “kutas” using
Google (it’s the Polish word for “penis”) returned the president’s web site as
the first choice. Mr. Kaczyn´ski was not pleased, and insulting the president is
a crime in Poland. Marek is now facing three years in prison.
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often cancer sufferers and their families. Search for “cancer,” and the NCI site
was “findable” because it appeared near the topic of the search page results.
That wasn’t the case, though, when you looked for specific cancers, yet that’s
exactly what the majority of the intended users did. NCI called in search
engine optimization experts, and all that is now changed. If we search for
“colon cancer,” the specific page on the NCI site about this particular form of
cancer appears among the top search results. 
Is this good? Perhaps—if you can’t trust the National Cancer Institute, who
can you trust? But WebMD and other commercial sites fighting for the top
position might not agree. And a legitimate coalition, the National Colorectal
Cancer Roundtable, doesn’t appear until page 7, too deep to be noticed by
almost any user. 
Optimization is a constant game of cat and mouse. The optimizers look for
better ways to optimize, and the search engine folks look for ways to produce
more reliable results. The game occasionally claims collateral victims. Neil
Montcrief, an online seller of large-sized shoes, prospered for a while because
searches for “big feet” brought his store, 2bigfeet.com, to the top of the list.
One day, Google tweaked its algorithm to combat manipulation. Montcrief’s
innocent site fell to the twenty-fifth page, with disastrous consequences for
his economically marginal and totally web-dependent business.
Manipulating the ranking of search results is one battleground where the
power struggle is played out. Because search is the portal to web-based infor-
mation, controlling the search results allows you, perhaps, to control what
people think. So even governments get involved.
Search Engines Don’t See Everything
Standard search engines fail to index a great deal of information that is
accessible via the Web. Spiders may not penetrate into databases, read the
contents of PDF or other document formats, or search useful sites that require
a simple, free registration. With a little more effort than just typing into the
search window of Google or Yahoo!, you may be able to find exactly what
you are looking for. It is a serious failure to assume that something is unim-
portant or nonexistent simply because a search engine does not return it. A
good overview of resources for finding things in the “deep web” is at Robert
Lackie’s web site, www.robertlackie.com.
Search Control and Mind Control 
To make a book disappear from a library, you don’t have to remove it from
the bookshelf. All you need to do is to remove its entry from the library
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catalog—if there is no record of where to find it, it does not matter if the book
actually still exists. 
When we search for something, we have an unconfirmed confidence that
what the search engine returns is what exists. A search tool is a lens through
which we view information. We count on the lens not to distort the scene,
although we know it can’t show us the
entire landscape at once. Like the book
gone from the catalog, information that
cannot be found may as well not exist. So
removing information in the digital world
does not require removing the documents
themselves. You can make things disappear by banishing them into the un-
indexed darkness.
By controlling “findability,” search tools can be used to hide as well as to
reveal. They have become a tool of governments seeking to control what their
people know about the world, a theme to which we return in Chapter 7, “You
Can’t Say That on the Internet.” When the Internet came to China, previously
unavailable information began pouring into the country. The government
responded by starting to erect “the great firewall of China,” which filtered out
information the government did not want seen. But bits poured in more
quickly than offending web sites could be blocked. One of the government’s
counter-measures, in advance of a Communist Party congress in 2002, was
simply to close down certain search engines. “Obviously there is some harm-
ful information on the Internet,” said a Chinese spokesman by way of expla-
nation. “Not everyone should have access to this harmful information.”
Google in particular was unavailable—it may have been targeted because
people could sometimes use it to access a cached copy of a site to which the
government had blocked direct access. 
Search was already too important to the Chinese economy to leave the ban
in place for very long. The firewall builders got better, and it became harder
to reach banned sites. But such a site might still turn up in Google’s search
results. You could not access it when you clicked on the link, but you could
see what you were missing.
In 2004, under another threat of being cut off from China, Google agreed
to censor its news service, which provides access to online newspapers. The
company reluctantly decided not to provide any information at all about
those stories, reasoning that “simply showing these headlines would likely
result in Google News being blocked altogether in China.” But the govern-
ment was not done yet. 
The really hard choice came a year later. Google’s search engine was avail-
able inside China, but because Google’s servers were located outside the
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them into the un-indexed
darkness.
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country, responses were sluggish. And because many of the links that were
returned did not work, Google’s search engine was, if not useless, at least
uncompetitive. A Chinese search engine, Baidu, was getting most of the busi-
ness. 
Google had a yes-or-no decision:
to cooperate with the government’s
web site censorship or to lose the
Chinese market. How would it bal-
ance its responsibilities to its share-
holders to grow internationally with
its corporate mission: “to organize
the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful”?
Would the company co-founded by an émigré from the Soviet Union make
peace with Chinese censorship?
Completely universal accessibility was already more than Google could
lawfully accomplish, even in the U.S. If a copyright holder complained that
Google was making copyrighted material improperly accessible, Google
would respond by removing the link to it from search results. And there were
other U.S. laws about web content, such as the Communications Decency Act,
which we discuss in Chapter 7.
Google’s accommodation to Chinese authorities was, in a sense, nothing
more than the normal practice of any company: You have to obey the local
laws anywhere you are doing business. China threw U.S. laws back at U.S.
critics. “After studying internet legislation in the West, I’ve found we basi-
cally have identical legislative objectives and principles,” said Mr. Liu
Zhengrong, deputy chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the State Council
Information Office. “It is unfair and smacks of double standards when (for-
eigners) criticize China for deleting illegal and harmful messages, while it is
legal for U.S. web sites to do so.”
And so, when Google agreed in early 2006 to censor its Chinese search
results, some were awakened from their dreams of a global information
utopia. “While removing search results is inconsistent with Google’s mission,
providing no information (or a heavily degraded user experience that
amounts to no information) is more inconsistent with our mission,” a Google
statement read. That excuse seemed weak-kneed to some. A disappointed
libertarian commentator countered, “The evil of the world is made possible by
the sanction that you give it.” (This is apparently an allusion to another
Google maxim, “Don’t be evil”—now revised to read, “You can make money
without doing evil.”) The U.S. Congress called Google and other search com-
panies on the carpet. “Your abhorrent activities in China are a disgrace,” said
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GOOGLE U.S. VS. GOOGLE CHINA
You can try some searches yourself: 
• www.google.com is the version
available in the United States.
• www.google.cn is the version
available in China.
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California Representative Tom Lantos. “I cannot understand how your corpo-
rate executives sleep at night.”
The results of Google’s humiliating compromise are striking, and anyone
can see them. Figure 4.10 shows the top search results returned by the U.S.
version of Google in response to the query “falun gong.”
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FIGURE 4.10 Search results for “falun gong” provided by Google U.S.
By contrast, Figure 4.11 shows the first few results in response to the same
query if the Chinese version of Google is used instead. All the results are neg-
ative information about the practice, or reports of actions taken against its
followers.
Most of the time, whether you use the U.S. or Chinese version of Google,
you will get similar results. In particular, if you search for “shoes,” you get
sponsored links to online shoe stores so Google can pay its bills.
But there are many exceptions. One researcher tested the Chinese version
of Google for 10,000 English words and found that roughly 9% resulted in
censored responses. Various versions of the list of blocked words exist, and
the specifics are certainly subject to change without notice. Recent versions
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FIGURE 4.11 Results of “falun gong” search returned by Google China.
The search engine lens is not
impartial. At this scale, search can be
an effective tool of thought control.
A Google executive told Congress, “In
an imperfect world, we had to make
an imperfect choice”—which is surely
the truth. But business is business. As
Google CEO Eric Schmidt said of the
company’s practices, “There are
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The home page of the OpenNet
Initiative at the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society, opennet.
net, has a tool with which you can
check which countries block access
to your favorite (or least favorite)
web site. A summary of findings
appears as the book Access Denied
(MIT Press, 2008).
contained such entries as “crime against humanity,” “oppression,” and “geno-
cide,” as well as lists of dissidents and politicians. 
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many, many ways to run the world, run your company … If you don’t like it,
don’t participate. You’re here as a volunteer; we didn’t force you to come.”
You Searched for WHAT? Tracking Searches
Search engine companies can store
everything you look for, and every-
thing you click on. In the world of
limitless storage capacity, it pays for
search companies to keep that data—
it might come in handy some day,
and it is an important part of the
search process. But holding search
histories also raises legal and ethical
questions. The capacity to retain
and analyze query history is another
power point—only now the power
comes from knowledge about what
interests you as an individual, and
what interests the population as a
whole.
But why would search companies
bother to keep every keystroke and
click? There are good reasons not
to—personal privacy is endangered
when such data is retained, as we
discuss in Chapter 2. For example,
under the USA PATRIOT Act, the federal government could, under certain cir-
cumstances, require your search company to reveal what you’ve been search-
ing for, without ever informing you that it is getting that data. Similar
conditions are even easier to imagine in more oppressive countries. Chinese
dissidents were imprisoned when Yahoo! turned over their email to the gov-
ernment—in compliance with local laws. Representative Chris Smith asked, “If
the secret police a half century ago asked where Anne Frank was hiding,
would the correct answer be to hand over the information in order to com-
ply with local laws?” What if the data was not email, but search queries? 
From the point of view of the search company, it is easy to understand the
reason for retaining your every click. Google founder Sergey Brin says it all
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IMAGE SEARCH
There are search engines for
pictures, and searching for faces
presents a different kind of privacy
threat. Face recognition by com-
puter has recently become quick
and reliable. Computers are now
better than people at figuring out
which photos are of the same per-
son. With millions of photographs
publicly accessible on the Web, all
that’s needed is a single photo
tagged with your name to find
others in which you appear. Similar
technology makes it possible to
find products online using images
of similar items. Public image-
matching services include
riya.com, polarrose.com, and
like.com.
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on the company’s “Philosophy” page: “The perfect search engine would
understand exactly what you mean and give back exactly what you want.”
Your search history is revealing—and Jen can read your mind much better if
she knows what you have been thinking about in the past. 
Search quality can improve if search histories are retained. We may prefer,
for privacy reasons, that search engines forget everything that has happened,
but there would be a price to pay for that—a price in performance to us, and
a consequent price in competitiveness to the search company. There is no free
lunch, and whatever we may think in theory about Jen keeping track of our
search queries, in practice we don’t worry about it very much, even when we
know.
Even without tying search data to our personal identity, the aggregated
search results over time provide valuable data for marketing and economic
analysis. Figure 4.12 shows the pat-
tern of Google searches for “iPhone”
alongside the identity of certain
news stories. The graph shows the
number of news stories (among
those Google indexes) that mentioned Apple’s iPhone. Search has created a
new asset: billions of bits of information about what people want to know.
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You can track trends yourself at
www.google.com/trends.
Google ™ is a registered trademark of Google, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
FIGURE 4.12 The top line shows the number of Google searches for “iphone,” and
the bottom line shows the number of times the iPhone was mentioned in the news
sources Google indexes.
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Regulating or Replacing the Brokers
Search engines have become a central point of control in a digital world once
imagined as a centerless, utopian universe of free-flowing information. The
important part of the search story is not about technology or money,
although there is plenty of
both. It is about power—the
power to make things visible,
to cause them to exist or to
make them disappear, and to
control information and access
to information. 
Search engines create com-
mercial value not by creating information, but by helping people find it, by
understanding what people are interested in finding, and by targeting adver-
tising based on that understanding. Some critics unfairly label this activity
“freeloading,” as though they themselves could have created a Google had
they not preferred to do something more creative (see Chapter 6). It is a
remarkable phenomenon: Information access has greater market value than
information creation. The market capitalization of Google ($157 billion) is
more than 50% larger than the combined capitalization of the New York
Times ($3 billion), Pearson Publishing ($13 billion), eBay ($45 billion), and
Macy’s ($15 billion). A company providing access to information it did not
create has greater market value than those that did the creating. In the bits
bazaar, more money is going to the brokers than to the booths.
158 BLOWN TO BITS
Search engines have become a
central point of control in a digital
world once imagined as a
centerless, utopian universe of
free-flowing information.
OPEN ALTERNATIVES
There are hundreds of open source search projects. Because the source of
these engines is open, anyone can look at the code and see how it works.
Most do not index the whole Web, just a limited piece, because the infra-
structure needed for indexing the Web as a whole is too vast. Nutch
(lucene.apache.org/nutch, wiki.apache.org/nutch) is still under devel-
opment, but already in use for a variety of specialized information domains.
Wikia Search, an evolving project of Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales
(search.wikia.com/wiki/Search_Wikia), uses Nutch as an engine and
promises to draw on community involvement to improve search quality.
Moreover, privacy is a founding principle—no identifying data is retained.
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The creation and redistribution of power is an unexpected side effect of the
search industry. Should any controls be in place, and should anyone (other
than services such as searchenginewatch.com) watch over the industry? There
have been a few proposals for required disclosure of search engine selection
and ranking algorithms, but as long as competition remains in the market,
such regulation is unlikely to gain
traction in the U.S. And competition
there is—although Microsoft pled to
the FTC that Google was close to
“controlling a virtual monopoly
share” of Internet advertising. That
charge, rejected by the FTC, brought
much merriment to some who
recalled Microsoft’s stout resistance
a few years earlier to charges that it
had gained monopoly status in desk-
top software. Things change quickly
in the digital world.
We rely on search engines. But we don’t know what they are doing, and
there are no easy answers to the question of what to do about it. 
French President Jacques Chirac was horrified that the whole world might
rely on American search engines as information brokers. To counter the
American hegemony, France and Germany announced plans for a state-spon-
sored search engine in early 2006. As Chirac put it, “We must take up the
challenge posed by the American giants Google and Yahoo. For that, we will
launch a European search engine, Quaero.” The European governments, he
explained, would enter this hitherto private-industry sphere “in the image of
the magnificent success of Airbus. … Culture is not merchandise and cannot
be left to blind market forces.” A year later, Germany dropped out of the
alliance, because, according to one industry source, the “Germans apparently
got tired of French America-bashing and the idea of developing an alterna-
tive to Google.”
So for the time being at least, the search engine market rules, and the
buyer must beware. And probably that is as it should be. Too often, well-
intentioned efforts to regulate technology are far worse than the imagined
evils they were intended to prevent. We shall see several examples in the
coming chapters.
✷
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METASEARCH
Tools such as copernic.com,
surfwax.com, and dogpile.com are
metasearch engines—they query
various search engines and report
results back to the user on the
basis of their own ranking algo-
rithms. On the freeloading theory
of search, they would be freeload-
ing on the freeloaders!
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Search technology, combined with the World Wide Web, has had an astonish-
ing effect on global access to information. The opportunities it presents for
limiting information do not overshadow its capacity to enlighten. Things
unimaginable barely a decade ago are simple today. We can all find our lost
relatives. We can all find new support groups and the latest medical informa-
tion for our ailments, no matter how obscure. We can even find facts in books
we have never held in our hands. Search shines the light of the digital explo-
sion on things we want to make visible.
Encryption technology has the opposite purpose: to make information
secret, even though it is communicated over open, public networks. That par-
adoxical story of politics and mathematics is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Secret Bits
How Codes Became Unbreakable 
Encryption in the Hands of Terrorists,
and Everyone Else 
September 13, 2001. Fires were still smoldering in the wreckage of the World
Trade Center when Judd Gregg of New Hampshire rose to tell the Senate what
had to happen. He recalled the warnings issued by the FBI years before the
country had been attacked: the FBI’s most serious problem was “the encryp-
tion capability of the people who have an intention to hurt America.” “It used
to be,” the senator went on, “that we had the capability to break most codes
because of our sophistication.” No more. “The technology has outstripped the
code breakers,” he warned. Even civil libertarian cryptographer Phil
Zimmermann, whose encryption software appeared on the Internet in 1991
for use by human rights workers world-wide, agreed that the terrorists were
probably encoding their messages. “I just assumed,” he said, “somebody plan-
ning something so diabolical would want to hide their activities using
encryption.”
Encryption is the art of encoding messages so they can’t be understood by
eavesdroppers or adversaries into whose hands the messages might fall.
De-scrambling an encrypted message requires knowing the sequence of sym-
bols—the “key”—that was used to encrypt it. An encrypted message may be
visible to the world, but without the key, it may as well be hidden in a locked
box. Without the key—exactly the right key—the contents of the box, or the
message, remains secret. 
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What was needed, Senator Gregg asserted, was “the cooperation of the
community that is building the software, producing the software, and build-
ing the equipment that creates the encoding technology”—cooperation, that
is, enforced by legislation. The makers of encryption software would have to
enable the government to bypass the locks and retrieve the decrypted mes-
sages. And what about encryption programs written abroad, which could be
shared around the world in the blink of an eye, as Zimmermann’s had been?
The U.S. should use “the market of the United States as leverage” in getting
foreign manufacturers to follow U.S. requirements for “back doors” that could
be used by the U.S. government. 
By September 27, Gregg’s legislation was beginning to take shape. The
keys used to encrypt messages would be held in escrow by the government
under tight security. There would be a “quasi-judicial entity,” appointed by
the Supreme Court, which would decide when law enforcement had made its
case for release of the keys. Civil libertarians squawked, and doubts were
raised as to whether the key escrow idea could actually work. No matter,
opined the Senator in late September. “Nothing’s ever perfect. If you don’t try,
you’re never going to accomplish it. If you do try, you’ve at least got some
opportunity for accomplishing it.”
Abruptly, three weeks later, Senator Gregg dropped his legislative plan.
“We are not working on an encryption bill and have no intention to,” said the
Senator’s spokesman on October 17.
On October 24, 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which gave
the FBI sweeping new powers to combat terrorism. But the PATRIOT Act does
not mention encryption. U.S. authorities have made no serious attempt to leg-
islate control over cryptographic software since Gregg’s proposal. 
Why Not Regulate Encryption? 
Throughout the 1990s, the FBI had made control of encryption its top legisla-
tive priority. Senator Gregg’s proposal was a milder form of a bill, drafted by
the FBI and reported out favorably by the House Select Committee on
Intelligence in 1997, which would have mandated a five-year prison sentence
for selling encryption products unless they enabled immediate decryption by
authorized officials.
How could regulatory measures that law enforcement deemed critical in
1997 for fighting terrorism drop off the legislative agenda four years later, in
the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack ever suffered by the United States
of America? 
No technological breakthrough in cryptography in the fall of 2001 had leg-
islative significance. There also weren’t any relevant diplomatic breakthroughs.
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No other circumstances conspired to make the use of encryption by terrorists
and criminals an unimportant problem. It was just that something else about
encryption had become accepted as more important: the explosion of commer-
cial transactions over the Internet. Congress suddenly realized that it had to
allow banks and their customers to use encryption tools, as well as airlines and
their customers, and eBay and Amazon and their customers. Anyone using the
Internet for commerce needed the protection that encryption provided. Very
suddenly, there were millions of such people, so many that the entire U.S. and
world economy depended on public confidence in the security of electronic
transactions. 
The tension between enabling secure conduct of electronic commerce and
preventing secret communication among outlaws had been in the air for a
decade. Senator Gregg was but the last of the voices calling for restrictions
on encryption. The National Research Council had issued a report of nearly
700 pages in 1996 that weighed the alternatives. The report concluded that
on balance, efforts to control encryption would be ineffective, and that their
costs would exceed any imaginable benefit. The intelligence and defense
establishment was not persuaded. FBI Director Louis Freeh testified before
Congress in 1997 that “Law enforcement is in unanimous agreement that the
widespread use of robust non-key recovery [i.e., non-escrowed] encryption
ultimately will devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism.”
Yet only four years later, even in the face of the September 11th attack, the
needs of commerce admitted no alternative to widespread dissemination of
encryption software to every business in the country, as well as to every home
computer from which a commercial transaction might take place. In 1997,
average citizens, including elected officials, might never have bought
anything online. Congress members’ families might not have been regular
computer users. By 2001, all that had changed—the digital explosion was
happening. Computers had become consumer appliances, Internet connec-
tions were common in American homes—and awareness of electronic fraud
had become widespread. Consumers did not want their credit card numbers,
birthdates, and Social Security numbers exposed on the Internet. 
Why is encryption so important to Internet communications that Congress
was willing to risk terrorists using encryption, so that American businesses
and consumers could use it too? After all, information security is not a new
need. People communicating by postal mail, for example, have reasonable
assurances of privacy without any use of encryption. 
The answer lies in the Internet’s open architecture. Bits move through the
Internet not in a continuous stream, but in discrete blocks, called packets. A
packet consists of about 1500 bytes, no more (see the Appendix). Data pack-
ets are not like envelopes sent through postal mail, with an address on the
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outside and contents hidden. They are like postcards, with everything exposed
for anyone to see. As the packets move through the Internet, they are steered
on their way by computers called routers, which are located at the switching
points. Every data packet gets handled at every router: stored, examined,
checked, analyzed, and sent on its way. Even if all the fibers and wires could
be secured, wireless networks would allow bits to be grabbed out of the air
without detection. 
If you send your credit card number to a store in an ordinary email, you
might as well stand in Times Square and shout it at the top of your lungs. By
2001, a lot of credit card numbers were traveling as bits though glass fibers
and through the air, and it was impossible to prevent snoopers from looking
at them. 
The way to make Internet communications secure—to make sure that no
one but the intended recipient knows what is in a message—is for the sender
to encrypt the information so that only the recipient can decrypt it. If that
can be accomplished, then eavesdroppers along the route from sender to
receiver can examine the packets all they want. All they will find is an unde-
cipherable scramble of bits. 
In a world awakening to Internet commerce, encryption could no longer
be thought of as it had been from ancient times until the turn of the third
millennium: as armor used by generals and diplomats to protect information
critical to national security. Even in the early 1990s, the State Department
demanded that an encryption researcher register as an international arms
dealer. Now suddenly, encryption was less like a weapon and more like the
armored cars used to transport cash on city streets, except that these armored
cars were needed by everyone. Encryption was no longer a munition; it was
money. 
The commoditization of a critical military tool was more than a technol-
ogy shift. It sparked, and continues to spark, a rethinking of fundamental
notions of privacy and of the balance between security and freedom in a
democratic society. 
“The question,” posed MIT’s Ron Rivest, one of the world’s leading cryptog-
raphers, during one of the many debates over encryption policy that occurred
during the 1990s, “is whether people should be able to conduct private con-
versations, immune from government surveillance, even when that surveil-
lance is fully authorized by a Court order.” In the post-2001 atmosphere that
produced the PATRIOT Act, it’s far from certain that Congress would have
responded to Rivest’s question with a resounding “Yes.” But by 2001, commer-
cial realities had overtaken the debates. 
To fit the needs of electronic commerce, encryption software had to be
widely available. It had to work perfectly and quickly, with no chance of
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anyone cracking the codes. And there was more: Although encryption had
been used for more than four millennia, no method known until the late
twentieth century would have worked well enough for Internet commerce.
But in 1976, two young mathematicians, operating outside the intelligence
community that was the center of cryptography research, published a paper
that made a reality out of a seemingly absurd scenario: Two parties work out
a secret key that enables them to exchange messages securely—even if they
have never met and all their messages to each other are in the open, for any-
one to hear. With the invention of public-key cryptography, it became possi-
ble for every man, woman, and child to transmit credit card numbers to
Amazon more securely than any general had been able to communicate mil-
itary orders fifty years earlier, orders on which the fate of nations depended. 
Historical Cryptography 
Cryptography—“secret writing”—has been around almost as long as writing
itself. Ciphers have been found in Egyptian hieroglyphics from as early as
2000 B.C. A cipher is a method for transforming a message into an obscured
form, together with a way of undoing the transformation to recover the mes-
sage. Suetonius, the biographer of the Caesars, describes Julius Caesar’s use
of a cipher in his letters to the orator Cicero, with whom he was planning and
plotting in the dying days of the Roman Republic: “… if he [Caesar] had any-
thing confidential to say, he wrote it in cipher, that is, by so changing the
order of the letters of the alphabet, that not a word could be made out. If any-
one wishes to decipher these, and get at their meaning, he must substitute the
fourth letter of the alphabet, namely D, for A, and so with the others.” In
other words, Caesar used a letter-by-letter translation to encrypt his
messages: 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC 
To encrypt a message with Caesar’s method, replace each letter in the top row
by the corresponding letter in the bottom row. For example, the opening of
Caesar’s Commentaries “Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres” would be
encrypted as: 
Plaintext: GALLIA EST OMNIS DIVISA IN PARTES TRES
Ciphertext: JDOOLD HVW RPQLV GLYLVD LQ SDUWHV WUHV
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The original message is called the plaintext and the encoded message is called
the ciphertext. Messages are decrypted by doing the reverse substitutions. 
This method is called the Caesar shift or the Caesar cipher. The encryp-
tion/decryption rule is easy to remember: “Shift the alphabet three places.” Of
course, the same idea would work if the alphabet were shifted more than three
places, or fewer. The Caesar cipher is really a family of ciphers, with 25 pos-
sible variations, one for each different amount of shifting.
Caesar ciphers are very simple, and an enemy who knew that Caesar was
simply shifting the plaintext could easily try all the 25 possible shifts of the
alphabet to decrypt the message. But Caesar’s method is a representative of a
larger class of ciphers, called substitution ciphers, in which one symbol is
substituted for another according to a uniform rule (the same letter is always
translated the same way). 
There are a great many more substitution ciphers than just shifts. For
example, we could scramble the letters according to the rule
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
XAPZRDWIBMQEOFTYCGSHULJVKN
so that A becomes X, B becomes A, C becomes P, and so on. There is a sim-
ilar substitution for every way of reordering the letters of the alphabet. The
number of different reorderings is 
26 × 25 × 24 ×···× 3 × 2 
which is about 4 × 10
26
different methods—ten thousand times the number of
stars in the universe! It would be impossible to try them all. General substi-
tution ciphers must be secure—or so it might seem. 
Breaking Substitution Ciphers 
In about 1392, an English author—once thought to be the great English poet
Geoffrey Chaucer, although that is now disputed—wrote a manual for use of
an astronomical instrument. Parts of this manual, which was entitled The
Equatorie of the Planetis, were written in a substitution cipher (see Figure
5.1). This puzzle is not as hard as it looks, even though there is very little
ciphertext with which to work. We know it is written in English—Middle
English, actually—but let’s see how far we can get thinking of it as encrypted
English. 
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Folio 30v of Peterson MS 75.1, The Equatorie of Planetis, a 14th century manuscript held at
University of Cambridge. 
FIGURE 5.1 Ciphertext in The Equatorie of Planetis (1392).
Although this looks like gibberish, it contains some patterns that may be
clues. For example, certain symbols occur more frequently than others. There
are twelve s and ten s, and no other symbol occurs as frequently as these.
In ordinary English texts, the two most frequently occurring letters are E and
T, so a fair guess is that these two symbols correspond to these two letters.
Figure 5.2 shows what happens if we assume that = E and = T. The pat-
tern appears twice and apparently represents a three-letter word begin-
ning with T and ending with E. It could be TIE or TOE, but THE seems more
likely, so a reasonable assumption is that = H. If that is true, what is the
four-letter word at the beginning of the text, which begins with TH? Not
THAT, because it ends with a new symbol, nor THEN, because the third letter
is also new. Perhaps THIS. And there is a two-letter word beginning with T
that appears twice in the second line—that must be TO. Filling in the equiva-
lencies for H, I, S, and O yields Figure 5.3. 
FIGURE 5.2 Equatorie ciphertext, with the two most common symbols assumed to
stand for E and T.
05_0137135599_ch05.qxd  5/2/08  8:04 AM  Page 167
FIGURE 5.3 Equatorie ciphertext, with more conjectural decodings. 
At this point, the guessing gets easier—probably the last two words are
EITHER SIDE—and the last few symbols can be inferred with a knowledge of
Middle English and some idea of what the text is about. The complete plain-
text is: This table servith for to entre in to the table of equacion of the mone
on either side (see Figure 5.4). 
168 BLOWN TO BITS
FIGURE 5.4 Equatorie ciphertext, fully decoded. 
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The technique used to crack the code is frequency analysis: If the cipher is
a simple substitution of symbols for letters, then crucial information about
which symbols represent which letters can be gathered from how often the
various symbols appear in the ciphertext. This idea was first described by the
Arabic philosopher and mathematician Al-Kindi, who lived in Baghdad in the
ninth century. 
By the Renaissance, this kind of informed guesswork had been reduced to
a fine art that was well known to European governments. In a famous exam-
ple of the insecurity of substitution ciphers, Mary Queen of Scots was
beheaded in 1587 due to her misplaced reliance on a substitution cipher to
conceal her correspondence with plotters against Queen Elizabeth I. She was
not the last to have put too much confidence in an encryption scheme that
looked hard to crack, but wasn’t. Substitution ciphers were in common use as
late as the 1800s, even though they had been insecure for a millennium by
that time! Edgar Allen Poe’s mystery story The Gold Bug (1843) and A. Conan
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes mystery Adventure of the Dancing Men (1903) both
turn on the decryption of substitution ciphers. 
Secret Keys and One-Time Pads 
In cryptography, every advance in code-breaking yields an innovation in
code-making. Seeing how easily the Equatorie code was broken, what could
we do to make it more secure, or stronger, as cryptographers would say? We
might use more than one symbol to represent the same plaintext letter. A
method named for the sixteenth-century French diplomat Blaise de Vigenère
uses multiple Caesar ciphers. For example, we can pick twelve Caesar ciphers
and use the first cipher for encrypting the 1st, 13th, and 25th letters of the
plaintext; the second cipher for encrypting the 2nd, 14th, and 26th plaintext
letters; and so on. Figure 5.5 shows such a Vigenère cipher. A plaintext mes-
sage beginning SECURE… would be encrypted to produce the ciphertext
llqgrw…, as indicated by the boxed characters in the figure—S is encrypted
using the first row, E is encrypted using the second row, and so on. After we
use the bottom row of the table, we start again at the top row, and repeat the
process over and over. 
We can use the cipher of Figure 5.5 without having to send our correspon-
dent the entire table. Scanning down the first column spells out thomasb-
bryan, which is the key for the message. To communicate using Vigenère
encryption, the correspondents must first agree on a key. They then use the
key to construct a substitution table for encrypting and decrypting messages. 
When SECURE was encrypted as llqgrw, the two occurrences of E at the
second and sixth positions in the plaintext were represented by different
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Harvard University Archives.
FIGURE 5.5 A Vigenère cipher. The key, thomasbbryan, runs down the second
column. Each row represents a Caesar cipher in which the shift amount is determined
by a letter of the key. (Thomas B. Bryan was an attorney who used this code for
communicating with a client, Gordon McKay, in 1894.) 
Cryptographers use stock figures
for describing encryption scenarios:
Alice wants to send a message to
Bob, and Eve is an adversary who
may be eavesdropping. 
Suppose Alice wants to send Bob
a message (see Figure 5.6). The lock-
and-key metaphor goes this way:
Alice puts the message in a box and
locks the box, using a key that only
she and Bob possess. (Imagine that
the lock on Alice’s box is the kind
that needs the key to lock it as well
as to open it.) If Eve intercepts the
ciphertext letters, and the two occurrences of the ciphertext letter l repre-
sented different plaintext letters. This illustrates how the Vigenère cipher con-
founds simple frequency analysis, which was the main tool of cryptanalysts
at the time. Although the idea may seem simple, the discovery of the Vigenère
cipher is regarded as a fundamental advance in cryptography, and the method
was considered to be unbreakable for hundreds of years. 
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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
Cryptography (code-making) and
cryptanalysis (code-breaking) have
been at the heart of many momen-
tous events in human history. The
intertwined stories of diplomacy,
war, and coding technology are
told beautifully in two books: The
Code-Breakers, revised edition, by
David Kahn (Scribner’s, 1996) and
The Code Book by Simon Singh
(Anchor paperback, 2000). 
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box in transit, she has no way to figure out what key to use to open it. When
Bob receives the box, he uses his copy of the key to open it. As long as the
key is kept secret, it doesn’t matter that others can see that there is a box with
something in it, and even what kind of lock is on the box. In the same way,
even if an encrypted message comes with an announcement that it is
encrypted using a Vigenère cipher, it will not be easy to decrypt, except by
someone who has the key. 
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SENDER
plaintext
message
encrypt
ciphertext
Eve
Bob
RECEIVER
plaintext
message
decrypt
key key
Alice
FIGURE 5.6 Standard cryptographic scenario. Alice wants to send a message to Bob.
She encrypts it using a secret key. Bob decrypts it using his copy of the key. Eve is an
eavesdropper. She intercepts the coded message in transit, and tries to decrypt it. 
Or at least that’s the idea. The Vigenère cipher was actually broken in the
mid 1800s by the English mathematician Charles Babbage, who is now rec-
ognized as a founding figure in the field of computing. Babbage recognized
that if someone could guess or otherwise deduce the length of the key, and
hence the length of the cycle on which the Vigenère cipher was repeated, the
problem was reduced to breaking several simple substitutions. He then used
a brilliant extension of frequency analysis to discover the length of the key.
Babbage never published his technique, perhaps at the request of British
Intelligence. A Prussian Army officer, William Kasiski, independently figured
out how to break the Vigenère code and published the method in 1863. The
Vigenère cipher has been insecure ever since. 
The sure way to beat this attack is to use a key that is as long as the plain-
text, so that there are no repetitions. If we wanted to encrypt a message of
length 100, we might use 100 Caesar ciphers in an arrangement like that of
Figure 5.5, extended to 100 rows. Every table row would be used only once.
A code like this is known as a Vernam cipher, after its World War I-era inven-
tor, AT&T telegraph engineer Gilbert Vernam, and is more commonly referred
to as a one-time pad. 
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The term “one-time pad” is based on a particular physical implementation
of the cipher. Let’s again imagine that Alice wants to get a message to Bob.
Alice and Bob have identical pads of paper. Each page of the pad has a key
written on it. Alice uses the top page to encrypt a message. When Bob
receives it, he uses the top page of his pad to decrypt the message. Both Alice
and Bob tear off and destroy the top page of the pad when they have used it.
It is essential that the pages not be re-used, as doing so could create patterns
like those exploited in cracking the Vigenère cipher. 
One-time pads were used during the Second World War and the Cold War
in the form of booklets filled with digits (see Figure 5.7). Governments still
use one-time pads today for sensitive communications, with large amounts of
keying material carefully generated and distributed on CDs or DVDs. 
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FIGURE 5.7 German one-time pad used for communication between Berlin and
Saigon during the 1940s. Encrypted messages identified the page to be used in
decryption. The cover warns, “Sheets of this encryption book that seem to be unused
could contain codes for messages that are still on their way. They should be kept safe
for the longest time a message might need for delivery.” 
A one-time pad, if used correctly, cannot be broken by cryptanalysis. There
are simply no patterns to be found in the ciphertext. There is a deep relation
between information theory and cryptography, which Shannon explored in
1949. (In fact, it was probably his wartime research on this sensitive subject
that gave birth to his brilliant discoveries about communication in general.)
Shannon proved mathematically what is obvious intuitively: The one-time
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pad is, in principle, as good as it gets in cryptography. It is absolutely
unbreakable—in theory. 
But as Yogi Berra said, “In theory, there is no difference between theory
and practice. In practice, there is.” Good one-time pads are hard to produce.
If the pad contains repetitions or other patterns, Shannon’s proof that one-
time pads are uncrackable no longer holds. More seriously, transmitting a pad
between the parties without loss or interception is likely to be just as difficult
as communicating the plaintext of the message itself without detection.
Typically, the parties would share a pad ahead of time and hope to conceal it
in their travels. Big pads are harder to conceal than small pads, however, so
the temptation arises to re-use pages—the kiss of death for security. 
The Soviet KGB fell victim to exactly this temptation, which led to the par-
tial or complete decryption of over 3000 diplomatic and espionage messages
by U.S. and British intelligence during the years 1942–1946. The National
Security Agency’s VENONA project, publicly revealed only in 1995, was
responsible for exposing major KGB agents such as Klaus Fuchs and Kim
Philby. The Soviet messages were doubly encrypted, using a one-time pad on
top of other techniques; this made the code-breaking project enormously dif-
ficult. It was successful only because, as World War II wore on and material
conditions deteriorated, the Soviets re-used the pads. 
Because one-time pads are impractical, almost all encryption uses rela-
tively short keys. Some methods are more secure than others, however.
Computer programs that break Vigenère encryption are readily available on
the Internet, and no professional would use a Vigenère cipher today. Today’s
sophisticated ciphers are the distant descendents of the old substitution meth-
ods. Rather than substituting message texts letter for letter, computers divide
the ASCII-encoded plaintext message into blocks. They then transform the
bits in the block according to some method that depends on a key. The key
itself is a sequence of bits on which Alice and Bob must agree and keep secret
from Eve. Unlike the Vigenère cipher, there are no known shortcuts for break-
ing these ciphers (or at least none known publicly). The best method to
decrypt a ciphertext without knowing the secret key seems to be brute-force
exhaustive search, trying all possible keys. 
The amount of computation required to break a cipher by exhaustive
search grows exponentially in the size of the key. Increasing the key length
by one bit doubles the amount of work required to break the cipher, but only
slightly increases the work required to encrypt and decrypt. This is what
makes these ciphers so useful: Computers may keep getting faster—even at an
exponential rate—but the work required to break the cipher can also be made
to grow exponentially by picking longer and longer keys. 
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Lessons for the Internet Age 
Let’s pause for a moment to consider some of the lessons of cryptographic
history—morals that were well-understood by the early twentieth century. In
the late twentieth century, cryptography changed drastically because of mod-
ern computer technology and new cryptographic algorithms, but these les-
sons are still true today. They are too often forgotten. 
Breakthroughs Happen, but News Travels Slowly 
Mary Stuart was beheaded when her letters plotting against Elizabeth were
deciphered by frequency analysis, which Al-Kindi had described nine cen-
turies earlier. Older methods have also remained in use to the present day,
even for high-stakes communications. Suetonius explained the Caesar cipher
in the first century A.D. Yet two millennia later, the Sicilian Mafia was still
using the code. Bernardo Provenzano was a notorious Mafia boss who man-
aged to stay on the run from Italian police for 43 years. But in 2002, some
pizzini—ciphertexts typed on small pieces of paper—were found in the posses-
sion of one of his associates. The messages included correspondence between
Bernardo and his son Angelo, written in a Caesar cipher—with a shift of three,
exactly as Suetonius had described it. Bernardo switched to a more secure
code, but the dominos started to topple. He was finally traced to a farmhouse
and arrested in April 2006. 
Even scientists are not immune from such follies. Although Babbage and
Kasiski had broken the Vigenère cipher in the mid-nineteenth century,
Scientific American 50 years later described the Vigenère method as “impos-
sible of translation.”
Encoded messages tend to look indecipherable. The incautious, whether
naïve or sophisticated, are lulled into a false sense of security when they look
at apparently unintelligible jumbles of numbers and letters. Cryptography is
a science, and the experts know a lot about code-breaking. 
Confidence Is Good, but Certainty Would Be Better 
There are no guarantees that even the best contemporary ciphers won’t be
broken, or haven’t been broken already. Some of the ciphers have the poten-
tial to be validated by mathematical proofs, but actually providing those
proofs will require deep mathematical breakthroughs. If anyone knows how
to break modern codes, it is probably someone in the National Security
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Agency or a comparable agency of a foreign government, and those folks
don’t tend to say much publicly. 
In the absence of a formal proof of security, all one can do is to rely on
what has been dubbed the Fundamental Tenet of Cryptography: If lots of
smart people have failed to solve a problem, then it probably won’t be solved
(soon).
Of course, that is not a very useful principle in practice—by definition,
breakthroughs are unlikely to happen “soon.” But they do happen, and when
they do, indigestion among cryptographers is widespread. In August 2004, at
an annual cryptography conference, researchers announced that they had
been able to break a popular algorithm (MD5) for computing cryptographic
operations called message digests, which are fundamental security elements
in almost all web servers, password programs, and office products.
Cryptographers recommended switching to a stronger algorithm (SHA-1) but
within a year, weaknesses were uncovered in this method as well. 
A provably secure encryption algorithm is
one of the holy grails of computer science.
Every weakness exposed in proposed algo-
rithms yields new ideas about how to make
them stronger. We aren’t there yet, but
progress is being made. 
Having a Good System Doesn’t Mean People Will Use It 
Before we explain that unbreakable encryption may finally be possible, we
need to caution that even mathematical certainty would not suffice to create
perfect security, if people don’t change their behavior. 
Vigenère published his encryption method in 1586. But foreign-office
cipher secretaries commonly avoided the Vigenère cipher because it was cum-
bersome to use. They stayed with simple substitution ciphers—even though it
was well-known that these ciphers were readily broken—and they hoped for
the best. By the eighteenth century, most European governments had skilled
“Black Chambers” through which all mail to and from foreign embassies was
routed for decryption. Finally, the embassies switched to Vigenère ciphers,
which themselves continued to be used after information about how to crack
them had become widely known. 
And so it is today. Technological inventions, no matter how solid in the-
ory, will not be used for everyday purposes if they are inconvenient or expen-
sive. The risks of weak systems are often rationalized in attempts to avoid the
trouble of switching to more secure alternatives. 
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In 1999, an encryption standard known as WEP (Wired Equivalent
Privacy) was introduced for home and office wireless connections. In 2001,
however, WEP was found to have serious flaws that made it easy to eaves-
drop on wireless networks, a fact that became widely known in the security
community. Despite this, wireless equipment companies continued to sell
WEP products, while industry pundits comforted people that “WEP is better
than nothing.” A new standard (WPA—Wi-Fi Protected Access) was finally
introduced in 2002, but it wasn’t until September 2003 that products were
required to use the new standard in order to be certified. Hackers were able
to steal more than 45 million credit and debit card records from TJX, the par-
ent company of several major retail store chains, because the company was
still using WEP encryption as late as 2005. That was long after WEP’s inse-
curities were known and WPA was available as a replacement. The cost of
that security breach has reached the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Similarly, many of today’s “smart card” systems that use RFID (Radio
Frequency Identification) tags are insecure. In January 2005, computer scien-
tists from Johns Hopkins University and RSA Data Security announced that
they had cracked an RFID-based automobile anti-theft and electronic pay-
ment system built into millions of automobile key tags. They demonstrated
this by making multiple gasoline purchases at an Exxon/Mobile station. A
spokesman for Texas Instruments, which developed the system, countered
that the methods the team used were “wildly beyond the reach of most
researchers,” saying “I don’t see any reason to change this approach.”
When encryption was a military monopoly, it was possible in principle for
a commander to order everyone to start using a new code if he suspected that
the enemy had cracked the old one. The risks of insecure encryption today
arise from three forces acting in consort: the high speed at which news of
insecurities travels among experts, the slow speed at which the inexpert rec-
ognize their vulnerabilities, and the massive scale at which cryptographic
software is deployed. When a university researcher discovers a tiny hole in
an algorithm, computers everywhere become vulnerable, and there is no cen-
tral authority to give the command for software upgrades everywhere.
The Enemy Knows Your System 
The last lesson from history may seem counterintuitive. It is that a crypto-
graphic method, especially one designed for widespread use, should be
regarded as more reliable if it is widely known and seems not to have been
broken, rather than if the method itself has been kept secret. 
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The Flemish linguist Auguste Kerckhoffs articulated this principle in an
1883 essay on military cryptography. As he explained it, 
The system must not require secrecy, and it could fall into the hands
of the enemy without causing trouble…. Here I mean by system, not
the key itself, but the material part of the system: tables, dictionaries,
or whatever mechanical apparatus is needed to apply it. Indeed, it’s
not necessary to create imaginary phantoms or to suspect the integrity
of employees or subordinates, in order to understand that, if a system
requiring secrecy were to find itself in the hands of too many individ-
uals, it could be compromised upon each engagement in which any of
them take part. 
In other words, if a cryptographic method is put in widespread use, it is unre-
alistic to expect that the method can remain secret for long. Thus, it should
be designed so that it will remain secure, even if everything but a small
amount of information (the key) becomes exposed. 
Claude Shannon restated Kerckhoffs’s Principle in his paper on systems for
secret communication: “… we shall assume that the enemy knows the system
being used.” He went on to write: 
The assumption is actually the one ordinarily used in cryptographic
studies. It is pessimistic and hence safe, but in the long run realistic,
since one must expect his system to be found out eventually. 
Kerckhoffs’s Principle is frequently violated in modern Internet security prac-
tice. Internet start-up companies routinely make bold announcements about
new breakthrough proprietary encryption methods, which they refuse to sub-
ject to public scrutiny, explaining that the method must be kept secret in
order to protect its security. Cryptographers generally regard such “security
through obscurity” claims with extreme skepticism. 
Even well-established organizations run afoul of Kerckhoffs’s Principle.
The Content Scrambling System (CSS) used on DVDs (Digital Versatile Disks)
was developed by a consortium of motion picture studios and consumer elec-
tronics companies in 1996. It encrypts DVD contents in order to limit unau-
thorized copying. The method was kept secret to prevent the manufacture of
unlicensed DVD players. The encryption algorithm, which consequently was
never widely analyzed by experts, turned out to be weak and was cracked
within three years after it was announced. Today, CSS decryption programs,
together with numerous unauthorized “ripped” DVD contents, circulate
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widely on the Internet (see Chapter 6, “Balance Toppled” for a more detailed
discussion of copy protection). 
Kerckhoffs’s Principle has been institutionalized in the form of encryption
standards. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was adopted as a national
standard in the 1970s and is widely used in the worlds of business and
finance. It has pretty much survived all attempts at cracking, although the
inexorable progress of Moore’s Law has made exhaustive searching through
all possible keys more feasible in recent years. A newer standard, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), was adopted in 2002 after a thorough and pub-
lic review. It is precisely because these encryption methods are so widely
known that confidence in them can be high. They have been subjected to both
professional analysis and amateur experimentation, and no serious deficien-
cies have been discovered. 
These lessons are as true today as they ever were. And yet, something else,
something fundamental about cryptography, is different today. In the late
twentieth century, cryptographic methods stopped being state secrets and
became consumer goods. 
Secrecy Changes Forever 
For four thousand years, cryptography was about making sure Eve could not
read Alice’s message to Bob if Eve intercepted the message en route. Nothing
could be done if the key itself was somehow discovered. Keeping the key
secret was therefore of inestimable importance, and was a very uncertain
business. 
If Alice and Bob worked out the key when they met, how could Bob keep
the key secret during the dangers of travel? Protecting keys was a military
and diplomatic priority of supreme importance. Pilots and soldiers were
instructed that, even in the face of certain death from enemy attack, their first
responsibility was to destroy their codebooks. Discovery of the codes could
cost thousands of lives. The secrecy of the codes was everything. 
And if Alice and Bob never met, then how could they agree on a key with-
out already having a secure method for transmitting the key? That seemed like
a fundamental limitation: Secure communication was practical only for peo-
ple who could arrange to meet beforehand, or who had access to a prior
method of secure communication (such as military couriers) for carrying the
key between them. If Internet communications had to proceed on this assump-
tion, electronic commerce never could have gotten off the ground. Bit packets
racing through the network are completely unprotected from eavesdropping. 
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And then, in the 1970s, everything changed. Whitfield Diffie was a
32-year-old mathematical free spirit who had been obsessed with cryptogra-
phy since his years as an MIT undergraduate. 31-year-old Martin Hellman
was a hard-nosed graduate of the Bronx High School of Science and an
Assistant Professor at Stanford. Diffie had traveled the length of the country
in search of collaborators on the mathematics of secret communication. This
was not an easy field to enter, since most serious work in this area was being
done behind the firmly locked doors of the National Security Agency. Ralph
Merkle, a 24-year-old computer science graduate student, was exploring a
new approach to secure communication. In the most important discovery in
the entire history of cryptography, Diffie and Hellman found a practical real-
ization of Merkle’s ideas, which they presented in a paper entitled “New
Directions in Cryptography.” This is what the paper described:
A way for Alice and Bob, without any prior arrangement, to agree on
a secret key, known only to the two of them, by using messages
between them that are not secret at all. 
In other words, as long as Alice and
Bob can communicate with each
other, they can establish a secret
key. It does not matter if Eve or any-
one else can hear everything they
say. Alice and Bob can come to a
consensus on a secret key, and there
is no way for Eve to use what she
overhears to figure out what that
secret key is. This is true even if
Alice and Bob have never met
before and have never made any prior agreements. 
The impact of this discovery cannot be overstated. The art of secret com-
munication was a government monopoly, and had been since the dawn of
writing—governments had the largest interests in secrets, and the smartest
scientists worked for governments. But there was another reason why gov-
ernments had done all the serious cryptography. Only governments had the
wherewithal to assure the production, protection, and distribution of the keys
on which secret communication depended. If the secret keys could be pro-
duced by public communication, everyone could use cryptography. They just
had to know how; they did not need armies or brave couriers to transmit and
protect the keys. 
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by James Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and
Malcolm Williamson.
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Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle dubbed their discovery “public-key cryptogra-
phy.” Although its significance was not recognized at the time, it is the inven-
tion that made electronic commerce possible. If Alice is you and Bob is
Amazon, there is no possibility of a meeting—how could you physically go to
Amazon to procure a key? Does Amazon even have a physical location? If Alice
is to send her credit card number to Amazon securely, the encryption has to be
worked out on the spot, or rather, on the two separate spots separated by the
Internet. Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, and a suite of related methods that followed,
made secure Internet transactions possible. If you have ever ordered anything
from an online store, you have been a cryptographer without realizing it. Your
computer and the store’s computer played the roles of Alice and Bob. 
It seems wildly counterintuitive that Alice and Bob could agree on a secret
key over a public communication channel. It was not so much that the sci-
entific community had tried and failed to do what Diffie, Hellman, and
Merkle did. It never occurred to them to try, because it seemed so obvious that
Alice had to give Bob the keys somehow. 
Even the great Shannon missed this possibility. In his 1949 paper that
brought all known cryptographic methods under a unified framework, he did
not realize that there might be an alternative. “The key must be transmitted
by non-interceptable means from transmitting to receiving points,” he wrote. 
Not true. Alice and Bob can get the same
secret key, even though all their messages
are intercepted. 
The basic picture of how Alice commu-
nicates her secret to Bob remains as shown
in Figure 5.6. Alice sends Bob a coded mes-
sage, and Bob uses a secret key to decrypt it. Eve may intercept the cipher-
text en route. 
The goal is for Alice to do the encryption in such a way that it is impos-
sible for Eve to decrypt the message in any way other than a brute-force
search through all possible keys. If the decryption problem is “hard” in this
sense, then the phenomenon of exponential growth becomes the friend of
Alice and Bob. For example, suppose they are using ordinary decimal numer-
als as keys, and their keys are ten digits long. If they suspect that Eve’s com-
puters are getting powerful enough to search through all possible keys, they
can switch to 20-digit keys. The amount of time Eve would require goes up
by a factor of 10
10
= 10,000,000,000. Even if Eve’s computers were powerful
enough to crack any 10-digit key in a second, it would then take her more
than 300 years to crack a 20-digit key! 
Exhaustive search is always one way for Eve to discover the key. But if
Alice encrypts her message using a substitution or Vigenère cipher, the
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encrypted message will have patterns that enable Eve to find the key far more
quickly. The trick is to find a means of encrypting the message so that the
ciphertext reveals no patterns from which the key could be inferred. 
The Key Agreement Protocol 
The crucial invention was the concept of a one-way computation—a compu-
tation with two important properties: It can be done quickly, but it can’t be
undone quickly. To be more precise, the computation quickly combines two
numbers x and y to produce a third number, which we’ll call x ∗ y. If you
know the value of x ∗ y, there is no quick way to figure out what value of y
was used to produce it, even if you also know the value of x. That is, if you
know the values of x and the result z, the only way to find a value of y so
that z = x ∗ y is trial and error search. Such an exhaustive search would take
time that grows exponentially with the number of digits of z—practically
impossible, for numbers of a few hundred digits. Diffie and Hellman’s one-
way computation also has an important third property: (x ∗ y) ∗ z always pro-
duces the same result as (x ∗ z) ∗ y. 
The key agreement protocol starts from a base of public knowledge: how
to do the computation x ∗ y, and also the value of a particular large number
g. (See the Endnotes for the details.) All this information is available to the
entire world. Knowing it, here is how Alice and Bob proceed.
1. Alice and Bob each choose a random number. We’ll call Alice’s number
a and Bob’s number b. We’ll refer to a and b as Alice and Bob’s secret
keys. Alice and Bob keep their secret keys secret. No one except Alice
knows the value of a, and no one except Bob knows the value of b. 
2. Alice calculates g ∗ a and Bob calculates g ∗ b. (Not hard to do.) The
results are called their public keys A and B, respectively. 
3. Alice sends Bob the value of A and Bob sends Alice the value of B. It
doesn’t matter if Eve overhears these communications; A and B are
not secret numbers. 
4. When she has received Bob’s public key B, Alice computes B ∗ a,
using her secret key a as well as Bob’s public key B. Likewise, when
Bob receives A from Alice, he computes A ∗ b. 
Even though Alice and Bob have done different computations, they have
ended up with the same value. Bob computes A ∗ b, that is, (g ∗ a) ∗ b (see
Step 2—A is g ∗ a). Alice computes B ∗ a, that is, (g ∗ b) ∗ a. Because of the
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third property of the one-way computation, that number is (g ∗ a) ∗ b once
again—the same value, arrived at in a different way! 
This shared value, call it K, is the key Alice and Bob will use for encrypt-
ing and decrypting their subsequent messages, using whatever standard
method of encryption they choose. 
Now here’s the crucial point. Suppose Eve has been listening to Alice and
Bob’s communications. Can she do anything with all the information she has?
She has overheard A and B, and she knows g because it is an industry stan-
dard. She knows all the algorithms and protocols that Alice and Bob are using;
Eve has read Diffie and Hellman’s paper too! But to compute the key K, Eve
would have to know one of the secret keys, either a or b. She doesn’t—only
Alice knows a and only Bob knows b. On numbers of a few hundred digits, no
one knows how to find a or b from g, A, and B without searching through
impossibly many trial values. 
Alice and Bob can carry out their computations with personal computers
or simple special-purpose hardware. But even the most powerful computers
aren’t remotely fast enough to let Eve break the system, at least not by any
method known. 
Exploiting this difference in computational effort was Diffie, Hellman, and
Merkle’s breakthrough. They showed how to create shared secret keys, with-
out requiring secure channels. 
Public Keys for Private Messages 
Suppose Alice wants to have a way for anyone in the world to send her
encrypted messages that only she can decrypt. She can do this with a small
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ARE WE SURE NO ONE CAN CRACK THE CODE? 
No one has proved mathematically that the public-key encryption algo-
rithms are unbreakable, in spite of determined efforts by top mathemati-
cians and computer scientists to provide absolute proof of their security.
So our confidence in them rests on the Fundamental Tenet: No one has
broken them so far. If anyone knows a fast method, it’s probably the
National Security Agency, which operates in an environment of extreme
secrecy. Maybe the NSA knows how and isn’t telling. Or maybe some inven-
tive loner has cracked the code but prefers profit to celebrity, and is quietly
socking away huge profits from decoding messages about financial transac-
tions. Our bet is that no one knows how and no one will. 
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variation of the key-agreement protocol. All the computations are the same
as in the key agreement protocol, except they take place in a slightly differ-
ent order. 
Alice picks a secret key a and computes the corresponding public key A.
She publishes A in a directory. 
If Bob (or anyone) now wants to send Alice an encrypted message, he gets
Alice’s public key from the directory. Next, he picks his own secret key b and
computes B as before. He also uses Alice’s public key A from the directory to
compute an encryption key K just as with the key-agreement protocol: K = A
∗ b. Bob uses K as a key to encrypt a message to Alice, and he sends Alice
the ciphertext, along with B. Because he uses K only once, K is like a one-
time pad. 
When Alice receives Bob’s encrypted
message, she takes the B that came with
message, together with her secret key a, just
as in the key agreement protocol, and com-
putes the same K = B ∗ a. Alice now uses K
as the key for decrypting the message. Eve
can’t decrypt it, because she doesn’t know
the secret keys. 
This might seem like just a simple variant of key agreement, but it results
in a major conceptual change in how we think about secure communication.
With public-key encryption, anyone can send encrypted mail to anyone over
an insecure, publicly exposed communication path. The only thing on which
they need to agree is to use the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle method—and knowing
that is of no use to an adversary trying to decipher an intercepted message. 
Digital Signatures 
In addition to secret communication, a second breakthrough achievement of
public-key cryptography is preventing forgeries and impersonations in elec-
tronic transactions. 
Suppose Alice wants to create a public announcement. How can people
who see the announcement be sure that it really comes from Alice—that it’s
not a forgery? What’s required is a method for marking Alice’s public mes-
sage in such a way that anyone can easily verify that the mark is Alice’s and
no one can forge it. Such a mark is called a digital signature. 
To build on the drama we have used already, we’ll continue to talk about
Alice sending a message to Bob, with Eve trying to do something evil while
the message is in transit. In this case, however, we are not concerned with the
secrecy of Alice’s message—only with assuring Bob that what he receives is
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really what Alice sent. In other words, the message may not be secret—
perhaps it is an important public announcement. Bob needs to be confident
that the signature he sees on the message is Alice’s and that the message
could not have been tampered with before he received it. 
Digital signature protocols use public keys and secret keys, but in a differ-
ent way. The protocol consists of two computations: one Alice uses to process
her message to create the signature, and one Bob uses to verify the signature.
Alice uses her secret key and the message itself to create the signature.
Anyone can then use Alice’s public key to verify the signature. The point is
that everyone can know the public key and thus verify the signature, but only
the person who knows the secret key could have produced the signature. This
is the reverse of the scenario of the previous section, where anyone can
encrypt a message, but only the person with the secret key can decrypt it. 
A digital signature scheme requires a computational method that makes
signing easy if you have the secret key and verifying easy if you have the
public key—and yet makes it computationally infeasible to produce a verifi-
able signature if you don’t know the secret key. Moreover, the signature
depends on the message as well as on the secret key of the person signing it.
Thus, the digital signature protocol attests to the integrity of the message—
that it was not tampered with in transit—as well as to its authenticity—that
the person who sent it really is Alice. 
In typical real systems, used to sign unencrypted email, for example, Alice
doesn’t encrypt the message itself. Instead, to speed up the signature compu-
tation, she first computes a compressed version of the message, called a
message digest, which is much shorter than the message itself. It requires less
computation to produce the signature for the digest than for the full message.
How message digests are computed is public knowledge. When Bob receives
Alice’s signed message, he computes the digest of the message and verifies
that it is identical to what he gets by decrypting the attached signature using
Alice’s public key. 
The digesting process needs to produce a kind of fingerprint—something
small that is nonetheless virtually unique to the original. This compression
process must avoid a risk associated with using digests. If Eve could produce
a different message with the same digest, then she could attach Alice’s signa-
ture to Eve’s message. Bob would not realize that someone had tampered with
the message before he received it. When he went through the verification
process, he would compute the digest of Eve’s message, compare it to the
result of decrypting the signature that Alice attached to Alice’s message, and
find them identical. This risk is the source of the insecurity of the message
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digest function MD5 mentioned earlier in this chapter, which is making the
cryptographic community wary about the use of message digests. 
RSA 
Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of digital signatures in their 1976
paper. They suggested an approach to designing signatures, but they did not
present a concrete method. The problem of devising a practical digital signa-
ture scheme was left as a challenge to the computer science community. 
The challenge was met in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len
Adleman of the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science. Not only was the RSA
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm a practical digital signature scheme, but it
could also be used for confidential messaging. With RSA, each person
generates a pair of keys—a public key and a secret key. We’ll again call Alice’s
public key A and her secret key a. The public and private keys are inverses: If
you transform a value with a, then transforming the result with A recovers the
original value. If you transform a value with A, then transforming the result
with a recovers the original value. 
Here’s how RSA key pairs are used. People publish their public keys and
keep their secret keys to themselves. If Bob wants to send Alice a message, he
picks a standard algorithm such as DES and a key K, and transforms K using
Alice’s public key A. Alice transforms the result using her secret key a to
recover K. As with all public-key encryption, only Alice knows her secret key,
so only Alice can recover K and decrypt the message. 
To produce a digital signature, Alice transforms the message using her
secret key a and uses the result as the signature to be sent along with the
message. Anyone can then check the signature by transforming it with Alice’s
public key A to verify that this matches the original message. Because only
Alice knows her secret key, only Alice could have produced something that,
when transformed with her public key, will reproduce the original message. 
It seems to be infeasible in the RSA cryptosystem—as in the Diffie-
Hellman-Merkle system—to compute a secret key corresponding to a public
key. RSA uses a different one-way computation than the one used by the
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle system. RSA is secure only if it takes much longer to
factor an n-digit number than to multiply two n/2-digit numbers. RSA’s
reliance on the difficulty of factoring has engendered enormous interest in
finding fast ways to factor numbers. Until the 1970s, this was a mathemati-
cal pastime of theoretical interest only. One can multiply numbers in time
comparable to the number of digits, while factoring a number requires effort
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comparable to the value of the number
itself, as far as anyone knows. A break-
through in factoring would render RSA
useless and would undermine many of
the current standards for Internet
security. 
Certificates and Certification Authorities 
There’s a problem with the public-key methods we’ve described so far. How
can Bob know that the “Alice” he’s communicating with really is Alice?
Anyone could be at the other end of the key-agreement communication pre-
tending to be Alice. Or, for secure messaging, after Alice places her public key
in the directory, Eve might tamper with the directory, substituting her own key
in place of Alice’s. Then, anyone who tries to use the key to create secret mes-
sages intended for Alice, will actually be creating messages that Eve, not Alice,
can read. If “Bob” is you and “Alice” is the mayor ordering an evacuation of
the city, some impostor could be trying to create a panic. If “Bob” is your com-
puter and “Alice” is your bank’s, “Eve” could be trying to steal your money! 
This is where digital signatures can help. Alice goes to a trusted authority,
to which she presents her public key together with proof of her identity. The
authority digitally signs Alice’s key—producing a signed key called a certifi-
cate. Now, instead of just presenting
her key when she wants to commu-
nicate, Alice presents the certificate.
Anyone who wants to use the key
to communicate with Alice first
checks the authority’s signature to
see that the key is legitimate.
People check a certificate by
checking the trusted authority’s sig-
nature. How do they know that the
signature on the certificate really is
the trusted authority’s signature,
and not some fraud that Eve set up
for the purpose of issuing fake cer-
tificates? The authority’s signature
is itself guaranteed by another cer-
tificate, signed by another author-
ity, and so on, until we reach an
authority whose certificate is
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COMMERCIAL CERTIFICATES
VeriSign, which is currently the
major commercial certification
authority, issues three classes of per-
sonal certificates. Class 1 is for
assuring that a browser is associated
with a particular email address and
makes no claims about anyone’s real
identity. Class 2 provides a modest
level of identity checking.
Organizations issuing them should
require an application with informa-
tion that can be checked against
employee records or credit records.
Class 3 certificates require applying
in person for verification of identity. 
A breakthrough in factoring
would render RSA useless
and would undermine many
of the current standards for
Internet security. 
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well-known. In this way, Alice’s public key is vouched for, not only by a cer-
tificate and a single signature, but by a chain of certificates, each one with a
signature guaranteed by the next certificate. 
Organizations that issue certificates are called certification authorities.
Certification authorities can be set up for limited use (for example, a corpo-
ration might serve as a certification authority that issues certificates for use
on its corporate network). There are also companies that make a business of
selling certificates for public use. The trust you should put in a certificate
depends on two things: your assessment of the reliability of the signature on
the certificate and also your assessment of the certification authority’s policy
in being willing to sign things. 
Cryptography for Everyone 
In real life, none of us is aware that we are carrying out one-way computa-
tions while we are browsing the Web. But every time we order a book from
Amazon, check our bank or credit card balance, or pay for a purchase using
PayPal, that is exactly what happens. The tell-tale sign that an encrypted web
transaction is taking place is that the URL of the web site begins with “https”
(the “s” is for “secure”) instead of “http.” The consumer’s computer and the
computer of the store or the bank negotiate the encryption, using public key
cryptography—unbeknownst to the human beings involved in the transaction.
The store attests to its identity by presenting a certificate signed by a
Certification authority that the consumer’s computer
has been preconfigured to recognize. New keys are
generated for each new transaction. Keys are cheap.
Secret messages are everywhere on the Internet. We are
all cryptographers now. 
At first, public-key encryption was treated as a mathematical curiosity. Len
Adleman, one of the inventors of RSA, thought that the RSA paper would be
“the least interesting paper I would ever be on.” Even the National Security
Agency, as late as 1977, was not overly concerned about the spread of these
methods. They simply did not appreciate how the personal computer revolu-
tion, just a few years away, would enable anyone with a home PC to
exchange encrypted messages that even NSA could not decipher.
But as the 1980s progressed, and Internet use increased, the potential of
ubiquitous cryptography began to become apparent. Intelligence agencies
became increasingly concerned, and law enforcement feared that encrypted
communications could put an end to government wiretapping, one of its most
powerful tools. On the commercial side, industry was beginning to appreciate
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cryptographers
now.
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that customers would want private communication, especially in an era of
electronic commerce. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Bush and the
Clinton administrations were floating proposals to control the spread of cryp-
tographic systems. 
In 1994, the Clinton administration unveiled a plan for an “Escrowed
Encryption Standard” that would be used on telephones that provided
encrypted communications. The technology, dubbed “Clipper,” was an
encryption chip developed by the NSA that included a back door—an extra
key held by the government, which would let law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies decrypt the phone communications. According to the pro-
posal, the government would purchase only Clipper phones for secure
communication. Anyone wanting to do business with the government over a
secure telephone would also have to use a Clipper phone. Industry reception
was cold, however (see Figure 5.8), and the plan was dropped. But in a
sequence of modified proposals beginning in 1995, the White House
attempted to convince industry to create encryption products that had simi-
lar back doors. The carrot here, and the stick, was export control law. Under
U.S. law, cryptographic products could not be exported without a license, and
violating export controls could result in severe criminal penalties. The admin-
istration proposed that encryption software would receive export licenses
only if it contained back doors. 
The ensuing, often heated negotiations, sometimes referred to as the
“crypto wars,” played out over the remainder of the 1990s. Law enforcement
and national security argued the need for encryption controls. On the other
side of the debate were the technology companies, who did not want govern-
ment regulation, and civil liberties groups, who warned against the potential
for growing communication surveillance. In essence, policymakers could not
come to grips with the transformation of a major military technology into an
everyday personal tool. 
We met Phil Zimmermann at the beginning of this chapter, and his career
now becomes a central part of the story. Zimmermann was a journeyman
programmer and civil libertarian who had been interested in cryptography
since his youth. He had read a Scientific American column about RSA
encryption in 1977, but did not have access to the kinds of computers that
would be needed to implement arithmetic on huge integers, as the RSA algo-
rithms demanded. But computers will get powerful enough if you wait. As the
1980s progressed, it became possible to implement RSA on home computers.
Zimmermann set about to produce encryption software for the people, to
counter the threat of increased government surveillance. As he later testified
before Congress: 
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Reprinted with permission of RSA Security, Inc.
FIGURE 5.8 Part of the “crypto wars,” the furious industry reaction against the
Clinton Administration’s “Clipper chip” proposal. 
The power of computers had shifted the balance towards ease of sur-
veillance. In the past, if the government wanted to violate the privacy
of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to
intercept and steam open and read paper mail, or listen to and possi-
bly transcribe spoken telephone conversations. This is analogous to
catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately
for freedom and democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is
not practical on a large scale. Today, electronic mail is gradually
replacing conventional paper mail, and is soon to be the norm for
everyone, not the novelty it is today. Unlike paper mail, e-mail mes-
sages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords.
This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectable on
a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing—making a quanti-
tative and qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy.
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Cryptography was the answer. If governments were to have unlimited surveil-
lance powers over electronic communications, people everywhere needed
easy-to-use, cheap, uncrackable cryptography so they could communicate
without governments being able to understand them. 
Zimmermann faced obstacles that would have stopped less-zealous souls.
RSA was a patented invention. MIT had licensed it exclusively to the RSA
Data Security Company, which produced commercial encryption software for
corporations, and RSA Data Security had no interest in granting
Zimmermann the license he would need to distribute his RSA code freely, as
he wished to do. 
And there was government policy, which was, of course, exactly the prob-
lem to which Zimmermann felt his encryption software was the solution. On
January 24, 1991, Senator Joseph Biden, a co-sponsor of antiterrorist legis-
lation Senate Bill 266, inserted some new language into the bill: 
It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communica-
tions services and manufacturers of electronic communications service
equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the gov-
ernment to obtain the plaintext contents of voice, data, and other
communications when appropriate authorized by law. 
This language received a furious reaction from civil liberties groups and
wound up not surviving, but Zimmermann decided to take matters into his
own hands. 
By June of 1991, Zimmermann had completed a working version of his
software. He named it PGP for “Pretty Good Privacy,” after Ralph’s mythical
Pretty Good Groceries that sponsored Garrison Keillor’s Prairie Home
Companion. The software mysteriously appeared on several U.S. computers,
available for anyone in the world to download. Soon copies were every-
where—not just in the U.S., but all over the world. In Zimmermann’s own
words: “This technology belongs to everybody.” The genie was out of the bot-
tle and was not going back in. 
Zimmermann paid a price for his libertarian gesture. First, RSA Data
Security was confident that this technology belonged to it, not to “every-
body.” The company was enraged that its patented technology was being
given away. Second, the government was furious. It instituted a criminal
investigation for violation of the export control laws, although it was not
clear what laws, if any, Zimmermann had violated. Eventually MIT brokered
an agreement that let Zimmermann use the RSA patent, and devised a way
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to put PGP on the Internet for use in
the U.S., and in conformance with
export controls. 
By the end of the decade, the
progress of electronic commerce had
overtaken the key escrow debate,
and the government had ended its
criminal investigation without an
indictment. Zimmermann built a
business around PGP (see
www.pgp.com), while still allowing
free downloads for individuals. His
web site contains testimonials from
human rights groups in Eastern
Europe and Guatemala attesting to
the liberating force of secret commu-
nication among individuals and
agencies working against oppressive
regimes. Zimmermann had won. 
Sort of. 
Cryptography Unsettled 
Today, every banking and credit card transaction over the Web is encrypted.
There is widespread concern about information security, identity theft, and
degradation of personal privacy. PGP and other high-quality email encryp-
tion programs are widely available—many for free. 
But very little email is encrypted today. Human rights groups use
encrypted email. People with something to hide probably encrypt their email.
But most of us don’t bother encrypting our email. In fact, millions of people
use Gmail, willingly trading their privacy for the benefits of free, reliable ser-
vice. Google’s computers scan every email, and supply advertisements related
to the subject matter. Google might turn over
email to the government in response to a court
order, without challenging the demand. Why are
we so unconcerned about email privacy? 
First, there is still little awareness of how easily
our email can be captured as the packets flow through the Internet. The pass-
word requests needed to get our email out of the mail server may provide the
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ENCRYPTION REGULATION ABROAD
Some countries have adjusted to
multiple uses of the same encryp-
tion algorithms, for commercial,
military, and conspiratorial pur-
poses. For example, the Chinese
government strictly regulates the
sale of encryption products, “to
protect information safety, to safe-
guard the legal interests of citizens
and organizations, and to ensure
the safety and interests of the
nation.” In 2007, the United
Kingdom enacted laws requiring
the disclosure of encryption keys to
government authorities investigat-
ing criminal or terror investiga-
tions, on penalty of up to five years
in prison.
Why are we so
unconcerned about
email privacy?
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illusion of security, but they do nothing to protect the messages themselves
from being sniffed as they float through fibers, wires, and the air. The world’s
biggest eavesdropping enterprise is very poorly known. It is the international
ECHELON system, which automatically monitors data communications to and
from satellites that relay Internet traffic. ECHELON is a cooperative project of
the U.S. and several of its allies, and is the descendant of communications
intelligence systems from the time of the Second World War. But it is up-to-
date technologically. If your email messages use words that turn up in
ECHELON’s dictionary, they may get a close look.
Second, there is little concern because most ordinary citizens feel they
have little to hide, so why would anyone bother looking? They are not con-
sidering the vastly increased capacity for automatic monitoring that govern-
ments now possess—the driftnet monitoring of which Zimmermann warned. 
Finally, encrypted email is not built into the Internet infrastructure in the
way encrypted web browsing is. You have to use nonstandard software, and
the people you communicate with have to use some compatible software. In
commercial settings, companies may not want to make encryption easy for
office workers. They have an interest—and in many cases, regulatory require-
ments—to watch out for criminal activities. And they may not want to sug-
gest that email is being kept private if they are unable to make that guarantee,
out of fear of liability if unsecured email falls into the wrong hands. 
It is not just email and credit card numbers that might be encrypted.
Instant Messaging and VoIP telephone conversations are just packets flowing
through the Internet that can be encrypted like anything else. Some Internet
phone software (such as Skype) encrypts conversations, and there are several
other products under development—including one led by Zimmermann him-
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SPYING ON CITIZENS
Historically, spying on citizens required a warrant (since citizens have an
expectation of privacy), but spying on foreigners did not. A series of execu-
tive orders and laws intended to combat terrorism allow the government to
inspect bits that are on their way into or out of the country. (Perhaps even
a phone call to an airline, if it is answered by a call center in India.) Also
excluded from judicial oversight is any “surveillance directed at a person
reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States,” whether
that person is a U.S. citizen or not. Such developments may stimulate
encryption of electronic communications, and hence in the end prove to be
counterproductive. That in turn might renew efforts to criminalize encryp-
tion of email and telephone communications in the U.S. 
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self—to create easy-to-use encryption software for Internet telephone conver-
sations. But for the most part, digital communications are open, and Eve the
evil eavesdropper, or anyone else, can listen in. 
✷
Overall, the public seems unconcerned about privacy of communication
today, and the privacy fervor that permeated the crypto wars a decade ago is
nowhere to be seen. In a very real sense, the dystopian predictions of both
sides of that debate are being realized: On the one hand, encryption technol-
ogy is readily available around the world, and people can hide the contents
of their messages, just as law enforcement feared—there is widespread specu-
lation about Al Qaeda’s use of PGP, for example. At the same time, the spread
of the Internet has been accompanied by an increase in surveillance, just as
the opponents of encryption regulation feared. 
So although outright prohibitions on encryption are now impossible, the
social and systems aspects of encryption remain in an unstable equilibrium.
Will some information privacy catastrophe spark a massive re-education of
the Internet-using public, or massive regulatory changes to corporate prac-
tice? Will some major supplier of email services and software, responding to
consumers wary of information theft and government surveillance, make
encrypted email the default option? 
The bottom-line question is this: As encryption becomes as ordinary a tool
for personal messages as it already is for commercial transactions, will the
benefits to personal privacy, free expression, and human liberty outweigh the
costs to law enforcement and national intelligence, whose capacity to eaves-
drop and wiretap will be at an end? 
Whatever the future of encrypted communication, encryption technology
has another use. Perfect copies and instant communication have blown the
legal notion of “intellectual property” into billions of bits of teenage movie
and music downloads. Encryption is the tool used to lock movies so only cer-
tain people can see them and to lock songs so only certain people can hear
them—to put a hard shell around this part of the digital explosion. The
changed meaning of copyright is the next stop on our tour of the exploded
landscape.
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CHAPTER 6
Balance Toppled
Who Owns the Bits?
Automated Crimes—Automated Justice 
Tanya Andersen was home having dinner with her eight-year-old daughter in
December 2005 when they were interrupted by a knock at the door. It was a
legal process server, armed with a lawsuit from the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), a trade organization representing half a
dozen music publishers that together control over 90% of music distribution
in the U.S. The RIAA claimed that the Oregon single mother surviving on dis-
ability payments owed them close to a million dollars for illegally download-
ing 1,200 tracks of gangsta rap and other copyrighted music. 
Andersen’s run-in with the RIAA had begun nine months previously with
a “demand letter” from a Los Angeles law firm. The letter stated that “a num-
ber of record companies” had sued her for copyright infringement and that
she could settle for $4,000–$5,000 or face the consequences. She suspected
the letter was a scam, and protested to the RIAA that she had never down-
loaded any music. Andersen repeatedly offered to let the record companies
verify this for themselves by inspecting her computer’s hard drive, but the
RIAA refused the offers. At one point, an RIAA representative admitted to her
that he believed she was probably innocent. But, he warned, once the RIAA
starts a lawsuit, they don’t drop it, because doing so would encourage other
people to defend themselves against the recording industry’s claims.
Andersen found a lawyer after the December lawsuit was served, and they
convinced a judge to order an inspection of the hard drive. The RIAA’s own
expert determined that Andersen’s computer had never been used for illegal
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downloading. But instead of dropping the suit, the RIAA increased the pres-
sure on Andersen to settle. They demanded that their lawyers be allowed to
take a deposition from Andersen’s daughter, and even tried to reach the child
directly by calling the apartment. An unknown woman phoned her elemen-
tary school principal falsely claiming to be her grandmother and asking about
the girl’s attendance. RIAA lawyers contacted Andersen’s friends and rela-
tives, telling them that Andersen was a thief who collected violent, racist
music. The pressure on the 41-year-
old Andersen, who suffered from a
painful illness and emotional prob-
lems, forced her to abandon her hope
of entering a back-to-work program.
Instead, she sought additional psy-
chiatric care. Finally, after two years,
Andersen was able to file a motion
for summary judgment, which
required the RIAA to come to court with proof of their claims. When they
could not produce proof, the case was dismissed. Andersen is currently suing
the RIAA for fraud and malicious prosecution.
26,000 Lawsuits in Five Years 
The RIAA has filed more than 26,000 lawsuits against individuals for illegal
downloading since 2003. The process begins when MediaSentry, RIAA’s inves-
tigative company, logs into a file-sharing network in search of computers
hosting music for download. MediaSentry connects to these computers and
scans them for music files. When it finds something suspicious, it sends the
computer’s IP address to the RIAA’s Anti-Piracy group, together with a list of
the files it found. RIAA staff members download and listen to a few of these
to verify that they are in fact copyrighted songs. Then they file a lawsuit
against “John Doe,” the person who uses the computer at the offending IP
address. (See the Appendix for an explanation of IP addresses and other
aspects of Internet structure.) With the lawsuit as a legal basis, they subpoena
the computer’s Internet Service Provider, forcing disclosure of the real name
of the John Doe user at that IP address. The RIAA sends the user its demand
letter, naming the songs that were verified and citing the total number of
songs found as the basis for damages. The letter offers an opportunity to set-
tle; the average settlement demand is about $4,000, non-negotiable. There’s
even a web site, p2plawsuits.com, which users can visit to pay conveniently.
It’s an automated sort of justice for the digital age. But these are auto-
mated sorts of crimes. File-sharing programs are commonly configured to
start up and run automatically, exchanging files without human intervention.
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A great deal of information about
digital copyright issues can be
found at www.chillingeffects.
org, a joint project of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation and
of several university law clinics. 
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The computer’s owner may not even be aware that it has been configured to
upload files in the background. 
It’s also an error-prone form of justice. Matching names to IP addresses is
unreliable—several computers on the same wireless network might share the
same IP address. An Internet Service Provider allocating IP addresses might
shift them around, so that a computer with a particular IP address today
might not be the same computer that was file sharing from that IP address
last week. Even if it is the same computer, there’s no way to prove who was
using it at the time. And maybe there was a clerical error in reporting. 
The RIAA knows that the process is flawed, but given their stake in stop-
ping downloading, they see no choice. Not only are they seeing their prod-
ucts being distributed for free, but they themselves might be liable to lawsuits
from artists for neglecting to protect the artists’ copyrights. Explains Amy
Weiss, RIAA Senior Vice President for Communications, “When you fish with
a net, you sometimes are going to catch a few dolphin…. But we also realize
that this cybershoplifting needs to stop.” Besides Andersen, other snared
“dolphin” included a Georgia family that didn’t own a computer, a paralyzed
stroke victim in Florida sued for files downloaded in Michigan, and an
83-year-old West Virginia woman who hated computers and who, as it turned
out, was deceased.
The High Stakes for Infringement 
Error or not, most people choose to pay when they get the demand letter. The
cost of settling is less than the legal
fees for contesting, and the cost of
losing the lawsuit is staggering:
damages of at least $750 for each
song downloaded. The 4,000-song
contents of a 20GB iPod would be
grounds for minimum damages of
$3 million—a thousand times the
cost of purchasing those songs on
iTunes. (A GB, or gigabyte, is about
a billion bytes.)
Driftnet justice, automated polic-
ing of automated crimes, and three
million dollars minimum damages
for an iPod’s worth of music are
consequences of policies honed for
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$750 A SONG
The minimum damages that the
court must award for infringement
is $750 per infringing act. In cases
where the infringement can be
shown to be “willful,” damages could
be as high as $150,000 per infringe-
ment, or $600 million for the 4,000
songs on an iPod. For defendants
who can prove that they weren’t
even aware of the infringement, the
court still must award at least $200
per infringement—a “mere” $800,000
for 4,000 songs.
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a pre-networked world colliding with the exponentials of the digital explo-
sion. Take the $3-million iPod. This traces to the Copyright Act of 1976,
which introduced a provision letting copyright holders sue for minimum
statutory damages of $750 per infringement. 
The rationale for statutory damages is to ensure that the penalty is suffi-
cient to deter infringement even when actual damages to the copyright holder
are small. The scale of the damages has dreadful consequences in the age of
digital reproduction, because each time a song is copied (uploaded or down-
loaded), it counts as a separate infringement. That way of reckoning “acts of
infringement” may have seemed reasonable when the standards were set in
pre-Internet 1976—when people could make only a few unauthorized copies,
one by one. But the damage calculations balloon into unreality when a thou-
sand songs can be downloaded to a home computer in a few hours over a
high-speed network connection. 
Although the digital explosion may have blown the legal penalties for
infringement out of realistic proportion to the offense, it has also brought a
more fundamental change: that the public is now concerned with copyright
at all. Before the Internet, what could an ordinary person do to infringe copy-
right—make fifty photocopies of a book and sell them on the street corner?
That would surely be infringement. But it would also be a lot of work, and
the financial loss to the copyright holder would be insignificant. 
Of all the dislocations of the digital explosion, the loss of the copyright bal-
ance is the most rancorous. Ordinary people can now effortlessly copy and dis-
tribute information on a massive scale. Listeners clash with a content industry
whose economics relies on ordinary people not doing precisely that. As a
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SENDING A MESSAGE
In October 2007, Jammie Thomas, a Minnesota single mother of two who
earns $36,000 a year, was found guilty of sharing 24 songs on the Kazaa file-
sharing network … and fined $222,000: $9,250 per song. This was the first of
the RIAA’s 16,000 lawsuits that went all the way to a jury trial. In the others,
people settled or, as with Tanya Andersen, the case was dismissed or dropped.
Given the legal statutory damages for infringement, Thomas’s fine for 24
songs could have been anywhere between $18,000 and $3.6 million. 
A juror interviewed afterward reported that there were people advocating for
fines at both ends of that spectrum during deliberation: “We wanted to send
a message that you don’t do this, that you have been warned.” 
Said the RIAA’s lawyer after the verdict was read, “This is what can happen
if you don’t settle.”
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result, millions of people are today vil-
ified as “pirates” and “thieves,” while
content providers are demonized as
subverters of innovation and consumer
freedom trying to protect their out-
dated business models. 
The war over copyright and the Internet has been escalating for more than
15 years. It is a spiral of more and more technology that makes it ever easier
for more and more people to share more and more information. This explo-
sion is countered by a legislative response that brings more and more acts
within the scope of copyright enforcement, subject to punishments that grow
ever more severe. Regulation tries to keep pace by banning technology, some-
times even before the technology exists. Single mothers facing mind-numb-
ing lawsuits are merely collateral damage in that war today. If we cannot
slow the arms race, tomorrow’s casualties may come to include the open
Internet and dynamic of innovation that fuels the information revolution. 
NET Act Makes Sharing a Crime 
Copyright infringement was not even a criminal matter in the U.S. until the
turn of the twentieth century, although an infringer could be sued for civil
damages. Infringement with a profit motive first became a crime in 1897. The
maximum punishment was then a year in prison and a $1,000 fine. Things
stayed that way until 1976, when Congress started enacting a series of laws
that repeatedly increased the penalties, motivated largely by prompting from
the RIAA and the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America). By 1992,
an infringement conviction could result in a ten-year prison sentence and
stiff fines, but only if the infringement was done “for the purpose of commer-
cial advantage or private financial gain.” Without a commercial motive, there
was no crime. 
That changed in 1994. 
During the 1980s, MIT became one of the first universities to deploy large
numbers of computer workstations connected to the Internet and open to
anyone on campus. Even several years later, public clusters of networked
powerful computers were not very common. In December 1993, some stu-
dents in one of the clusters noticed a machine that was strangely unrespon-
sive and was strenuously exercising its disk drive. When the computer staff
examined this “bug,” they discovered that the machine was acting as a file-
server bulletin board—a relay point where people around the Internet were
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Of all the dislocations of the
digital explosion, the loss of
the copyright balance is
the most rancorous.
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uploading and downloading files. Most of the files were computer games, and
there was also some word-processing software. 
MIT, like most universities, prefers to handle matters like this internally,
but in this case there was a complication: The FBI had asked about this very
same machine only a few days earlier. Federal agents had been investigating
some crackers in Denmark who were trying to use MIT machines to break into
National Weather Service computers. While measuring network traffic into
and out of MIT, the Bureau had noticed a lot of activity coming from this par-
ticular machine. The bulletin board had nothing to do with the Denmark
operation, but MIT felt that it had to tell the FBI what was happening. An
agent staked out the machine and identified an MIT undergraduate, accusing
him of operating the bulletin board. 
The Justice Department seized on the case. The software industry was
growing rapidly in 1994, and the Internet was just starting to enter the pub-
lic eye—and here was the power of the Internet being turned to “piracy.” The
Boston U.S. Attorney issued a statement claiming that the MIT bulletin board
was responsible for more than a million dollars in monetary losses, adding
“We need to respond to the culture that no one is hurt by these thefts and
that there is nothing wrong with pirating software.”
What had occurred at MIT involved copyright infringement to be sure, but
there was no commercial motive and hence no crime—no basis on which the
Justice Department could act. There might have been grounds for a civil suit,
but the companies whose software was involved were not interested in suing.
Instead, the Boston U.S. Attorney’s office, after checking with their superiors
in Washington, brought a charge of wire fraud against the student, on the
grounds that his acts constituted interstate transmission of stolen property. 
At the trial, Federal District Judge Stearns dismissed the case, citing a
Supreme Court ruling that bootleg copies do not qualify as stolen property.
Stearns chastised the student, describing his behavior as “heedlessly irrespon-
sible.” The judge suggested that Congress could modify the copyright law to
permit criminal prosecutions in cases like this if it so wished. But he empha-
sized that changing the rules should be up to Congress, not the courts. To
accept the prosecution’s claim, he warned, would “serve to criminalize the
conduct … of the myriad of home computer users who succumb to the temp-
tation to copy even a single software program for private use.” He cited
Congressional testimony from the software industry that even the industry
would not consider such an outcome desirable.
Two years later, Congress responded by passing the 1997 No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act. Described by its supporters as “closing the loophole” demon-
strated by the MIT bulletin board, NET criminalized any unauthorized copy-
ing with retail value over $1000, commercially motivated or not. This
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addressed Judge Stearns’s suggestion, but it did not heed his caution: From
now on, anyone making unauthorized copies at home, even a single copy of
an expensive computer program, was risking a year in prison. After only two
more years, Congress was back with the Digital Theft Deterrence and
Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999. Its supporters argued that NET
had been ineffective in stopping “piracy,” and that penalties needed to be
increased. The copyright arms race was in full swing. 
The Peer-to-Peer Upheaval 
The NET Act marked the first time that the Internet had triggered a signifi-
cant expansion of liability for copyright infringement. It would hardly be
the last. 
In the summer of 1999, Sean Fanning, a student at Northeastern Uni-
versity, began distributing a new file-sharing program and joined his uncle
in forming a company around it: Napster. Napster made it easy to share files,
especially music tracks, over the Internet, and to share them on a scale never
before seen. 
Here is how the system worked: Suppose Napster user Mary wants to share
her computer file copy of Sarah McLachlan’s 1999 hit Angel. She tells the
Napster service, which adds “Angel; Sarah McLachlan” to its directory,
together with an ID for Mary’s computer. Any other Napster user who would
like to get a copy of Angel, say Beth, can query the Napster directory to learn
that Mary has a copy. Beth’s computer then connects directly to Mary’s com-
puter and downloads the song without any further involvement from the
Napster service. The connecting and downloading are done transparently by
Napster-supplied software running on Mary’s and Beth’s computers. 
The key point is that previous file-sharing set-ups like the MIT bulletin
board were so-called centralized systems. They collected files at a central
computer for people to download. Napster, in contrast, maintained only a
central directory showing where files on other computers could be found. The
individual computers passed the files among themselves directly. This kind of
system organization is called a peer-to-peer architecture. 
Peer-to-peer architectures make vastly more efficient use of the network
than centralized systems, as Figure 6.1 indicates. In a centralized system, if
many users want to download files, they must all get the files from the cen-
tral server, whose connection to the Internet would consequently become a
bottleneck as the number of users grows. In a peer-to-peer system, the cen-
tral server itself need communicate only a tiny amount of directory informa-
tion, while the large network load for transmitting the files is distributed over
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I want
Sarah McLachlan's
Angel .
I'm looking for
Hey, Jude.
How
about Sinatra's
My Way.
Send me
Satisfaction.
Jane
Hal
Larry
Bill
Where can I find
Sarah McLachlan's
Angel ?
You can
get Angel 
from Hal
or Jane
Where can I get
Hey, Jude?
Jane,
can I have
Angel ?
Sure,
here it is.
You can
get Hey, Jude
from Larry.
FIGURE 6.1 Underlying organization of traditional and peer-to-peer client-server
network architectures. On the top, a traditional centralized file distribution architec-
ture, in which files are downloaded to clients from a central server. On the bottom, a
Napster-style peer-to-peer architecture in which the central server holds only
directory information and the actual files are transmitted directly between clients
without passing through the server.
06_0137135599_ch06.qxd  5/2/08  8:05 AM  Page 202
the Internet connections of all the users. Even the slow connections common
with personal computers in 1999 were enough for Napster’s peer-to-peer sys-
tem to let millions of users share music files … which they did. By early 2001,
two years after Napster appeared, there were more than 26 million registered
Napster users. At some colleges, more than 80% of the on-campus network
traffic could be traced to Napster. Students held Napster parties. You hooked
up a computer to some speakers and to the Internet, invited your friends
over—and for any song title requested, there it was. Someone among those
millions of Napster users had the song available for downloading. This was
the endless cornucopia of music; the universal jukebox. 
The Specter of Secondary Liability 
Universal though it may have been, this jukebox was collecting no quarters
for the music industry. Previous escapades in file sharing, usually done on a
small scale among friends, were barely annoyances from an economic per-
spective. Even the MIT bulletin board that engendered the No Electronic Theft
Act had perhaps a few hundred users altogether. Napster was on a completely
different scale, where anyone could readily share music files with a few hun-
dred thousand “friends.” The recording industry recognized this immediately,
and in December 1999, just a few months after Napster appeared, the RIAA
sued it for more than $100 million in damages. 
Napster protested that it had no liability. After all, Napster itself wasn’t
copying any files. It was merely providing a directory service. How could you
hold a company liable for simply publishing the locations of items on the
Internet? Wasn’t that publication
just exercising freedom of speech?
Unfortunately for Napster, the
California Federal District Court
didn’t agree, and in July 2000, found
Napster guilty of secondary copy-
right infringement (enabling others
to infringe, and profiting from the
infringement). A year later, after an
unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court ordered Napster’s
file-sharing service to shut down.
Napster was dead, but it had
captured the imagination of the tech-
nical community as a striking
demonstration of the power of the
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SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT
Copyright law distinguishes
between two kinds of secondary
infringement. The first is contribu-
tory infringement—i.e., knowingly
providing tools that enable others
to infringe. The second is vicarious
infringement—i.e., profiting from
the infringement of others that
one is in a position to control, and
not preventing it. Napster was
found guilty of both contributory
and vicarious infringement. 
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Internet’s fundamental architecture. No central machine controls the network;
every machine in the network has equal rights to send any other machine a
message. Machines connected to the Internet are, as the lingo has it, peers. The
notion of the Internet as a network of peer machines communicating with each
other directly—as opposed to a network of client machines mediated by central
servers—was hardly new. Even the very first Internet technical specification,
published in 1969, described the network architecture in terms of machines
interacting as a network of peers. Systems incorporating peer-to-peer commu-
nication between larger computers had been in wide use since the early 1980s.
Napster showed that the same principle remained valid when the peers
were millions of personal computers controlled by ordinary people. Napster’s
use of peer-to-peer was illegal, but it demonstrated the potential of the idea.
Research and development in distributed computing took off. In 2000 and
2001, more than $500 million was invested in companies building peer-to-
peer applications. And transcending its roots as a technical network architec-
ture, “P2P” became enshrined in techno-pop-culture-speak as a catchword for
organizations of all types—including social, corporate, and political—that har-
ness the power of myriad cooperating individuals without reliance on central
authorities. As one 2001 review gushed, “P2P is a mindset, not a particular
technology or industry.”
Napster had also given an entire generation a taste of the Internet as uni-
versal jukebox for which people would clamor. Yet the recording companies,
who worked together to combat illegal downloading, failed to collaborate to
create a legal and profitable Internet music service to fill the vacuum left by
Napster. Instead of capitalizing on file-sharing technology, they demonized it
as a threat to their business. That technological rejectionism ratcheted up the
rancor in the arms race, but it also did something even more short-sighted. The
music companies surrendered a vast business opportunity to the profit of more
imaginative entrepreneurs. Two years later, Apple would launch its iTunes
music store, the first commercially successful music downloading service. 
Sharing Goes Decentralized 
In the meantime, new file-sharing schemes sprouted up that explored new
technical architectures in attempts to tiptoe around liability for secondary
infringement. Napster’s legal Achilles’s heel had been its central directory. As
the court had ruled, control of the directory amounted to control of the file-
sharing activity, and Napster was consequently liable for that activity. The
new architectures got rid of central directories entirely. One of the simplest
methods, called flooding, works like this: Each computer in the file-sharing
network maintains a list of other computers in the network. When file-sharer
204 BLOWN TO BITS
06_0137135599_ch06.qxd  5/2/08  8:05 AM  Page 204
Beth wants to find a copy of Angel,
her computer asks all the computers
in its list. Each of those computers
offers to send Beth a copy of Angel
if it has one, and otherwise relays
Beth’s request to all the computers
on its list, and so on, until the
request eventually reaches a com-
puter that has the file. Figure 6.2
illustrates the process. In contrast to
the Napster-style architecture in
Figure 6.1, there’s no central direc-
tory. Distributed architectures like
this are powerful because they can be extremely robust. The network will
keep working even if many individual computers fail or go offline, as long as
enough computers remain to propagate the requests. 
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I
have Angel.
Sending
it now.
Looking
for Sarah
McLachlan's
Angel track 
No, I'll ask
my friends No, I'll ask
my friends
No,- I'll
ask my
friends
No,- I'll
ask my
friends
FIGURE 6.2 In contrast to Napster-style peer-to-peer systems illustrated earlier,
decentralized file-sharing systems such as Grokster have no central directories. 
CONTENT-DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
The bare-bones flooding method
sketched here is too simple to sup-
port practical large networks. But
the success of decentralized peer-
to-peer architectures has stimu-
lated research into practical
content-distribution network
architectures that exploit the effi-
ciency and robustness of peer-
to-peer methods.
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No Safe Harbors 
The companies building the new generation of file-sharing systems hoped
these distributed architectures would also immunize them against liability for
secondary copyright infringement. After all, once users had the software,
what they did with it was beyond the companies’ knowledge or control. So,
how could the companies be held liable for what users did? To the recording
industry, however, this was just Napster all over again: exploiting the Internet
to promote copyright infringement on a massive scale. In October 2001, the
RIAA sued the makers of three of the most popular systems—Grokster,
Morpheus, and Kazaa—for damages of $150,000 per infringement.
The three companies responded that they had no control over the users’
actions. Moreover, their software was only one piece of the infrastructure that
enabled file-sharing, and there were many other pieces. If the three software
companies were liable, wouldn’t makers of the other pieces be liable as well?
What about Microsoft, whose operating system lets users of one computer
copy files from other computers? What about Cisco, whose routers relay the
unlicensed copyrighted material? What about the computer manufacturers,
whose machines run the software? Wouldn’t a ruling against the file-sharing
network software companies expose the entire industry to liability? 
The Supreme Court had provided guidance for navigating these waters
with the landmark 1984 case Sony v. Universal Studios. In an episode that
foreshadowed the Grokster suit 17 years later, the MPAA had sued Sony
Corporation, charging Sony with secondary infringement for selling a device
that was threatening to ruin the motion picture industry: the video cassette
recorder. As the President of the MPAA thundered before Congress in 1982:
“I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American
public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”
In a narrow 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Sony’s favor, hold-
ing that even though there was widespread infringement from people using
VCRs
… the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the prod-
uct is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
The technology industries applauded. Here was a reasonably clear criterion
they could rely on in evaluating the risk in bringing new products to market.
Showing that a product was capable of substantial noninfringing uses would
provide a “safe harbor” against allegations of secondary infringement. 
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This 1984 scenario—a new technology, a threatened business model—was
now being replayed in the 2001 Grokster suit. The file-sharing companies
were quick to cite the Sony ruling in their defense, explaining that there were
many noninfringing uses of file sharing. 
In April 2003, the Central California Federal District Court agreed that this
case was different from Napster, and dismissed the suit, citing the Sony deci-
sion and commenting that the RIAA was asking the court to “expand exist-
ing copyright law beyond its well-drawn boundaries.” In reaction, the RIAA
immediately began its campaign of suing individual users of the file-sharing
software—the campaign that would later snag Tanya Andersen and Jammie
Thomas.
The District Court’s ruling was appealed, and it was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit, the same court that had ruled against Napster three years earlier: 
In short, from the evidence presented, the district court quite correctly
concluded that the software was capable of substantial noninfringing
uses and, therefore, that the Sony-Betamax doctrine applied.
The RIAA naturally appealed, and when the Supreme Court agreed to review
the decision, the entire networked world held its breath. Were content pub-
lishers to have no legal recourse against massive file-sharing? Would the
Sony safe harbor be overturned? In June 2005, the Court returned a unani-
mous verdict in favor of the RIAA:
We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promot-
ing its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties. 
A Question of Intent 
The content industry had won, although it ended up with less than it had
hoped for. The MPAA wanted the court to be explicit in weakening the Sony
“substantial noninfringing use” standard. Instead, the court declared that the
Sony case was not at issue here, and it would not revisit that standard. The
file-sharing companies’ liability, the court said, stemmed not from the capa-
bilities of the software, but from the companies’ intent in distributing it. 
The technology industries (other than the three defendants, who were
driven out of business) breathed an immediate sigh of relief that Sony had
been left intact. But this was quickly followed by second thoughts. The
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Grokster decision had opened up an entirely new set of grounds on which one
could be held liable for secondary infringement. As the court ruled: “Nothing
in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent to promote infringement
if such evidence exists.” 
But what evidence? If someone accuses your company of secondary
infringement, how confidently can you defend yourself against accusations
of bad intent? The Sony safe harbor doesn’t seem so safe any more. 
Take an example: The Grokster ruling cited “advertising an infringing use”
as evidence of an active step taken to encourage infringement. Apple intro-
duced the iTunes desktop with its CD-copying software in 2001. Early adver-
tisements heavily promoted the product with the slogan “Rip, Mix, Burn.”
Was that a demonstration of Apple’s bad intent? Many people certainly
thought so, including the Chairman of Walt Disney when he told Congress in
2002, “There are computer companies, that their ads, full-page ads, billboards
up and down San Francisco and L.A., that say—what do they say?—‘rip, mix,
burn’ to kids to buy the computer.”
Can your company risk introducing a product with that slogan in the post-
Grokster era? You might expect that you would have every chance of winning
an “intent” fight in court, but the
risks of losing are catastrophic. In
personal infringement cases like
Tanya Andersen’s, even the mini-
mum statutory damage penalties of
$750 per infringement could have
meant a million dollar claim over the
(falsely alleged) songs on her hard
drive—a staggering burden for an
individual. But a technology com-
pany could conceivably be liable for
damages based on every song ille-
gally copied by every user of a
device. Say you sell 14 million iPods
(the number Apple sold in 2006)
times 100 songs allegedly copied per
iPod times $750 per song. That’s
more than a trillion dollars in dam-
ages—more than 100 times the total
retail revenues of the recording
industry worldwide in 2006! Liability like that might seem ridiculous, but
that’s the law. It means that guessing wrong is a bet-the-company mistake.
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NO COMMERCIAL SKIPPING
In 2001, ReplayTV Network intro-
duced a digital video recorder for
television programs that included
the ability to skip commercials
automatically. It also permitted
people to move recorded shows
from one ReplayTV machine to
another. The company was sued for
secondary infringement by the
major movie studios and television
networks, and driven into bank-
ruptcy before the case was con-
cluded. The company that bought
Replay’s assets settled the case,
promising not to include these
features in its future models.
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Better to be conservative and not introduce products with features that might
prompt a lawsuit, even if you are reasonably sure that your products are legal. 
We can speculate about products and features that are unavailable today
due to the uncertainties in Grokster’s “intent” standard, coupled with penal-
ties for secondary infringement penalties that could lead to nightmarish fines.
Companies are naturally reluctant to give examples, but one might ask why
songs shared wirelessly with Microsoft Zune players self-destruct after three
plays, or why Tivo recorders don’t have automatic commercial skipping or let
you move recorded movies to a PC. Non-coincidentally, in 2002, the CEO of
a major cable network characterized skipping commercials while watching TV
as theft, although he allowed that “I guess there could be a certain amount of
tolerance for going to the bathroom.”
But speculating about the consequences of liability alone is largely point-
less, because these liability risks have not been increasing in a vacuum. A
second front has opened up in the copyright wars. Here, the weapons are not
lawsuits, but technology. 
Authorized Use Only 
Computers process information by copying bits—between disk and memory,
between memory and networks, from one part of memory to another.
Actually, most computers are able to “keep” bits in memory only by recopy-
ing them over and over, thousands of times a second. (Ordinary computers
use what is called Dynamic Random Access Memory, or DRAM. The copying
is what makes it “dynamic.”) The relation of all this essential copying to the
kind of copying governed by copyright law has been intellectual fodder for
legal scholars—and for lawyers looking for new grounds on which to sue. 
Computers cannot run programs stored on disk without copying the pro-
gram code to memory. The copyright law explicitly permits this copying for
the purpose of running the program. But suppose someone wants simply to
look at the code in memory, not to run it. Does that require explicit permis-
sion from the copyright holder? In 1993, a U.S. Federal Circuit Court ruled
that it does.
Going further, computers cannot display images on the screen without
copying them to a special part of memory called a display buffer. Does this
mean that, even if you purchase a computer graphic image, you can’t view
the image without explicit permission from the copyright holder each time?
A 1995 report from the Department of Commerce argued that it does mean
exactly this, and went on to imply that almost any use of a digital work
involves making a copy and therefore requires explicit permission.
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Digital Rights and Trusted Systems 
Legal scholars can debate whether copyright law mandates a future of
“authorized use only” for digital information. The answer may not matter
much, because that future is coming to pass through the technologies of dig-
ital rights management and trusted systems. 
The core idea is straightforward. If computers are making it easy to copy
and distribute information without permission, then change computers so that
copying or distributing without permission is difficult or impossible. This is
not an easy change to make; perhaps it cannot be done at all without sacri-
ficing the computer’s ability to function as a general-purpose device. But it’s
a change that’s underway nonetheless. 
Here is the issue: Suppose (fictitious) Fortress Publishers is in the business
of selling content over the Web. They’d like the only people getting their con-
tent to be those whose pay. Fortress can start by restricting access on their
web site to registered users only, by requiring passwords. Much web content
is sold like this today—for instance, Wall Street Digest or Safari Books Online.
The method works well (or at least has worked well so far) for this type of
material, but there’s a problem with higher-value content. How does Fortress
prevent people who’ve bought its material from copying and redistributing it? 
One thing Fortress can do is to distribute their material in encrypted form,
in such a way that it can be decrypted and processed only by programs that
obey certain rules. For instance, if Fortress distributes PDF documents created
with Adobe Acrobat, it can use Adobe LiveCycle Enterprise Suite to control
whether people reading the PDF file with Adobe Reader are allowed to print
it, modify it, or copy portions of it. Fortress can even arrange to make a doc-
ument “phone home” over the Internet—i.e., to notify Fortress whenever it is
opened and report the IP address of the computer that is opening it. Similarly,
if Fortress prepares music files for use with Windows Media Player, it can use
Microsoft Windows Media Rights Manager to limit the number of times the
music can be played, to control whether it can be copied to a portable player
or a CD, force it to expire after a certain period of time, or make it phone
home for permission each time it’s played so that the Fortress web server can
check a license and require payment if necessary.
The general technique of distributing content together with control infor-
mation that restricts its use is called digital rights management (DRM). DRM
systems are widely used today, and there are industry specifications (called
rights expression languages) that detail a wide range of restrictions that can
be imposed.
DRM might appear to solve Fortress’s problem, but the approach is far from
airtight. How can Fortress be confident that people using their material are
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using it with the intended programs,
the ones that obey the DRM restric-
tions? Encrypting the files helps, but
as explained in Chapter 5, attackers
break that kind of encryption all the
time—it happens regularly with PDF
and Windows Media. More simply,
someone could modify the document
reader or the media player program
to save unencrypted copies of the
material as they are running, and
then distribute those copies all over
the Internet for anyone’s use. 
To prevent this, Fortress could
rely on the computer operating sys-
tem to require that any program
manipulating their content must be
certified. Before a program is run,
the operating system checks a digital
signature for the program to verify that the program is approved and has not
been altered. That’s better, but a really clever attacker might alter the operat-
ing system so that it will run the modified program anyway. How could any-
one prevent that? The answer is to build a chip into every computer that
checks the operating system each time the machine is turned on. If the oper-
ating system has been modified, the computer will not boot. The chip should
be tamper-proof so that any attempt to disable it will render the machine
inoperable. 
This basic technique was worked out during the 1980s and demonstrated
in several research and advanced development projects, but only since 2006
has it been ready for wide deployment in consumer-grade computers. The
required chip, called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), was designed by the
Trusted Computing Group, a consortium of hardware and software companies
formed in 1999. More than half of the computers shipped worldwide today
contain TPMs. Popular operating systems, including Microsoft Windows Vista
and several versions of GNU/Linux, can use them for security applications.
One application, trusted boot, prevents the computer from booting if the oper-
ating system has been modified (for example, by a virus). Another applica-
tion, called sealed storage, lets you encrypt files in such a way that they can
be decrypted only on particular computers that you specify. Given today’s
concerns over viruses and Internet security, it’s a safe bet that TPMs will
become pervasive. One industry estimate shows that more than 80% of lap-
top PCs will include TPMs by 2009.
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ENCRYPTION AND DRM
Chapter 5 explains public-key
encryption and digital signatures—
the technologies that make public
distribution of encrypted material
possible. The “messages” that Alice
and Bob are exchanging might be
not text messages, but rather music,
videos, illustrated documents, or
anything at all. As the first koan
says, “it’s all just bits.” Thus, the
encryption technologies that Alice
and Bob use for secret communica-
tion can be used by content suppli-
ers to control the conditions under
which consumers can watch movies
or listen to songs.
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Asserting Control Beyond the Bounds of Copyright 
Fortress Publishers’ problem could be solved in a world of digital rights man-
agement reinforced by trusted computing, but is that something we should
welcome? 
For one thing, it gives Fortress a level of control over use of its material
that goes far beyond the bounds of copyright law. When we buy a book
today, we take for granted that we have the right to read it whenever we like
and as many times as we like; read it from cover to cover or skip around; lend
it to a friend; resell it; copy out a paragraph for use in a book report; donate
it to a school library; open it without “phoning home” to tell Fortress we are
doing so. We need no permission to do any of these things. Are we willing to
give up these rights when books are digital computer files? How about music?
Videos? Software? Should we care? 
Now leave to one side, for a moment, the dispute between music com-
panies and listeners. DRM and trusted computing technologies, once standard
in personal computers, will have other uses. The same methods that, in one
country, prohibit people from playing unlicensed songs can, in another coun-
try, prevent people from listening to
unapproved political speeches or reading
unapproved newspapers. Developers of
DRM and trusted platforms may be creat-
ing effective technologies to control the
use of information, but no one has yet
devised effective methods to circumscribe
the limits of that control. As one security
researcher warned: “Trusted computing”
means that “third parties can trust that
your computer will disobey your wishes.”
Another concern with DRM is that it
increases opportunities for technology lock-in and anticompetitive mischief.
It is tempting to design operating systems that run only certified applications
in order to protect against viruses or bogus document readers and media
players. But this can easily turn into an environment where no one can mar-
ket a new media player without publishers’ approval, or where no one can
deploy any application without first having it registered and approved by
Microsoft, HP, or IBM. A software company that poses a competitive threat to
established interests, like publishers, operating system vendors, or computer
manufacturers, might suddenly encounter “complications” in getting its prod-
ucts certified. One reason innovation has been so rapid in information tech-
nology is that the infrastructure is open: You don’t need permission to
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The same methods that, in
one country, prohibit
people from playing
unlicensed songs can, in
another country, prevent
people from listening to
unapproved political
speeches or reading
unapproved newspapers.
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introduce new programs and devices on the Internet. A world of trusted sys-
tems could easily jeopardize this.
A third DRM difficulty is that, in the name of security and virus protec-
tion, we could easily slip into an unwinnable arms race of increasing tech-
nology lock-down that provides no real gain for content owners. As soon as
attackers anywhere bypass the DRM to produce an unencrypted copy, they
can distribute it—and they might be willing to go to a lot of effort to be able
to do that. 
Think, for example, about making unauthorized copies of movies. Very
sophisticated attackers might modify the TPM hardware on their computers,
putting a lot of effort into bypassing the tamper-proof chip. Here’s an even
easier method: let the TPM system operate normally, but hook up a video
recorder in place of the computer display. That particular attack has been
anticipated by the industry with a standard that requires all high-definition
video to be transmitted between devices in encrypted form. Windows Vista
implements this in its Output Protection Management subsystem, out of con-
cern that otherwise the movie studios would not permit high-definition video
to be played on PCs at all. Even that protection scheme is vulnerable—you
could simply point a video recorder at the screen. The result would not be
high-definition quality, but once it has been digitized, it could be sent around
the Internet without any further degradation. 
Content owners worried about these sorts of attacks refer to them as
the analog hole, and there seems to be no technological way to prevent them.
J.K. Rowling tried to prevent unauthorized Internet copies of Harry Potter and
the Deathly Hallows by not releasing an electronic version of the book at all.
That did not stop the zealous fan mentioned in Chapter 2 from simply pho-
tographing every page and posting the entire book on the Web even before it
was in bookstores. 
In the words of one computer security expert, “Digital files cannot be made
uncopyable, any more than water can be made not wet.” There is one thing
for certain: The DRM approach to copyright control is difficult, frustrating,
and potentially fraught with unintended consequences. Out of that frustration
has emerged a third response—along with liability and DRM—to the increas-
ing levels of copying on the Internet: outright criminalization of technology. 
Forbidden Technology 
The lines of text following this paragraph might be illegal to print in a book
sold in the United States. We’ve omitted the middle four lines to protect our-
selves and our publisher. Had we left them in, this would be a computer
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program, written in the Perl computer language, to unscramble encrypted
DVDs. Informing you how to break DVD encryption so you could copy your
DVDs would be a violation of 17 USC §1201, the anti-circumvention provi-
sion of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). This section of
the DMCA outlaws technology for bypassing copyright protection. Don’t
bother turning to the back of the book for a note telling you where to find
the missing four lines. A New York U.S. District Judge ruled in 2000 that even
providing so much as a web link to the code was a DMCA violation in itself,
and the Appeals Court agreed.
s’’$/=\\2048;while(<>){G=29;R=142;if((@a=unqT=”C*”,_)[20]&48){D=89;_unqb24.qT.@ 
. . . (four lines suppressed) . . . 
)+=P+( F&E))for@a[128..$#a]\\}print+qT.@a}’;s/[D-HO-U_]/\\$$&/g;s/q/pack+/g;eval 
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention rules do more than stop people from
printing gibberish in books. They outlaw a broad class of technologies—out-
law manufacturing them, selling them, writing about them, and even talking
about them. That Congress took such a step shows the depth of the alarm and
frustration at how easily DRM is bypassed. With §1201, Congress legislated,
not against copyright infringement, but against bypassing itself, whether or
not anything is copied afterwards. If you find an encrypted web page that
contains the raw text of the Bible and break the encryption order to read
Genesis, that’s not copyright infringement—but it is circumvention.
Circumvention is its own offense, subject to many of the same penalties as
copyright infringement: statutory damages and, in some cases, imprisonment.
Congress intentionally chose to make the offense independent of actual
infringement. Alternative proposals that would have limited the prohibition
to circumvention for the purpose of copyright infringement were considered
and defeated.
The DMCA prohibition goes further. As §1201(a)(2) decrees: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, compo-
nent, or part thereof, that … is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under [copyright]. 
Here the law passes from regulating behavior (circumvention) to regulat-
ing technology itself. It’s a big step, but in the words of one of the bill’s
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supporters at the time, “I continue to believe that we must ban devices whose
major purpose is circumvention because I do not think it will work from the
enforcement standpoint. That is, allowing anti-circumvention devices to pro-
liferate freely, and outlaw only the inappropriate use of them, seems to me
unlikely to deter much.”
In the arena of security, there is an odd asymmetry between the world of
atoms and the world of bits. There are many published explanations of how
to crack mechanical combination locks, and even of how to construct a phys-
ical master key for a building from a key to a single lock in the set. But if the
lock is digital, and what is behind it is Pirates of the Caribbean, the rules are
different. Federal law prohibits publication of any explanation of how to
reverse-engineer that kind of lock. 
Legislators may not have seen an effective alternative, but they crafted an
awkward form of regulation that begins with a broad prohibition and then
grants exemptions on a case-by-case basis. The need for exemptions became
apparent even as the DMCA was being drafted. A few exemptions got writ-
ten into the statute. These included permission for intelligence and law
enforcement agents to break encryption during the course of investigations
and permission for non-profit libraries to break the encryption on a work, but
only for the purpose of deciding whether to buy it. The law also included a
complex rule that allows certain types of encryption research under certain
circumstances. Recognizing that needs for new exemptions would continue to
arise, Congress charged the Librarian of Congress to conduct hearings to
review the exemptions every three years and grant new ones if appropriate. 
For instance, in November 2006, after a year-long hearing process, a new
exemption gave Americans the right to undo the lock-in on their mobile
phones for the purpose of shifting to a new cellular service provider. The rul-
ing had a big impact nine months later in August 2007, when Apple released
its iPhone, locked to the AT&T cellular network. Users clamored to unlock
their iPhones so they could be used on other networks, and several companies
began selling unlocking services. But the language of the DMCA and the
exemption is so murky that, while unlocking your own phone is legal, dis-
tributing unlocking software or even telling other people how to unlock their
phones might still be a DMCA violation. Indeed, AT&T threatened legal action
against at least one unlocking company.
Copyright Protection or Competition Avoidance? 
The DMCA’s framework for regulation is a poor match to technology innova-
tion, because the lack of an appropriate exemption can stymie the deploy-
ment of a new device or a new application. Given the ferocity of industry
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competition, there’s the constant temptation to exploit the broad language of
the prohibition as grounds for lawsuits against competitors. 
In 2002, the Chamberlain garage-door company sued a maker of univer-
sal electronic garage-door openers, claiming that the universal transmitters
circumvented access controls when they sent radio signals to open and close
the doors. It took two years for the case to finally die at the appeals court.
That same year, Lexmark International sued a company that made replace-
ment toner cartridges for Lexmark printers, charging that the cartridges cir-
cumvented access controls in order to function with the printer. The District
Court agreed. The ruling was overturned on appeal in 2004, but in the mean-
time, the alternative cartridges were kept off the market for a year and a half.
In 2004, the Storage Technology Corporation successfully convinced the
Boston District Court that it was a DMCA violation for third-party vendors to
service its systems. Had the appeals court not overturned the ruling, we might
now be in a situation where no independent company could service computer
hardware. It would be as if Ford Tauruses came with their hoods sealed, and
it was illegal for any mechanic not licensed by Ford to service them. 
Lawsuits like these earned the DMCA the epithet “Digital Millennium
Competition Avoidance.” Fortunately, none of the lawsuits were ultimately
successful, because the courts ruled that the underlying disputes weren’t suf-
ficiently related to copyrighted material—it’s unlikely that Congress intended
the DMCA to apply to garage doors. But in areas where copyright enters, the
anti-competitive impact of the DMCA emerges in full force. 
Imagine that the 1984 Supreme Court ruling in the Sony case had gone the
other way, and the Court had declared Sony liable for copyright infringement
for selling VCRs. Would VCRs have disappeared? Almost certainly not—
consumers wanted them. More likely, the electronics industry would have cut
a deal with the motion picture industry, giving them control over the capa-
bilities of VCRs. VCRs would have become highly regulated machines, regu-
lated to meet the demands of the motion picture industry. All new VCR
features would need to be approved, and any feature the MPAA didn’t like
would be kept off the market. The capabilities of the VCR would be under the
control of the content industry. 
That’s the kind of world we are living in today when it comes to digital
media. If a company manufactures a product that processes digital informa-
tion, it needs to be concerned about copyright infringement, even without
the DMCA. This is a big concern, especially after Grokster. But suppose the
device could not be used for copyright infringement. Even then, if the digi-
tal information is restricted by DRM, the product must abide by the terms of
the DRM restrictions. Otherwise, that would be circumvention, so the prod-
uct couldn’t be legally manufactured at all. The terms of the DRM restrictions
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are completely at the whim of the content provider. Once Fortress Publishers
installs DRM, they get to dictate the behavior of any device that accesses
their material. 
In the case of DVDs, DVD content is encrypted with an algorithm called
the Content Scrambling System (CSS), developed by Matsushita and Toshiba
and first introduced in 1996. As mentioned in Chapter 5, that algorithm was
quickly broken—a textbook violation of Kerckhoffs’s Principle—and under-
ground decryption programs are today readily found on the Internet. The cen-
sored six lines of text earlier in this chapter is one such program. 
Although CSS is useless for realistic copy protection, it is invaluable as an
enabler of anti-competitive technology regulation. Any company marketing
a product that decrypts DVDs needs a license from the DVD Copy Control
Association (DVD CCA), an organization formed in 1999. The license condi-
tions are determined by whatever the CCA decides. For example, all DVD
players must obey “region coding,” which limits them to playing DVDs made
for one part of the world only, and an individual player’s region can be
changed no more than five times. Region coding has nothing to do with
copyright. It is there to support a motion picture industry marketing strategy
of releasing movies in different parts of the world at different times. The var-
ied license restrictions include some that companies are not even permitted
to see until after they have signed the license. 
The Face of Technology Lock-in 
Suppose you are a company with an idea for an innovative DVD product.
Maybe it is a home entertainment system that lets people copy and store
DVDs for later watching, and you have worked out a way to do this without
encouraging copyright infringement. This is an actual product. Kaleidescape,
the California start-up that makes it, was sued by the DVD CCA in 2004 for
violating a provision of the CSS license that forces DVD players to be
designed to work only when there is a physical disk present. In March 2007,
a California court ruled in Kaleidescape’s favor, on the grounds that the
license wasn’t clear enough, but the case is being appealed. In any case, the
CCA can change the license at any time. The legal wrangling has kept the
company under a cloud for three years. Another start-up working on a sim-
ilar product at the same time folded when it failed to get venture funding, “in
part due to the threat of legal action from the DVD CCA.”
The DVD technology lock-in has been in place since 2000. A similar lock-
in is being implemented for high-definition cable TV. A campaign to extend
the lock-in to all consumer media technology is being promoted in
Washington as the broadcast flag initiative. And more trial balloons keep
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being floated in the name of protecting copyright. A bill was introduced in
Congress to ban home recording of satellite radio. NBC urged the Federal
Communications Commission to force Internet service providers to filter all
Internet traffic for copyright infringement (that is, to compel ISPs to check
packets as they are passed around the Internet and to discard packets deemed
to contain unauthorized material). In 2002, Congress considered a breathtak-
ingly broad prohibition against any communications device that does not
implement copyright control—a bill that had to be redrafted after it became
apparent that the first draft would have banned heart pacemakers and hear-
ing aids.
So, in the United States today, a technology company is free to invent a
new garage-door opener without needing its design approved by the garage-
door makers. It can manufacture cheaper replacement toner cartridges with-
out approval from the printer companies. It cannot, however, create new
software applications that manipulate video from Hollywood movie DVDs
without permission from the DVD CCA. It cannot in principle create any new
product or service around DRM-restricted digital content without getting per-
mission, often from the very people who might regard that new product as a
competitive threat. 
This is the regulatory posture at the present juncture in the copyright wars.
People can debate the merits of this position. Some say that the DMCA is nec-
essary. Others claim that it has been largely ineffective in curtailing infringe-
ment, as the continuing calls for ever more
severe copyright penalties demonstrate.
But whatever its merits, the anti-circum-
vention approach is poisonous to the inno-
vation that drives the digital age. It
hobbles the rapid deployment of new prod-
ucts and services that interoperate with
existing infrastructure. The uncertain legal risks drive away the venture cap-
ital needed to bring innovations to market. 
In essence, the DMCA has enlisted the force of criminal law in the service
of the lock-in shenanigans invited
by DRM. It has introduced anti-
competitive regulation under the
guise of copyright protection. By
outlawing technology for circum-
venting DRM, the law has, in the
words of one critic, become a tool
for “circumventing competition.”
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The anti-circumvention
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Copyright Koyaanisqatsi: Life Out of Balance 
1982 marked the release of an astonishing film called Koyaanisqatsi. The title
is a Hopi Indian word meaning “life out of balance.” The film, which has no
dialogue or narration, barrages viewers with images at once hauntingly
beautiful and deeply disturbing, images that juxtapose the world of nature
with the world of cities. The relentless message is that technology is destroy-
ing our ability to live harmonious, balanced lives.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, we inhabit a world of copy-
right koyaanisqatsi. Virtually every salvo in the copyright war, Congressional
bill introduced, lawsuit filed, court ruling issued, or advocacy piece trum-
peted, pays homage to the “traditional balance of copyright” and the need to
preserve it. The truth is that the balance is gone, toppled in the digital explo-
sion, which is likewise shattering the framework for any civil consensus over
the disposition of information. The balance is gone for good reason. 
Copyright (at least in the United States) is supposedly a deal the govern-
ment strikes between the creator of a work and the public. The creator gets
limited monopoly control over the work, for limited times, which provides the
opportunity to benefit commercially. The public gets the benefit of having the
work, and also gets to use it without restriction after the monopoly has
expired. The parameters of the deal have evolved over the years, generally in
the direction of a stronger monopoly. Under the first U.S. copyright law,
enacted in 1790, copyright lasted a maximum of 28 years. Today, it lasts until
70 years after the author’s death. In principle, however, it’s still a deal. 
It is an enormously complex deal, and it is easy see why. Today’s copy-
right law is the outcome of 200 years of wrangling, negotiating, and compro-
mising. The first copyright statute was printed in its entirety in two
newspaper columns of the Columbian Centinel, shown in Figure 6.3. As the
enlarged text insert shows, the law
covered only maps, charts, and
books, and granted exclusive rights
to “print, reprint, publish, or vend.”
The period of copyright was 14
years (with a 14-year renewal).
Today’s statute runs to more than
200 pages. It’s a Byzantine stew
peppered with exceptions, qualifi-
cations, and arcane provisions. You
can’t make a public performance of
a musical work unless you’re an
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DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
Digital Copyright by Jessica Litman
(Prometheus Books, 2001) recounts
the evolution of U.S. copyright law
as a series of negotiated compro-
mises. The Citizen Media Law Project
(www.citmedialaw.org) offers use-
ful information to online publish-
ers—not just about copyright, but
other legal matters as well.
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agricultural society at an agricultural fair. You can’t freely copy written
works, but you can if you’re an association for the blind and you’re making
an edition of the work in Braille (but not if the work is a standardized test).
A radio station can’t broadcast a recording without a license from the music
publisher, but it doesn’t need a license from the record company—but that’s
only if it’s an analog broadcast. For digital satellite radio, you need licenses
from both (but there are exceptions).
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FIGURE 6.3 The first U.S. copyright law—“An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning.” It was printed as the first two columns of the July 17, 1790 edition of
the Columbian Centinel. Note George Washington’s signature on the bill at the
bottom of the second column.
It is a law written for specialists, not for ordinary people. Even ordinary
lawyers have trouble interpreting it. But that never mattered, because the
copyright deal never was about ordinary people. The so-called “copyright bal-
ance” was largely a balancing act among competing business interests. The
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evolution of copyright law has been a story of the relevant players sitting
down at the table and working things out, with Congress generally following
suit. Ordinary people were not involved, because ordinary people had no real
ability to publish, and they had nothing to bring to the table. 
Late to the Table 
The digital explosion has changed all that by making it easy for anyone to
copy and distribute information on a world-wide scale. We can all be pub-
lishers now. The public is now a party to the copyright deal—but the game has
been going on for 200 years, and the hands were dealt long ago. 
When people come to the table with their new publishing power, expect-
ing to take full advantage of information technology, they find that there are
possibilities that seem attractive, easy, and natural, but for which the public’s
rights have already been “balanced” away. Among the lost opportunities are
copying a DVD to a portable player, making the video clip equivalent of an
audio mixtape, placing a favorite cartoon or a favorite song on a Facebook
page, or adding your own creative input to a work of art you love and shar-
ing that with the world. 
People resent it when acts like these are denounced as theft and piracy. As
a contributor to a computer bulletin board quipped, “My first-grade teacher
told me I should share, and now they’re telling me it’s illegal.” 
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CAN YOU COPY MUSIC CDS TO YOUR COMPUTER? 
Of course, you can easily copy CDs to your computer hard drive: There are
dozens of software packages designed to do just that, and millions of people
do it regularly. Yet the legal issues in CD copying are both murky and con-
fusing—a striking example of the mismatch of copyright law and public
understanding. 
In testimony at the Jammie Thomas trial in October 2007 (see the sidebar ear-
lier this chapter), Jennifer Pariser, the head of litigation for Sony BMG, sug-
gested that ripping your own legally purchased CD, even for personal use, is
illegal, asserting that making a copy of a purchased song is just “a nice way of
saying ‘steals just one copy’.” The RIAA web site specifically states that there is
no legal right to copy music CDs, although it allows that copying music “usu-
ally won’t raise concerns” so long as the copy is for personal use, and it warns
that it’s illegal to give your copy away or lend it to others to copy. 
In contrast, in an October 2006 poll of Los Angeles teenagers, 69% believed
that it is legal to copy a CD from a friend who had purchased it.
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That resentment can easily grow to a sense of moral outrage. In the words
of Electronic Frontier Foundation founder, John Gilmore:
What is wrong is that we have invented the technology to eliminate
scarcity, but we are deliberately throwing it away to benefit those who
profit from scarcity. We now have the means to duplicate any kind of
information that can be compactly represented in digital media…. We
should be rejoicing in mutually creating a heaven on earth! Instead,
those crabbed souls who make their living from perpetuating scarcity
are sneaking around, convincing co-conspirators to chain our cheap
duplication technology so that it won’t make copies—at least not of
the kind of goods they want to sell us. This is the worst sort of eco-
nomic protectionism—beggaring your own society for the benefit of
an inefficient local industry. 
But one person’s sharing can be another person’s theft, and the other side in
the copyright war has no shortage of its own moral outrage. The motion pic-
ture industry estimates that the retail value of unauthorized movie copies
floating around the Internet is more than $7 billion. As the president of the
MPAA puts it:
We will not welcome … theft masquerading as technology. No busi-
ness, including the movies, can keep its doors open, its employees
paid, and its customers satisfied if pirates and thieves are allowed to
run ramshackle over this country’s basic protection of the right of
individuals to the ownership of their creative expressions, and to ben-
efit from those expressions and that ownership. 
This is not “balance.” It’s a nasty firefight filled with indignation, recrimina-
tions, and a path of escalating punishments and anticompetitive regulation in
the name of copyright law. As collateral damage of the battle, innovation is
being held hostage. 
Toward De-Escalation 
Getting off that path requires freeing ourselves of old ideas and perspectives.
Difficult as that seems, there are grounds for optimism. During 2007, the
recording industry made a major shift away from reliance on digital rights
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management. In addition to restraints it imposes on technology, DRM is an
inconvenience both for consumers and publishers. There has been an increas-
ing public acknowledgement of the downsides of DRM, not only by consumer
groups, but by the industry itself. 
One of the first visible moves was an announcement in February 2007 by
Apple’s Steve Jobs, in the form of an open letter to recording industry exec-
utives asking them to relax the licensing restrictions that required Apple to
implement DRM on iTunes music. In Jobs’s view, a world of online stores sell-
ing DRM-free music that could play on any player would be “clearly the best
alternative for consumers, and Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat.” The
industry reacted coldly, but other groups chimed in to agree with Jobs. In
March, Musicload, one of Europe’s largest online music retailers, came out
against DRM, noting that 75% of its customer service calls were due to DRM.
Musicload asserted that DRM makes using music difficult for consumers and
hinders the development of a mass market for legal downloads. In November,
the British Entertainment Retailers Association also came out against DRM.
Its director general claimed that copy protection mechanisms were “stifling
growth and working against the consumer interest.”
By the summer of 2007, Apple iTunes and (separately) Universal Music
Group began releasing music tracks
that could be freely copied. The
iTunes tracks contained information
(“watermarks”) identifying the origi-
nal purchaser from iTunes. That way,
if large numbers of unauthorized
copies would appear on the Internet,
the original purchaser could be
traced and held accountable. 
A few months later, even that
level of restriction was vanishing. By
the beginning of 2008, all four
major music labels—Universal, EMI,
Warner, and Sony/BMG—were
releasing music for sale through
Amazon without watermarks that
identified individual buyers. It was a
remarkable about-face over the
course of a year. When Jobs made his February 2007 proposal, Warner Music
CEO Edgar Bronfman flat-out rejected the idea as “completely without logic
or merit.” Before the end of the year, Warner was announcing that it would
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USING WATERMARKING
Using watermarking rather than
copy restrictions and access control
is an example of a general approach
to regulation through account-
ability, rather than restriction.
Don’t try to prohibit violations in
advance, but make it possible to
identify violations when they occur
and deal with them then. The same
perspective can apply in privacy, as
mentioned in Chapter 2, where one
can focus on the appropriate use of
personal information rather than
restricting access to it.
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sell DRM-free music on Amazon, with Bronfman explaining in a note to
employees:
By removing a barrier to the sale and enjoyment of audio downloads,
we bring an energy-sapping debate to a close and allow ourselves to
refocus on opportunities and products that will benefit not only
WMG, but our artists and our consumers as well. 
The increasing recognition that the DRM approach is failing is sparking
experiments with other models for distributing music on the Internet.
Universal has been talking to Sony and other labels about a subscription ser-
vice, where users would pay a fixed fee and then get as much music as they
want. One plan links the service to a new hardware device, here the price of
the service would be folded into the price of the hardware.
A related idea is to distribute music through blanket licenses with mobile
carriers or ISPs. New companies are emerging that offer this kind of service
on college computer networks. Another variant is the idea of unlimited con-
tent networks. These are networks that give access to music or video that
floats around the network with no restrictions. People can make unlimited use
of the material—downloading, copying, moving it to portable devices, shar-
ing with others—as long as they keep it within the network.
A complementary approach promotes sharing of music and other creative
works in a way that enriches the common culture, by making it easy for cre-
ators to distribute their own work and to build on each other’s work. One
organization that provides technical and legal tools to encourage this is
Creative Commons. This organization distributes a family of copyright
licenses that creators can use for publishing their works on the Internet,
including licenses that permit open sharing. The licenses are expressed both
as legal documents and as computer code that can support new applications.
If a work appears on the Web with the appropriate Creative Commons code,
for example, search engines might return references to it when asked to find
material that can be used under specified licensing conditions. Stimulating
open sharing on the Internet is an example of moving toward a commons—
that is, a system of sharing that minimizes the need for fine-grained property
restrictions (Chapter 8, “Bits in the Air” includes more on the notion of a
commons).
Experience with these and other approaches will show whether there are
economically viable models for distributing music that do not rely upon
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DRM. Success could pave the way
for the motion picture industry and
other publishers to get off the anti-
circumvention path—a dead end
that has been more effective at
harming innovation than at stop-
ping infringement, and which even
some of the original architects of
the policy are now acknowledging
as a failed approach.
Even then, however, the larger
problems created by the DMCA
would not fade away, since policies locked into law are not easily unlocked.
If the content industry moves to better business models and the DRM battles
subside, the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions may continue to be anti-
consumer, anti-competitive blots on the digital landscape. Unless repealed
from the legal code, they would remain as battlefield relics of a war that was
settled by peaceful means—unexploded ordnance that a litigious business
could still use in ways unrelated to the law’s original intent. 
The Limits of Property 
For 15 years, the fights over digital music and digital video have been the
front line of the copyright wars. Perhaps innovations and experiments that
are already underway will help defuse those battles. The enormous potential
of the Internet for good—and for profit—need not be sacrificed to combat its
abuse. If you do not like what others are doing with the Internet, the Internet
does not have to become your enemy—unless you make it your enemy. 
The indignation over copyright is intense. The interest in new approaches,
such as accountability and commons, suggests the deeper source of the dis-
comfort with the metaphors of property and theft when applied to words and
music. The copyright balance that is being toppled by digitization is not just
the traditional tension between creator and the public. It is the balance
between the individual and society that underlies our notions of property
itself. Accountability and commons are attempts to find substitutes for the
ever-expanding property restrictions imposed in the name of digital copy-
right law.
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CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSES
If you’ve created works that you want
to publish on the Internet, you can
use the Creative Commons license
generator at creativecommons.
org to obtain a license tailored to
your needs. With the license, you can
retain specified rights of your choice
while granting blanket permission for
other uses. 
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When we characterize movies,
songs, and books as “property,” we
evoke visceral metaphors of freedom
and independence: “my parcel of
land versus your parcel of land.” But
the digital explosion is fracturing
these property metaphors. “My par-
cel of land” might be different from
“your parcel of land,” but when both
parcels are blown to clouds of bits,
the clouds swirl together. The prop-
erty lines that would separate them vanish in a fog of network packets. 
Learning To Fly Through the Digital Clouds 
In 2004, Google embarked on a project, mentioned in Chapter 4, to index the
book collections of several large libraries for Google’s search engine. The idea
is that when you search on the Web, you’ll be able to find books relevant to
your search query, together with a snippet of text from the book. As Google
describes it, they are creating “an enhanced card catalog of the world’s
books,” and this should be no more controversial than any card catalog. 
The Association of American Publishers (AAP) and the Authors’ Guild
object to the Google book project, and they are suing Google for copyright
infringement. In the words of the AAP President Patricia Schroeder, “Google
is seeking to make millions of dollars by freeloading on the talent and prop-
erty of authors and publishers.” The president of the Authors’ Guild equates
including a book in the project with stealing the work. At issue is the fact that
Google is scanning the books and making copies in order to create the search
index, and the case is being debated on legal technicalities about whether this
scanning constitutes copyright infringement.
The library project will certainly be beneficial to Google by making its
search engine more valuable, and Google is indeed scanning the books with-
out permission from the copyright holders. Are they “appropriating property”
and extracting value from it without compensating the owners, not even ask-
ing for permission? Should Google be permitted to do that? If you write a
book, and that’s “property” that you “own,” how far should the limits of your
ownership extend? 
As a society, we have faced this kind of question before. If a stream runs
through your land, do you own the water in the stream? Are there limits to
your ownership? Can you pump out that water and sell it—even if that would
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FREE CULTURE
Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture: How
Big Media Uses Technology and the
Law to Lock Down Culture and
Control Creativity (Penguin, 2004)
compellingly traces the story of
how overbroad copyright restric-
tions are jeopardizing the future of
a robust and vibrant public culture. 
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cause water shortages downstream? What about the obligations of landown-
ers upstream from you? These were major controversial issues in the western
U.S. in the nineteenth century, which eventually resulted in codifying a sys-
tem of limited property rights that landowners have to the water running
through their land.
Suppose an airplane flies over your land. Is that trespassing? Suppose the
plane is flying very low. How far upward does your property right extend?
From ancient times, property rights were held to reach upward indefinitely.
Perhaps airlines should be required to seek permission from every landowner
whose property their planes traverse. Imagine being faced with that regula-
tory question at the dawn of the Aviation Age. Should we require airlines to
obtain that permission out of respect for property and ownership? That might
have seemed reasonable at a time when planes flew at only a few thousand
feet. But had society done that, what would have been the implications for
innovation in air travel? Would we ever have seen the emergence of
transcontinental flight, or would the path to that technology have been
blocked by thickets of regulation? Congress forestalled the growth of those
thickets by nationalizing the navigable airspace in 1926.
Similarly, should we require Google to get permission from every book’s
copyright holder before including it in the index? It seems perfectly reason-
able—and in fact other book indexing projects are underway that do seek that
permission. Yet perhaps book search is the fledging digital equivalent of the
low-flying aircraft. Can we envision the future transcontinental flights, where
books, music, images, and videos are automatically extracted, sampled,
mixed, and remixed; fed into massive automated reasoning engines; assimi-
lated into the core software of every personal computer and every cell phone—
and thousands of other things for which the words don’t even exist yet? 
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COPYRIGHT AND WEB SEARCHING
If you believe that the Google library project violates copyright, you might
wonder whether search engines themselves infringe copyright by caching
and indexing web sites and providing links. This claim has been the source
of lawsuits, but the courts have been rejecting it. In Field v. Google (January
2006), a Nevada District Court ruled that Google’s caching and indexing of
web sites is permissible. One of the factors in the ruling was that Google
stores web pages in its cache only temporarily. In Perfect 10 v. Google (May
2007), the Ninth Circuit Court denied an adult magazine’s request for a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent Google from linking to its site and posting
thumbnail images from it. 
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What’s the proper balance? How far “upward” into the bursting informa-
tion space should property rights extend? What should ownership even mean
when we’re talking about bits? We don’t know, and finding answers won’t be
easy. But somehow, we must learn to fly. 
✷
The digital explosion casts information every which way, breaching estab-
lished boundaries of property. Technologies have confounded copyright—the
rules that would regulate and restrain bits in their flight. Technological solu-
tions have been brought to bear on the problems technology created. Those
solutions created de facto policies of their own, bypassing the considerations
of public interest on which copyright was balanced. 
Property lines are not the only boundaries the explosion is breaching, and
copyright is not the only arena in which information regulation is challenged.
Bits fly across national borders. They fly into private homes and public places
carrying content that is unwanted, even harmful—content that has histori-
cally been restricted, not by copyright, but by regulations against defamation
and pornography. Yet the bits fly anyway, and that is the conundrum to
which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 7
You Can’t Say That on the
Internet
Guarding the Frontiers of Digital
Expression 
Do You Know Where Your Child Is on the
Web Tonight? 
It was every parent’s worst nightmare. Katherine Lester, a 16-year-old hon-
ors student from Fairgrove, Michigan, went missing in June 2006. Her par-
ents had no idea what had happened to her; she had never given them a
moment’s worry. They called the police. Then federal authorities got involved. 
After three days of terrifying absence, she was found, safe—in Amman,
Jordan. 
Fairgrove is too small to have a post office, and the Lesters lived in the last
house on a dead-end street. In another time, Katherine’s school, six miles
away, might have been the outer limit of her universe. But through the
Internet, her universe was—the whole world. Katherine met a Palestinian man,
Abdullah Jimzawi, from Jericho on the West Bank. She found his profile on
the social networking web site, MySpace, and sent him a message: “u r cute.”
They quickly learned everything about each other through online messages.
Lester tricked her mother into getting her a passport, and then took off for
the Middle East. When U.S. authorities met her plane in Amman, she agreed
to return home, and apologized to her parents for the distress she had caused
them.
A month later, Representative Judy Biggert of Illinois rose in the House to
co-sponsor the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA). “MySpace.com and
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other networking web sites have become new hunting grounds for child pred-
ators,” she said, noting that “we were all horrified” by the story of Katherine
Lester. “At least let’s give parents some comfort that their children won’t fall
prey while using the Internet at schools and libraries that receive federal
funding for Internet services.” The law would require those institutions to
prevent children from using on-location computers to access chat rooms and
social networking web sites without adult supervision. 
Speaker after speaker rose in the House to stress the importance of protect-
ing children from online predators, but not all supported the bill. The lan-
guage was “overbroad and ambiguous,” said one. As originally drafted, it
seemed to cover not just MySpace, but sites such as Amazon and Wikipedia.
These sites possess some of the same characteristics as MySpace—users can
create personal profiles and continually share information with each other
using the Web. Although the law might block children in schools and libraries
from “places” where they meet friends (and sometimes predators), it would
also prevent access to online encyclopedias and bookstores, which rely on
content posted by users. 
Instead of taking the time to develop a sharper definition of what exactly
was to be prohibited, DOPA’s sponsors hastily redrafted the law to omit the
definition, leaving it to the Federal Communications Commission to decide
later just what the law would cover. Some murmured that the upcoming
midterm elections were motivating the sponsors to put forward an ill-
considered and showy effort to protect children—an effort that would likely
be ineffective and so vague as to be unconstitutional. 
Children use computers in lots of places; restricting what happens in
schools and libraries would hardly discourage determined teenagers from
sneaking onto MySpace. Only the most overbearing parents could honestly
answer the question USA Today asked in its article about “cyber-predators”:
“It’s 11 p.m. Do you know where your child is on the Web tonight?”
The statistics about what can go wrong were surely terrifying. The Justice
Department has made thousands of arrests for “cyber enticement”—almost
always older men using social networking web sites to lure teenagers into
meetings, some of which end very badly. Yet, as the American Library
Association stated in opposition to DOPA, education, not prohibition, is the
“key to safe use of the Internet.” Students have to learn to cooperate online,
because network use, and all the human interactions it enables, are basic
tools of the new, globally interconnected world of business, education, and
citizenship. 
And perhaps even the globally interconnected world of true love. The tale
of Katherine Lester took an unexpected turn. From the moment she was found
in Jordan, Lester steadily insisted that she intended to marry Jimzawi.
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Jimzawi, who was 20 when he and Lester first made contact, claimed to be in
love with her—and his mother agreed. Jimzawi begged Lester to tell her par-
ents the truth before she headed off to meet him, but she refused. Upon her
return, authorities charged Lester as a runaway child and took her passport
away from her. But on September 12, 2007, having attained legal independ-
ence by turning 18, she again boarded a plane to the Middle East, finally to
meet her beloved face to face. The affair finally ended a few weeks later in
an exchange of accusations and denials, and a hint that a third party had
attracted Lester’s attentions. There was no high-tech drama to the breakup—
except that it was televised on Dr. Phil. 
The explosion in digital communications has confounded long-held
assumptions about human relationships—how people meet, how they come to
know each other, and how they decide if they can trust each other. At the
same time, the explosion in digital information, in the form of web pages and
downloadable photographs, has put at the fingertips of millions material that
only a few years ago no one could have found without great effort and
expense. Political dissidents in Chinese Internet cafés can (if they dare) read
pro-democracy blogs. People all around the world who are ashamed about
their illness, starved for information about their sexual identity, or eager to
connect with others of their minority faith can find facts, opinion, advice, and
companionship. And children too small to leave home by themselves can see
lurid pornography on their families’ home computers. Can societies anymore
control what their members see and to whom they talk? 
Metaphors for Something Unlike
Anything Else 
DOPA, which has not been passed into law, is the latest battle in a long war
between conflicting values. On the one hand, society has an interest in keep-
ing unwanted information away from children. On the other hand, society as
a whole has an interest in maximizing open communication. The U.S.
Constitution largely protects the freedom to speak and the right to hear. Over
and over, society has struggled to find a metaphor for electronic communi-
cation that captures the ways in which it is the same as the media of the past
and the ways in which it is different. Laws and regulations are built on tra-
ditions; only by understanding the analogies can the speech principles of the
past be extended to the changed circumstances of the present—or be con-
sciously transcended. 
What laws should apply? The Internet is not exactly like anything else. If
you put up a web site, that is something like publishing a book, so perhaps
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the laws about books should apply. But that was Web 1.0—a way for “pub-
lishers” to publish and viewers to view. In the dynamic and participatory Web
2.0, sites such as MySpace change constantly in response to user postings. If
you send an email, or contribute to a blog, that is something like placing a
telephone call, or maybe a conference call, so maybe laws about telephones
should be the starting point. Neither metaphor is perfect. Maybe television is
a better analogy, since browsing the Web is like channel surfing—except that
the Internet is two-way, and there is no limit to the number of “channels.” 
Underneath the web software and the email software is the Internet itself.
The Internet just delivers packets of bits, not knowing or caring whether they
are parts of books, movies, text messages, or voices, nor whether the bits will
wind up in a web browser, a telephone, or a movie projector. John Perry
Barlow, former lyricist for the Grateful Dead and co-founder of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, used a striking metaphor to describe the Internet as it
burst into public consciousness in the mid-1990s. The world’s regulation of
the flow of information, he said, had long controlled the transport of wine
bottles. In “meatspace,” the physical world, different rules applied to books,
postal mail, radio broadcasts, and telephone calls—different kinds of bottles.
Now the wine itself flowed freely through the network, nothing but bits freed
from their packaging. Anything could be put in, and the same kind of thing
would come out. But in between, it was all the same stuff—just bits. What are
the rules of Cyberspace—what are the rules for the bits themselves?
When information is transmitted between two parties, whether the infor-
mation is spoken words, written words, pictures, or movies, there is a source
and a destination. There may also be some intermediaries. In a lecture hall,
the listeners hear the speaker directly, although whoever provided the hall
also played an important role in making the communication possible. Books
have authors and readers, but also publishers and booksellers in between. It
is natural to ascribe similar roles to the various parties in an Internet com-
munication, and, when things go wrong, to hold any and all of the parties
responsible. For example, when Pete Solis contacted a 14-year-old girl (“Jane
Doe”) through her MySpace profile and allegedly sexually assaulted her when
they met in person, the girl’s parents sued MySpace for $30 million for
enabling the assault.
The Internet has a complex structure. The source and destination may be
friends emailing each other, they may be a commercial web site and a resi-
dential customer, or they may be one office of a company sending a mockup
of an advertising brochure to another office halfway around the world. The
source and destination each has an ISP. Connecting the ISPs are routing
switches, fiber optic cables, satellite links, and so on. A packet that flows
through the Internet may pass through devices and communication links
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owned by dozens of different parties. For convenience (and in the style of
Jonathan Zittrain), we’ll call the collection of devices that connect the ISPs
to each other the cloud. As shown in Figure 7.1, speech on the Internet goes
from the source to an ISP, into the cloud, out of the cloud to another ISP, and
to its destination (see the sidebar, “Cloud Computing,” in Chapter 3 for addi-
tional information about this). 
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FIGURE 7.1 Where to regulate the Internet? 
If a government seeks to control speech, it can attack at several different
points. It can try to control the speaker or the speaker’s ISP, by criminalizing
certain kinds of speech. But that won’t work if the speaker isn’t in the same
country as the listener. It can try to control the listener, by prohibiting pos-
session of certain kinds of materials. In the U.S., possession of copyrighted
software without an appropriate license is illegal, as is possession of other
copyrighted material with the intent to profit from redistributing it. If citizens
have reasonable privacy rights, however, it is hard for the government to
know what its citizens possess. In a society such as the U.S., where citizens
have reasonable rights of due process, one-at-a-time prosecutions for posses-
sion are unwieldy. As a final alternative, the government can try to control
the intermediaries. 
There are parallels in civil law. The parents of the Jane Doe sued MySpace
because it was in the communication path between Mr. Solis and their daugh-
ter, even though MySpace was not the alleged assailant. 
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Very early, defamation laws had to adapt to the Internet. In the U.S.,
speech is defamatory if it is false, communicated to third parties, and dam-
ages one’s reputation. 
In the physical world, when the speaker defames someone, the intermedi-
aries between the speaker and the listener sometimes share responsibility with
the speaker—and sometimes not. If we defame someone in this book, we may
be sued, but so may the book’s publisher, who might have known that what
we were writing was false. On the other hand, the trucker who transported the
book to the bookstore probably isn’t liable, even though he too helped get our
words from us to our readers. Are the various electronic intermediaries more
like publishers, or truckers? Do the parents of Jane Doe have a case against
MySpace? 
Society has struggled to identify the right metaphors to describe the 
parties to an electronic communication. To understand this part of the story
of electronic information, we have to go back to pre-Internet electronic 
communication. 
Publisher or Distributor? 
CompuServe was an early provider of computer services, including bulletin
boards and other electronic communities users could join for a fee. One of
these fora, Rumorville USA, provided a daily newsletter of reports about
broadcast journalism and journalists. CompuServe didn’t screen or even col-
lect the rumors posted on Rumorville. It contracted with a third party, Don
Fitzpatrick Associates (DFA), to provide the content. CompuServe simply
posted whatever DFA provided without reviewing it. And for a long time, no
one complained. 
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DEFAMING PUBLIC FIGURES
Damaging statements about public figures, even if false, are not defamatory
unless they were made with malicious intent. This extra clause protects news
media against libel claims by celebrities who are offended by the way the
press depicts them. It was not always so, however. The pivotal case was New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the newspaper was
sued by officials in Alabama on the basis of a pro-civil-rights advertisement
it published. The story is detailed, along with a readable history of the First
Amendment, in Make No Law by Anthony Lewis (Vintage Paperback, 1992).
For a later account of First Amendment struggles, see Lewis’s Freedom for
the Thought That We Hate (Basic Books, 2008). 
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In 1990, a company called Cubby, Inc. started a competing service,
Skuttlebut, which also reported gossip about TV and radio broadcasting.
Items appeared on Rumorville describing Skuttlebut as a “new start-up scam”
and alleging that its material was being stolen from Rumorville. Cubby cried
foul and went after CompuServe, claiming defamation. CompuServe
acknowledged that the postings were defamatory, but claimed it was not act-
ing as a publisher of the information—just a distributor. It simply was send-
ing on to subscribers what other people gave it. It wasn’t responsible for the
contents, any more than a trucker is responsible for libel that might appear
in the magazines he handles. 
What was the right analogy? Was CompuServe more like a newspaper, or
more like the trucker who transports the newspaper to its readers? 
More like the trucker, ruled the court. A long legal tradition held distribu-
tors blameless for the content of the publications they delivered. Distributors
can’t be expected to have read all the books on their trucks. Grasping for a
better analogy, the court described CompuServe as “an electronic for-profit
library.” Distributor or library, CompuServe was independent of DFA and
couldn’t be held responsible for libelous statements in what DFA provided.
The case of Cubby v. CompuServe was settled decisively in CompuServe’s
favor. Cubby might go after the source, but that wasn’t CompuServe.
CompuServe was a blameless intermediary. So was MySpace, years later,
when Jane Doe’s parents sought redress for Mr. Solis’s alleged assault of their
daughter. In a ruling building on the Cubby decision, MySpace was absolved
of responsibility for what Solis had posted. 
When Cubby v. CompuServe was decided, providers of computer services
everywhere exhaled. If the decision had gone the other way, electronic distri-
bution of information might have become a risky business that few dared to
enter. Computer networks created an information infrastructure unprece-
dented in its low overhead. A few people could connect tens of thousands,
even millions, to each other at very low cost. If everything disseminated had
to be reviewed by human readers before it was posted, to ensure that any
damaging statements were truthful, its potential use for participatory democ-
racy would be severely limited. For a time, a spirit of freedom ruled. 
Neither Liberty nor Security 
“The law often demands that we sacrifice some liberty for greater security.
Sometimes, though, it takes away our liberty to provide us less security.” So
wrote law professor Eugene Volokh in the fall of 1995, commenting on a
court case that looked similar to Cubby v. CompuServe, but wasn’t. 
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Prodigy was a provider of computer
services, much like CompuServe. But
in the early 1990s, as worries began
to rise about the sexual content of
materials available online, Prodigy
sought to distinguish itself as a fam-
ily-oriented service. It pledged to exercise editorial control over the postings
on its bulletin boards. “We make no apology,” Prodigy stated, “for pursuing
a value system that reflects the culture of the millions of American families
we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper does less….” Prodigy’s
success in the market was due in no small measure to the security families
felt in accessing its fora, rather than the anything-goes sites offered by other
services. 
One of Prodigy’s bulletin boards, called “Money Talk,” was devoted to
financial services. In October 1994, someone anonymously posted comments
on Money Talk about the securities investment firm Stratton Oakmont. The
firm, said the unidentified poster, was involved in “major criminal fraud.” Its
president was “soon to be proven criminal.” The whole company was a “cult
of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired.”
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy for libel, claiming that Prodigy should be
regarded as the publisher of these defamatory comments. It asked for $200
million in damages. Prodigy countered that it had zero responsibility for what
its posters said. The matter had been settled several years earlier by the Cubby
v. CompuServe decision. Prodigy wasn’t the publisher of the comments, just
the distributor. 
In a decision that stunned the Internet community, a New York court ruled
otherwise. By exercising editorial control in support of its family-friendly
image, said the court, Prodigy became a publisher, with the attendant respon-
sibilities and risks. Indeed, Prodigy had likened itself to a newspaper pub-
lisher, and could not at trial claim to be something less. 
It was all quite logical, as long as the choice was between two metaphors:
distributor or newspaper. In reality, though, a service provider wasn’t exactly
like either. Monitoring for bad language was a pretty minor form of editorial
work. That was a far cry from checking everything for truthfulness. 
Be that as it may, the court’s finding undercut efforts to create safe districts
in Cyberspace. After the decision, the obvious advice went out to bulletin
board operators: Don’t even consider editing or censoring. If you do, Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy means you may be legally liable for any malicious false-
hood that slips by your review. If you don’t even try, Cubby v. CompuServe
means you are completely immune from liability. 
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Eugene Volokh has a blog,
volokh.com, in which he comments
regularly on information freedom
issues and many other things. 
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This was fine for the safety of the site operators, but what about the pub-
lic interest? Freedom of expression was threatened, since fewer families
would be willing to roam freely through the smut that would be posted. At
the same time, security would not be improved, since defamers could always
post their lies on the remaining services with their all-welcome policies. 
The Nastiest Place on Earth 
Every communication technology has been used to control, as well as to
facilitate, the flow of ideas. Barely a century after the publication of the
Gutenberg Bible, Pope Paul IV issued a list of 500 banned authors. In the
United States, the First Amendment protects authors and speakers from gov-
ernment interference: Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press …. But First Amendment protections are not absolute.
No one has the right to publish obscene materials. The government can
destroy materials it judges to be obscene, as postal authorities did in 1918
when they burned magazines containing excerpts of James Joyce’s Ulysses. 
What exactly counts as obscene has been a matter of much legal wran-
gling over the course of U.S. history. The prevailing standard today is the one
the Supreme Court used in 1973 in deciding the case of Miller v. California,
and is therefore called the Miller Test. To determine whether material is
obscene, a court must consider the following:
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest.
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 
Only if the answer to each part is “yes” does the work qualify as obscene. The
Miller decision was a landmark, because it established that there were no
national standards for obscenity. There were
only “community” standards, which could be
different in Mississippi than in New York City.
But there were no computer networks in 1973.
What is a “community” in Cyberspace? 
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In 1992, the infant World Wide Web was hardly world-wide, but many
Americans were using dial-up connections to access information on central-
ized, electronic bulletin boards. Some bulletin boards were free and united
communities of interest—lovers of baseball or birds, for example. Others dis-
tributed free software. Bob and Carleen Thomas of Milpitas, California, ran a
different kind of bulletin board, called Amateur Action. In their advertising,
they described it as “The Nastiest Place on Earth.” 
For a fee, anyone could download images from Amateur Action. The pic-
tures were of a kind not usually shown in polite company, but readily avail-
able in magazines sold in the nearby cities of San Francisco and San Jose.
The Thomases were raided by the San Jose police, who thought they might
have been distributing obscene materials. After looking at their pictures, the
police decided that the images were not obscene by local standards. 
Bob and Carleen were not indicted, and they added this notice to their bul-
letin board: “The San Jose Police Department as well as the Santa Clara
County District Attorney’s Office and the State of California agree that
Amateur Action BBS is operating in a legal manner.”
Two years later, in February 1994, the Thomases were raided again, and
their computer was seized. This time, the complaint came from Agent David
Dirmeyer, a postal inspector—in western Tennessee. Using an assumed name,
Dirmeyer had paid $55 and had downloaded images to his computer in
Memphis. Nasty stuff indeed, particularly for Memphis: bestiality, incest, and
sado-masochism. The Thomases were arrested. They stood trial in Memphis
on federal charges of transporting obscene material via common carrier, and
via interstate commerce. They were convicted by a Tennessee jury, which
concluded that their Milpitas bulletin board violated the community stan-
dards of Memphis. Bob was sentenced to 37 months incarceration and
Carleen to 30. 
The Thomases appealed their conviction, on the grounds that they could
not have known where the bits were going, and that the relevant community,
if not San Jose, was a community of Cyberspace. The appeals court did not
agree. Dirmeyer had supplied a Tennessee postal address when he applied for
membership in Amateur Action. The Thomases had called him at his Memphis
telephone number to give him the password—they had known where he was.
The Thomases, concluded the court, should have been more careful where
they sent their bits, once they started selling them out of state. Shipping the
bits was just like shipping a videotape by UPS (a charge of which the
Thomases were also convicted). The laws of meatspace applied to
Cyberspace—and one city’s legal standards sometimes applied thousands of
miles away. 
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The Most Participatory Form of Mass Speech 
Pornography was part of the electronic world from the moment it was possi-
ble to store and transmit words and images. The Thomases learned that bits
were like books, and the same obscenity standards applied. 
In the mid-1990s, something else happened. The spread of computers and
networks vastly increased the number of digital images available and the
number of people viewing them. Digital pornography became not just the
same old thing in a new form—it seemed to be a brand-new thing, because
there was so much of it and it was so easy to get in the privacy of the home.
Nebraska Senator James Exon attached an anti-Internet-pornography amend-
ment to a telecommunications bill, but it seemed destined for defeat on civil
liberties grounds. And then all hell broke loose. 
On July 3, 1995, Time Magazine blasted “CYBERPORN” across its cover.
The accompanying story, based largely a single university report, stated: 
What the Carnegie Mellon researchers discovered was: THERE’S AN
AWFUL LOT OF PORN ONLINE. In an 18-month study, the team sur-
veyed 917,410 sexually explicit pictures, descriptions, short stories,
and film clips. On those Usenet newsgroups where digitized images
are stored, 83.5% of the pictures were pornographic.
The article later noted that this statistic referred to only a small fraction of all
data traffic, but failed to explain that the offending images were mostly on
limited-access bulletin boards, not openly available to children or anyone
else. It mentioned the issue of government censorship, and it quoted John
Perry Barlow on the critical role of parents. Nonetheless, when Senator
Grassley of Iowa read the Time Magazine story into the Congressional Record,
attributing its conclusions to a study by the well-respected Georgetown
University Law School, he called on Congress to “help parents who are under
assault in this day and age” and to “help stem this growing tide.” 
Grassley’s speech, and the circulation in the Capitol building of dirty pic-
tures downloaded by a friend of Senator Exon, galvanized the Congress to
save the children of America. In February 1996, the Communications Decency
Act, or CDA, passed almost unanimously and was signed into law by
President Clinton. 
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The CDA made it a crime to use “any interactive computer service to dis-
play in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in con-
text, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem-
porary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”
Criminal penalties would also fall on anyone who “knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under such person’s control to be used” for such
prohibited activities. And finally, it criminalized the transmission of materi-
als that were “obscene or indecent” to persons known to be under 18. 
These “display provisions” of the CDA vastly extended existing anti-
obscenity laws, which already applied to the Internet. The dual prohibitions
against making offensive images available to a person under 18, and against
transmitting indecent materials to persons known to be under 18, were unlike
anything that applied to print publications. “Indecency,” whatever it meant,
was something short of obscenity, and only obscene materials had been
illegal prior to the CDA. A newsstand could tell the difference between a
12-year-old customer and a 20-year-old, but how could anyone check ages
in Cyberspace? 
When the CDA was enacted, John Perry Barlow saw the potential of the
Internet for the free flow of information challenged. He issued a now-classic
manifesto against the government’s effort to regulate speech:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You have no sover-
eignty where we gather…. We are creating a world that all may enter
without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, mil-
itary force, or station of birth. We are creating a world where anyone,
anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular,
without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity…. In our
world, all the sentiments and expressions of humanity, from the
debasing to the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the global
conversation of bits…. [Y]ou are trying to ward off the virus of liberty
by erecting guard posts at the frontiers of Cyberspace.
Brave and stirring words, even if the notion of Cyberspace as a “seamless
whole” had already been rendered doubtful. At a minimum, bits had to meet
different obscenity standards in Memphis than in Milpitas, as the Thomases
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had learned. In fact, the entire metaphor of the Internet as a “space” with
“frontiers” was fatally flawed, and misuse of that metaphor continues to
plague laws and policies to this day. 
Civil libertarians joined the chorus challenging the Communications
Decency Act. In short order, a federal court and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in the momentous case of ACLU v. Reno. The display provisions of the CDA
were unconstitutional. “The Government may only regulate free speech for a
compelling reason,” wrote Judge Dalzell in the district court decision, “and in
the least restrictive manner.” It would chill discourse unacceptably to demand
age verification over the Internet from every person who might see material
that any adult has a legal right to see. 
The government had argued that the authority of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the content of TV and radio
broadcasts, which are required not to be “indecent,” provided an analogy for
government oversight of Internet communications. 
The courts disagreed. The FCC analogy was wrong, they ruled, because the
Internet was far more open than broadcast media. Different media required
different kinds of laws, and the TV and radio laws were more restrictive than
laws were for print media, or should be for the Internet. “I have no doubt”
wrote Judge Dalzell, “that a Newspaper Decency Act, passed because Congress
discovered that young girls had read a front page article in the New York
Times on female genital mutilation in Africa, would be unconstitutional….
The Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversa-
tion. The Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt that conversation.
As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet
deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion.” The CDA’s dis-
play provisions were dead. 
In essence, the court was unwilling to risk the entire Internet’s promise as
a vigorous marketplace of ideas to serve the narrow purpose of protecting
children from indecency. Instead, it transferred the burden of blocking
unwanted communications from source ISPs to the destination. The DOPA’s
proposed burden on libraries and schools is heir to the court’s ruling over-
turning the CDA. Legally, there seemed to be nowhere else to control speech
except at the point where it came out of the cloud and was delivered to the
listener. 
Lost in the 1995–96 Internet indecency hysteria was the fact that the
“Carnegie Mellon report” that started the legislative ball rolling had been dis-
credited almost as soon as the Time Magazine story appeared. The report’s
author, Martin Rimm, was an Electrical Engineering undergraduate. His
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study’s methodology was flawed,
and perhaps fraudulent. For exam-
ple, he told adult bulletin board
operators that he was studying how
best to market pornography online,
and that he would repay them for
their cooperation by sharing his tips.
His conclusions were unreliable.
Why hadn’t that been caught when
his article was published? Because
the article was not a product of
Georgetown University, as Senator
Grassley had said. Rather, it appeared
in the Georgetown Law Review, a
student publication that used neither
peer nor professional reviewers.
Three weeks after publishing the
“Cyberporn” article, Time acknowl-
edged that Rimm’s study was
untrustworthy. In spite of this repu-
diation, Rimm salvaged something
from his efforts: He published a book called The Pornographer’s Handbook:
How to Exploit Women, Dupe Men, & Make Lots of Money.
Protecting Good Samaritans—and a Few
Bad Ones 
The Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy decision, which discouraged ISPs from exer-
cising any editorial judgment, had been handed down in 1995, just as
Congress was preparing to enact the Communications Decency Act to protect
children from Internet porn. Congress recognized that the consequences of
Stratton Oakmont would be fewer voluntary efforts by ISPs to screen their
sites for offensive content. So, the bill’s sponsors added a “Good Samaritan”
provision to the CDA. 
The intent was to allow ISPs to act as editors without running the risk that
they would be held responsible for the edited content, thus putting themselves
in the jam in which Prodigy had found itself. So the CDA included a provi-
sion absolving ISPs of liability on account of anything they did, in good faith,
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DEFENDING ELECTRONIC FREEDOMS
The Electronic Frontier Foundation,
www.eff.org, is the leading public
advocacy group defending First
Amendment and other personal
rights in Cyberspace. Ironically, it
often finds itself in opposition with
media and telecommunications
companies. In principle, communi-
cations companies should have the
greatest interest in unfettered
exchange of information. In actual
practice, they often benefit finan-
cially from policies that limit
consumer choice or expand surveil-
lance and data-gathering about
private citizens. The EFF was among
the plaintiffs bringing suit in the
case that overturned the CDA. 
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to filter out “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable” material. For good measure, the CDA pushed the
Cubby court’s “distributor” metaphor to the limit, and beyond. ISPs should not
be thought of as publishers, or as sources either. “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.” This was
the bottom line of §230 of the CDA, and it meant that there would be no more
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Catch-22s. 
When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the CDA in 1996, it negated
only the display provisions, the clauses that threatened the providers of
“indecent” content. The Good Samaritan clause was allowed to stand and
remains the law today. ISPs can do as much as they want to filter or censor
their content, without any risk that they will assume publishers’ liabilities in
the process. 
Or as little as they choose, as Ken Zeran learned to his sorrow a few years
later. 
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THE CDA AND DISCRIMINATION
The “Good Samaritan” clause envisioned a sharp line between “service
providers” (which got immunity) and “content providers” (which did not).
But as the technology world evolved, the distinction became fuzzy. A room-
mate-matching service was sued in California, on the basis that it invited
users to discriminate by categorizing their roommate preferences (women
only, for example). A court ruled that the operators of the web site were
immune as service providers. An appeals court reversed the decision, on the
basis that the web site became a content provider by filtering the informa-
tion applicants provided—people seeking female roommates would not learn
about men looking for roommates. There was nothing wrong with that, but
the principle that the roommate service had blanket protection, under the
CDA, to filter as it wished would mean that with equal impunity, it could
ask about racial preferences and honor them. That form of discrimination
would be illegal in newspaper ads. “We doubt,” wrote the appeals court
judge, “this is what Congress had in mind when it passed the CDA.”
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The worst terrorist attack in history on U.S. soil prior to the 2001 destruc-
tion of New York’s World Trade Center was the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. 168 people
were killed, some of them children in a day care center. Hundreds more were
injured when the building collapsed around them and glass and rubble rained
down on the neighborhood. One man who made it out alive likened the event
to the detonation of an atomic bomb.
Less than a week later, someone with screen name “Ken ZZ03” posted an
advertisement on an America On Line (AOL) bulletin board. Ken had “Naughty
Oklahoma T-Shirts” for sale. Among the available slogans were “Visit
Oklahoma—it’s a Blast” and “Rack’em, Stack’em, and Pack’em—Oklahoma
1995.” Others were even cruder and more tasteless. To get your T-shirt, said
the ads, you should call Ken. The posting gave Ken’s phone number. 
The number belonged to Ken Zeran, an artist and filmmaker in Seattle,
Washington. Zeran had nothing to do with the posting on AOL. It was a hoax. 
Ken Zeran started to receive calls. Angry, insulting calls. Then death
threats. 
Zeran called AOL and asked them to take down the posting and issue a
retraction. An AOL employee promised to take down the original posting, but
said retractions were against company policy. 
The next day, an anonymous poster with a slightly different screen name
offered more T-shirts for sale, with even more offensive slogans. 
Call Ken. And by the way—there’s high demand. So if the phone is busy,
call back. 
Zeran kept calling AOL to ask that the postings be removed and that fur-
ther postings be prevented. AOL kept promising to close down the accounts
and remove the postings, but didn’t. By April 30, Ken was receiving a phone
call every two minutes. Ken’s art business depended on that phone number—
he couldn’t change it or fail to answer it, without losing his livelihood. 
About this time, Shannon Fullerton, the host of a morning drive-time
radio talk show on KRXO in Seattle, received by email a copy of one of the
postings. Usually his show was full of light-hearted foolishness, but after the
bombing, Fullerton and his radio partner had devoted several shows to shar-
ing community grief about the Oklahoma City tragedy. Fullerton read Ken’s
T-shirt slogans over the air. And he read Ken’s telephone number and told his
listeners to call Ken and tell him what they thought of him. 
Zeran got even more calls, and more death threats. Fearing for his safety,
he obtained police surveillance of his home. Most callers were not interested
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in hearing what Ken had to say
when he answered the phone, but he
managed to keep one on the line
long enough to learn about the
KRXO broadcast. Zeran contacted
the radio station. KRXO issued a
retraction, after which the number
of calls Ken received dropped to fif-
teen per day. Eventually, a newspa-
per exposed the hoax. AOL finally
removed the postings, after leaving
them visible for a week. Ken’s life
began to return to normal. 
Zeran sued AOL, claiming defamation, among other things. By putting up
the postings, and leaving them up long after it had been informed that they
were false, AOL had damaged him severely. 
The decision went against Zeran, and the lower court’s decision held up on
appeal. AOL certainly had behaved like a publisher, by communicating the
postings in the first place and by choosing not to remove them when
informed that they were fraudulent. Unlike the defendant in the Cubby v.
CompuServe case, AOL knew exactly what it was publishing. But the Good
Samaritan provision of the CDA specifically stated that AOL should not
legally be treated as a publisher. AOL had no liability for Zeran’s woes.
Zeran’s only recourse was to identify the actual speaker, the pseudony-
mous Ken ZZ03 who made the postings. And AOL would not help him do
that. Everyone felt sorry for Ken, but the system gave him no help. 
The posters could evade responsibility as long as they remained anony-
mous, as they easily could on the Internet. And Congress had given the ISPs
a complete waiver of responsibility for the consequences of false and damag-
ing statements, even when the ISP knew they were false. Had anyone in
Congress thought through the implications of the Good Samaritan clause? 
Laws of Unintended Consequences 
The Good Samaritan provision of the CDA has been the friend of free speech,
and a great relief to Internet Service Providers. Yet its application has defied
logical connection to the spirit that created it. 
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WAS THE RADIO STATION LIABLE? 
Zeran sued the radio station sepa-
rately, but failed in that effort as
well. Much as he may have suf-
fered, reasoned the court, it wasn’t
defamation, because none of the
people who called him even knew
who Ken Zeran was—so his reputa-
tion couldn’t possibly have been
damaged when the radio station
spoke ill of “Ken”!
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Sidney Blumenthal was a Clinton aide whose job it was to dish dirt on the
president’s enemies. On August 11, 1997, conservative online columnist Matt
Drudge reported, “Sidney Blumenthal has a spousal abuse past that has been
effectively covered up.” The White House denied it, and the next day Drudge
withdrew the claim. The Blumenthals sued AOL, which had a deal with
Drudge. And had deeper pockets—the Blumenthals asked for $630,000,021.
AOL was as responsible for the libel as Drudge, claimed the Blumenthals,
because AOL could edit what Drudge supplied. AOL could even insist that
Drudge delete items AOL did not want posted. The court sided with AOL, and
cited the Good Samaritan clause of the CDA. AOL couldn’t be treated like a
publisher, so it couldn’t be held liable for Drudge’s falsehoods. Case closed.
Even more strangely, the Good
Samaritan clause of the Communications
Decency Act has been used to protect an
ISP whose chat room was being used to
peddle child pornography. 
In 1998, Jane and John Doe, a mother
and her minor son, sued AOL for harm
inflicted on the son. The Does alleged that
AOL chat rooms were used to sell porno-
graphic images of the boy made when he was 11 years old. They claimed that
in 1997, Richard Lee Russell had lured John and two other boys to engage in
sexual activities with each other and with Russell. Russell then used AOL chat
rooms to market photographs and videotapes of these sexual encounters. 
Jane Doe complained to AOL. Under the terms of its agreement with its
users, AOL specifically reserved the right to terminate the service of anyone
engaged in such improper activities. And yet AOL did not suspend Russell’s
service, or even warn him to stop what he was doing. The Does wanted com-
pensation from AOL for its role in John Doe’s sexual abuse. 
The Does lost. Citing the Good Samaritan clause, and the precedent of the
Zeran decision, the Florida courts held AOL blameless. Online service
providers who knowingly allow child pornography to be marketed on their
bulletin boards could not be treated as though they had published ads for
kiddie porn. 
The Does appealed and lost again. The decision in AOL’s favor was 4-3 at
the Florida Supreme Court. Judge J. Lewis fairly exploded in his dissenting
opinion. The Good Samaritan clause was an attempt to remove disincentives
from the development of filtering and blocking technologies, which would
assist parents in their efforts to protect children. “[I]t is inconceivable that
Congress intended the CDA to shield from potential liability an ISP alleged to
have taken absolutely no actions to curtail illicit activities … while profiting
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The Communications
Decency Act has been
used to protect an ISP
whose chat room was
being used to peddle
child pornography.
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from its customer’s continued use of the service.” The law had been trans-
formed into one “which both condones and exonerates a flagrant and repre-
hensible failure to act by an ISP in the face of … material unquestionably
harmful to children.” This made no sense. The sequence of decisions “thrusts
Congress into the unlikely position of having enacted legislation that encour-
ages and protects the involvement of ISPs as silent partners in criminal enter-
prises for profit.”
The problem, as Judge Lewis saw it, was that it wasn’t enough to say that
ISPs were not like publishers. They really were more like distributors—as Ken
Zeran had tried to argue—and distributors are not entirely without responsi-
bility for what they distribute. A trucker who knows he is carrying child
pornography, and is getting a cut of the profits, has some legal liability for
his complicity in illegal commerce. His role is not that of a publisher, but it
is not nothing either. The Zeran court had created a muddle by using the
wrong analogy. Congress had made the muddle possible by saying nothing
about the right analogy after saying that publishing was the wrong one. 
Can the Internet Be Like a Magazine Store? 
After the display provision of the CDA was ruled unconstitutional in 1997,
Congress went back to work to protect America’s children. The Child Online
Protection Act (COPA), passed into law in 1998, contained many of the key
elements of the CDA, but sought to avoid the CDA’s constitutional problems
by narrowing it. It applied only to “commercial” speech, and criminalized
knowingly making available to minors “material harmful to minors.” For the
purposes of this law, a “minor” was anyone under 17. The statute extended
the Miller Test for obscenity to create a definition of material that was not
obscene but was “harmful to minors:” 
The term “material that is harmful to minors” means any communica-
tion … that — (A) the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to … the prurient interest; (B)
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, … [a] sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
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COPA was challenged immediately and never took effect. A federal judge
enjoined the government from enforcing it, ruling that it was likely to be
unconstitutional. The matter bounced between courts through two presiden-
cies. The case started out as ACLU v. Reno, for a time was known as ACLU v.
Ashcroft, and was decided as ACLU v. Gonzalez. The judges were uniformly
sympathetic to the intent of Congress to protect children from material they
should not see. But in March 2007, the ax finally fell on COPA. Judge Lowell
A. Reed, Jr., of U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
confirmed that the law went too far in restricting speech. 
Part of the problem was with the vague definition of material “harmful to
minors.” The prurient interests of a 16-year-old were not the same as those
of an 8-year-old; and what had literary value for a teenager might be value-
less for a younger child. How would a web site designer know which stan-
dard he should use to avoid the risk of imprisonment? 
But there was an even more basic problem. COPA was all about keeping
away from minors material that would be perfectly legal for adults to have.
It put a burden on information distributors to ensure that recipients of such
information were of age. COPA provided a “safe harbor” against prosecution
for those who in good faith checked the ages of their customers. Congress
imagined a magazine store where the clerks wouldn’t sell dirty magazines to
children who could not reach the countertop, and might ask for identification
of any who appeared to be of borderline age. The law envisioned that some-
thing similar would happen in Cyberspace:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material
that is harmful to minors (A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit
account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number; (B)
by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or (C) by any other
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology. 
The big problem was that these methods either didn’t work or didn’t even
exist. Not every adult has a credit card, and credit card companies don’t want
their databases used to check customers’ ages. And if you don’t know what is
meant by an “adult personal identification number” or a “digital certificate
that verifies age,” don’t feel badly—neither do we. Clauses (B) and (C) were
basically a plea from Congress for the industry to come up with some tech-
nical magic for determining age at a distance. 
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In the state of the art, however, computers can’t reliably tell if the party
on the other end of a communications link is human or is another computer.
For a computer to tell whether a human is over or under the age of 17, even
imperfectly, would be very hard indeed. Mischievous 15-year-olds could get
around any simple screening system that could be used in the home. The
Internet just isn’t like a magazine store. 
Even if credit card numbers or personal identification systems could dis-
tinguish children from adults, Judge Reed reasoned, such methods would
intimidate computer users. Fearful of identity theft or government surveil-
lance, many computer users would refuse interrogation and would not reveal
personal identifying information as the price for visiting web sites deemed
“harmful to minors.” The vast electronic library would, in practice, fall into
disuse and start to close down, just as an ordinary library would become use-
less if everyone venturing beyond the children’s section had to endure a
background check. 
Congress’s safe harbor recommendations, concluded Judge Reed, if they
worked at all, would limit Internet speech drastically. Information adults had
a right to see would, realistically, become unavailable to them. The filtering
technologies noted when the CDA was struck down had improved, so the
government could not credibly claim that limiting speech was the only pos-
sible approach to protecting children. And even if the free expression con-
cerns were calmed or ignored, and even if everything COPA suggested worked
perfectly, plenty of smut would still be available to children. The Internet was
borderless, and COPA’s reach ended at the U.S. frontier. COPA couldn’t stop
the flood of harmful bits from abroad. 
Summing up, Reed quoted the thoughts of Supreme Court Justice Kennedy
about a flag-burning case. “The hard fact is that sometimes we must make
decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the
sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.”
Much as he was sympathetic to the end of protecting children from harmful
communications, Judge Reed concluded, “perhaps we do the minors of this
country harm if First Amendment protections, which they will with age
inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of their protection.”
Let Your Fingers Do the Stalking 
Newsgroups for sharing sexual information and experiences started in the
early 1980s. By the mid-90s, there were specialty sites for every orientation
and inclination. So when a 28-year-old woman entered an Internet chat room
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in 1998 to share her sexual fantasies, she was doing nothing out of the ordi-
nary. She longed to be assaulted, she said, and invited men reading her email
to make her fantasy a reality. “I want you to break down my door and rape
me,” she wrote. 
What was unusual was that she gave her name and address—and instruc-
tions about how to get past her building’s security system. Over a period of
several weeks, nine men took up her invitation and showed up at her door,
often in the middle of the night. When she sent them away, she followed up
with a further email to the chat room, explaining that her rejections were just
part of the fantasy.
In fact, the “woman” sending the emails was Gary Dellapenta, a 50-year-
old security guard whose attentions the actual woman had rebuffed. The vic-
tim of this terrifying hoax did not even own a computer. Dellapenta was
caught because he responded directly to emails sent to entrap him. He was
convicted and imprisoned under a recently enacted California anti-“cyber-
stalking” statute. The case was notable not because the events were unusual,
but because it resulted in a prosecution and conviction. Most victims are not
so successful in seeking redress. Most states lacked appropriate laws, and
most victims could not identify their stalkers. Sometimes the stalker did not
even know the victim—but simply found her contact information somewhere
in Cyberspace. 
Speeches and publications with frightening messages have long received
First Amendment protections in the U.S., especially when their subject is
political. Only when a message is likely to incite “imminent lawless action”
(in the words of a 1969 Supreme Court decision) does speech become illegal—
a test rarely met by printed words. This high threshold for government inter-
vention builds on a “clear and present danger” standard explained most
eloquently by Justice Louis Brandeis in a 1927 opinion. “Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech …. No danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion.”
Courts apply the same standard to web sites. An anti-abortion group listed
the names, addresses, and license plate numbers of doctors performing abor-
tions on a web site called the “Nuremberg Files.” It suggested stalking the
doctors, and updated the site by graying out the names of those who had been
wounded and crossing off those who had been murdered. The web site’s cre-
ators acknowledged that abortion was legal, and claimed not to be threaten-
ing anyone, only collecting dossiers in the hope that the doctors could at
some point in the future be held accountable for “crimes against humanity.”
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The anti-abortion group was taken to court in a civil action. After a long legal
process, the group was found liable for damages because “true threats of vio-
lence were made with the intent to intimidate.” 
The courts had a very difficult time with the question of whether the
Nuremberg Files web site was threatening or not, but there was nothing
intrinsic to the mode of publication that complicated that decision. In fact,
the same group had issued paper “WANTED” posters, which were equally part
of the materials at issue. Reasonable jurists could, and did, come to different
conclusions about whether the text on the Nuremberg Files web site met the
judicial threshold.
But the situation of Dellapenta’s victim, and other women in similar situ-
ations, seemed to be different. The scores being settled at their expense had
no political dimensions. There were already laws against stalking and tele-
phone harassment; the Internet was being used to recruit proxy stalkers and
harassers. Following the lead of California and other states, Congress passed
a federal anti-cyberstalking law. 
Like an Annoying Telephone Call? 
The “2005 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthori-
zation Act” (signed into law in early 2006) assigned criminal penalties to any-
one who “utilizes any device or software that can be used to originate
telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted,
in whole or in part, by the Internet … without disclosing his identity and with
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person….” The clause was lit-
tle noticed when the Act was passed in the House on a voice vote and in the
Senate unanimously. 
Civil libertarians again howled, this time about a single word in the legis-
lation. It was fine to outlaw abuse, threats, and harassment by Internet. Those
terms had some legal history. Although it was not always easy to tell whether
the facts fit the definitions, at least the courts had standards for judging what
these words meant. 
But “annoy”? People put lots of annoying things on web sites and say lots
of annoying things in chat rooms. There is even a web site, annoy.com, devoted
to posting annoying political messages anonymously. Could Congress really
have intended to ban the use of the Internet to annoy people? 
Congress had extended telephone law to the Internet, on the principle that
harassing VoIP calls should not receive more protection than harassing land-
line telephone calls. In using broad language for electronic communications,
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however, it created another in the series of legal muddles about the aptness
of a metaphor. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1934 made it a criminal offense for any-
one to make “a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass
any person at the called number.” In the world of telephones, the ban posed
no threat to free speech, because a telephone call is one-to-one communica-
tion. If the person you are talking to doesn’t want to listen, your free speech
rights are not infringed. The First Amendment gives you no right to be sure
anyone in particular hears you. If your phone call is unwelcome, you can eas-
ily find another forum in which to be annoying. The CDA, in a clause that
was not struck down along with the display provisions, extended the prohi-
bition to faxes and emails—still, basically, person-to-person communications.
But harassing VoIP calls were not criminal under the Telecommunications
Act. In an effort to capture all telephone-like technologies under the same
regulation, the same clause was extended to all forms of electronic commu-
nication, including the vast “electronic library” and “most participatory form
of mass speech” that is the Internet. 
Defenders of the law assured alarmed bloggers that “annoying” sites would
not be prosecuted unless they also were personally threatening, abusive, or
harassing. This was an anti-cyberstalking provision, they argued, not a cen-
sorship law. Speech protected by the First Amendment would certainly be
safe. Online publishers, on the other hand, were reluctant to trust prosecutors’
judgment about where the broadly written statute would be applied. And
based on the bizarre and unexpected uses to which the CDA’s Good Samaritan
provisions had been put, there was little reason for confidence that the leg-
islative context for the law would restrict its application to one corner of
Cyberspace. 
The law was challenged by The Suggestion Box, which describes itself as
helping people send anonymous emails for reasons such as to “report sensi-
tive information to the media” and to “send crime tips to law enforcement
agencies anonymously.” The law, as the complaint argued, might criminalize
the sort of employee whistle-blowing that Congress encouraged in the after-
math of scandals about corporate accounting practices. The Suggestion Box
dropped its challenge when the Government stated that mere annoyances
would not be prosecuted, only communications meant “to instill fear in the
victim.” So the law is in force, with many left wishing that Congress would
be more precise with its language!
Which brings us to the present. The “annoyance” clause of the Violence
Against Women Act stands, but only because the Government says that it
doesn’t mean what it says. DOPA, with which this chapter began, remains
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stuck in Congress. Like the CDA and COPA, DOPA has worthy goals. The
measures it proposes would, however, probably do more harm than good. In
requiring libraries to monitor the computer use of children using sites such
as MySpace, it would likely make those sites inaccessible through public
libraries, while having little impact on child predators. The congressional
sponsors have succumbed to a well-intentioned but misguided urge to con-
trol a social problem by restricting the technology that assists it.
Digital Protection, Digital Censorship—and
Self-Censorship 
The First Amendment’s ban on government censorship complicates govern-
ment efforts to protect the safety and security of U.S. citizens. Given a choice
between protection from personal harm
and some fool’s need to spout profanities,
most of us would opt for safety. Security
is immediate and freedom is long-term,
and most people are short-range thinkers.
And most people think of security as a
personal thing, and gladly leave it to the
government to worry about the survival
of the nation. 
But in the words of one scholar, the bottom line on the First Amendment
is that “in a society pledged to self-government, it is never true that, in the
long run, the security of the nation is endangered by the freedom of the peo-
ple.” The Internet censorship bills have passed Congress by wide margins
because members of Congress dare not be on record as voting against the
safety of their constituents—and especially against the safety of children.
Relatively isolated from political pressure, the courts have repeatedly undone
speech-restricting legislation passed by elected officials. 
Free speech precedes the other freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
but not just numerically. In a sense, it precedes them logically as well. In the
words of Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, it is “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” 
For most governments, the misgivings about censoring electronic informa-
tion are less profound. 
In Saudi Arabia, you can’t get to www.sex.com. In fact, every web access in
Saudi Arabia goes through government computers to make sure the URL isn’t
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on the government’s blacklist. In
Thailand, www.stayinvisible.com is
blocked; that’s a source of informa-
tion about Internet privacy and tools
to assist in anonymous web surfing.
The disparity of information free-
dom standards between the U.S. and
other countries creates conflicts
when electronic transactions involve
two nations. As discussed in Chapter
4, China insists that Google not help
its citizens get information the gov-
ernment does not want them to have.
If you try to get to certain web sites
from your hotel room in Shanghai,
you suddenly lose your Internet con-
nection, with no explanation. You
might think there was a glitch in the
network somewhere, except that you
can reconnect and visit other sites
with no problems. 
Self-censorship by Internet com-
panies is also increasing—the price
they pay for doing business in cer-
tain countries. Thailand and Turkey
blocked the video-sharing site
YouTube after it carried clips lampooning (and, as those governments saw it,
insulting) their current or former rulers. A Google official described censor-
ship as the company’s “No. 1 barrier to trade.” Stirred by the potential costs
in lost business and legal battles, Internet companies have become outspoken
information libertarians, even as they do what must be done to meet the
requirements of foreign governments. Google has even hired a Washington
lobbyist to seek help from the U.S. government in its efforts to resist censor-
ship abroad.
It is easy for Americans to shrug their isolationist shoulders over such
problems. As long as all the information is available in the U.S., one might
reason, who cares what version of Google or YouTube runs in totalitarian
regimes abroad? That is for those countries to sort out. 
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INTERNET FREEDOM
A great many organizations devote
significant effort to maintaining
the Internet’s potential as a free
marketplace of ideas. In addition to
EFF, already mentioned earlier in
this chapter, some others include:
the Electronic Privacy Information
Network, www.epic.org; The Free
Expression Network, freeexpres-
sion.org, which is actually a coali-
tion; the American Civil Liberties
Union, www.aclu.org; and the
Chilling Effects Clearinghouse,
www.chillingeffects.org. The
OpenNet Initiative, opennet.net,
monitors Internet censorship
around the world. OpenNet’s find-
ings are presented in Access
Denied: The Practice and Policy of
Global Internet Filtering, by Ronald
J. Deibert, John G. Palfrey, Rafal
Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain
(eds.), MIT Press, 2008.
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But the free flow of information into the U.S. is threatened by the laws of
other nations about the operation of the press. Consider the case of Joseph
Gutnick and Barron’s magazine. 
On October 30, 2000, the financial weekly Barron’s published an article
suggesting that Australian businessman Joseph Gutnick was involved in
money-laundering and tax evasion. Gutnick sued Dow Jones Co., the pub-
lisher of Barron’s, for defamation. The suit was filed in an Australian court.
Gutnick maintained that the online edition of the magazine, available in
Australia for a fee, was in effect published in Australia. Dow Jones countered
that the place of “publication” of the online magazine was New Jersey, where
its web servers were located. The suit, it argued, should have been brought in
a U.S. court and judged by the standards of U.S. libel law, which are far more
favorable to the free speech rights of the press. The Australian court agreed
with Gutnick, and the suit went forward. Gutnick ultimately won an apology
from Dow Jones and $580,000 in fines and legal costs.
The implications seem staggering. Americans on American soil expect to
be able to speak very freely, but the Australian court claimed that the global
Internet made Australia’s laws applicable wherever the bits reaching
Australian soil may have originated. The Amateur Action conundrum about
what community standards apply to the borderless Internet had been trans-
lated to the world of global journalism. Will the freedom of the Internet press
henceforth be the minimum applying to any of the nations of the earth? Is it
possible that a rogue nation could cripple the global Internet press by extort-
ing large sums of money from alleged defamers, or by imposing death sen-
tences on reporters it claimed had insulted their leaders?
The American press tends to fight hard for its right to publish the truth,
but the censorship problems reach into Western democracies more insidiously
for global corporations not in the news business. It is sometimes easier for
American companies to meet the minimum “world” standards of information
freedom than to keep different information available in the U.S. There may
even be reasons in international law and trade agreements that make such
accommodations to censorship more likely. Consider the trials of Yahoo!
France. 
In May 2000, the League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA, in its
French acronym) and the Union of French Jewish Students (UEJF) demanded
to a French court that Yahoo! stop making Nazi paraphernalia available for
online auction, stop showing pictures of Nazi memorabilia, and prohibit the
dissemination of anti-Semitic hate speech on discussion groups available in
France. Pursuant to the laws of France, where the sale and display of Nazi
items is illegal, the court concluded that what Yahoo! was doing was an
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offense to the “collective memory” of the country and a violation of Article
R654 of the Penal Code. It told Yahoo! that the company was a threat to
“internal public order” and that it had to make sure no one in France could
view such items. 
Yahoo! removed the items from the yahoo.fr site ordinarily available in
France. LICRA and UEJF then discovered that from within France, they could
also get to the American site, yahoo.com, by slightly indirect means. Reaching
across the ocean in a manner reminiscent of the Australian court’s defama-
tion action, the French court demanded that the offending items, images, and
words be removed from the American web site as well. 
Yahoo! resisted for a time, claiming it couldn’t tell where the bits were
going—an assertion somewhat lacking in credibility since the company
tended to attach French-language advertising to web pages if they were dis-
patched to locations in France. Eventually, Yahoo! made a drastic revision of
its standards for the U.S. site. Hate speech was prohibited under Yahoo’s
revised service terms with its users, and most of the Nazi memorabilia disap-
peared. But Nazi stamps and coins were still available for auction on the U.S.
site, as were copies of Mein Kampf. In November 2000, the French court
affirmed and extended its order: Mein Kampf could not be offered for sale in
France. The fines were adding up. 
Yahoo! sought help in U.S. courts. It had committed no crime in the U.S.,
it stated. French law could not leap the Atlantic and trump U.S. First
Amendment protections. Enforcement of the French order would have a chill-
ing effect on speech in the United States. A U.S. district court agreed, and the
decision was upheld on appeal by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (Northern California). 
But in 2006, the full 11-member court of appeals reversed the decision and
found against Yahoo!. The company had not suffered enough, according to
the majority opinion, nor tried long enough to have the French change their
minds, for appeal to First
Amendment protections to be
appropriate. A dissenting opinion
spoke plainly about what the court
seemed to be doing. “We should not
allow a foreign court order,” wrote
Judge William Fletcher, “to be used
as leverage to quash constitution-
ally protected speech….”
Such conflicts will be more com-
mon in the future, as more bits flow
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across national borders. The laws, trade agreements, and court decisions of
the next few years, many of them regulating the flow of “intellectual prop-
erty,” will shape the world of the future. It would be a sad irony if informa-
tion liberty, so stoutly defended for centuries in the U.S., would fall in the
twenty-first century to a combination of domestic child protection laws and
international money-making opportunities. But as one British commentator
said when the photo-hosting site Flickr removed photos to conform with
orders from Singapore, Germany, Hong Kong, and Korea, “Libertarianism is
all very well when you’re a hacker. But business is business.”
✷
Information freedom on the Internet is a tricky business. Technological
changes happen faster than legal changes. When a technology shift alarms
the populace, legislators respond with overly broad laws. By the time chal-
lenges have worked their way through the courts, another cycle of technol-
ogy changes has happened, and the slow heartbeat of lawmaking pumps out
another poorly drafted statute. 
The technology of radio and television has also challenged the legislative
process, but in a different way. In the broadcast world, strong commercial
forces are arrayed in support of speech-restricting laws that have long since
outgrown the technology that gave birth to them. We now turn to those
changes in the radio world.
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CHAPTER 8
Bits in the Air
Old Metaphors, New Technologies,
and Free Speech
Censoring the President
On July 17, 2006, U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony
Blair were chatting at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. The event was
a photo opportunity, but the two leaders did not realize that a microphone
was on. They were discussing what the UN might do to quell the conflict
between Israel and militant forces in Lebanon. “See the irony is,” said Bush,
“what they need to do is get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit and
it’s over.” 
The cable network CNN carried the clip in full and posted it on the Web,
but most broadcast stations bleeped out the expletive. They were aware of the
fines, as much as $325,000, that the Federal Communications Commission
might impose for airing the word “shit.” 
The FCC had long regulated speech over the public airways, but had raised
its decency standards after the 2002 “Golden Globes” awards presentation.
Singer Bono had won the “Best Original Song” award. In his acceptance
speech, broadcast live on NBC, he said, “This is really, really, fucking bril-
liant.” The FCC ruled that this remark was “patently offensive under contem-
porary community standards for the broadcast medium.” It promised to fine
and even pull the licenses of stations broadcasting such remarks.
In 2006, the Commission extended the principle from the F-word to the
S-word. Nicole Richie, referring to a reality TV show on which she had done
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some farm work, said to Paris Hilton, “Why do they even call it The Simple
Life? Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so
fucking simple.” The FCC’s ruling on Richie’s use of the excrement metaphor
implied that Bush’s use would be “presumptively profane” in the eyes of the
FCC. 
A federal court reversed the FCC’s policy against such “fleeting”
expletives—an expansion of indecency policies that had been in place for
decades. Congress quickly introduced legislation to restore the FCC’s new and
strict standard, and the whole matter was to be argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court in the spring of 2008. The FCC had adopted its new standards
after complaints about broadcast indecency rose from fewer than 50 to about
1.4 million in the period from 2000 to 2004. Congress may have thought that
the new speech code reflected a public mandate.
Under the First Amendment, the government is generally not in the
speech-restricting business. It can’t force its editorial judgments on news-
papers, even to increase the range of information available to readers. The
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Florida law assuring polit-
ical candidates a simple “right to reply” to newspaper attacks on them.
Nonetheless, in 2006, an agency of the federal government was trying to
keep words off television, using rules that “presumptively” covered even a
candid conversation about war and peace between leaders of the free world.
Dozens of newspapers printed Bush’s remark in full, and anyone with an
Internet connection could hear the audio. In spite of the spike in indecency
complaints to the FCC, Americans are generally opposed to having the gov-
ernment nanny their television shows.
How Broadcasting Became Regulated 
The FCC gained its authority over what is said on radio and TV broadcasts
when there were fewer ways to distribute information. The public airways
were scarce, went the theory, and the government had to make sure they were
used in the public interest. As radio and television became universally acces-
sible, a second rationale emerged for government regulation of broadcast
speech. Because the broadcast media have “a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Americans,” as the Supreme Court put it in 1978, the govern-
ment had a special interest in protecting a defenseless public from objection-
able radio and television content. 
The explosion in communications technologies has confused both ratio-
nales. In the digital era, there are far more ways for bits to reach the consumer,
so broadcast radio and television are hardly unique in their pervasiveness.
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With minimal technology, anyone can sit at home or in Starbucks and choose
from among billions of web pages and tens of millions of blogs. Shock jock
Howard Stern left broadcast radio for satellite radio, where the FCC has no
authority to regulate what he says.
More than 90% of American televi-
sion viewers get their TV signal
through similarly unregulated cable
or satellite, not through broadcasts
from rooftop antennas. RSS feeds
supply up-to-date information to
millions of on-the-go cell phone
users. Radio stations and television channels are today neither scarce nor
uniquely pervasive. 
For the government to protect children from all offensive information
arriving through any communication medium, its authority would have to be
expanded greatly and updated continuously. Indeed, federal legislation has
been introduced to do exactly that—to extend FCC indecency regulations for
broadcast media to satellite and cable television as well.
The explosion in communications raises another possibility, however. If
almost anyone can now send information that many people can receive, per-
haps the government’s interest in restricting transmissions should be less than
what it once was, not greater. In the absence of scarcity, perhaps the govern-
ment should have no more authority over what gets said on radio and TV
than it does over what gets printed in newspapers. In that case, rather than
expanding the FCC’s censorship authority, Congress should eliminate it
entirely, just as the Supreme Court ended Florida’s regulation of newspaper
content. 
Parties who already have spots on the radio dial and the TV channel lineup
respond that the spectrum—the public airwaves—should remain a limited
resource, requiring government protection. No one is making any more radio
spectrum, goes the theory, and it needs to be used in the public interest. 
But look around you. There are still only a few stations on the AM and FM
radio dials. But thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of radio communica-
tions are passing through the air around you. Most Americans walk around
with two-way radios in their pockets—devices we call cell phones—and most
of the nation’s teenagers seem to be talking on them simultaneously. Radios
and television sets could be much, much smarter than they now are and could
make better use of the airwaves, just as cell phones do. 
Engineering developments have vitiated the government’s override of the
First Amendment on radio and television. The Constitution demands, under
these changed circumstances, that the government stop its verbal policing. 
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As a scientific argument, the
claim that the spectrum is necessar-
ily scarce is now very weak. Yet that
view is still forcefully advanced by
the very industry that is being
regulated. The incumbent license
holders—existing broadcast stations
and networks—have an incentive to
protect their “turf” in the spectrum
against any risk, real or imagined,
that their signals might be corrupted.
By deterring technological innova-
tion, incumbents can limit competi-
tion and avoid capital investments.
These oddly intertwined strands—the
government’s interest in artificial
scarcity to justify speech regulation
and the incumbents’ interest in artificial scarcity to limit competition and
costs—today impair both cultural and technological creativity, to the detri-
ment of society. 
To understand the confluent forces that have created the world of today’s
radio and television censorship, we have to go back to the inventors of the
technology. 
From Wireless Telegraph to Wireless Chaos 
Red, orange, yellow, green, blue—the colors of the rainbow—are all different
and yet are all the same. Any child with a crayon box knows that they are all
different. They are the same because they are all the result of electromagnetic
radiation striking our eyes. The radiation travels in waves that oscillate very
quickly. The only physical difference between red and blue is that red waves
oscillate around 450,000,000,000,000 times per second, and blue waves about
50% faster. 
Because the spectrum of visible light is continuous, an infinity of colors
exists between red and blue. Mixing light of different frequencies creates
other colors—for example, half blue waves and half red creates a shade of
pink known as magenta, which does not appear in the rainbow. 
In the 1860s, British physicist James Clerk Maxwell realized that light con-
sists of electromagnetic waves. His equations predicted that there might be
waves of other frequencies—waves that people couldn’t sense. Indeed, such
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SURVIVING ON WIRELESS
A dramatic example of the perva-
siveness of wireless networks, in
spite of the limits on spectrum
where they are allowed to operate,
was provided in the aftermath of
the destruction of the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001.
Lower Manhattan communicated
for several days largely on the
strength of wireless. Something
similar happened after the
December 2006 earthquake that
severed undersea communications
cables in southeast Asia. 
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waves have been passing right through us from the beginning of time. They
shower down invisibly from the sun and the stars, and they radiate when
lightning strikes. No one suspected they existed until Maxwell’s equations
said they should. Indeed, there should be a whole spectrum of invisible waves
of different frequencies, all traveling at the same great speed as visible light. 
In 1887, the radio era began with a demonstration by Henrich Hertz. He
bent a wire into a circle, leaving a small gap between the two ends. When he
set off a big electric spark a few feet away, a tiny spark jumped the gap of
the almost-completely-circular wire. The big spark had set off a shower of
unseen electromagnetic waves, which had traveled through space and caused
electric current to flow in the other wire. The tiny spark was the current com-
pleting the circuit. Hertz had created the first antenna, and had revealed the
radio waves that struck it. The unit of frequency is named in his honor: One
cycle per second is 1 hertz, or Hz for short. A kHz (kilohertz) is a thousand
cycles per second, and a MHz (megahertz) is a million cycles per second.
These are the units on the AM and FM radio dials. 
Gugliemo Marconi was neither a mathematician nor a scientist. He was an
inventive tinkerer. Only 13 years old at the time of Hertz’s experiment,
Marconi spent the next decade developing, by trial and error, better ways of
creating bursts of radio waves, and antennas for detecting them over greater
distances. 
In 1901, Marconi stood in Newfoundland and received a single Morse code
letter transmitted from England. On the strength of this success, the Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Company was soon enabling ships to communicate with
each other and with the shore. When the Titanic left on its fateful voyage in
1912, it was equipped with Marconi equipment. The main job of the ship’s
radio operators was to relay personal messages to and from passengers, but
they also received at least 20 warnings from other ships about the icebergs
that lay ahead.
The words “Wireless Telegraph” in the name of Marconi’s company sug-
gest the greatest limitation of early radio. The technology was conceived as
a device for point-to-point communication. Radio solved the worst problem
of telegraphy. No calamity, sabotage, or war could stop wireless transmissions
by severing cables. But there was a compensating disadvantage: Anyone
could listen in. The enormous power of broadcasting to reach thousands of
people at once was at first seen as a liability. Who would pay to send a mes-
sage to another person when anyone could hear it?
As wireless telegraphy became popular, another problem emerged—one
that has shaped the development of radio and television ever since. If several
people were transmitting simultaneously in the same geographic area, their
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signals couldn’t be kept apart. The Titanic disaster demonstrated the confu-
sion that could result. The morning after the ship hit the iceberg, American
newspapers reported excitedly that all passengers had been saved and the
ship was being towed to shore. The mistake resulted from a radio operator’s
garbled merger of two unrelated segments of Morse code. One ship inquired
if “all Titanic passengers safe?” A completely different ship reported that it
was “300 miles west of the Titanic and towing an oil tank to Halifax.” All the
ships had radios and radio operators. But there were no rules or conventions
about whether, how, or when to use them. 
Listeners to Marconi’s early transmitters were easily confused because they
had no way to “tune in” a particular communication. For all of Marconi’s
genius in extending the range of transmission, he was using essentially
Hertz’s method for generating radio waves: big sparks. The sparks splattered
electromagnetic energy across the radio spectrum. The energy could be
stopped and started to turn it into dots and dashes, but there was nothing else
to control. One radio operator’s noise was like any other’s. When several
transmitted simultaneously, chaos resulted. 
The many colors of visible light look white if all blended together. A color
filter lets through some frequencies of visible light but not others. If you look
at the world through a red filter, everything is a lighter or darker shade of red,
because only the red light comes through. What radio needed was something
similar for the radio spectrum: a way to produce radio waves of a single fre-
quency, or at least a narrow range of frequencies, and a receiver that could
let through those frequencies and screen out the rest. Indeed, that technology
already existed. 
In 1907, Lee De Forest patented a key technology for the De Forest Radio
Telephone Company—dedicated to sending voice and even music over the
radio waves. When he broadcast Enrico Caruso from the Metropolitan Opera
House on January 13, 1910, the singing reached ships at sea. Amateurs hud-
dled over receivers in New York and New Jersey. The effect was sensational.
Hundreds of amateur broadcasters sprang into action over the next few years,
eagerly saying whatever they wanted, and playing whatever music they
could, to anyone who happened to be listening. 
But with no clear understanding
about what frequencies to use, radio
communication was a hit-or-miss affair.
Even what the New York Times
described as the “homeless song waves”
of the Caruso broadcast clashed with
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another station that, “despite all entreaties,” insisted on broadcasting at the
identical 350kHz frequency. Some people could “catch the ecstasy” of
Caruso’s voice, but others got only some annoying Morse code: “I took a beer
just now.”
Radio Waves in Their Channels 
The emerging radio industry could not grow under such conditions. Commer-
cial interests complemented the concerns of the U.S. Navy about amateur
interference with its ship communications. The Titanic disaster, although it
owed little to the failures of radio, catalyzed government action. On May 12,
1912, William Alden Smith called for radio regulation on the floor of the U.S.
Senate. “When the world weeps together over a common loss…,” proclaimed
the Senator, “why should not the nations clear the sea of its conflicting
idioms and wisely regulate this new
servant of humanity?”
The Radio Act of 1912 limited
broadcasting to license holders.
Radio licenses were to be “granted
by the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor upon application therefor.” In
granting the license, the Secretary
would stipulate the frequencies
“authorized for use by the station for
the prevention of interference and
the hours for which the station is
licensed for work.” The Act reserved
for government use the choice fre-
quencies between about 200 and
500kHz, which permitted the clear-
est communications over long dis-
tances. Amateurs were pushed off to
“short wave” frequencies above
1500kHz, considered useless for
technological reasons. The fre-
quency 1000kHz was reserved for
distress calls, and licensed stations
were required to listen to it every 15
minutes (the one provision that
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HIGH FREQUENCIES
Over the years, technological
improvements have made it possi-
ble to use higher and higher fre-
quencies. Early TV was broadcast at
what were then considered “Very
High Frequencies” (VHF) because
they were higher than AM radio.
Technology improved again, and
more stations appeared at “Ultra
High Frequencies” (UHF). The high-
est frequency in commercial
use today is 77GHz—77 gigahertz,
that is, 77,000MHz. In general, high
frequency signals fade with dis-
tance more than low signals, and
are therefore mainly useful for
localized or urban environments.
Short waves correspond to high
frequencies because all radio waves
travel at the same speed, which is
the speed of light. 
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might have helped the Titanic, since the radio operators of a nearby ship had
gone off-duty and missed the Titanic’s rescue pleas). The rest of the spectrum
the Secretary could assign to commercial radio stations and private busi-
nesses. Emphasizing the nature of radio as “wireless telegraphy,” the Act made
it a crime for anyone hearing a radio message to divulge it to anyone except
its intended recipient. 
Much has changed since 1912. The uses of radio waves have become more
varied, the allocation of spectrum blocks has changed, and the range of
usable frequencies has grown. The current spectrum allocation picture has
grown into a dense, disorganized quilt, the product of decades of Solomonic
FCC judgments (see Figure 8.1). But still, the U.S. government stipulates what
parts of the spectrum can be used for what purposes. It prevents users from
interfering with each other and with government communications by
demanding that they broadcast at limited power and only at their assigned
frequencies. As long as there weren’t many radio stations, the implied
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Source: www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.
FIGURE 8.1 Frequency allocation of the U.S. radio spectrum. The spectrum from
3kHz to 300GHz is laid out from left to right and top to bottom, with the scale
10 times denser in each successive row. For example, the large block in the second
row is the AM radio dial, about 1MHz wide. The same amount of spectrum would be
about .00002 of an inch wide in the bottom row. 
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promise in the Act of 1912 that licenses would be granted “upon application
therefor” caused no problems. With the gossip of the pesky amateurs pushed
into remote radio territory, there was plenty of spectrum for commercial, mil-
itary, and safety use. 
Within a decade, that picture had changed dramatically. On November 2,
1920, a Detroit station broadcast the election of Warren Harding as President
of the United States, relaying to its tiny radio audience the returns it was
receiving by telegraph. Radio was no longer just point-to-point communica-
tion. A year later, a New York station broadcast the World Series between the
Giants and the Yankees, pitch by pitch. Sports broadcasting was born with a
broadcaster drearily repeating the ball and strike information telephoned by
a newspaper reporter at the ballpark.
Public understanding of the possibilities grew rapidly. The first five radio
stations were licensed for broadcasting in 1921. Within a year, there were
670. The number of radio receivers jumped in a year from less than 50,000 to
more than 600,000, perhaps a million. Stations using the same frequency in
the same city divided up the hours of the day. As radio broadcasting became
a profitable business, the growth could not go on forever. 
On November 12, 1921, the New York City broadcast license of Intercity
Radio Co. expired. Herbert Hoover, then the Secretary of Commerce, refused
to renew it, on the grounds that there was no frequency on which Intercity
could broadcast in the city’s airspace without interfering with government or
other private stations. Intercity sued Hoover to have its license restored, and
won. Hoover, said the court, could choose the frequency, but he had no dis-
cretion to deny the license. As the congressional committee proposing the
1912 Radio Act had put it, the licensing system was “substantially the same
as that in use for the documenting upward of 25,000 merchant vessels.” The
implied metaphor was that Hoover should keep track of the stations like ships
in the ocean. He could tell them what shipping lanes to use, but he couldn’t
keep them out of the water. 
The radio industry begged for order. Hoover convened a National Radio
Conference in 1922 in an attempt to achieve consensus on new regulations
before chaos set in. The spectrum was “a great national asset,” he said, and
“it becomes of primary public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting,
under what circumstances, and with what type of material.” “[T]he large mass
of subscribers need protection as to the noises which fill their instruments,”
and the airwaves need “a policeman” to detect “hogs that are endangering the
traffic.”
Hoover divided the spectrum from 550kHz to 1350kHz in 10kHz bands—
called “channels,” consistent with the nautical metaphor—to squeeze in more
stations. Empty “guard bands” were left on each side of allocated bands
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because broadcast signals inevitably spread out, reducing the amount of
usable spectrum. Persuasion and voluntary compliance helped Hoover limit
interference. As stations became established, they found it advantageous to
comply with Hoover’s prescriptions. Start-ups had a harder time breaking in.
Hoover convinced representatives of a religious group that to warn of the
coming apocalypse, they should buy time on existing stations rather than
build one of their own. After all, their money would go farther that way—in
six months, after the world had ended, they would have no further use for a
transmitter. Hoover’s effectiveness made Congress complacent—the system
was working well enough without laws. 
But as the slicing got finer, the troubles got worse. WLW and WMH in
Cincinnati broadcast on the same frequency in 1924 until Hoover brokered a
deal for three stations to share two frequencies in rotating time slots. Finally,
the system broke down. In 1925, Zenith Radio Corporation was granted a
license to use 930kHz in Chicago, but only on Thursday nights, only from 10
p.m. to midnight, and only if a Denver station didn’t wish to broadcast then.
Without permission, Zenith started broadcasting at 910kHz, a frequency that
was more open because it had been ceded by treaty to Canada. Hoover fined
Zenith; Zenith challenged Hoover’s authority to regulate frequencies, and
won in court. The Secretary then got even worse news from the U.S. Attorney
General: The 1912 Act, drafted before broadcasting was even a concept, was
so ambiguous that it probably gave Hoover no authority to regulate anything
about broadcast radio—frequency, power, or time of day. 
Hoover threw up his hands. Anyone could start a station and choose a fre-
quency—there were 600 applications pending—but in doing so, they were
“proceeding entirely at their own risk.” The result was the “chaos in the air”
that Hoover had predicted. It was worse than before the 1912 Act because so
many more transmitters existed and they were so much more powerful.
Stations popped up, jumped all over the frequency spectrum in search of open
air, and turned up their transmission power to the maximum to drown out
competing signals. Radio became virtually useless, especially in cities.
Congress finally was forced to act.
The Spectrum Nationalized 
The premises of the Radio Act of 1927 are still in force. The spectrum has
been treated as a scarce national resource ever since, managed by the 
government. 
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The purpose of the Act was to maintain
the control of the United States over all the
channels of … radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but
not the ownership thereof, by individuals,
firms, or corporations, for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal
authority…. The public could use the spec-
trum, under conditions stipulated by the
government, but could not own it. A
new authority, the Federal Radio
Commission (FRC), made licensing
decisions. The public had a qualified
expectation that license requests
would be granted: The licensing
authority, if public convenience,
interest, or necessity will be served
thereby, … shall grant to any appli-
cant therefor a station license…. The
Act recognized that demand for
licenses could exceed the supply of
spectrum. In case of competition
among applicants, the licensing
authority shall make such a distribution of licenses, bands of frequency…,
periods of time for operation, and of power among the different States and
communities as to give fair, efficient, and equitable radio service to each….
The language about “public convenience, interest, or necessity” echoes
Hoover’s 1922 speech about a “national asset” and the “public interest.” It is
also no accident that this law was drafted as the Teapot Dome Scandal was
cresting. Oil reserves on federal land in Wyoming had been leased to Sinclair
Oil in 1923 with the assistance of bribes paid to the Secretary of the Interior.
It took several years for Congressional investigations and federal court cases
to expose the wrongdoing; the Secretary was eventually imprisoned. By early
1927, the fair use of national resources in the public interest was a major con-
cern in the United States. 
With the passage of the Act of 1927, the radio spectrum became federal
land. International treaties followed, to limit interference near national bor-
ders. But within the U.S., just as Hoover had asked five years earlier, the fed-
eral government took control over who would be allowed to broadcast, which
radio waves they could use—and even what they could say. 
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THE “RADIO COMMISSION” GROWS
In 1934, the FRC’s name was
changed to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission—the FCC—
when telephone and telegraph
regulation came under the
Commission’s oversight. When a
separate chunk of radio spectrum
was allocated for television, the
FCC assumed authority over video
broadcasts as well. 
The premises of the Radio
Act of 1927 are still in
force. The spectrum has
been treated as a scarce
national resource ever
since, managed by the 
government.
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Goat Glands and the First Amendment 
The Radio Act of 1927 stipulated that the FRC could not abridge free speech
over the radio. Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give
the licensing authority the power of censorship…, and no regulation or con-
dition … shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio com-
munications. Inevitably, a case would arise exposing the implicit conflict: On
the one hand, the Commission had to use a public interest standard when
granting and renewing licenses. On the other, it had to avoid censorship. The
pivotal case was over the license for KFKB radio, the station of the Kansas
goat-gland doctor, John Romulus Brinkley (see Figure 8.2). The wrath
brought down on CBS in 2004 for showing a flash of Janet Jackson’s breast—
and which the networks feared if they broadcast Saving Private Ryan on
New York Evening Journal, September 11, 1926. Microfilm courtesy of the Library of Congress.
FIGURE 8.2 A planted newspaper article about “Dr.” Brinkley’s goat-gland clinic.
The doctor himself is shown at the left, holding the first baby—named “Billy,” of
course—conceived after a goat-gland transplant. 
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Veterans’ Day or President Bush muttering to Tony Blair—descends from the
FCC’s action against this classic American charlatan.
Brinkley, born in 1885, became a “doctor” licensed to practice in Kansas
by buying a degree from the Eclectic Medical University in Kansas City. He
worked briefly as a medic for Swift & Co., the meatpackers. In 1917, he set
up his medical practice in Milford, a tiny town about 70 miles west of Topeka.
One day, a man came for advice about his failing virility, describing himself
as a “flat tire.” Drawing on his memory of goat behavior from his days at the
slaughterhouse, Brinkley said, “You wouldn’t have any trouble if you had a
pair of those buck glands in you.” “Well, why don’t you put ‘em in?” the
patient asked. Brinkley did the transplant in a back room, and a business was
born. Soon he was performing 50 transplants a month, at $750 per surgery.
In time, he discovered that promising sexual performance was even more
lucrative than promising fertility.
As a young man, Brinkley had worked at a telegraph office, so he knew
the promise of communication technology. In 1923, he opened Kansas’s first
radio station, KFKB—“Kansas First, Kansas Best” radio, or sometimes “Kansas
Folks Know Best.” The station broadcast a mixture of country music, funda-
mentalist preaching, and medical advice from Dr. Brinkley himself. Listeners
sent in their complaints, and the advice was almost always to buy some of
Dr. Brinkley’s mail-order patent medicines. “Here’s one from Tillie,” went a
typical segment. “She says she had an operation, had some trouble 10 years
ago. I think the operation was unnecessary, and it isn’t very good sense to
have an ovary removed with the expectation of motherhood resulting there-
from. My advice to you is to use Women’s Tonic No. 50, 67, and 61. This com-
bination will do for you what you desire if any combination will, after three
months persistent use.”
KFKB had a massively powerful transmitter, heard halfway across the
Atlantic. In a national poll, it was the most popular station in America—with
four times as many votes as the runner-up. Brinkley was receiving 3,000
letters a day and was a sensation throughout the plains states. On a good day,
500 people might show up in Milford. But the American Medical
Association—prompted by a competing local radio station—objected to his
quackery. The FRC concluded that “public interest, convenience, or necessity”
would not be served by renewing the license. Brinkley objected that the can-
cellation was nothing less than censorship. 
An appeals court sided with the FRC in a landmark decision. Censorship,
the court explained, was prior restraint, which was not at issue in Brinkley’s
case. The FRC had “merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appel-
lant’s past conduct.” An arguable point—as Albert Gallatin said more than 200
years ago about prior restraint of the press, it was “preposterous to say, that
to punish a certain act was not an abridgment of the liberty of doing that act.”
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The court used the public land metaphor in justifying the FRC’s action.
“[B]ecause the number of available broadcasting frequencies is limited,”
wrote the court, “the commission is necessarily called upon to consider the
character and quality of the service to be rendered…. Obviously, there is no
room in the broadcast band for every business or school of thought.” 
“Necessarily” and “obviously.” It is always wise to scrutinize arguments that
proclaim loudly how self-evident they are. Judge Felix Frankfurter, in an opin-
ion on a different case in 1943, restated the principle in a form that has often
been quoted. “The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable
to certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication—its facilities
are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio
spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a
fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without
interfering with one another.”
These were facts of the technology of the time. They were true, but they
were contingent truths of engineering. They were never universal laws of
physics, and are no longer limitations of technology. Because of engineering
innovations over the past 20 years, there is no practically significant “natu-
ral limitation” on the number of broadcast stations. Arguments from
inevitable scarcity can no longer justify U.S. government denials of the use
of the airwaves. 
The vast regulatory infrastructure, built to rationalize use of the spectrum
by much more limited radio technology, has adjusted slowly—as it almost
inevitably must: Bureaucracies don’t move as quickly as technological inno-
vators. The FCC tries to anticipate resource needs centrally and far in
advance. But technology can cause abrupt changes in supply, and market
forces can cause abrupt changes in demand. Central planning works no bet-
ter for the FCC than it did for the Soviet Union.
Moreover, plenty of stakeholders in old technology are happy to see the
rules remain unchanged. Like tenants enjoying leases on public land, incum-
bent radio license holders have no reason to encourage competing uses of the
assets they control. The more money that is at stake, the greater the leverage
of the profitable ventures. Radio licenses had value almost from the begin-
ning, and as scarcity increased, so did price. By 1925, a Chicago license was
sold for $50,000. As advertising expanded and stations bonded into networks,
transactions reached seven figures. After the 1927 Act, disputes between
stations had to be settled by litigation, trips to Washington, and pressure by
friendly Congressional representatives—all more feasible for stations with
deep pockets. At first, there were many university stations, but the FRC
squeezed them as the value of the airwaves went up. As non-profits, these
stations could not hold their ground. Eventually, most educational stations
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sold out to commercial broadcasters. De facto, as one historian put it, “while
talking in terms of the public interest, … the commission actually chose to
further the ends of the commercial broadcasters.”
The Path to Spectrum Deregulation 
When you push a button on your key fob and unlock your car doors, you are
a radio broadcaster. The signal from the key fob uses a bit of the spectrum.
The key fob signal obeys the same basic physical laws as WBZ’s radio broad-
casts in Boston, which have been going on continuously since WBZ became
the first Eastern commercial station in 1921. But the new radio broadcasts are
different in two critical respects. There are hundreds of millions of them going
on every day. And while WBZ’s broadcast power is 50,000 watts, a key fob’s
is less than .0002 of a watt. 
If the government still had to license every radio transmitter—as Congress
authorized in the aftermath of the radio chaos of the 1920s—neither radio key
fobs nor any of hundreds of other innovative uses of low-power radio could
have come about. The law and the bureaucracy it created would have snuffed
this part of the digital explosion. 
Another development also lay behind the wireless explosion. Technology
had to change so that the available spectrum could be used more efficiently.
Digitalization and miniaturization changed the communications world. The
story of cell phones and wireless Internet and many conveniences as yet
unimagined is a knot of politics, technology, and law. You can’t understand
the knot without understanding the strands, but in the future, the strands
need not remain tied up in the same way as they are today. 
From a Few Bullhorns to Millions of Whispers 
Thirty years ago, there were no cell phones. A handful of business executives
had mobile phones, but the devices were bulky and costly. Miniaturization
helped change the mobile phone from the perk of a few corporate bigwigs
into the birthright of every American teenager. But the main advance was in
spectrum allocation—in rethinking the way the radio spectrum was used. 
In the era of big, clunky mobile phones, the radio phone company had a
big antenna and secured from the FCC the right to use a few frequencies in
an urban area. The executive’s phone was a little radio station, which broad-
cast its call. The mobile phone had to be powerful enough to reach the com-
pany’s antenna, wherever in the city the phone might be located. The number
of simultaneous calls was limited to the number of frequencies allocated to
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the company. The technology was the same as broadcast radio stations used,
except that the mobile phone radios were two-way. The scarcity of spectrum,
still cited today in limiting the number of broadcast channels, then limited
the number of mobile phones. Hoover understood this way back in 1922.
“Obviously,” he said, “if 10,000,000 telephone subscribers are crying through
the air for their mates … the ether will be filled with frantic chaos, with no
communication of any kind possible.”
Cellular technology exploits Moore’s Law. Phones have become faster,
cheaper, and smaller. Because cell phone towers are only a mile or so apart,
cell phones need only be powerful enough to send their signals less than a
mile. Once received by an antenna, the signal is sent on to the cell phone
company by “wireline”—i.e., by copper or fiber optic cables on poles or under-
ground. There need be only enough radio spectrum to handle the calls within
the “cell” surrounding a tower, since the same frequencies can be used simul-
taneously to handle calls in other cells. A lot of fancy dancing has to be done
to prevent a call from being dropped as an active phone is carried from cell
to cell, but computers, including the little computers inside cell phones, are
smart and fast enough to keep up with such rearrangements. 
Cell phone technology illustrates an important change in the use of radio
spectrum. Most radio communications are now over short distances. They are
transmissions between cell phone towers and cell phones. Between wireless
routers at Starbucks and the computers of coffee drinkers. Between cordless
telephone handsets and their bases. Between highway toll booths and the
transponders mounted on commuters’ windshields. Between key fobs with
buttons and the cars they unlock. Between Wii remotes and Wii game
machines. Between iPod transmitters plugged into cars’ cigarette lighters and
the cars’ FM radios. 
Even “satellite radio” transmissions often go from a nearby antenna to a
customer’s receiver, not directly from a satellite orbiting in outer space. In
urban areas, so many buildings lie between the receiver and the satellite that
the radio companies have installed “repeaters”—antennas connected to each
other by wireline. When you listen to XM or Sirius in your car driving around
a city, the signal is probably coming to you from an antenna a few blocks
away.
The radio spectrum is no longer mainly
for long-range signaling. Spectrum policies
were set when the major use of radio was
for ship-to-shore transmissions, SOS sig-
naling from great distances, and broadcast-
ing over huge geographic areas. As the nation has become wired, most radio
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The radio spectrum is no
longer mainly for long-
range signaling.
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signals travel only a few feet or a few hundred feet. Under these changed con-
ditions, the old rules for spectrum management don’t make sense. 
Can We Just Divide the Property Differently? 
Some innovations make better use of the spectrum without changing the fun-
damental allocation picture shown in Figure 8.1. For example, HD radio
squeezes an unrelated low-power digital transmission alongside the analog
AM and FM radio channels. (“HD” is a trademark. It doesn’t stand for “high
definition.”) On AM HD radio, the HD transmission uses the guard bands on
either side of an AM station for entirely different broadcast content (see
Figure 8.3). Most AM radios filter out any signal in the channels adjacent to
the one to which it is tuned, so the HD transmission is inaudible on an ordi-
nary radio, even as noise. The HD radio broadcast can be heard only on a spe-
cial radio designed to pick up and decode the digital transmission. 
FIGURE 8.3 HD radio uses guard bands to broadcast digital signals at low power.
In the AM spectrum, the 10kHz bands on either side of the band allocated to an
ordinary analog broadcast station may be used for an entirely independent digital
broadcast, limited to low power so that it does not interfere with reception of the
analog broadcast. 
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HD radio is a clever invention, and by opening the spectrum to HD broad-
casts, the FCC has been able to squeeze in more broadcast stations—at least
for those willing to buy special radios. But it doesn’t challenge the fundamen-
tal model that has been with us since the 1920s: Split up the spectrum and
give a piece to each licensee. 
Even parts of the spectrum that are “allocated” to licensees may be drasti-
cally underused in practice. A 2002 Federal Communications Committee
Report puts it this way: “… the shortage of spectrum is often a spectrum access
problem. That is, the spectrum resource is available, but its use is compart-
mented by traditional policies based on traditional technologies.” The com-
mittee came to this conclusion in part by listening to the air waves in various
frequency blocks to test how often nothing at all was being transmitted.
Most of the time, even in the dense urban settings of San Diego, Atlanta, and
Chicago, important spectrum bands were nearly 100% idle. The public would
be better served if others could use the otherwise idle spectrum. 
For about ten years, the FCC has experimented with “secondary spectrum
marketing.” Someone wanting some spectrum for temporary use may be able
to lease it from a party who has a right to use it, but is willing to give it up
in exchange for a payment. A university radio station, for example, may
need the capacity to broadcast at high power only on a few Saturday after-
noons to cover major football games. Perhaps such a station could make a
deal with a business station that doesn’t have a lot of use for its piece of the
spectrum when the stock markets are closed. As another example, instead of
reserving a band exclusively for emergency broadcasts, it could be made
available to others, with the understanding—enforced by codes wired into
the transmitters—that the frequency would be yielded on demand for public
safety broadcasts. 
As the example of eBay has shown, computerized auctions can result in
very efficient distribution of goods. The use of particular pieces of the spec-
trum—at particular times, and in particular geographic areas—can create effi-
ciencies if licensees of under-utilized spectrum bands had an incentive to sell
some of their time to other parties. 
But secondary markets don’t change the basic model—a frequency band
belongs to one party at a time. Such auction ideas change the allocation
scheme. Rather than having a government agency license spectrum statically
to a single party with exclusive rights, several parties can divide it up and
make trades. But these schemes retain the fundamental notion that spectrum
is like land to be split up among those who want to use it. 
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Sharing the Spectrum 
In his 1943 opinion, Justice Frankfurter used an analogy that unintentionally
pointed toward another way of thinking. Spectrum was inevitably scarce, he
opined. “Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traf-
fic control was to the development of the automobile.” 
Just as the spectrum is said to be, the roadways are a national asset. They
are controlled by federal, state, and local governments, which set rules for
their use. You can’t drive too fast. Your vehicle can’t exceed height and
weight limits, which may depend on the road. 
But everyone shares the roads. There aren’t any special highways reserved
for government vehicles. Trucking companies can’t get licenses to use partic-
ular roads and keep out their competitors. Everybody shares the capacity of
the roads to carry traffic.
The roads are what is known in law as a “commons” (a notion introduced
in Chapter 6). The ocean is also a commons, a shared resource subject to
international fishing agreements. In theory at least, the ocean need not be a
commons. Fishing boats could have exclusive fishing rights in separate sec-
tors of the ocean’s surface. If the regions were large enough, fishermen might
be able to earn a good living under
these conditions. But such an alloca-
tion of the resources of the ocean
would be dreadfully inefficient for
society as a whole. The oceans better
satisfy human needs if they are
treated as a commons and fishing
boats move with the fish—under
agreed limits about the intensity of
fishing. 
The spectrum can be shared rather than split up into pieces. There is a
precedent in electronic communications. The Internet is a digital commons.
Everyone’s packets get mixed with everyone else’s on the fiber optics and
satellite links of the Internet backbone. The packets are coded. Which packet
belongs to whom is sorted out at the ends. Anything confidential can be
encrypted. 
Something similar can be done with broadcasts—provided there is a basic
rethinking of spectrum management. Two ideas are key: first, that using lots
of bandwidth need not cause interference and can greatly increase transmis-
sion capacity; and second, that putting computers into radio receivers can
greatly improve the utilization of the spectrum.
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Yochai Benkler’s site, www.
benkler.org, has several impor-
tant and readable papers for free
download, including the classic
“Overcoming Agoraphobia.” His
book, The Wealth of Networks (Yale
University Press, 2007), details
these and other concepts. 
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The Most Beautiful Inventor in the World 
Spread spectrum was discovered and forgotten several times and in several
countries. Corporations (ITT, Sylvania, and Magnavox), universities (espe-
cially MIT), and government laboratories doing classified research all shared
in giving birth to this key component of modern telecommunications—and
were often unaware of each other’s activities. 
By far the most remarkable precedent for spread spectrum was a patented
invention by Hollywood actress Hedy Lamarr—“the most beautiful woman in
the world,” in the words of movie mogul Louis Mayer—and George Antheil,
an avant-garde composer known as “the bad boy of music.” 
Lamarr made a scandalous name for herself in Europe by appearing nude
in 1933, at the age of 19, in a Czech movie, Ecstasy. She became the trophy
wife of Fritz Mandl, an Austrian munitions maker whose clients included
both Hitler and Mussolini. In 1937, she disguised herself as a maid and
escaped Mandl’s house, fleeing first to Paris and then to London. There she
met Mayer, who brought her to Hollywood. She became a star—and the iconic
beauty of her screen generation (see Figure 8.4). 
In 1940, Lamarr arranged to meet Antheil. Her upper torso could use some
enhancement, she thought, and she hoped Antheil could give her some
advice. Antheil was a self-styled expert on female endocrinology, and had
written a series of articles for Esquire magazine with titles such as “The
Glandbook for the Questing Male.” Antheil suggested glandular extracts.
Their conversation then turned to other matters—specifically, to torpedo
warfare. 
A torpedo—just a bomb with a propeller—could sink a massive ship. Radio-
controlled torpedoes had been developed by the end of World War I, but were
far from foolproof. An effective countermeasure was to jam the signal con-
trolling the torpedo by broadcasting loud radio noise at the frequency of the
control signal. The torpedo would go haywire and likely miss its target. From
observing Mandl’s business, Lamarr had learned about torpedoes and why it
was hard to control them. 
Lamarr had become fiercely pro-American and wished to help the Allied
war effort. She conceived the idea of transmitting the torpedo control signal
in short bursts at different frequencies. The code for the sequence of frequen-
cies would be held identically within the torpedo and the controlling ship.
Because the sequence would be unknown to the enemy, the transmission
could not be jammed by flooding the airwaves with noise in any limited fre-
quency band. Too much power would be required to jam all possible frequen-
cies simultaneously. 
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FIGURE 8.4 Hedy Lamarr, at about the age when she and George Antheil made their
spread spectrum discovery.
Antheil’s contribution was to control the frequency-hopping sequence by
means of a player piano mechanism—with which he was familiar because he
had scored his masterpiece, Ballet Mécanique, for synchronized player pianos.
As he and Lamarr conceived the device (it was never built), the signal would
therefore hop among 88 frequencies, like the 88 keys on a piano keyboard.
The ship and the torpedo would have identical piano rolls—in effect, encrypt-
ing the broadcast signal. 
In 1941, Lamarr and Antheil assigned their patent (see Figure 8.5) to the
Navy. A small item on the “Amusements” page of the New York Times quoted
an army engineer as describing their invention as so “red hot” that he could
not say what it did, except that it was “related to the remote control of appa-
ratus employed in warfare.” Nonetheless, the Navy seems to have done
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nothing with the invention at the
time. Instead, Lamarr went to work
selling war bonds. Calling herself
“just a plain gold-digger for Uncle
Sam,” she sold kisses, and once
raised $4.5 million at a single lunch.
The patent was ignored for more
than a decade. Romuald Ireneus ’Scibor-Marchocki, who was an engineer for
a Naval contractor in the mid-1950s, recalls being given a copy when he was
put to work on a device for locating enemy submarines. He didn’t recognize
the patentee because she had not used her stage name.
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The story of Antheil and Lamarr,
and the place of their invention in
the history of spread spectrum, is
told in Spread Spectrum by Rob
Walters (Booksurge LLC, 2005). 
U.S. Patent Office.
FIGURE 8.5 Original spread spectrum patent by Hedy Lamarr (née Kiesler—Gene
Markey was her second husband, of six) and George Antheil. On the left, the
beginning of the patent itself. On the right, a diagram of the player-piano
mechanism included as an illustration in the patent. 
And that, in a nutshell, is the strange story of serendipity, teamwork, vanity,
and patriotism that led to the Lamarr-Antheil discovery of spread spectrum.
The connection of these two to the discovery of spread spectrum was made
only in the 1990s. By that time, the influence of their work had become
entangled with various lines of classified military research. Whether Hedy
Lamarr was more a Leif Erikson than a Christopher Columbus of this new
conceptual territory, she was surely the most unlikely of its discoverers. In
1997, the Electronic Frontier Foundation honored her for her discovery; she
welcomed the award by saying, “It’s about time.” When asked about her dual
achievements, she commented, “Films have a certain place in a certain time
period. Technology is forever.” 
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Channel Capacity 
Lamarr and Antheil had stumbled on a particular way of exploiting a broad fre-
quency range—“spreading” signals across the spectrum. The theoretical founda-
tion for spread spectrum was one of the remarkable mathematical results of
Claude Shannon in the late 1940s. Although no digital telephones or radios
existed at the time, Shannon derived many of the basic laws by which they
would have to operate. The Shannon-Hartley Theorem predicted spread spec-
trum in the same way that Maxwell’s equations predicted radio waves. 
Shannon’s result (building on work by Ralph Hartley two decades earlier)
implies that “interference” is not the right concept for thinking about how much
information can be carried in the radio spectrum. Signals can overlap in fre-
quency and yet be pulled apart perfectly by sufficiently sophisticated radio
receivers. 
Early engineers assumed that communication errors were inevitable. Send
bits down a wire, or through space using radio waves, and some of them
would probably arrive incorrectly, because of noise. You could make the
channel more reliable by slowing the transmission, they supposed, in the
same way that people talk more slowly when they want to be sure that oth-
ers understand them—but you could never guarantee that a communication
was errorless. 
Shannon showed that communication channels actually behave quite dif-
ferently. Any communication channel has a certain channel capacity—a num-
ber of bits per second that it can handle. If your Internet connection is
advertised as having a bit rate of 3Mbit/sec (3 million bits per second), that
number is the channel capacity of the particular connection between you and
your Internet Service Provider (or should be—not all advertisements tell the
truth). If the connection is over telephone wiring and you switch to a service
that runs over fiber optic cables, the channel capacity should increase. 
However large it is, the channel capacity has a remarkable property, which
Shannon proved: Bits can be transmitted through the channel, from the
source to the destination, with negligible probability of error as long as the
transmission rate does not exceed the channel capacity. Any attempt to push
bits down the channel at a rate higher than the channel capacity will
inevitably result in data loss. With sufficient cleverness about the way data
from the source is encoded before it is put in the channel, the error rate can
be essentially zero, as long as the channel capacity is not exceeded. Only if
the data rate exceeds the channel capacity do transmission errors become
inevitable. 
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Power, Signal, Noise, and Bandwidth 
The capacity of a radio channel depends on the frequencies at which mes-
sages are transmitted and the amount of power used to transmit them. It’s
helpful to think about these two factors separately. 
A radio broadcast is never “at” a
single frequency. It always uses a
range or band of frequencies to con-
vey the actual sounds. The only
sound that could be carried at a sin-
gle, pure frequency would be an
unvarying tone. The bandwidth of a
broadcast is the size of the frequency
band—that is, the difference between
the top frequency and the bottom
frequency of the band. Hoover, to use
this language, allotted 10kHz of
bandwidth for each AM station. 
If you can transmit so many bits
per second with a certain amount of bandwidth, you can transmit twice that
many bits per second if you have twice as much bandwidth. The two trans-
missions could simply go on side by side, not interacting with each other in
any way. So, channel capacity is proportional to bandwidth. 
The relation to signal power is more surprising. To use simple numbers for
clarity, suppose you can transmit one bit, either 0 or 1, in one second. If you
282 BLOWN TO BITS
BANDWIDTH
Because channel capacity depends
on frequency bandwidth, the term
“bandwidth” is used informally to
mean “amount of information
communicated per second.” But
technically, bandwidth is a term
about electromagnetic communica-
tion, and even then is only one of
the factors affecting the capacity
to carry bits. 
ERRORS AND DELAYS
Although transmission errors can be made unlikely, they are never impossible.
However, errors can be made far less probable than, for example, the death
of the intended recipient in an earthquake that just happens to occur while
the bits are on their way (see the Appendix). Guaranteeing correctness
requires adding redundant bits to the message—in the same way that fragile
postal shipments are protected by adding styrofoam packing material.
Attaining data rates close to the “Shannon limit” involves pre-processing the
bits. That may increase latency—the time delay between the start of the
“packing” process and the insertion of bits into the channel. Latency can be a
problem in applications such as voice communication, where delays annoy
the communicants. Happily, phone calls don’t require error-free transmis-
sion—we are all used to putting up with a little bit of static. 
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could use more power but no more time or bandwidth, how many bits could
you transmit? 
One way a radio transmission might distinguish between 0 and 1 is for the
signals representing these two values to have different signal powers. To con-
tinue to oversimplify, assume that zero power represents 0, and a little more
power, say 1 watt, represents 1. Then to distinguish a 1 from a 0, the radio
receiver has to be sensitive enough to tell the difference between 1 watt and
0 watts. The uncontrollable noise—radio waves arriving from sunspots, for
example—also must be weak enough that it does not distort a signal repre-
senting 0 so that it is mistaken for a signal representing 1. 
Under these conditions, four times as much power would enable transmis-
sion of two bits at once, still in one second. Power level 0 could represent 00;
1 watt, 01; 2 watts, 10; and 3 watts could represent 11. Successive power
levels have to be separated by at least a watt to be sure that one signal is not
confused with another. If the power levels were closer together, the
unchanged noise might make them impossible to distinguish reliably. To
transmit three bits at a time, you’d need eight times as much power, using
levels 0 through 7 watts—that is, the amount of power needed increases expo-
nentially with the number of bits to be transmitted at once (see Figure 8.6). 
FIGURE 8.6 Shannon-Hartley. Signal levels must be far enough apart to be
distinguishable in spite of the distortion caused by noise. Tripling the bit rate
requires eight times as much power. 
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So the Shannon-Hartley result says that channel capacity depends on both
bandwidth and signal power, but more bandwidth is exponentially more valu-
able than more signal power. You’d have to get more than a thousand times
more signal power to get the same increase in channel capacity as you could
get from having just ten times more bandwidth (because 1024 = 210).
Bandwidth is precious indeed. 
One Man’s Signal Is Another Man’s Noise 
The consequences of the Shannon-Hartley result about the value of band-
width are quite astonishing. If WBZ were transmitting digitally with its 50,000
watt transmitter, it could transmit the same amount of information (over
shorter distances) using less power than a household light bulb—if it could get
100kHz of bandwidth rather than the 10kHz the FCC has allowed it. 
Of course, no station could get exclusive use of 100kHz. Even giving each
station 10kHz uses up the spectrum too quickly. The spectrum-spreading
idea works only if the spectrum is regarded as a commons. And to see the
consequences of many signals broadcasting in the same spectrum, one more
crucial insight is needed.
The power level that affects the capacity of a radio channel is not actually
the signal power, but the ratio of the signal power to the noise power—the
so-called signal-to-noise ratio. In other words, you could transmit at the same
bit rate with one watt of power as with ten—if you could also reduce the noise
by a factor of ten. And “noise” includes other people’s signals. It really
doesn’t matter whether the interference is coming from other human broad-
casts or from distant stars. All the interfering broadcasts can share the same
spectrum band, to the extent they could coexist with the equivalent amount
of noise.
A surprising consequence of
Shannon-Hartley is that there is
some channel capacity even if the
noise (including other people’s sig-
nals) is stronger than the signal.
Think of a noisy party: You can pick
out a conversation from the back-
ground noise if you focus on a single
voice, even if it is fainter than the rest of the noise. But the Shannon-Hartley
result predicts even more: The channel can transmit bits flawlessly, if slowly,
even if the noise is many times more powerful than the signal. And if you
could get a lot of bandwidth, you could drastically reduce the signal power
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A readable account of spread
spectrum radio appeared in 1998:
“Spread-Spectrum Radio” by David
R. Hughes and DeWayne Hendricks
(Scientific American, April 1998,
94–96). 
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without lowering the bit rate at all (see Figure 8.7). What would seem to be
just noise to anyone listening casually on a particular frequency would actu-
ally have a useful signal embedded within it. 
The Shannon-Hartley Theorem is a mathematician’s delight—a tease that
limits what is possible in theory and gives no advice about how to achieve it
in practice. It is like Einstein’s E = mc
2
—which at once says nothing, and
everything, about nuclear reactors and atomic bombs. Hedy Lamarr’s fre-
quency hopping was one of the spread spectrum techniques that would even-
tually be practical, but other ingenious inventions, named by odd acronyms,
would emerge in the late twentieth century. 
Two major obstacles stood between the Shannon-Hartley result and usable
spread spectrum devices. The first was engineering: computers had to become
fast, powerful, and cheap enough to process bits for transmission of high-
quality audio and video to consumers. That wouldn’t happen until the 1980s.
The other problem was regulatory. Here the problem was not mathematical or
scientific. Bureaucracies change more slowly than the technologies they
regulate. 
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FIGURE 8.7 The spread spectrum principle. The same bit rate can be achieved at
much lower power by using more bandwidth, and the signal power can even be less
than the noise. 
Spectrum Deregulated 
Today, every Starbucks has WiFi—that is, wireless Internet access. Hotel rooms,
college dormitories, and a great many households also have “wireless.” This
happened because a tiny piece of the spectrum, a slice less than a millimeter
wide in Figure 8.1, was deregulated and released for experimental use by cre-
ative engineers. It is an example of how deregulation can stimulate industrial
innovations, and about how existing spectrum owners prefer a regulatory cli-
mate that maintains their privileged position. It is a story that could be
repeated elsewhere in the spectrum, if the government makes wise decisions.
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Michael Marcus is an improbable revolutionary. An MIT-trained electrical
engineer, he spent three years as an Air Force officer during the Vietnam war,
designing communications systems for underground nuclear test detection at
a time when the ARPANET—the original, military-sponsored version of the
Internet—was first in use. After finishing active duty, he went to work at a
Pentagon think tank, exploring potential military uses of emerging commu-
nications technologies. 
In the summer of 1979, Marcus attended an Army electronic warfare work-
shop. As was typical at Army events, attendees were seated alphabetically.
Marcus’s neighbor was Steve Lukasik, the FCC’s chief scientist. Lukasik had
been Director of ARPA during the development of the ARPANET and then an
ARPANET visionary at Xerox. He came to the FCC, not generally considered
a technologically adventurous agency, because Carter administration officials
were toying with the idea that existing federal regulations might be stifling
innovation. Lukasik asked Marcus what he thought could stimulate growth
in radio communications. Marcus answered, among other things, “spread
spectrum.” His engineering was sound, but not his politics. People would not
like this idea. 
The military’s uses of spread spectrum were little known to civilians, since
the Army likes to keep its affairs secret. The FCC prohibited all civil use of
spread spectrum, since it would require, in the model the Commission had
used for decades, trespassing on spectrum bands of which incumbents had
been guaranteed exclusive use. Using lots of bandwidth, even at low power
levels, was simply not possible within FCC regulations. Lukasik invited
Marcus to join the FCC, to champion the development of spread spectrum and
other innovative technologies. That required changing the way the FCC had
worked for years. 
Shortly after the birth of the Federal Radio Commission, the U.S. plum-
meted into the worst depression it had ever experienced. In the 1970s, the FCC
was still living with the culture of the 1930s, when national economic poli-
cies benevolently reined in free-market capitalism. As a general rule, innova-
tors hate regulation, and incumbent stakeholders love it—when it protects
their established interests. In the radio world, where spectrum is a limited,
indispensable, government-controlled raw material, this dynamic can be
powerfully stifling.
Incumbents, such as existing radio and TV stations and cell phone com-
panies, have spectrum rights granted by the FCC in the past, perhaps decades
ago, and renewed almost automatically. Incumbents have no incentive to
allow use of “their” spectrum for innovations that may threaten their busi-
ness. Innovators can’t get started without a guarantee from regulators that
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they will be granted use of spectrum, since investors won’t fund businesses
reliant on resources the government controls and may decide not to provide. 
Regulators test proposals to relax their rules by inviting public comment,
and the parties they hear from most are the incumbents—who have the
resources to send teams to lobby against change. Their complaints predict
disaster if the rules are relaxed. In fact, their doomsday scenarios are often
exaggerated in the hope the regulators will exclude competition. Eventually,
the regulators lose sight of their ultimate responsibility, which is to the pub-
lic good and not to the good of the incumbents. It is just easier to leave things
alone. They can legitimately claim to be responding to what they are being
told, however biased by the huge costs of travel and lobbying. Regulatory
powers meant to prevent electromagnetic interference wind up preventing
competition instead. 
And then there is the revolving door. Most communications jobs are in the
private sector. FCC employees know that their future lies in the commercial
use of the spectrum. Hundreds of FCC staff and officials, including all eight
past FCC chairmen, have gone to work for or represented the businesses they
regulated. These movements from government to private employment violate
no government ethics rules. But FCC officials can be faced with a choice
between angering a large incumbent that is a potential employer, and disap-
pointing a marginal start-up or a public interest non-profit. It is not surpris-
ing that they remember that they will have to earn a living after leaving
the FCC. 
In 1981, Marcus and his colleagues invited comment on a proposal to
allow low-power transmission in broad frequency bands. The incumbents
who were using those bands almost universally howled. The FCC beat a
retreat and attempted, in order to break the regulatory logjam, to find fre-
quency bands where there could be few complaints about possible interfer-
ence with other uses. They hit on the idea of deregulating three “garbage
bands,” so called because they were used only for “industrial, scientific, and
medical” (ISM) purposes. Microwave ovens, for example, cook food by pum-
meling it with 2.450GHz electromagnetic radiation. There should have been
no complaints—microwave ovens were unaffected by “interference” from
radio signals, and the telecommunications industry did not use these bands.
RCA and GE complained anyway about possible low-power interference,
but their objections were determined to be exaggerated. This spectrum band
was opened to experimentation in 1985, on the proviso that frequency hop-
ping or a similar technique be used to limit interference. 
Marcus did not know what might develop, but engineers were waiting to
take advantage of the opportunity. Irwin Jacobs founded QUALCOMM a few
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months later, and by 1990, the company’s cell phone technology was in wide-
spread use, using a spread spectrum technique called CDMA. A few years
later, Apple Computer and other manufacturers agreed with the FCC on stan-
dards to use spread spectrum for radio local area networks—“wireless routers,”
for which Apple’s trademarked device is called the Airport. In 1997, when the
FCC approved the 802.11 standard and the spectrum bands were finally avail-
able for use, the press barely noticed.
Within three years, wireless network-
ing was everywhere, and virtually all
personal computers now come ready
for WiFi. 
For his efforts, Marcus was sent
into internal exile within the FCC for
seven years but emerged in the Clinton era and returned to spectrum policy
work. He is now retired and working as a consultant in the private sector. 
The success of WiFi has opened the door to discussion of more radical
spectrum-spreading proposals. The most extreme is UWB—“ultra wide band”
radio. UWB returns, in a sense, to Hertz’s sparks, splattering radiation all
across the frequencies of the radio spectrum. There are two important differ-
ences, however. First, UWB uses extremely low power—feasible because of the
very large bandwidth. Power usage is so low that UWB will not interfere with
any conventional radio receiver. And second, UWB pulses are extremely short
and precisely timed, so that the time between pulses can symbolically encode
a transmitted digital message. Even at extremely low power, which would
limit the range of UWB transmissions to a few feet, UWB has the potential to
carry vast amounts of information in short periods of time. Imagine connect-
ing your high definition TV, cable box, and DVD player without cables.
Imagine downloading your library of digital music from your living room
audio system to your car while it is parked in your garage. Imagine wireless
video phones that work better than wired audio phones. The possibilities are
endless, if the process of regulatory relaxation continues. 
What Does the Future Hold for Radio? 
In the world of radio communications, as everywhere in the digital explosion,
time has not stopped. In fact, digital communications have advanced less far
than computer movie-making or voice recognition or weather prediction,
because only in radio does the weight of federal regulation retard the explo-
sive increase in computational power. The deregulation that is possible has
only begun to happen. 
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Michael Marcus’s web site,
www.marcus-spectrum.com, has
interesting materials, and opinions,
about spectrum deregulation and
spread spectrum history. 
08_0137135599_ch08.qxd  5/2/08  1:36 PM  Page 288
What If Radios Were Smart? 
Spread spectrum is a way of making better use of the spectrum. Another
dramatic possibility comes with the recognition that ordinary radios are
extremely stupid by comparison
with what is computationally pos-
sible today. If taken back in time,
today’s radios could receive the
broadcasts of 80 years ago, and
the AM radios of 80 years ago
would work as receivers of today’s
broadcasts. To achieve such total
“backward compatibility,” a great deal of efficiency must be sacrificed. The
reason for such backward compatibility is not that many 80-year-old radios
are still in service. It’s that at any moment in time, the incumbents have a
strong interest in retaining their market share, and therefore, in lobbying
against efforts to make radios “smarter” so more stations can be accommo-
dated. 
If radios were intelligent and
active, rather than dumb and pas-
sive, vastly more information could
be made available through the air-
waves. Rather than broadcasting at
high power so that signals could
travel great distances to reach pas-
sive receivers, low-power radios
could pass signals on to each other.
A request for a particular piece of
information could be transmitted
from radio to radio, and the informa-
tion could be passed back. The radios
could cooperate with each other to
increase the information flux
received by all of them. Or multiple
weak transmitters could occasionally
synchronize to produce a single
powerful beam for long-range communication. 
Such “cooperation gains” are already being exploited in wireless sensor
networking. Small, low-power, radio-equipped computers are equipped with
sensors for temperature or seismic activity, for example. These devices can be
scattered in remote areas with hostile environments, such as the rim of a
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If radios were intelligent and
active, rather than dumb and
passive, vastly more information
could be made available through
the airwaves.
WHAT DOES “SMART” MEAN? 
“Intelligent” or “smart” radio goes
by various technical names. The
two most commonly used terms are
“software-defined radio” (SDR) and
“cognitive radio.” Software-defined
radio refers to radios capable of
being reprogrammed to change
characteristics usually implemented
in hardware today (such as whether
they recognize AM, FM, or some
other form of modulation).
Cognitive radio refers to radios that
use artificial intelligence to
increase the efficiency of their
spectrum utilization. 
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smoldering volcano, or the Antarctic nesting grounds of endangered pen-
guins. At far lower cost and greater safety than human observers could
achieve, the devices can exchange information with their neighbors and
eventually pass on a summary to a single high-power transmitter. 
There are vast opportunities to use “smart” radios to increase the number
of broadcast information options—if the regulatory stranglehold on the indus-
try can be loosened and the incentives for innovation increased.
Radios can become “smarter” in another respect. Even under the “narrow-
band” model for spectrum allocation, where one signal occupies only a small
range of frequencies, cheap computation can make a difference. The very
notion that it is the government’s job to prevent “interference,” enshrined in
legislation since the 1912 Radio Act, is now anachronistic. 
Radio waves don’t really “interfere,” the way people in a crowd interfere
with each other’s movements. The waves don’t bounce off each other; they
pass right through each other. If two different waves pass through the
antenna of a dumb old radio, neither signal can be heard clearly. 
To see what might be possible in the future, ask a man and a woman to
stand behind you, reading from different books at about the same voice level.
If you don’t focus, you will hear an incoherent jumble. But if you concentrate
on one of the voices, you can understand it and block out the other. If you
shift your focus to the other voice, you can pick that one out. This is possi-
ble because your brain performs sophisticated signal processing. It knows
something about male and female voices. It knows the English language and
tries to match the sounds it is hearing to a lexicon of word-sounds it expects
English speakers to say. Radios could do the same thing—if not today, then
soon, when computers become a bit more powerful. 
But there is a chicken-and-egg cycle. No one will buy a “smart” radio
unless there is something to listen to. No one can undertake a new form of
broadcasting without raising some capital. No investor will put up money for
a project that is dependent on uncertain deregulation decisions by the FCC.
Dumb radios and inefficient spectrum use protect the incumbents from com-
petition, so the incumbents lobby against deregulation. 
Moreover, the incumbent telecommunications and entertainment indus-
tries are among the leading contributors to congressional election campaigns.
Members of Congress often pressure the FCC to go against the public interest
and in favor of the interests of the existing stakeholders. This problem was
apparent even in the 1930s, when an early history of radio regulation stated,
“no quasi-judicial body was ever subject to so much congressional pressure
as the Federal Radio Commission.” The pattern has not changed. 
In other technologies, such as the personal computer industry, there is no
such cycle. Anyone who wants to innovate needs to raise money. Investors
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are inhibited by the quality of the
technology and the market’s
expected reaction to it—but not by
the reactions of federal regulators.
Overextended copyright protections
have chilled creativity, as was dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, but lawmakers
are to blame for that problem, not
unelected commissioners.
From cell phones to wireless
routers to keychain auto locks, wire-
less innovations are devoured by the
public, when they can be brought to market
at all. To foster innovation, the regulatory
stranglehold needs to be broken throughout
the wireless arena, including broadcast
technologies. The regulations are now the
source of the scarcity that is used to justify
the regulations!
But Do We Want the Digital Explosion? 
Technologies converge. In 1971, Anthony Oettinger foresaw the line blurring
between computing and communications. He called the emerging single tech-
nology “compunication.” Today’s computer users don’t even think about the
fact that their data is stored thousands of miles away—until their Internet
connection fails. Telephones were first connected using copper wires, and tel-
evision stations first broadcast using electromagnetic waves, but today most
telephone calls go through the air and most television signals go through
wires. 
Laws, regulations, and bureaucracies change much more slowly than the
technologies they govern. The FCC still has separate “Wireless” and “Wire-
line” bureaus. Special speech codes apply to “broadcast” radio and television,
although “broadcasting” is an engineering anachronism. 
The silo organization of the legal structures inhibits innovation in today’s
layered technologies. Regulation of the content layer should not be driven by
an outdated understanding of the engineering limits of the physical layer.
Investments made in developing the physical layer should not enable the same
companies to control the content layer. The public interest is in innovation and
efficiency; it is not in the preservation of old technologies and revolving doors
between regulators and the incumbents of the regulated industry. 
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TV, ENTERTAINMENT, AND CONGRESS
In the 2006 election campaigns,
the TV, movie, and music industries
contributed more than $12 million
to the re-election campaigns of
incumbents, more than the oil and
gas industry. The three biggest con-
tributors were Comcast Corp., Time
Warner, and the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association.
The regulations are now
the source of the scarcity
that is used to justify the
regulations!
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But if the spectrum is freed up—used vastly more efficiently than it now is,
and made available for innovative wireless inventions and far more “broad-
cast” channels—will we like the result? 
There are general economic and social benefits from innovations in wire-
less technology. Garage door openers, Wiis, and toll booth transponders do
not save lives, but wireless fire detectors and global positioning systems do.
The story of WiFi illustrates how rapidly an unforeseen technology can
become an essential piece of both business and personal infrastructure. 
But what about television and radio? Would we really be better off with a
million channels than we were in the 1950s with 13, or are today with a few
hundred on satellite and cable? Won’t this profusion of sources cause a gen-
eral lowering of content quality, and a societal splintering as de facto author-
itative information channels wither? And won’t it become impossible to keep
out the smut, which most people don’t want to see, whatever the rights of
a few? 
As a society, we simply have to confront the reality that our mindset about
radio and television is wrong. It has been shaped by decades of the scarcity
argument. That argument is now brain-dead, kept breathing on artificial life
support by institutions that gain from the speech control it rationalizes.
Without the scarcity argument, TV and radio stations become less like private
leases on public land, or even shipping lanes, and more like … books. 
There will be a period of social readjustment as television becomes more
like a library. But the staggering—even frightening—diversity of published lit-
erature is not a reason not to have libraries. To be sure, there should be deter-
mined efforts to minimize the social cost of getting the huge national
investment in old TV sets retired in favor of million-channel TV sets. But we
know how to do that sort of thing. There is always a chicken-and-egg
problem when a new technology comes along, such as FM radios or personal
computers. 
When market forces govern what gets aired, we may not be happy with the
results, however plentiful. But if what people want is assurance about what
they won’t see, then the market will develop channels without dirty words
and technologies to lock out the others. The present system stays in place
because of the enormous financial and political influence of the incumbents—
and because the government likes speech control. 
How Much Government Regulation Is Needed? 
Certainly, where words end and actions begin, people need government pro-
tection. Dr. Brinkley lost his medical license, which was right then, and would
be right today. 
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In the new wireless world, government needs to enforce the rules for spec-
trum sharing—technologies that can work only if everyone respects power
and bandwidth restraints. The government has to ensure that manufactured
devices obey the rules, and that rogues don’t violate them. The government
also has to help develop and endorse standards for “smart” radios. 
It also has the ultimate responsibility for deciding if the dire warnings of
incumbents about the risks imposed by new technologies are scientifically
valid, and if valid, of sufficiently great social importance to block the
advancement of engineering. A typical caution was the one issued in the fall
of 2007 by the National Association of Broadcasters as it rolled out a national
advertising campaign to block a new technology to locate unused parts of the
TV spectrum for Internet service: “While our friends at Intel, Google, and
Microsoft may find system errors, computer glitches, and dropped calls toler-
able, broadcasters do not.” Scientific questions about interference should be
settled by science, not by advertisements or Congressional meddling. We will
always need an independent body, like the FCC, to make these judgments
rationally and in the public interest. 
If all that happens, the scarcity problem will disappear. At that point, gov-
ernment authority over content should—and constitutionally must—drop back
to the level it is at for other non-scarce media, such as newspapers and books.
Obscenity and libel laws would remain in place for wireless communication
as for other media. So would any other lawful restrictions Congress might
adopt, perhaps for reasons of national security. 
Other regulation of broadcast words and images should end. Its legal foun-
dation survives no longer in the newly engineered world of information.
There are too many ways for the information to reach us. We need to take
responsibility for what we see, and what our children are allowed to see. And
they must be educated to live in a world of information plenty. 
There is no reason to re-establish a “Fairness Doctrine,” like that which
until 1987 required stations to present multiple points of view. If there were
more channels, the government would not have any need, or authority, to
second-guess the editorial judgment of broadcasters. Artificial spectrum
scarcity has, in the words of Justice William O. Douglas, enabled “adminis-
tration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sor-
did or its benevolent ends.” Justice Frankfurter’s claim that “there is no room
in the broadcast band for every business or school of thought” is now false. 
✷
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Bits are bits, whether they represent movies, payrolls, expletives, or poems.
Bits are bits, whether they are moved as electrons in copper wire, light pulses
in glass fiber, or modulations in radio waves. Bits are bits, whether they are
stored in gigantic data warehouses, on DVDs sent through the mail, or on
flash drives on keychains. The regulation of free speech on broadcast radio
and television is but one example of the lingering social effects of historical
accidents of technology. There are many others—in telephony, for example.
Laws and policies regulating information developed around the technologies
in which that information was embodied. 
The digital explosion has reduced all information to its lowest common
denominator, sequences of 0s and 1s. There are now adapters at all the junc-
tions in the world-wide networks of information. A telephone call, a personal
letter, and a television show all reach you
through the same mixture of media. The
bits are shunted between radio antennas,
fiber-optic switching stations, and tele-
phone wiring many times before they
reach you. 
The universality of bits gives mankind a rare opportunity. We are in a posi-
tion to decide on an overarching view of information. We can be bound in
the future by first principles, not historical contingencies. In the U.S., the dig-
ital explosion has blown away much of the technological wrapping obscur-
ing the First Amendment. Knowing that information is just bits, all societies
will be faced with stark questions about where information should be open,
where it should be controlled, and where it should be banned.
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Conclusion
After the Explosion
Bits Lighting Up the World 
In Greek mythology, Prometheus stole Zeus’s fire and brought it from
Olympus to Earth, along with the useful arts of civilization. Zeus retaliated
for Prometheus’s trickery by visiting upon humanity the ills and evils that
beset us. We have been trying to make the best of things ever since. 
The Prometheus myth is about technology. Technology, like fire, is neither
good nor bad—its value depends on how we use it. And once we start using
a technology, society itself changes. It is never the same again. 
Information technologies spark a special kind of fire. Bits are the atomic
particles of the information flames. With our information tools, we can do
things, both good and bad, that we could not have done unassisted. For bet-
ter or worse, these technologies enable us to think, reason, create, express,
debate, compromise, learn, and teach in ways never before possible. They
connect people across physical space, both in pairs and in groups. They
extend the reach of our voices and the range of our hearing. They also
amplify our capacity to frighten, harass, and hate other people, and to mis-
represent ourselves to others. They enable us to earn and to spend money
without going anywhere, and also to steal money from the comfort of our
homes. 
So central was Prometheus, the fire-bringer, to the Greek conception of
humanity that in later retellings of the myth, he is credited with creating the
human species itself. What changes to society will information technologies
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yield, in a decade or two, when the ongoing digital explosion has unimagin-
able power? 
We don’t know, of course. But if things go on changing as they are chang-
ing today, there are likely to be dramatic changes to three distinctive aspects
of human culture: our sense of personal identity and privacy, our capacity for
free speech, and the creativity that drives human progress. 
Privacy and Personhood 
As the digital explosion was beginning, the struggle over privacy seemed to
be a war. Individuals wanted to protect themselves from invasive forces.
Institutions, both corporations and government, wanted the benefit of infor-
mation that individuals would rather not reveal. 
In actual practice, things have turned out to be much more complicated. 
Technologies improved so that data gathering became easier and less
annoying. Modest incentives induced individuals to sacrifice their personal
privacy—often before they understood what they were giving up. Relatively
few people today worry about stores keeping track of their purchases. Even
without loyalty cards, a credit card swipe, together with bar code scans at the
cash register, link a customer’s name to his preferences in candy and con-
doms. You have to give up many conveniences to protect your privacy, and
most people are not willing to do it. 
The next generation may not even see the loss of privacy as a sacrifice.
Socrates said that the unexamined life was not worth living, but people who
have grown up with Gmail and MySpace may find life fully exposed to pub-
lic view simply normal. As Sun Microsystem CEO Scott McNealy quipped:
“You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”
Yet getting over it is not so simple when social interactions happen
through the computer screen. When most personal interactions were face-to-
face or over the telephone, we mistrusted people claiming to represent our
bank and trusted people we felt we had gotten to know. In the electronic
world, we do the opposite—we trust our bank’s web site with large sums of
our money, but we have to be reminded that close electronic friends may be
impostors. Where is the border for children between the personal and the
public? Will we need laws about fraudulent friendships? 
As electronic privacy becomes lost in the cloud of bits and caution gives
way to social networking, what societal structures will break down? What
will evolve to replace them? Society as we know it functions because of a web
of trusting relationships between parties who are independently responsible
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for their own actions. What will replace that if the concept of personal iden-
tity becomes meaningless? Will the very notions of privacy and identity be
destroyed in the explosion? 
What Can We Say, and Who Will Be Listening? 
The digital explosion revolutionizes human communication. Earlier technolo-
gies for disseminating text, spoken words, and images also changed the
world—but all included choke points. A million eyes might read your book,
but only if you could get it published. You might discover a scandal that
would bring down a government,
but only if you could get a newspa-
per to expose it to public view. A
million ears might hear your
speeches, but only if you could con-
trol a radio station. 
No longer are speakers bound by
the whims of those who control the
loudspeakers and printing presses.
In the U.S., anyone can say any-
thing, without permission from
church or state, and be audible to
millions. No one has to listen, but it
is easy to put the message where
millions can hear it. 
And yet there is a cost. Not a financial cost—web sites are cheap, and email
is even cheaper. The cost is that the speaker relies on many intermediaries to
handle the messages, and so there are many opportunities for eavesdropping,
filtering, and censoring. The choke points have multiplied and become more
diffuse, but they have not disappeared. The very technological miracles that
have created the communication revolution have also created a big-brother
revolution. With speech recognition and language understanding improving
every year, we have to expect that, before long, every email, telephone call,
blog, and television show may be monitored by the technological equivalent
of a human listener. Machines will be waiting attentively for someone to say
the “wrong” thing—whatever that is deemed to be. 
Governments eavesdrop to protect national security, political opposition,
and public morality. Communication companies want to listen to what their
networks are being used for, so that they can tailor their service to the
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content in the most profitable way—a soft form of corporate censorship, in
which unwanted communications are slowed down or made costly. Service
providers want to listen in so they can add advertising to the content they
deliver. 
In spite of the unimaginable expansion of communications over the past
quarter-century, the jury is still out on whether speech will be freer or less
free in the future than it was in the
past, even in the U.S. with its uncom-
promising First Amendment. And like
the tree falling in the forest, of what
use will free speech be if no one is lis-
tening? The dramatic pluralism of our
information sources threatens to cre-
ate a society where no one learns
anything from people with whom
they disagree. It is simply too easy for
people to decide whom they want to hear and to ignore everyone else. Will
the digital explosion in fact make information more limited? 
A Creative Explosion, or a Legal Explosion? 
In the same letter quoted in Chapter 1 Thomas Jefferson wrote, He who
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine;
as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. Will
the digital explosion be used to enlighten the world, or to create illusions and
to blind us to the truth? 
The digital explosion has started a legal revolution. In the past, teenagers
were not routinely threatened with federal criminal charges. Today, such
warnings about downloading music and movies are commonplace. In the
past, if a political advertisement included a few seconds of video of a candi-
date debating his opponents, he did not fear the wrath of the television net-
work that broadcast the debate. But Fox News Channel went after John
McCain in the fall of 2007 for doing exactly that. If you want to silence your
critics under the new legal regime, you may threaten to sue them simply for
showing that you said something. That’s what Uri Geller, the “paranormalist,”
did when prominent skeptic James Randi debunked Geller’s powers in a
YouTube clip that included eight seconds of Geller’s activities. Even univer-
sities misuse copyright law to stanch the flow of information. A widely
reported public statement by Harvard’s president (Figure 4.3) could not be
shown in this book because the university denied the publisher’s request to
print it.
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Patent and copyright laws in the U.S. were designed to promote individual
creativity in the interest of the progress of society. The law struck a balance
between providing financial incentive to the creator and high social benefit
to the population at large. The term for which artists and inventors main-
tained exclusive control over their creations was designed to be long enough
to provide a financial return and short enough to provide an incentive for
continued creativity. And  there was a high threshold on what could be pro-
tected at all, so that the system did not encourage lawyerly inventiveness
rather than artistic and engineering creativity. 
As mechanical tools have been supplanted by information-processing tools,
and all manner of writing, music, and art have gone digital, the rules of the
game have changed. The parties who receive the strongest protections are now
major corporations, rather than the original creators or the ultimate con-
sumers. At a time where information technology promises disintermediation—
getting rid of the middle-man—those middle-men are becoming more
powerful, not less. 
The legal power of the powerful intermediaries, protecting their economic
interests, has increased at the same time as new technologies have empow-
ered the creators to reach their consumers directly. 
Similar tensions are visible in the world of invention. The antitrust actions
against Microsoft by the European Union stem from a fear that a software
monopoly will stifle the creativity that might be shown by other software
creators, were they able to survive. The power of the incumbent radio and tel-
evision broadcast industries to exclude newcomers from the airwaves
restrains both speech and invention, limiting radio communications and
keeping useful devices off the market. 
Will the United States move toward being an information democracy or an
information oligarchy? Whose hands will be on the controls that regulate the
way we produce and use bits in the future? 
A Few Bits in Conclusion 
The worldwide bits explosion is lighting up the world (see Figure C.1). Most
of the illumination today is in Europe and North America, but it is growing
brighter almost everywhere. There is no physical reason it can’t continue to
grow. Bits are not like oil or coal. They take almost no raw materials to pro-
duce, and only tiny amounts of electricity. They flow through glass fibers in
astonishing numbers, and they radiate through space, over short distances
and long. With our cameras and computers, we produce them at will, in unin-
telligibly larger numbers every year. Existing dark spots—North Korea, for
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Chris Harrison, Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
www.chrisharrison.net/projects/InternetMap/high/worldBlack.png.
FIGURE C.1 A map of the world, showing the number of Internet connections
between routers. At present, the U.S. and Europe are heavily interconnected. If the
volume of data transmissions were depicted instead (giving more prominence, for
example, to areas with heavily used Internet cafés), Africa, Asia, and South America
might show more prominently. 
The explosion happened through technological inventions supported by
political and economic freedoms. Gutenberg laid the foundation when he
invented the printing press, and Morse’s telegraph, Bell’s telephone, and
Edison’s phonograph were all precursors. Claude Shannon was the bits
Prometheus. After the Second World War, his mathematical insights lit the
flame of communication and computing technologies, which have now illu-
minated the earth with bits. 
The bits explosion is not over. We are in the middle of it. But we don’t
know whether it will be destructive or enlightening. The time for deciding
who will control the explosion may soon be past. Bits are still a new phenom-
enon—a new natural resource whose regulatory structures and corporate
ownership are still up for grabs. The legal and economic decisions being made
today, not just about bits but about everything that depends on bits, will
determine how our descendants will lead their lives. The way the bits illumi-
nate or distort the world will shape the future of humanity.
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example—may remain black for a time, but eventually even these regions may
glow brighter. And all that data and thought-stuff, all those atoms of light,
can be captured and stored on disk for eternity. 
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This Appendix explains how the Internet works and summarizes some larger
lessons of its remarkable success.
The Internet as a Communication System
The Internet is not email and web pages and digital photographs, any more
than the postal service is magazines and packages and letters from your Aunt
Mary. And the Internet is not a bunch of wires and cables, any more than the
postal service is a bunch of trucks and airplanes. The Internet is a system, a
delivery service for bits, whatever the bits represent and however they get
from one place to another. It’s important to know how it works, in order to
understand why it works so well and why it can be used for so many differ-
ent purposes. 
Packet Switching 
Suppose you send an email to Sam, and it goes through a computer in
Kalamazoo—an Internet router, as the machines connecting the Internet
together are known. Your computer and Sam’s know it’s an email, but the
router in Kalamazoo just knows that it’s handling bits. 
Your message almost certainly goes through some copper wires, but prob-
ably also travels as light pulses through fiber optic cables, which carry lots of
bits at very high speeds. It may also go through the air by radio—for example,
if it is destined for your cell phone. The physical infrastructure for the Internet
is owned by many different parties—including telecommunications firms in the
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U.S. and governments in some countries. The Internet works not because any-
one is in charge of the whole thing, but because these parties agree on what
to expect as messages are passed from one to another. As the name suggests,
the Internet is really a set of standards for interconnecting networks. The indi-
vidual networks can behave as they wish, as long as they follow established
conventions when they send bits out or bring bits in. 
In the 1970s, the designers of the Internet faced momentous choices. One
critical decision had to do with message sizes. The postal service imposes size
and weight limits on what it will handle. You can’t send your Aunt Mary a
two-ton package by taking it to the Post Office. Would there also be a limit
on the size of the messages that could be sent through the Internet? The
designers anticipated that very large messages might be important some day,
and found a way to avoid any size limits. 
A second critical decision was about the very nature of the network. The
obvious idea, which was rejected, was to create a “circuit-switched” network.
Early telephone systems were completely circuit-switched. Each customer was
connected by a pair of wires to a central switch. To complete a call from you
to your Aunt Mary, the switch would be set to connect the wires from you to
the wires from Aunt Mary, establishing a complete electrical loop between you
and Mary for as long as the switch was set that way. The size of the switch
limited the number of calls such a system could handle. Handling more simul-
taneous calls required building bigger switches. A circuit-switched network
provides reliable, uninterruptible connections—at a high cost per connection.
Most of the switching hardware is doing very little most of the time. 
So the early Internet engineers needed to allow messages of unlimited size.
They also needed to ensure that the capacity of the network would be limited
only by the amount of data traffic, rather than by the number of intercon-
nected computers. To meet both objectives, they designed a packet-switched
network. The unit of information traveling over the Internet is a packet of
about 1500 bytes or less—roughly the amount of text you might be able to
put on a postcard. Any communications longer than that are broken up into
multiple packets, with serial numbers so that the packets can be reassembled
upon arrival to put the original message back together. 
The packets that constitute a message need not travel through the Internet
following the same route, nor arrive in the same order in which they were
sent. It is very much as though the postal service would deliver only post-
cards with a maximum of 1500 characters as a message. You could send War
and Peace, using thousands of postcards. You could even send a complete
description of a photograph on postcards, by splitting the image into thou-
sands of rows and columns and listing on each postcard a row number, a col-
umn number, and the color of the little square at that position. The recipient
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could, in principle, reconstruct the picture after receiving all the postcards.
What makes the Internet work in practice is the incredible speed at which the
data packets are transmitted, and the processing power of the sending and
receiving computers, which can disassemble and reassemble the messages so
quickly and flawlessly that users don’t even notice. 
Core and Edge 
We can think of the ordinary postal system as having a core and an edge—the
edge is what we see directly, the mailboxes and letter carriers, and the core is
everything behind the edge that makes the system work. The Internet also has
a core and an edge. The edge is made up of the machines that interface
directly with the end users—for example, your computer and mine. The core
of the Internet is all the connectivity that makes the Internet a network. It
includes the computers owned by the telecommunications companies that
pass the messages along. 
An Internet Service Provider or ISP is any computer that provides access
to the Internet, or provides the functions that enable different parts of the
Internet to connect to each other. Sometimes the organizations that run those
computers are also called ISPs. Your ISP at home is likely your telephone or
cable company, though if you live in a rural area, it might be a company pro-
viding Internet services by satellite. Universities and big companies are their
own ISPs. The “service” may be to convey messages between computers deep
within the core of the Internet, passing messages until they reach their desti-
nation. In the United States alone, there are thousands of ISPs, and the sys-
tem works as a whole because they cooperate with each other. 
Fundamentally, the Internet consists of computers sending bit packets that
request services, and other computers sending packets back in response. Other
metaphors can be helpful, but the service metaphor is close to the truth. For
example, you don’t really “visit” the web page of a store, like a voyeuristic
tourist peeking through the store window. Your computer makes a very spe-
cific request of the store’s web server, and the store’s web server responds to
it—and may well keep a record of exactly what you asked for, adding the new
information about your interests to the record it already has from your other
“visits.” Your “visits” leave fingerprints! 
IP Addresses 
Packets can be directed to their destination because they are labeled with an
IP address, which is a sequence of four numbers, each between 0 and 255.
(The numbers from 0 to 255 correspond to the various sequences of 8 bits,
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from 00000000 to 11111111, so IP addresses are really 32 bits long. “IP” is an
abbreviation for “Internet Protocol,” explained next.) A typical IP address is
66.82.9.88. Blocks of IP addresses are assigned to ISPs, which in turn assign
them to their customers.
There are 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 possible IP addresses, or about 4 billion.
In the pre-miniaturization days when the Internet was designed, that seemed
an absurdly large number—enough so every computer could have its own IP
address, even if every person on the planet had his or her own computer.
Figure A.1 shows the 13 computers that made up the entire network in 1970.
As a result of miniaturization and the inclusion of cell phones and other small
devices, the number of Internet devices is already in the hundreds of millions
(see Figure A.2), and it seems likely that there will not be enough IP addresses
for the long run. A project is underway to deploy a new version of IP in
which the size of IP addresses increases from 32 bits to 128—and then the
number of IP addresses will be a 3 followed by 38 zeroes! That’s about ten
million for every bacterium on earth. 
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Source: Heart, F., McKenzie, A., McQuillian, J., and Walden, D., ARPANET Completion Report, Bolt,
Beranek and Newman, Burlington, MA, January 4, 1978.
FIGURE A.1 The 13 interconnected computers of the December, 1970 ARPANET
(as the Internet was first known). The interconnected machines were located at the
University of California campuses at Santa Barbara and at Los Angeles, the Stanford
Research Institute, Stanford University, Systems Development Corporation, the RAND
Corporation, the University of Utah, Case Western Reserve University, Carnegie
Mellon University, Lincoln Labs, MIT, Harvard, and Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc. 
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Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image: Internet_map_1024.jpg. This work is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.
FIGURE A.2 Traffic flows within a small part of the Internet as it exists today. Each
line is drawn between two IP addresses of the network. The length of a line indicates
the time delay for messages between those two nodes. Thousands of cross-
connections are omitted. 
An important piece of the Internet infrastructure are the Domain Name
Servers, which are computers loaded with information about which IP
addresses correspond to which “domain names” such as harvard.edu,
verizon.com, gmail.com, yahoo.fr (the suffix in this case is the country code
for France), and mass.gov. So when your computer sends an email or requests
a web page, the translation of domain names into IP addresses takes place
before the message enters the core of the Internet. The routers don’t know
about domain names; they need only pass the packets along toward their des-
tination IP address numbers. 
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IP ADDRESSES AND CRIMES
The recording industry identifies unlawful music downloads by the IP
addresses to which the bits are sent. But an IP address is rarely the exclusive
property of an individual, so it is hard to be sure who is doing the down-
loading. A provider of residential Internet service allocates an address to a
home only temporarily. When the connection becomes inactive, the address
is reclaimed so someone else can use it. If NAT is in use or if many people
use the same wireless router, it can be impossible to establish reliably who
exactly used an IP address. If you don’t activate the security on your home
wireless router, neighbors who poach your home network signal may get
you in serious trouble by their illegal downloads! 
An enterprise that manages its own network can connect to the Internet
through a single gateway computer, using only a single IP address. Packets
are tagged with a few more bits, called a “port” number, so that the gateway
can route responses back to the same computer within the private network.
This process, called Network Address Translation or NAT, conserves IP
addresses. NAT also makes it impossible for “outside” computers to know
which computer actually made the request—only the gateway knows which
port corresponds to which computer. 
The Key to It All: Passing Packets 
At heart, all the core of the Internet does is to transmit packets. Each router
has several links connecting it to other routers or to the “edge” of the net-
work. When a packet comes in on a link, the router very quickly looks at the
destination IP address, decides which outgoing link to use based on a limited
Internet “map” it holds, and sends the packet on its way. The router has some
memory, called a buffer, which it uses to store packets temporarily if they are
arriving faster than they can be processed and dispatched. If the buffer fills
up, the router just discards incoming packets that it can’t hold, leaving other
parts of the system to cope with the data loss if they choose to. 
Packets also include some redundant bits to aid error detection. To give a
simple analogy, suppose Alice wants to guard against a character being
smudged or altered on a post card while it is in transit. Alice could add to the
text on the card a sequence of 26 bits—indicating whether the text she has
put on the card has an even or odd number of As, Bs, …, and Zs. Bob can
check whether the card seems to be valid by comparing his own reckoning
with the 26-bit “fingerprint” already on the card. In the Internet, all the
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routers do a similar integrity check on data packets. Routers discard packets
found to have been damaged in transit. 
The format for data packets—which bits represent the IP address and other
information about the packet, and which bits are the message itself—is part
of the Internet Protocol, or IP. Everything that flows through the Internet—
web pages, emails, movies, VoIP telephone calls—is broken down into data
packets. Ordinarily, all packets are handled in exactly the same way by the
routers and other devices built around IP. IP is a “best effort” packet delivery
protocol. A router implementing IP tries to pass packets along, but makes no
guarantees. Yet guaranteed delivery is possible within the network as a
whole—because other protocols are layered on top of IP. 
Protocols 
A “protocol” is a standard for communicating messages between networked
computers. The term derives from its meaning in diplomacy. A diplomatic
protocol is an agreement aiding in communications between mutually mis-
trustful parties—parties who do not report to any common authority who can
control their behavior. Networked computers are in something of the same
situation of both cooperation and mistrust. There is no one controlling the
Internet as a whole. Any computer can join the global exchange of informa-
tion, simply by interconnecting physically and then following the network
protocols about how bits are inserted into and extracted from the communi-
cation links. 
The fact that packets can get discarded, or “dropped” as the phrase goes,
might lead you to think that an email put into the network might never
arrive. Indeed emails can get lost, but when it happens, it is almost always
because of a problem with an ISP or a personal computer, not because of a
network failure. The computers at the edge of the network use a higher-level
protocol to deliver messages reliably, even though the delivery of individual
packets within the network may be unreliable. That higher-level protocol is
called “Transport Control Protocol,” or TCP, and one often hears about it in
conjunction with IP as “TCP/IP.” 
To get a general idea of how TCP works, imagine that Alice wants to send
Bob the entire text of War and Peace on postcards, which are serial numbered
so Bob can reassemble them in the right order even if they arrive out of order.
Postcards sometimes go missing, so Alice keeps a copy of every postcard she
puts in the mail. She doesn’t discard her copy of a postcard until she has
received word back from Bob declaring that he has received Alice’s postcard.
Bob sends that word back on a postcard of his own, including the serial num-
ber of Alice’s card so Alice knows which card is being confirmed. Of course,
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Bob’s confirming postcards may get lost too, so Alice keeps track of when she
sent her postcards. If she doesn’t hear anything back from Bob within a cer-
tain amount of time, she sends a duplicate postcard. At this point, it starts
getting complicated: Bob has to know enough to ignore duplicates, in case it
was his acknowledgment rather than Alice’s original message that got lost.
But it all can be made to work! 
TCP works the same way on the Internet, except that the speed at which
packets are zipping through the network is extremely fast. The net result is
that email software using TCP is failsafe: If the bits arrive at all, they will be
a perfect duplicate of those that were sent. 
TCP is not the only high-level protocol that relies on IP for packet deliv-
ery. For “live” applications such as streaming video and VoIP telephone calls,
there is no point in waiting for retransmissions of dropped packets. So for
these applications, the packets are just put in the Internet and sent on their
way, with no provision made for data loss. That higher-level protocol is called
UDP, and there are others as well, all relying on IP to do the dirty work of
routing packets to their destination. 
The postal service provides a rough analogy of the difference between
higher-level and lower-level protocols. The same trucks and airplanes are
used for carrying first-class mail, priority mail, junk mail, and express mail.
The loading and unloading of mail bags onto the transport vehicles follow a
low-level protocol. The handling between receipt at the post office and load-
ing onto the transport vehicles, and between unloading and delivery, follows
a variety of higher-level protocols, according to the kind of service that has
been purchased. 
In addition to the way it can be used to support a variety of higher-level
protocols, IP is general in another way. It is not bound to any particular phys-
ical medium. IP can run over copper
wire, radio signals, and fiber optic
cables—in principle, even carrier
pigeons. All that is required is the
ability to deliver bit packets, includ-
ing both the payload and the
addressing and other “packaging,” to
switches that can carry out the
essential routing operation. 
There is a separate set of “lower-
level protocols” that stipulate how
bits are to be represented—for exam-
ple, as radio waves, or light pulses in
optic fibers. IP is doubly general, in
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IP OVER CARRIER PIGEON
You can look up RFC 1149 and RFC
2549 on the Web, “Standard for the
Transmission of IP Datagrams on
Avian Carriers” and “IP over Avian
Carriers with Quality of Service.”
They faithfully follow the form of
true Internet standards, though the
authors wrote them with tongue
firmly planted in cheek, demurely
stating, “This is an experimental,
not recommended standard.” 
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that it can take its bit packets from many different physical substrates, and
deliver those packets for use by many different higher-level services. 
The Reliability of the Internet 
The Internet is remarkably reliable. There are no “single points of failure.” If a
cable breaks or a computer catches on fire, the protocols automatically reroute
the packets around the inoperative links. So when Hurricane Katrina sub-
merged New Orleans in 2005, Internet routers had packets bypass the city. Of
course, no messages destined for New Orleans itself could be delivered there. 
In spite of the redundancy of interconnections, if enough links are broken,
parts of the Internet may become inaccessible to other parts. On December 26,
2006, the Henchung earthquake severed several major communication cables
that ran across the floor of the South China Sea. The Asian financial markets
were severely affected for a few days, as traffic into and out of Taiwan, China,
and Hong Kong was cut off or severely reduced. There were reports that the
volume of spam reaching the U.S. also dropped for a few days, until the
cables were repaired! 
Although the Internet core is reliable, the computers on the edge typically
have only a single connection to the core, creating single points of failure.
For example, you will lose your home Internet service if your phone company
provides the service and a passing truck pulls down the wire connecting your
house to the telephone pole. Some big companies connect their internal net-
work to the Internet through two different service providers—a costly form of
redundancy, but a wise investment if the business could not survive a service
disruption. 
The Internet Spirit 
The extraordinary growth of the Internet, and its passage from a military and
academic technology to a massive replacement for both paper mail and tele-
phones, has inspired reverence for some of its fundamental design virtues.
Internet principles have gained status as important truths about communica-
tion, free expression, and all manner of engineering design. 
The Hourglass 
The standard electric outlet is a universal interface between power plants and
electric appliances. There is no need for people to know whether their power
is coming from a waterfall, a solar cell, or a nuclear plant, if all they want to
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do is to plug in their appliances and run their household. And the same elec-
tric outlet can be used for toasters, radios, and vacuum cleaners. Moreover, it
will instantly become usable for the next great appliance that gets invented,
as long as that device comes with a standard household electric plug. The
electric company doesn’t even care if you are using its electricity to do bad
things, as long as you pay its bills. 
The outlet design is at the neck of a conceptual hourglass through which
electricity flows, connecting multiple possible power sources on one side of
the neck to multiple possible electricity-using devices on the other. New
inventions need only accommodate what the neck expects—power plants
need to supply 115V AC current to the outlet, and new appliances need plugs
so they can use the current coming from the outlet. Imagine how inefficient
it would be if your house had to be rewired in order to accommodate new
appliances, or if different kinds of power plants required different household
wiring. Anyone who has tried to transport an electric appliance between the
U.S. and the U.K. knows that electric appliances are less universal than
Internet packets.
The Internet architecture is also conceptually organized like an hourglass
(see Figure A.3), with the ubiquitous Internet Protocol at the neck, defining
the form of the bit packets carried through the network. A variety of higher-
level protocols use bit packets to achieve different purposes. In the words of
the report that proposed the hourglass metaphor, “the minimal required ele-
ments [IP] appear at the narrowest point, and an ever-increasing set of
choices fills the wider top and bottom, underscoring how little the Internet
itself demands of its service providers and users.”
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FIGURE A.3 The Internet protocol hourglass (simplified). Each protocol interfaces
only to those in the layers immediately above and below it, and all data is turned
into IP bit packets in order to pass from an application to one of the physical media
that make up the network. 
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For example, TCP guarantees reliable though possibly delayed message
delivery, and UDP provides timely but unreliable message delivery. All the
higher-level protocols rely on IP to deliver packets. Once the packets get into
the neck of the hourglass, they are handled identically, regardless of the
higher-level protocol that produced them. TCP and UDP are in turn utilized
by even higher-level protocols, such as HTTP (“HyperText Transport
Protocol”), which is used for sending and receiving web pages, and SMTP
(“Simple Mail Transport Protocol”), which is used for sending email.
Application software, such as web browsers, email clients, and VoIP software,
sit at a yet higher level, utilizing the protocols at the layer below and uncon-
cerned with how those protocols do their job. 
Below the IP layer are various physical protocol layers. Because IP is a uni-
versal protocol at the neck, applications (above the neck) can accommodate
various possible physical implementations (below the neck). For example,
when the first wireless IP devices became available, long after the general
structure of the Internet hourglass was firmly in place, nothing above the
neck had to change. Email, which had previously been delivered over copper
wires and glass fibers, was immediately delivered over radio waves such as
those sent and received by the newly developed household wireless routers. 
Governments, media firms, and communication companies sometimes wish
that IP worked differently, so they could more easily filter out certain kinds of
content and give others priority service. But the universality of IP, and the
many unexpected uses to which it
has given birth, argue against such
proposals to re-engineer the Internet.
As information technology consult-
ant Scott Bradner wrote, “We have
the Internet that we have today
because the Internet of yesterday did
not focus on the today of yesterday.
Instead, Internet technology devel-
opers and ISPs focused on flexibility,
thus enabling whatever future was
coming.”
Indeed, the entire social structure
in which Internet protocols evolved
prevented special interests from gain-
ing too much power or building their
pet features into the Internet infra-
structure. Protocols were adopted by
a working group called the Internet
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THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—
AND HOW TO STOP IT
This excellent book by Jonathan
Zittrain (Yale University Press and
Penguin UK, 2008) sees the vulner-
abilities of the Internet—rapidly
spreading viruses, and crippling
attacks on major servers—as conse-
quences of its essential openness,
its capacity to support new inven-
tions—what Zittrain calls its
“generativity.” The book reflects on
whether society will be driven to
use a network of less-flexible
“appliances” in the future to avoid
the downsides of the Internet’s
wonderfully creative malleability. 
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Engineering Task Force (IETF), which made its decisions by rough consensus,
not by voting. The members met face to face and hummed to signify their
approval, so the aggregate sense of the group would be public and individual
opinions could be reasonably private—but no change, enhancement, or feature
could be adopted by a narrow majority. 
The larger lesson is the importance of minimalist, well-selected, open stan-
dards in the design of any system that is to be widely disseminated and is to
stimulate creativity and unforeseen uses. Standards, although they are merely
conventions, give rise to vast innovation, if they are well chosen, spare, and
widely adopted. 
Layers, Not Silos 
Internet functionality could, in theory, have been provided in many other
ways. Suppose, for example, that a company had set out just to deliver elec-
tronic mail to homes and offices. It could have brought in special wiring, both
economical and perfect for the data rates needed to deliver email. It could
have engineered special switches, perfect for routing email. And it could have
built the ideal email software, optimized to work perfectly with the special
switches and wires. 
Another group might have set out to deliver movies. Movies require higher
data rates, which might better be served by the use of different, specialized
switches. An entirely separate network might have been developed for that.
Another group might have conceived something like the Web, and have tried
to convince ordinary people to install yet a third set of cables in their homes. 
The magic of the hourglass structure is not just the flexibility provided by
the neck of the bottle. It’s the logical isolation of the upper layers from the
lower. Inventive people working in the upper layers can rely on the guaran-
tees provided by the clever people working at the lower layers, without know-
ing much about how those lower layers work. Instead of multiple, parallel
vertical structures—self-contained silos—the right way to engineer informa-
tion is in layers. 
And yet we live in an information economy still trapped, legally and polit-
ically, in historical silos. There are special rules for telephones, cable services,
and radio. The medium determines the rules. Look at the names of the main
divisions of the Federal Communications Commission: Wireless, wireline, and
so on. Yet the technologies have converged. Telephone calls go over the
Internet, with all its variety of physical infrastructure. The bits that make up
telephone calls are no different from the bits that make up movies. 
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Laws and regulations should respect layers, not the increasingly meaning-
less silos—a principle at the heart of the argument about broadcast regulation
presented in Chapter 8.
End to End 
“End to End,” in the Internet, means that the switches making up the core of
the network should be dumb—optimized to carry out their single limited func-
tion of passing packets. Any functionality requiring more “thinking” than
that should be the responsibility of the more powerful computers at the edge
of the network. For example, Internet protocols could have been designed so
that routers would try much harder to ensure that packets do not get dropped
on any link. There could have been
special codes for packets that got
special, high-priority handling, like
“Priority Mail” in the U.S. Postal
Service. There could have been spe-
cial codes for encrypting and
decrypting packets at certain stages
to provide secrecy, say when packets
crossed national borders. There are a
lot of things that routers might have
done. But it was better, from an
engineering standpoint, to have the
core of the network do the minimum
that would enable those more com-
plex functions to be carried out at
the edge. One main reason is that
this makes it more likely that new
applications can be added without
having to change the core—any
operations that are application-
specific will be handled at the edges.
This approach has been staggeringly successful, as illustrated by today’s
amazing array of Internet applications that the original network designers
never anticipated. 
Separate Content and Carrier 
The closest thing to the Internet that existed in the nineteenth century was
the telegraph. It was an important technology for only a few decades. It put
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STUPID NETWORKS
Another way to understand the
Internet’s end-to-end philosophy is
to realize that if the computers are
powerful at the edge of the net-
work, the network itself can be
“stupid,” just delivering packets
where the packets themselves say
they want to go. Contrast this with
the old telephone network, in
which the devices at the edge of
the network were stupid tele-
phones, so to provide good service,
the switching equipment in the
telephone office had to be intelli-
gent, routing telephone signals
to where the network said they
should go.
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the Pony Express out of business,
and was all but put out of business
itself by the telephone. And it didn’t
get off to a fast start; at first, a ser-
vice to deliver messages quickly did-
n’t seem all that valuable. 
One of the first big users of the
telegraph was the Associated Press—
one of the original “wire services.”
News is, of course, more valuable if
it arrives quickly, so the telegraph
was a valuable tool for the AP.
Recognizing that, the AP realized
that its competitive position, relative
to other press services, would be
enhanced to the extent it could keep
the telegraph to itself. So it signed
an exclusive contract with Western Union, the telegraph monopoly. The con-
tract gave the AP favorable pricing on the use of the wires. Other press ser-
vices were priced out of the use of the “carrier.” And as a result, the AP got
a lock on news distribution so strong that it threatened the functioning of the
American democracy. It passed the news about politicians it liked and omit-
ted mention of those it did not.
Freedom of the press existed in the-
ory, but not in practice, because the
content industry controlled the
carrier. 
Today’s version of this morality
play is the debate over “net neutral-
ity.” Providers of Internet backbone
services would benefit from provid-
ing different pricing and different
service guarantees to preferred cus-
tomers. After all, they might argue,
even the Postal Service recognizes
the advantages of providing better
service to customers who are willing
to pay more. But what if a movie
studio buys an ISP, and then gets
creative with its pricing and service
structure? You might discover that
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THE VICTORIAN INTERNET
That is the title of an excellent
short book by Tom Standage
(Berkley Books, 1999), making the
argument that many of the social
consequences of the Internet were
seen during the growth of the tele-
graph. The content-carrier conflict
is only one. On a less-serious level,
the author notes that the tele-
graph, like the Internet, was used
for playing games at a distance
almost from the day it came into
being. 
MORE ON INFORMATION FREEDOM
The SaveTheInternet.com Coalition
is a pluralistic group dedicated to
net neutrality and Internet freedom
more generally. Its member organi-
zations run the gamut from the
Gun Owners of America, to
MoveOn.org, to the Christian
Coalition, to the Feminist Majority.
Its web site includes a blog and a
great many links. The blog of
law professor Susan Crawford,
scrawford.net/blog, comments
on many aspects of digital infor-
mation freedom, and also has a
long list of links to other blogs. 
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your movie downloads are far cheaper to watch, or arrive at your home look-
ing and sounding much better, if they happen to be the product of the parent
content company. 
Or what if a service provider decides it just doesn’t like a particular cus-
tomer, as Verizon decided about Naral? Or what if an ISP finds that its cus-
tomer is taking advantage of its service deal in ways that the provider did not
anticipate? Are there any protections for the customer? 
In the Internet world, consider the clever but deceptive scheme imple-
mented by Comcast in 2007. This ISP promised customers unlimited band-
width, but then altered the packets it was handling to slow down certain data
transmissions. It peeked at the packets and altered those that had been gen-
erated by certain higher-level protocols commonly (but not exclusively) used
for downloading and uploading movies. The end-user computer receiving
these altered packets did not realize they had been altered in transit, and
obeyed the instruction they contained, inserted in transit by Comcast, to
restart the transmission from scratch. The result was to make certain data ser-
vices run very slowly, without informing the customers. In a net neutrality
world, this could not happen; Comcast would be a packet delivery service,
and not entitled to choose which packets it would deliver promptly or to alter
the packets while handing them on. 
In early 2008, AT&T announced that it was considering a more direct vio-
lation of net neutrality: examining packets flowing through its networks to
filter out illegal movie and music downloads. It was as though the electric
utility announced it might cut off the power to your DVD player if it sensed
that you were playing a bootleg movie. A content provider suggested that
AT&T intended to make its content business more profitable by using its
carrier service to enforce copyright restrictions. In other words, the idea was
perhaps that people would be more likely to buy movies from AT&T the con-
tent company if AT&T the carrier refused to deliver illegally obtained movies.
Of course, any technology designed to detect bits illegally flowing into pri-
vate residences could be adapted, by either governments or the carriers, for
many other purposes. Once the carriers inspect the bits you are receiving into
your home, these private businesses could use that power in other ways: to
conduct surveillance, enforce laws, and impose their morality on their cus-
tomers. Just imagine Federal Express opening your mail in transit and decid-
ing for itself which letters and parcels you should receive! 
Clean Interfaces 
The electric plug is the interface between an electric device and the power
grid. Such standardized interfaces promote invention and efficiency. In the
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Internet world, the interfaces are the connections between the protocol
layers—for example, what TCP expects of IP when it passes packets into the
core, and what IP promises to do for TCP. 
In designing information systems, there is always a temptation to make the
interface a little more complicated in order to achieve some special function-
ality—typically, a faster data rate for certain purposes. Experience has shown
repeatedly, however, that computer programming is hard, and the gains in
speed from more complex interfaces are not worth the cost in longer devel-
opment and debugging time. And Moore’s Law is always on the side of sim-
plicity anyway: Just wait, and a cruder design will become as fast as the more
complicated one might have been. 
Even more important is that the interfaces be widely accepted standards.
Internet standards are adopted through a remarkable process of consensus-
building, nonhierarchical in the extreme. The standards themselves are
referred to as RFCs, “Requests for Comment.” Someone posts a proposal, and
a cycle of comment and revision, of
buy-in and objection, eventually
converges on something useful, if
not universally regarded as perfect.
All the players know they have more
to gain by accepting the standard
and engineering their products and
services to meet it than by trying to
act alone. The Internet is an object
lesson in creative compromise pro-
ducing competitive energy. 
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RFCS AND STANDARDS
The archive of RFCs creates a his-
tory of the Internet. It is open for
all to see—just use your favorite
search engine. All the Internet
standards are RFCs, although not
all RFCs are standards. Indeed, in a
whimsically reflexive explanation,
“Not all RFCs are standards” is
RFC 1796. 
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